


J. K. ZAWODNY

Man and International Relations:
VOLUME I: CONFLICT

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Volume I: CONFLICT



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Man and International Relations

*Contributions of the Social Sciences to the
Study of Conflict and Integration*

J. K. Zawodny

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

WITH THE EDITORIAL ASSISTANCE OF

Aina Z. B. Kruger

FOREWORD BY

Ernest R. Hilgard

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Volume I: CONFLICT



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To my mother and sister,
two noble hearts, who did not surrender
human dignity in a concentration camp.



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Foreword

ERNEST R. HILGARD

We have come a long way since we were satisfied to justify violence between men on the grounds that nature is red in tooth and claw and that man shares the instinct of pugnacity with the mammals from which he has descended. At the same time we have not progressed far enough to eliminate self-destructive behavior of many kinds, of which suicide is but the most conspicuous. Nor have we been able to control the violence on the streets of our cities as intergroup tensions reach fever heat. Nations continue to threaten to destroy each other, and a relatively peaceful era becomes one of cold war.

Dr. Zawodny has taken the position that violent and nonviolent solutions of problems at all of these levels must have something in common, so that the more we can learn at any one level the better off we will be in solving problems at each of the other levels. He has searched the literature with an understanding that only his rich experience and training would allow, and with the characteristic persistence and thoroughness with which he goes about any task he sets himself. He has come up with representative papers covering a wide spectrum of studies of conflict and the integrative resolution of conflict at individual, group, and international levels. Examination of the topics covered and of the varieties of backgrounds of the authors and investigators chosen is itself convincing that we have here an unusual sample of what is now known in these areas.

The issue of whether or not we can move from individual to group behavior with the same set of behavioral laws is by no means settled. On the one hand, all thinking and planning goes on in individual nervous systems, and all action is initiated there. As the UNESCO charter puts it, wars begin in the minds of men. On the other hand, there is the possibility that suprasummative properties exist at higher levels of organization, so that new laws hold for aggregates that do not hold for individuals. The continuities of the memories of an individual are perhaps one thing, while the continuities of tradition and institutionalized behavior may be another. That there are parallels there can be no doubt. A certain inflexibility in individual attitudes is not dissimilar to cultural lag in group responsiveness to change; aggressive reactions to insult are found in the individual and in the nation. Caution is needed, however, in generalizing too quickly from

one level to another. Even though the analogies may be sound, the details may be very different, such as the timing between stimulus and response, or the techniques of compromise response. These details may sometimes be as important as the gross relationships that they embody.

This collection of studies does not prejudge the issues; it lays out the evidence from which the serious reader can work toward his own conclusions. Here are the parallels at all levels of threat, fear, frustration, hostility, aggression, conflict, and the integrative forces of love and empathy, of belongingness, of attitudes favoring the reduction of tension, of nonviolent solutions to problems.

The problems with which these papers grapple are among the most pressing ones confronting contemporary man. The most evident problem is that of survival in a world of weapons of untold destructive power. But beneath this issue lies also the human problem of learning to live with decency and compassion among other men, so that the individual can achieve a measure of happiness with dignity and self-respect.

Stanford University
July 1966

Acknowledgments

The following persons and institutions deserve warm words of appreciation.

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The Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania and the Relm Foundation have also contributed by covering the cost of permissions.

Aina Kruger, my Research Associate, gracious friend and magnificent co-worker, brought me from foggy hypothesizing to the mundane demands of publishing. Her loyalty and belief in the value of this work were among the great compensations for the six years of effort in preparing these volumes.

The staff of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, and the Fellows of the year 1961–1962, provided an incomparable intellectual experience. Never has a sandy beach opened its treasures and beauty, or spoken about Man to me, until I walked upon it with Loren Eiseley. Never has the meaning of social justice come forth so forcefully as when I listened to Sidney Hook. To them, and to the rest of my Fellow colleagues, I am grateful—for they indirectly affected the concerns of this study.

Professor Ernest R. Hilgard, under whom I studied psychology, not only extended the range of my knowledge, but also affected my life.

Mr. Mark Nomikos, Miss Joy Furry, Miss Myrna Stepansky, and Ina Fitzhenry (Mrs. L. Coor) were intermittently associated with the research. Their quiet labors are reflected in this study.

J. K. ZAWODNY

University of Pennsylvania
July 1966

Man and International Relations

Volume I: CONFLICT

*I*NTRODUCTION

My purpose as a political scientist in the field of international relations and as the editor assembling the material in these two volumes, was to analyze and study violent and nonviolent problem-solving on three levels: psychodynamics of the individual, group dynamics, and nation-state relations. An attempt was made to gather the thought and the results of research concerning conflict and integration on each of these three levels from all social-science disciplines. The material presented here is that which seems most relevant to me.

Research covers the period from 1927 to 1965. About 3200 scholarly journals in disciplines bearing on human behavior were searched. (In this connection, it should be pointed out that in the behavioral sciences articles are primary sources, since empirical validation is found in them.) In addition, about 200 books were surveyed. The disciplines under scrutiny included biology, neurophysiology, genetic psychology, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, and others.

As all human beings are, I am a product of adaptive experiences. I saw the abysmal brutality of war in the eyes of the dying and felt it in my own wounds as a combat officer of an underground movement during World War II. The experiences of war, the increasing awareness that as human beings we are not always able to do what we know to be in our best interest, the belief that if an individual cannot control his own behavior even less can be expected of a nation, and a sense of frustration with political science as the discipline having direct bearing on the subject of conflict in international relations but producing no solutions—these nurtured the idea for this collection. Postdoctoral study in the field of psychology, made possible by a Ford Foundation grant in 1958–1959, was the immediate stimulus that led to its conception.

Research began in 1960 under the auspices of the Studies in International Conflict and Integration Project at Stanford University. The arrangement of material was done at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in consultation with Fellows representing various social sciences during the fellowship I enjoyed in 1961-1962.

The materials dealing with human conflict are to be found in Volume I, and those concerned with integrative behavior are arranged in Volume II. (Since conflict also produces cohesion, "integration" is understood as the internal unification resulting in volitional cooperation and the avoidance of violence.) Within each level the material fell naturally into chapters. These chapters, depending upon the material available, deal with the factors and processes occurring within each unit of investigation and the relation of the unit to other peer units. At the end of each chapter is a list of Further References—these are not duplicated in the bibliography.

The articles and references included in the volumes were selected using the following criteria:

1. The material had to be pertinent to the underlying intent of the study.
2. The material had to be comprehensible, as judged by the editor, to scholars from other disciplines.
3. An attempt was made to include materials not generally known or accessible.

The reader may find that in his own area of specialization some work which he considers important has been omitted or mentioned only in the Further References. It is obviously impossible for one social scientist to be acquainted with all the works dealing with human behavior, nor would it be possible to include them all in one study; therefore, the editor's preferences, fallibility, and judgment have determined the selection.

During the evaluation and integration of the material it became obvious that there is more material dealing with human conflict than with human integrative and cooperative processes. The fewest insights exist on the level of nation-state. On that level of inquiry, the most meaningful contributions have been made, with some exceptions, by scientists and scholars from disciplines other than international relations.

While within each level there are numerous aspects promising rewarding investigation, and while there is a considerable amassing of data, particularly for individual behavior, scientists are justifiably cautious against inferring applicable parallels between patterns of behavior in an individual, a group, and a nation. There are some indications that on the levels of the group and the nation-state, characteristics of behavior peculiar to each level are present; however, they have not been empirically validated or systematically classified.

Here, then, is an attempt to collect, collate, and present current thought and research on man at war and at peace with himself, within and among groups and nations.

J. K. ZAWODNY

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PART A

Intrapersonal Conflict

1. *Frustration-Anxiety*
2. *Fear and Anger*
3. *Hostility*
4. *Aggression*
5. *Conflict*
6. *Behavior under Stress*
7. *Social Maladaptation*

CHAPTER 1 • Frustration-Anxiety

Some Social and Biological Aspects of Anxiety

HARLEY C. SHANDS, M.D.

Definition

The physiological state basic to anxiety may be generally observed in mammals, but anxiety in its clinical form is limited to human beings. In animals the state is a generalized condition of wariness or vigilance, and the most prominent manifestations are the result of activity in the thoraco-lumbar division of the autonomic nervous system.

This physiological state in animals was extensively investigated by Cannon (3). He found that the activity of the sympathetic nervous system improves the state of readiness in the animal by lessening muscular fatigue, increasing cardiac output, increasing the general muscular tone, and so forth. Vigilance in some ways is analogous to the "warming up" process in which an athlete prepares himself for entering the game; mild anxiety tends to lead to a better performance than a state of complete calm. The characteristic manifestations include a rapid pulse, tremulousness of the extremities, sweatiness of the palms and axillae, widening of the pupils and of the palpebral fissures, a generalized height-

Harley C. Shands, "Some Social and Biological Aspects of Anxiety," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (1957), pp. 459-468. Copyright © 1957, The Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore, Md. 21202, U. S. A. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes are numbered as in the original.

ened tension in the muscular apparatus, and so on. This state can be artificially induced either by stimulation of the thoraco-lumbar division of the autonomic nervous system or by the injection of epinephrine in appropriate dosage.

The difference between the physiological condition of sympathetic activity and the psychological state of anxiety is the difference between a set of data and a conclusion. With reference to experimental animals, the conclusion reached by Cannon after a large number of ingenious studies was that this state of sympathetic mobilization had the purpose of preparing the organism for violent activity, for "fight or flight". In man the psychological condition of anxiety represents the awareness of widespread mobilization of sympathetic activity within oneself, along with an interpretation that this mobilization has some purpose or goal. A distinction between the states of fear and anxiety has been made on the basis that in fear the purpose is clarified by a conscious awareness of the goal, whereas in anxiety the threat is unknown. It is apparent that this distinction cannot be an absolute one, but it is of considerable importance. For example, many states of anxiety can be relieved by an understanding of the threat. Indeed, the occurrence of phobias demonstrates this convincingly since in the establishment of a phobia a concrete fear is substituted for a diffuse anxiety, and the avoidance of the feared object allows the phobic patient to feel comfortable.

As a theoretical tool, anxiety in another sense has come to occupy a central place in modern psychiatry: behavior is explained as designed to reduce anxiety. Many of the commonly observed behavioral patterns of human beings are understood as repetitive attempts to avert anxiety or to defend oneself from the occurrence of this disagreeable state. Modern notions of anxiety formulate the state in a teleological setting: it points to the future and has the purpose of preventing catastrophe. In general the catastrophe is understood as a severe disturbance of the relationship involving the organism and the environment. This relationship has to remain constant within certain limits if the organism is to survive and reproduce, and the emergency devices of the organism have the purpose of making this possible. It has been one of the important achievements of modern psychiatry to extend this general scheme to embrace developments at a psychological level; where the physiological defenses of the body are oriented to the maintenance of a steady state at the organism-environment level, the psychological defenses are oriented toward the maintenance of a steady state in the system of human relationships of which any given individual is the nodal point.

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In reviewing the whole development in somewhat greater detail, it is of

interest to follow the shifts in point of view which occur in the various investigations. Bernard's idea of an internal environment is a rather static one; the fluid buffer like the shell of the crustacean surrounds the naked cell and protects it from the hostile environment. Cannon's development put the basic idea in a more dynamic framework. He noted that it was the steady state of relationship between environment and organism which was most important to preserve. The steady state puts the emphasis upon a *process* occurring in time, replacing an idea of a fluid bath spatially interposed between cell and environment. His investigations emphasized preparatory and predictive functions: through the mediation of the thoracolumbar division of the autonomic nervous system and its associated glandular devices, animals have developed great potentialities of preparing for coming emergencies. In the case of wild animals the principal dangers demand either "flight or fight"; epinephrine and sympathetic nervous system stimulation prepare the organism for violent muscular activity of this sort, through mobilization of blood sugar, increase in heart rate, in blood pressure and in cardiac output, and the effect of epinephrine in decreasing fatigue in muscle.

Sherrington's work complements that of Cannon. Sherrington was primarily interested in the integrative action of the nervous system by means of which sensory and motor components of action were connected with each other in a purposive way. Much of his work was concerned with what would now be called "feed-back" sensorimotor mechanisms by means of which the organism adapts itself to varying conditions. In summing up his work, he points out how integration via the sensorimotor system enables the animal to live in expectation of future events. In his differentiation between the exteroceptive and the proprioceptive components of the central nervous system he emphasized the temporal distinction between their functions. The exteroceptors, the "distance receptors", collect information about future dangers to be avoided and gratifications to be sought, while the proprioceptors provide a continuous source of information about the immediately current state of affairs in the organism's muscular and skeletal systems.

If we compare the work of Sherrington and of Cannon, it will be clear that the two dichotomies with which these two investigators worked are closely related to each other. The significant distinction in each case is between preparation for future emergencies and the appropriate handling of the current situation. Sherrington made this distinction by talking about "anticipatory" and "consummatory" reactions, and he pointed out that in the central nervous system these were primarily related respectively to the distance receptors and to the proprioceptors. Cannon's distinction between the thoraco-lumbar and the cranio-sacral division to the autonomic nervous system deals with the same sort of temporal division, differentiating

between the anticipatory reactions of the sympathetic side and consummatory reactions of the parasympathetic side.

It needs perhaps to be emphasized that these dichotomies are analytic devices significant primarily for purposes of discussion, and that in fact the glory of the animal organism is the integration of the nervous and glandular systems dealing both with the present and with the future. Much of the problem of anxiety in human beings can be traced to a disturbance in this integration; in anxiety the preoccupation with a dreadful future interferes with the management of the immediate problem. In this connection another distinction pointed out both by Cannon and Sherrington is of great significance. This distinction is one made between part-reactions and whole-reactions. Sherrington points out that the distance-receptors control the musculature of the whole body. The potentiality of the total reaction is most completely observable in emergency situations in which the animal may be completely immobile in an intense attitude of listening or looking; we say that the animal "freezes in his tracks". In man the same sort of immobilization can be induced in emergency situations by means of the general commands, "Hark!", "Lo!", or "Listen!"—the railroad slogan, "Stop, Look, and Listen!" is a combination of all these. Cannon points out with reference to his special interests that the thoraco-lumbar system of the autonomic nervous system has a similarly diffuse area of influence: the wide distribution of sympathetic nerves and the diffuse influence of the humoral agents associated with the thoraco-lumbar division affect the body from head to toe.

On the other hand, Sherrington points out how the consummatory reactions affect only one system at a time; an animal feeds or excretes or copulates to the exclusion of other activity. In some animal species this absorption reaches extreme degrees, as in the case of the frog which continues its copulatory activity even after having been cut in two at the middle. Cannon in turn has pointed to the separate functions of the various subdivisions in the parasympathetic (cranio-sacral) division of the autonomic system.

The balance between these two systems is of interest since, in general, the whole-reactions and the distance receptors take precedence in cases of emergency; for the most part a situation in which the sympathetic nervous activity is high inhibits parasympathetically innervated consummatory reactions. Anorexia, constipation, and loss of sexual desire, for instance, not infrequently accompany states of anxiety. On the other hand, in situ-

² Parenthetically here it may be noted that certain "psychosomatic" diseases have been traced to an imbalance between the two systems; in those instances in which the response in the sympathetic division is inadequate either by reason of suppression or of wearing out, the subsequent overactivity of the parasympathetic component may be of crucial importance in the genesis of a chronic illness. [Reference is to page 11, facing.]

actions in which the consummatory tendency is extremely intense, the actions motivated by these impulses may go on in the face of the most extreme danger: the starving man is willing to take almost any chance to get food, and so on. Under different conditions almost any conceivable combination of activity in the two systems can be found in clinical states of illness.² [Footnote on page 10, facing.]

The work of Pavlov takes a sharply different tack from the work of these men in that Pavlov studied the manner in which animals learned to adapt themselves to artificial situations. Since artificial situations vary to a much greater degree than does the natural environment, the problem becomes a much more individual one. For example, the development of lungs can be thought of as a modification which confidently predicts that the species can be expected to be born into an atmosphere; this prediction is so automatic that it is only for special purposes that it is seen as a prediction. On the other hand, the animal in the conditioned reflex situation can be trained to respond predictively to an immense variety of stimuli, such as bell tones, geometrical figures, metronomes at various speeds, and so on. The general scheme remains the same, however, since the conditioned reflex represents an expectation of environmental events built into the behavioral structure of the organism. The vast increase in uncertainty made possible by this artificial situation is the occasion for the development of an anxiety very like that of human beings. The confused animal confronted with contradictory directions is not unlike the human being who asks anxiously, "What shall I do?"

The understanding of the specifically human problems of adaptation may be attributed in large part to Freud. In his work the same general scheme may be found although it is much obscured by an unfortunately metaphorical terminology. Freud pointed out how significantly neurotic symptoms may be traced to the training of a child in his earliest years; the personality is to be understood as the resultant of biological tendencies and the social restraints imposed by the parents who form the social environment of the earliest years of life.

The central controlling system in human beings is one which mediates between biological and social imperatives: human beings are faced with the special problem of so altering innate biological tendencies as to integrate them with the restrictions imposed by social living. These rigid restrictions form a sort of strait-jacket, into which the human being must fit himself. This problem is even further complicated by the fact that the social restraints to which the child is exposed in the plastic period of early life may be similar to, or different from, the restraints experienced by the majority of his fellows. As a general rule when a child finds himself in a situation where the restraints are very different from those to which he is accustomed, in either direction, he feels anxious because the degree of

uncertainty in the world is very much increased by either more severe restriction or more complete freedom.

The Ego, in Freud's terms, is the institution which mediates between the external world and the Id, but if we translate this terminology into that of Cannon and Sherrington, the Id is a collective term for those potentialities for consummatory reactions which form the central biological concern of the organism. The "instincts" or "drives" which make up the Id are those needs which relate to the same problems of feeding, excreting, and sexual activity. Freud's tendency to work out new names for the entities which he described and to personify these entities has tended to obscure the basic similarity in his point of view and that of Cannon and Sherrington. The idea of an Ego emergent from processes to which environment and organism are party is similar to the other transactional formulations cited. Freud says of the Ego that it is "... a coherent organization of mental processes ... (which ... includes consciousness and ... controls the approaches to motility, e.g., to the discharge of excitations into the external world." Freud points out with embryological accuracy that the sense organs directed toward the external world, the "distance receptors" of Sherrington, are elaborated from the surface of the body. The Ego derives from "inside" and "outside" data, correlated through the activities of the sensory modalities at the surface.

It is a commentary upon the universality of trends of thought that the work of Freud and of these investigators in the biological field supplement each other to an important degree. Together the two approaches allow a fuller understanding of the way in which a physiological state comes to assume a social function in that it operates as a signal warning of approaching danger not only to the steady state at a physiological level, but also to the steady state at the level of human relatedness. The same preparatory steps which take place when the organism is threatened by a predatory animal take place also when a human being is threatened with economic catastrophe or a loss of status. This human development of the animal function depends upon the restraint of immediate action and the perception of the state of readiness; man is differentiated from animal by his ability to derive information from self-observation.

In man the signal anxiety invariably has some significant connection with the system of human relatedness which forms the most important environment. Man lives in this environment indirectly in a manner similar to that outlined above. The "social internal milieu" is the system of habits and expectations interposed between "individual" and "group", and a maintenance of a steady state in this system is essential for social existence. This system is in many ways analogous to the internal milieu of Bernard, but there is a crucial difference in that many of the most important institutions in a social system are purely matters of agreement. Goals which have

a meaning only in such a system, goals such as honor, patriotism, loyalty, and the like, have in human beings superseded the goals of self-preservation, feeding, and sexual satisfaction which are prepotent in lower animals.

Anxiety in Relation to Restraint

Many lines of evidence indicate that the clinical state appearing as anxiety in man only occurs where the potentialities of movement in response to stimulation are severely curtailed. The natural impulse, as Cannon postulated, is to attack or run away from a danger when it is perceived. The mobilization of resources mediated through activity in the sympathetic nervous system is maximally valuable in situations in which violent muscular activity is imminent. In human beings this state of preparedness has the quality of being unpleasant up to the point at which the indicated action is set in motion, although beyond that point the actor loses awareness of the state of anxiety as it merges into the given action. This sequence, of an unpleasant preparatory state completely disappearing as the action is begun, is one which can be introspectively verified on any occasion of the occurrence of stage fright. The general principle is that when action is called for by the situation under circumstances which restrain the individual, the state of preparedness is experienced as intensely disagreeable.

The restraint of immediate response is essential in human beings since it is only by means of such restraint that new patterns of action can be learned. A novice in a given situation must be immobilized long enough for the new pattern of stimulation and of responsiveness to become clear to him. Training of either animals or of human beings requires the suppression of previously learned or instinctive patterns of action for establishment of new patterns.

The problem in all types of training is one of the establishment of an appropriate middle course. Where the restraint is too suddenly or too forcibly applied, the resulting state of preparedness may become explosive.³ On the other hand, in the absence of restraint new patterns of action are not learned. Not only so, but unless the restraint is applied at a point at which the animal is in a developmental stage which makes him sufficiently plastic, new patterns of learning are almost impossible to induce ("You can't teach an old dog new tricks").

The physiological basis for these phenomena is to be found in the work of Pavlov. In his research into the nature of conditioned reflexes he demonstrated the significance of restraint, and the later extensions of his

³It is presumably to the general condition of over-restraint that the sudden death of many wild animals in the state of captivity can be traced. It is parenthetically interesting that in his later years Cannon's interests turned to this phenomenon of sudden death. The explosive character of the response to restraint in a situation demanding action can be observed also in the epileptiform seizures induced in rats in subjecting them to air blasts at close range.

work into the field of the so-called "experimental neuroses" has demonstrated many of the possibilities of the disorganization of behavior through a combination of repetitive stimulation and restraint.

In the classic Pavlovian conditional reflex experiment, a trained dog is brought into the laboratory, immobilized in a harness. In a state of hunger he is stimulated repetitively by a combination of the unconditional stimulus, that is to say, a piece of meat, and the conditional stimulus, classically a bell tone. The dog reflexly salivates in response to the unconditional stimulus, the meat, as he prepares to eat it. When the meat and the bell tone are repetitively presented together, the dog tends after a period of training to salivate reflexly to the conditional stimulus when it is presented alone. The dog can be said to be responding physiologically to the *meaning* of the bell tone in terms of his past experience.

In the restrained setting of the CR situation, when the stimuli presented to the experimental animal over a considerable period of time are too ambiguous for the animal to make satisfactory distinctions or when the signals are so arranged as to call for contradictory responses, the animal develops an "experimental neurosis", many of the manifestations of which are closely similar to those of human neuroses. It is a matter of interest that the experimental neurosis cannot be induced unless the animal's movements are greatly restricted. In some circumstances, the presence of a related animal (e.g., the mother of the kid being used as an experimental animal) prevents the development of the experimental neurosis. Both of these facts carry therapeutic implications in relation to anxiety.

Formulation of Anxiety

The feeling of anxiety is related to disturbance in the "social internal milieu", the system of expectations which forms the central concern of each of us. The relation is primarily quantitative here since any alteration of sufficient magnitude will arouse anxiety: unexpectedly "good" events evoke anxiety as well as unexpectedly "bad" ones. The various events which may grossly change the system of expectations are myriad: the loss of a close relative, a loss of a job or a promotion, a major illness, a marked change in social position, and so on.

The biological state basic to anxiety is one of a general readiness for action. The patient is tuned up, ready to go. The difficulty in pathological instances of anxiety, however, is that this preparation is phylogenetically oriented towards an external world whereas the danger which threatens is internal. Immediate relief of anxiety is usually experienced when some active measure can be taken; an important defensive maneuver often used is that of projection in which the inside danger is attributed to some outside source. Basically the internal danger is an uncertainty on the part of the patient of his ability to cope with the problems which confront him. He is

usually afraid of two different possibilities. The first of these is that he will be too weak or inadequate to cope with some feared emergency, and the second is the mirror image, in a sense, of the first: the patient fears the possibility that he will resort to anti-social means of solving the problem.

For instance, commonly in anxious patients some problem in the father-son or boss-subordinate relationship is involved. Any such relationship includes elements of both dependence and competition; the junior member wishes to become senior, but he fears giving up the protection involved in his dependent status. The most severe anxiety can be found in those persons who cling desperately to a dependent status while rebelliously asserting their independence. When the fears which underlie the anxiety become manifest in such a patient, it will be found that they go in two directions, those of being injured by, and of injuring, the related person. The fantasies of being injured include all versions of attack and illness, while the fantasies and dreams of injuring may take violent and bloody form. The general basic problem is one of anticipating a loss of control in a world which has become too uncertain to live in. Anxiety is characteristically the state which ensues when the threat is maintained over a long period of time in the presence of considerable restraint. The intensity of the anxiety is proportional in general to the intensity of the threat and to the extent of the impairment of freedom in action.

The simplest method for the relief of anxiety is the method directly borrowed from wild animals, that of flight or fight; "acting out" includes various methods of running away from a threat or of anti-social behavior designed to remove the threat. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that in a civilized society the direct methods of solution of these problems present a variety of complications. Not only does anti-social behavior frequently lead to direct punishment, but it also leads into many vicious-circle processes of guilt feelings and lowered self-esteem with a consequent diminished confidence in one's ability to handle future threats.

At the opposite end of the scale, the appropriate use of anxiety at levels of tolerable intensity leads to growth in the personality and in accumulation of reserves of adaptive potentialities. Anxiety is most productively relieved through its conversion into some sort of emotional expression. The appropriate emotion varies greatly with the situation; common ones are grief, anger, or love. The loss of a close relative threatens a whole series of habitual behavioral patterns, and for the adequate discharge of the anxiety induced by these demands a period of mourning with the establishment of new behavioral patterns is essential. The threat of opposition by a competitor also arouses anxiety and poses the demand for a different type of emotional expression, e.g., a controlled display of anger or aggressiveness in relation to the competitor. Still further, the demands imposed by the processes of sexual maturation arouse anxiety in the course of the

establishment of new patterns of behavior in relation to members of the opposite sex. These problems are most effectively solved by the development of a loving relationship with an appropriate partner.

Perhaps the most important contribution of modern psychiatry to the problem of anxiety is the idea that every such state refers to some possible crisis in human relationships. The remarkable shift in emphasis in human living has made preservation of the "social internal milieu" the most important goal of human beings, and it is to alterations in this aspect of life that anxiety symptoms refer. The unknown aspect of the danger is accounted for by the fact that human beings know little about the form and function of this important system. The social internal milieu is far more complicated than is any physiological system, and it is correspondingly more difficult to understand, requiring even a different vocabulary and a different set of general notions; it is not therefore surprising that our knowledge of it should be so late in arriving and as yet so limited in extent.

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Deprivation, Threat and Frustration

ABRAHAM H. MASLOW

It is easy in the discussion of frustration to fall into the error of segmenting the human being. That is to say, there is still a tendency to speak of the mouth or stomach being frustrated, or of a need being frustrated. We must keep in mind constantly the truism that only a whole human being is frustrated, never a part of a human being.

With this in mind, an important distinction becomes apparent, namely the difference between deprivation and threat to the personality. The usual definitions of frustration are in terms simply of not getting what one desires, of interference with a wish, or with a gratification. Such a definition fails to make the distinction between a deprivation which is unimportant to the organism (easily substituted for, with few serious after-effects), and, on the other hand, a deprivation which is at the same time, a threat to the personality, that is, to the life goals of the individual, to his defensive system, to his self-esteem or to his feeling of security. It is our contention that only a threatening deprivation has the multitude of effects (usually undesirable) which are commonly attributed to frustration in general.

A goal object may have two meanings for the individual. First it has its intrinsic meaning, and secondly, it may have also a secondary, symbolic value. Thus a certain child deprived of an ice-cream cone which he wanted may have lost simply an ice-cream cone. A second child, however, deprived of an ice-cream cone, may have lost not only a sensory gratification, but may also feel deprived of the love of his mother because she refused to buy it for him. For the second boy the ice-cream cone not only has an intrinsic value, but may also be the carrier of psychological values. Being deprived merely of ice-cream *qua* ice-cream probably means very little for a healthy individual, and it is questionable whether it should even be called by the same name, *i.e.*, frustration, which characterizes other more threatening deprivations. It is only when a goal object represents love, prestige,

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respect, or achievement that being deprived of it will have the bad effects ordinarily attributed to frustration in general.

It is possible to demonstrate very clearly this twofold meaning of an object in certain groups of animals and in certain situations. For instance, it has been shown that when two monkeys are in a dominance-subordination relationship a piece of food is (1) an appeaser of hunger and also (2) a symbol of dominance status. Thus if the subordinate animal attempts to pick up food, he will at once be attacked by the dominant animal. If, however, he can deprive the food of its symbolic dominance value, then his dominator allows him to eat it. This he can do very easily by a gesture of obeisance, *i.e.*, presentation as he approaches the food; this is as if to say, "I want this food only to still hunger, I do not want to challenge your dominance. I readily concede your dominance." In the same way we may take a criticism from a friend in two different ways. Ordinarily the average person will respond by feeling attacked and threatened (which is fair enough because so frequently criticism is an attack). He therefore bristles and becomes angry in response. But if he is assured that this criticism is not an attack or a rejection of himself, he will then not only listen to the criticism, but possibly even be grateful for it. Thus, if he has already had thousands of proofs that his friend loves him and respects him, the criticism represents only criticism: it does not also represent an attack or threat.

Neglect of this distinction has created a great deal of unnecessary turmoil in psychoanalytic circles. An ever-recurring question is: Does sexual deprivation inevitably give rise to all or any of the many effects of frustration, *e.g.*, aggression, sublimation, etc. It is now well known that many cases are found in which celibacy has no psychopathological effects. In many other cases, however, it has many bad effects. What factor determines which shall be the result? Clinical work with non-neurotic people gives the clear answer that sexual deprivation becomes pathogenic in a severe sense only when it is felt by the individual to represent rejection by the opposite sex, inferiority, lack of worth, lack of respect, or isolation. Sexual deprivation can be borne with relative ease by individuals for whom it has no such implications. (Of course, there will probably be what Rosenzweig calls need-persistent reactions, but these are not necessarily pathological.)

The unavoidable deprivations in childhood are also ordinarily thought of as frustrating. Weaning, elimination control, learning to walk, in fact every new level of adjustment, is conceived to be achieved by forceable pushing of the child. Here, too, the differentiation between mere deprivation and threat to the personality enjoins caution upon us. Observations of children who are completely assured of the love and respect of their parents have shown that deprivations can sometimes be borne with astonishing ease. There are few frustration effects if these deprivations are not conceived by the child to be threatening to his fundamental personality, to his main life goals, or needs.

From this point of view, it follows that the phenomenon of threatening frustration is closely allied to other threat situations much more than it is to mere deprivation. The classic effects of frustration are also found frequently to be a consequence of other types of threat—traumatization, conflict, rejection, severe illness, actual physical threat, imminence of death, humiliation, isolation, or loss of prestige.

This leads us to our final hypothesis, that perhaps frustration as a single concept is less useful than the two concepts which cross-cut it, (1) deprivation, and (2) threat to the personality. Deprivation implies much less than is ordinarily implied by the concept of frustration; threat implies much more.

Frustration Theory:

Restatement and Extension

NORMAN R. F. MAIER

In presenting a new point of view one must of necessity differ with the thinking of others. . . . Some of these differences are purely semantic; others are due to the emphasis the writer puts on the aspect of his views that are new, so that readers may assume that he has neglected or overlooked other important relationships; while the remainder are due to alternate ways of interpreting the same phenomena. . . .

For the sake of progress in science it is also desirable to consider a fourth source of difference. No point of view remains static, and it is questionable whether an author can reinstate the meaning he originally intended when he later elaborates his position. His views must grow as a result of additional years of speculation, and pointed criticisms help him clarify his distinctions and stimulate him to come to deal with relationships that he may have neglected. . . .

The frustration theory of the writer (16) seems to be a case in point. . . . it seems that some clarification and sharpening of distinctions is in order. It is hoped that such an analysis will clarify the thinking of proponents and opponents, obviate controversy due to faulty communication, and point up crucial experiments that can be formulated. . . .

Clarifying Questions

Is a Frustrated Person Without a Goal? The writer's book title, *Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal*, may be taken to mean that a frustrated person has no goal. This was not the intent in selecting the title. The thought that the title was meant to convey was that a frustrated person's *behavior* is without a goal, i.e., the behavior sample under discussion lacks goal orientation. . . .

Norman R. F. Maier, "Frustration Theory: Restatement and Extension," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 63, No. 6 (1956), pp. 370-388. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.

Is the Frustration-Fixation Relationship Circular? Circular thinking in this instance would seem to run as follows: frustration produces fixation, and the appearance of a fixation in an animal indicates that it has been frustrated.

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. . . the concept of abnormal fixation was developed to account for certain experimental findings, particularly the bimodal nature of certain distributions in scores. A comparable term is the concept of a habit. Reinforcement produces habits, and the appearance of a habit in an animal indicates that it has been rewarded after making the response. However, one does not regard this relationship as circular.

Once, however, the casual relationship between frustration and fixation has been established, one can use differences in the number of animals showing fixated behavior as a measure of the number of frustrated rats. This was done in subsequent studies, in which the concept of the frustration-fixation relationship was used as a working hypothesis.

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What Factors Influence the Number of Animals that Will Fixate a Response? Bimodal distributions are obtained in experiments of discrimination learning, but the proportion of animals that are unable to learn, vs. those that learn readily, varies. Chance variation and strain differences are to be expected, but a number of other causes have been experimentally demonstrated.

The following results indicate some of the relevant factors.

1. Punishment on every trial produces more fixations in rats (also more rapid learning for those that learn) than punishment on every other trial (27).
2. Sixteen days in an insoluble problem produces more fixations than eight days (24).
3. Mild electric shock given to human subjects on 75 per cent of the trials in an insoluble problem for 50 trials produces more fixations than the same absolute number of shocks distributed over 150 trials (31).
4. Feeding after electric shock results in a smaller number of fixations than shock alone (7).
5. Guidance during the early stages of learning prevents fixations from forming later on when the rats are placed in an insoluble problem (20).
6. Difficult learning problems result in more fixations than easy learning problems (21, 25, 27).
7. Learned position responses that correspond to the natural preferences of the rat are less likely to become fixated than position responses that are on the side opposite the natural preference (25).

8. The use of the word "wrong" instead of electric shock, to indicate an error, produced fixations in human subjects about as frequently as electric shock to the fingers (31, 32).

9. Failure in fulfillment of expectancies seemed to be an important influence in the formation of fixations in a discrimination learning problem in rats (22).

Since punishment and experience of failure are associated with situations producing high rates of fixation, the frustration-fixation hypothesis is supported. It also seems necessary to regard the transition from problem-solving or trial-and-error behavior to stereotyped behavior to be rather sharp, or even of an all-or-nothing character. This suggests that there is a frustration threshold.

* * * *

Can Abortive Behavior Prevent Punishment? The fact that animals learn to jump abortively when placed in an insoluble problem serves to reduce any punishment that a locked window produces. This method of jumping may create a condition that prevents rats from discovering that the problem is soluble, and hence interferes with learning the discrimination problem.

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... In order to distinguish cause from effect, it is necessary to study how abortive jumping develops in relation to the progress made in learning.

Maier, Glaser, and Klee (25) showed that animals placed in an insoluble problem soon develop abortive jumping, which increases as the animal is retained on the insoluble problem. However, when the problem is made soluble, the abortive jumping is expressed differentially—that is to say, it declines in frequency for the trials on which the positive card is on the side to which the animal has been jumping, but increases for the trials on which the negative card is on the side to which the animal has been jumping. This, then, is the first evidence that the rat has learned to discriminate between the stimulus cards. For animals that do not show fixations, this *differential* abortive jumping begins to appear about the same time that the position response is replaced by the discrimination response; in other words, the animal now follows the positive card from side to side, and abortive jumping disappears because the animal no longer jumps to the negative card. For animals that fixate, the differential abortive jumping persists and becomes even more clear cut, since this discrimination between the stimulus cards is not followed by abandonment of the position response. The rat with the fixated position response fails to follow the positive card from side to side, and thus jumps abortively whenever the negative card is on the side of the fixation. The greater total of abortive jumps in rats with fixations than in

rats that learn, therefore, may be an artifact, i.e., they jump abortively more often because they jump to the negative card over a longer period of time.

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Can the Difference Between Fixations and Habits be Reduced to Two Kinds of Learning? In 1935 Maier and Schneirla treated conditioning and trial-and-error learning as qualitatively different forms of learning, and discussed the topics in separate chapters of their book (29). Later (30) they pointed out how conflicting evidence in learning data could be reconciled by making a qualitative distinction between trial-and-error learning, which always requires reinforcement in the form of reward (or punishment), and Pavlovian conditioning, which requires reinforcement in the form of the presentation of the unconditioned stimulus. Confusion arose because in some instances the same object (food) could serve either as a stimulus for salivation or as a reward for the same response. Skinner (35) later found a similar distinction (respondent vs. operant conditioning) essential to his organization of data, while Mowrer (33) raised the same issue when he postulated the dual nature of learning: conditioning of autonomic responses (such as fear reactions) and instrumental (trial-and-error) learning.

* * * *

There is considerable evidence which indicates that all learning data cannot be incorporated under one set of principles, but the nature of the essential difference is controversial. The fact that the Pavlovian type of conditioning experiments often utilized autonomic responses may have caused Mowrer, as well as Solomon and Wynne [36], to make the separation along physiological lines. However, a conditioned eyelid is an example of strict Pavlovian conditioning, but it is not associated with anxiety. It would also be inappropriate to classify eyelid conditioning with instrumental learning.

Extensions of Frustration Theory

Physiological Basis for Frustration Mechanism. In describing the frustration mechanism, emphasis has been given to differentiating it from the motivation process at the behavior level. Is there a physiological justification for postulating a second type of intervening variable? The one that naturally comes to mind is to associate frustration with the autonomic nervous system. The concept of threshold is associated with emotional behavior and the arousal of the autonomic nervous system. . . . Since frustration theory clearly separates hate and intense fear states from emotions of love, it becomes imperative to find differing autonomic reactions during states of love and hate if support for this physiological mechanism is to be obtained.

Jost has analyzed a variable in polygraphic measurements that may throw new light on this problem (11). He emphasizes the *patterning* of the various polygraph indices rather than the individual measures of heart rate, blood pressure, galvanic skin resistance, and muscle tension, and describes some interesting individual differences in the manner of reacting to conflict. . . . [Several] studies [12, 13] are suggestive in that they reveal that persons suffering from emotional problems show physiologically different reactions to frustration than normals. In an earlier study, Sherman and Jost (11) had found physiological measures to be sufficiently unique to serve a diagnostic purpose.

* * * *

In relating the autonomic nervous system and the frustration process one cannot assume that autonomic functions are absent when a state of frustration does not exist. Rather, the experimental question becomes one of determining whether a level, or unique patterning, of autonomic functioning can be associated with frustration. Certainly pleasant and unpleasant feeling states can occur without assuming frustration. At what level does anger change to rage, fear to terror or panic, and choice behavior to compulsion? Frustration theory would demand some kind of sharp transition, either in the form of a dropping out of voluntary control mechanisms or a sheer dominance of autonomic processes as provocation exceeded a certain point. The possibility of an intermediate condition, such as conflict between the motivation and frustration processes, needs exploration, and it may be the kind of mechanism that underlies the state of anxiety.

Another physiological mechanism that conceivably may be associated with the frustration process is suggested by the researches of Coghill (2). It will be recalled that he found behavior changes in the developing salamander to run parallel with neural growth; new behaviors appeared rather suddenly as essential neural links were formed. According to Coghill's work, the gross bodily functions develop first, and require only a limited number of cells in a chain of neurons. . . . Later, as the limbs develop further, additional neurons are grown so that each muscle group has its own specific neurons and therefore controls a smaller amount of behavior. Eventually each movement has its own controls. . . .

According to Coghill's analysis, it follows that each muscle group may be activated either as part of the larger pattern or as a separate response. Specific or individuated behavior depends upon the acquisition of additional neural mechanisms which are superimposed upon the more primitive mechanisms controlling the grosser patterns. However, the newer responses can make their appearance only if there is a successful inhibition of the older patterns. Thus mature behavior is both a process of excitation of the

more recently developed pathways and a process of inhibition of the older pathways.

Up to this point the anatomical evidence is fairly rich, and the speculation is supported by the evidence. The next step requires merely that we assume that frustration removes inhibition and permits the grosser responses to take over in much the same way that removal of the cortex removes spinal inhibitions. Since frustrated responses are more global and less subject to cortical control, the required assumptions are not unreasonable. Certainly the general notion seems worthy of further refinement.

If the evidence for qualitative difference in behavior is sound, it becomes important to locate the physiological basis on which it rests. Research along this line could do much to increase our knowledge of the control of behavior.

* * * *

The Function of Catharsis. The benefits attributed to catharsis vary and they perhaps are accepted more readily by the clinician than by the theoretician. From the point of view of frustration theory, catharsis should have a therapeutic value of two sorts.

When in a state of frustration, during which the autonomic nervous system sends sensory impulses (feedback) to the central nervous system, an individual's behavior becomes the end of a sequence. The behavior is the organism's response to the frustrating condition as it exists at that moment. Since the frustrated behavior is the final link in the causal chain, anything that facilitates its expression tends to end the cycle. Behaviors released along harmless channels (where there is no retaliation) most effectively remove the stimulus conditions setting off the state of frustration, whereas forms of physical violence that are met with superior force are least beneficial because they set up a new cycle of frustration. The unit of behavior controlled by the frustration process is in contrast with that controlled by the motivation process, because the latter requires a goal or need reduction to terminate its cycle, and behavior expressed serves as a means to this end.

The second way in which catharsis serves a therapeutic function according to frustration theory is through a clarification of the problem. As long as a state of frustration exists, the autonomic nervous system sends distracting sensory impulses to the brain. These are experienced as feelings (in accordance with the James-Lange theory) and tend to confuse the cognitive picture of the problem situation. Clarification of the perception of the actual problem should occur, both because verbal expression would tend to unscramble the two conflicting sources of data (externally vs. internally aroused sensations) and because general expression should reduce the extent of the confusing feeling data.

The Unconscious and the Logic of Feeling. Freudian theory describes the need to bring the unconscious mind to consciousness in overcoming com-

pulsions. Many forms of conflict are therapeutically treated as though they were the result of contradictory influences of the conscious and the unconscious minds. In brief, two different kinds of influences on behavior are postulated. Frustration theory sets up a similar dichotomy: the logic of ideas (i.e., of the mind) and the logic of feeling (i.e., of the viscera). Since these logics are qualitatively different, an aspect of therapy in frustration theory depends upon removing the conflicts between thinking and feeling.

A little further speculation brings these two sets of dichotomies close together. Feelings are vague and difficult to describe, but most compelling. Was it not natural for a theorist, writing at the time when psychology was dominated by philosophy, to describe these confusing and yet compelling forces as an unconscious mind? In the writer's thinking this simple step of substituting feeling for the unconscious mind has given him a greater appreciation of the original psychoanalytic concepts, and at the same time it clarifies the place of emotion in psychological conflicts.

Preoccupation with the Self and Therapy. If the state of frustration is characterized by autonomic feedback, it follows that feelings will dominate consciousness at such times; as a result, perceptions and thoughts will have subjective rather than objective reference. The frustrated person, therefore, must be unusually aware of a mass of feelings or sensations of internal origin. When these sensations are excessive, they would occupy his attention and consequently make him less aware of the external world as well as insensitive to the feelings of other persons.

* * * *

The condition of paranoia illustrates how the external world may be distorted by being viewed against a background of feeling. The self seems to be the center of the universe, and all events and actions of others become related to the self. Thus the meanings and interpretations of events and actions are influenced by the observer's role in the universe and by the way he feels. Although the paranoid personality is aware of his external world, he is not able to separate the sensations of external origin from the mass of feelings created by his anxieties.

The distracting role of visceral sensations becomes even more apparent in the condition of schizophrenia. In describing the nature of the schizophrenic process, Jenkins (10) has emphasized both the early frustration and the lack of interest in external things. He describes the self-consciousness of patients as painful and maladaptive. The schizophrenic becomes insensitive to minor social cues (intonations, gestures, and so forth), and more and more his consciousness centers "in processes which are the very essence of the self" (10, p. 9). Thus the schizophrenic does not seem to retreat from the external world; rather, his inner world takes over. It appears that the

withdrawal behavior of schizophrenics may not be a form of escape from the external world, but one of being engulfed by his internal world. This distinction would seem to have basic therapeutic implications.

The fact that the literature on clinical psychology deals considerably with the problem of the self, while the literature on normal personality shows little concern with the problem, supports the hypothesis described above. If this idea is pursued a step farther, it suggests the notion that good adjustment is a process of being aware primarily of external stimulation. Therapy, accordingly, would become the process of reducing the awareness of the self as well as the amount of subjective sensations, and increasing the awareness of external stimulation, including the behavior of other persons.

* * * *

Sensory Deprivation and the Self. There are two ways in which a person might conceivably become preoccupied with his internal sensations, if we assume that domination is a relative matter. The examples cited above are taken from abnormal psychology and illustrate the condition of being trapped or overwhelmed by an overabundance of sensations of internal origin. The second possible type of preoccupation with internal stimulation could result from a sharp reduction in external stimulation.

The researches associated with extreme sensory deprivation indicate that when external stimulation is greatly reduced, the content of consciousness becomes startlingly different and strange to the person so treated. . . . For example, Bexton, Heron, and Scott (1) reported various kinds of hallucinations and dream-like imagery when their subjects were placed on a comfortable bed in a lighted, soundproof cubicle for an extended period. To reduce sensations further, subjects wore translucent glasses, gloves, cardboard cuffs that extended beyond the finger tips, and a U-shaped rubber pillow which restricted movement.

Subjects found the experience unpleasant; they showed emotional lability, were easily upset, and irritability increased as the experimental period continued. In addition to visual, auditory, tactual, and kinaesthetic hallucinations, some subjects described strange experiences. Two subjects reported that they felt as if they had two bodies; in one case the bodies were side by side and in the other, they overlapped. Other subjects reported feelings of "otherness" and bodily "strangeness." Others reported their heads or minds as being detached from the body.

The authors conclude that their findings represent evidence of a kind of dependence a person has upon the sensory input that previously had not been recognized. It would seem to require but little stretch of the imagination to interpret the experiences reported as containing a description of the exaggerated awareness of the self, and to regard the hallucinations

produced under sensory deprivation to be similar to those reported by mental patients.

* * * *

If . . . the phenomena are viewed from the frame of reference of frustration theory, no new assumptions are needed. Rather the findings supplement the interpretation that this theory places upon mental illness, and even lead one to entertain seriously the consideration of a form of therapy for certain conditions of schizophrenia that is either new or that previously lacked conceptual support. This is the use of intense external stimulation to offset the excessive internal stimulation. It is possible that music therapy served this distracting purpose for some patients, but the general idea suggested by these experiments goes beyond this point. Among the research approaches that come to mind are the use of amplification devices in speaking to patients; making radical changes in the environments of patients, such as the use of bright lights and sharp contrasts; and varied methods designed to increase activity. It is conceivable that the intensely stimulating environment would serve to release withdrawn patients from the domination of stimulation of internal origin and thereby make them more accessible to psychological therapy. Drugs that depress visceral functions should serve a similar purpose.

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Frustration Tolerance, Frustration Susceptibility, and Overt Disturbance

GARDNER LINDZEY

In recent years, the concept "frustration tolerance" has been given increasingly wide usage among psychologists interested in problems of personality. It seems commonly accepted that the manner in which the individual reacts to frustration is extremely important for any investigator who is interested in predicting behavior. Because of this, almost all theories of personality have dealt with reaction to frustration, and many have introduced the concept of frustration tolerance to account for generalities in this kind of reaction. A comprehensive discussion of the concept is contained in Rosenzweig's account of a "frustration theory." He defines frustration as follows: "... frustration occurs whenever the organism meets a more or less insurmountable obstacle or obstruction in its route to the satisfaction of any vital need."¹ And frustration tolerance is defined as "an individual's capacity to withstand frustration without failure of psychological adjustment; i.e., without resorting to inadequate modes of response."

He compares the concept of frustration tolerance to ego strength and certain other Freudian concepts and suggests that it possesses the advantage of indicating a continuum rather than a dichotomy and thus is more amenable to quantified and experimental research. . . .

Most investigators have translated Rosenzweig's definition into empirical terms by accepting certain experimenter-created situations as uniformly frustrating and have shown no interest in the frustration that the subjects

¹ S. Rosenzweig, "An Outline of Frustration Theory," in J. McV. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*; New York, Ronald Press, 1944; pp. 380.

actually experienced or felt in this situation. Consequently, *investigators who have attempted to measure frustration tolerance, almost without exception, have equated this attribute to overt disturbance in response to a situation defined by the experimenter as frustrating. . . .*

Objections to Customary View of Frustration Tolerance

It is surprising that a concept that is so closely related to psychoanalysis, both in form and origin, should, as it is used, overlook what is perhaps the most important message that Freud has for contemporary psychology. This message, also stated effectively by Kurt Lewin, emphasizes that the important determinants of behavior are to be found not in the physical or objective facts of an individual's experience, but rather in the meanings that the individual assigns to these. . . .

If one continues to equate frustration tolerance to the adequacy of response following frustration, as in Rosenzweig's definition, there are two major objections to the customary measures of frustration tolerance.

First, these measures almost always assume that the immediate reaction to frustration is the only evidence necessary to estimate the extent to which the frustration has disturbed the behavior or level of adjustment of a person. The overt disturbance displayed by the person during the frustrating experience is frequently the only data available upon which any estimate can be made of the adequacy of the person's response to the frustration. The human organism is capable of such a great variety of responses that an attempt to label behavior as adequate or inadequate when the measure samples only one of numerous possible responses seems unjustified. . . . It seems that to obtain a satisfactory measure of the degree of disturbance resulting from frustration, observation of behavior should extend for a period past the time of frustration and should include multiple measures of behavior.

Second, these measures assume that if a group of persons are placed in an objectively constant frustration situation, each person will experience this situation as equally frustrating. This assumption necessitates a further, even less probable, assumption; namely, the motives of these persons exactly concur so that a change in the physical world will constitute an equivalent blocking in the motives or needs of each of the persons exposed to these changes. . . .

The result of my comparison of high-prejudice and low-prejudice groups in their feelings of frustration during experimental frustration provides further negative evidence. In the first place, I found that the subjects in many cases were being frustrated by different parts of the frustration situation. Some experienced certain acts of the experimenter as intensely frustrating, while others reacted neutrally, or even positively to the same acts. Further, I found that those high in prejudice were significantly more subjectively frustrated than those low in prejudice, suggesting that

not only is the "felt frustration" of all subjects not equal, but it may vary systematically with other significant variables. In view of the evidence that I have just discussed, it seems legitimate to reject the notion that given the same objective frustration situation, the subjects exposed to it will experience roughly the same amount of frustration.

If different subjects experience a given situation as frustrating in different degrees, it is evident that *frustration tolerance when equated to overt disturbance is compounded of at least two dimensions*. On the one hand, there is the extent to which the subject experienced the situation as frustrating; that is, how susceptible to frustration he was. On the other hand, there is the extent to which he was able to make an adequate response to the experienced frustration. Given this relationship, the use of overt disturbance alone as a measure of frustration tolerance for all subjects would be justified, only if it could be shown that either of the two factors above was a constant, or that the two factors were perfectly correlated, so that they would not vary independently. In my study, both frustration susceptibility and overt disturbance varied considerably. . . .

From this discussion two issues arise. One is the question of whether the assumption that all subjects are equally frustrated in the same situation can be empirically confirmed. The other is whether this assumption is the most useful one that can be made. The answer to the first question is clearly negative. The studies discussed, and others not mentioned, contain excellent evidence that the same situation is experienced in very different ways, by different individuals. . . .

The second question is somewhat more difficult to answer, but it seems possible, logically at least, to conceive of many situations in which the assumption would fail to produce relationships that might have been established by measuring the frustration actually experienced by the subjects. Thus, interest in frustration tolerance is a product of the belief that this is a generalized behavioral tendency that will enable us to predict behavior in one situation from that in another. . . . If there is any general tendency toward making adequate responses in the face of frustration, this tendency can be observed only under those circumstances in which the degree of experienced frustration is held constant or partialled out.

Proposed Measure of Frustration Tolerance

I propose that *frustration tolerance be equated to the adequacy of response to frustration when the degree of experienced or "felt" frustration is held constant*. This implies two changes from the customary techniques for measuring frustration tolerance: *first*, broadening the measures of adequacy of response to include more than immediate overt disturbance; *second*, measuring the susceptibility to frustration or the actual experienced frustration of the subjects. In discussing the possibility of attaining these goals I will center

on an attempt along these lines which I made in a study of differences in reaction to frustration.

In this study only a beginning was made in the direction of expanding the measures of behavioral alterations taking place as a result of frustration. This beginning, however, points to the possibility of further extension of these measures without undue effort. I secured measures of overt disturbance during a complex social frustration experience and in addition measured the change in intrapunitiveness, and tendency toward displacement of aggression shortly after the frustration. Not only was there variation among the subjects in terms of these three measures, but also there was considerable variation within the various subjects between the different measures. Thus, the picture of adequacy of response that would have been inferred from one of these indices would not necessarily be the same as that inferred from another index.

My measure of frustration susceptibility or experienced frustration consisted of a ranking of the subjects in terms of the amount of subjective frustration that they reported having undergone during the frustration situation . . . Frustration tolerance, then, was represented by a score based on a measure of the adequacy of the person's response to frustration from which had been subtracted a measure of the degree of "experienced" frustration.

It is possible to object to the procedure I have used in establishing a measure of frustration susceptibility or experienced frustration on one, or both, of two grounds.

First, one might maintain that such a measure is not feasible and that the attempt to get at the experience of the individual is mentalistic, qualitative, and doomed to failure because of the many factors that might prevent satisfactory measurement of this variable. This point of view suggests a residue of psychology's over-reaction to Titchener's subjectivism. In brief it seems to stem from the feeling that subjective¹⁰ material, by its very nature, is exposed to so many distorting factors that the scientist can hope to build a firm structure only by ignoring these indeterminant introspective elements.

I cannot prove that only theories of behavior that take into consideration the problem of experience, with its inevitable subjective concomitants, will, in the long run, be fruitful. However, I can point to cases in which the

¹⁰At several places in this paper I have referred to objective or overt, as opposed to subjective, data. I am aware that both of these kinds of data are behavioral and occupy the same logical status in any theory of behavior. Nevertheless, there is a rather well-established tendency for certain investigators to prefer measures of behavior dependent upon the observations of some external observer, rather than the verbal report of the subject. This preference has obvious empirical and theoretical consequences and it is for this reason that I have maintained the, in some respects untenable, distinction between subjective and objective data.

acceptance of the point of view that the same objective event may signify different things to different people resulted in a greater utility than the view that objective events are somehow sacred. . . .

Second, one might accept the importance of meaning or "psychological environment" but maintain that the specific kind of data that I have employed are either not appropriate or else such poor measures as to be worthless. This objection seems to me much more legitimate and can scarcely be answered except by pointing to the fact that the utility of these specific data can be measured only through further investigation. I do know that the use of the subjective protocols enabled me to make certain formulations that were different from those that would have been made otherwise, and that possess certain advantages over the formulations deducible from the more traditional view. Further, it is possible to point to certain variations in the situation that the traditional method of determining frustration tolerance overlooks, and that must, inevitably, contribute to the inaccuracy of any measuring device based on this view. On the other hand, the new proposal involves measurement that is sufficiently crude and unreliable as to almost certainly arouse protest. *Logically*, however, this new view possesses more defensibility, and thus, practically, it might be hoped that it would eventually achieve far more utility than could be provided by any method that overlooked the dimension of experienced frustration.

* * * *

I am not defending the position that my measure of the experience of frustration even approaches the best that can be devised. There seems little doubt that it could be much improved although such measure will never be easy of quantification.

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CHAPTER 2 • Fear and Anger

Psychophysiology of Fear and Anger

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Physiological action patterns unquestionably differentiate major categories of emotion such as relaxed contentment, wild panic, or sexual orgasm. Yet scepticism is expressed when it is postulated that all emotions reliably differentiated by introspective experience *must* have physiological differences. Many physiological differentiations are never conscious, others may be conscious, but surely all play a part in shaping behavior. We should be confident of success in our search for specific physiological, biochemical, and neurological patterns constituting the processes experienced as emotions. In describing and classifying emotions our main concern is not the existence of physiological differentiations of emotions, but rather the problems: (1) how to specify accurately the subjective aspect of emotion, (2) how to measure physiological processes accurately, yet with minimum disturbance to the organism, and (3) how to construct an adequate conceptual model.

To lend concreteness to my remarks, I would like to review my study of physiological differentiation between fear and anger in humans,(2) the results of which have been verified substantially by Joseph Schachter.(11)

Figure 1 is a short section of polygraph chart recording heart rate, ballistocardiogram, respiration, face skin temperature, finger temperature,

Albert F. Ax, "Psychophysiology of Fear and Anger," *Psychiatric Research Reports*, No. 12: Explorations in the Physiology of Emotion (1960), Louis J. West and Milton Greenblatt, eds., pp. 167-175. Reprinted by permission.

palmar sweating, and frontalis muscle potentials. A Grass electroencephalograph was used as the basic polygraph and because of its A.C. amplifiers it was convenient to record all variables except the upper two as 60 cycle A.C. envelopes. A nurse took systolic and diastolic blood pressures at one minute intervals.




Figure 1

Each subject was recruited from an employment agency and paid \$3.00 for the two hours spent in the laboratory. The criterion for inclusion was freedom from illness. Age range was from 21 to 55, with a mean of 27 years. Twenty-one subjects were women, twenty-two men.

The subjects were told that the experiment was a study of physiological differences between people with and without hypertension, and that their only task was to relax on the bed for about an hour, listening to their preferred music. A rest period of 25 minutes preceded the first stimulus period. Stimulations were alternated so that 22 subjects received a fear stimulation first and 21 subjects received an anger stimulation first.

The fear stimulus consisted of an intermittent shock to the little finger, gradually increased in intensity but never sufficient to cause pain. When the subject reported the shock sensation, the experimenter expressed surprise, checked the wiring, pressed a key that caused sparks near the subject, and then exclaimed with alarm that there was a dangerous high-voltage short circuit. Thus the experimenter created an atmosphere of alarm and confusion. Five minutes after the subject reported the shock, the experimenter removed the shock wire, reported that the short circuit had been found and repaired and assured the subject that all danger was past.

A recovery period of rest with music followed the fear situation and lasted for ten or fifteen minutes. An anger situation followed the recovery period.

In the anger situation the polygraph operator was the key figure. He was described to the subject as a substitute operator who had been fired previously for incompetence and arrogance, but was reemployed for that day because the regular operator was ill. In this way he became a suitable target for the subject's hostility.

The anger stimulus situation began when the operator entered the room to check the wiring supposedly because some calibrations might be in error. The experimenter voiced his objections, but agreed to operate the polygraph in another room. The operator proceeded to shut off the music, criticize the nurse, and tell the subject sarcastically that it would have helped had the subject been on time. He checked the electrodes, adjusted the subject in a rough manner, and criticized him for moving, noncooperation, etc. After five minutes of such abuse, the operator left. The experimenter returned, apologized for the operator's rude behavior, reassured the subject, and urged him to relax again. Ten minutes later the experimenter interviewed the subject about his memory of and feelings during the first interruption; after another ten-minute rest period, he questioned him about the second interruption.

The subjects illustrated their feeling states by the remarks they made either just after the stress stimulus or during the subsequent interviews. For example, after the anger stimulus, when the operator had left the room, a female subject remarked, "Well! It's easy to see he is not an educated man." Another time a male subject said, "Say, what goes on here? I was just about to punch that character on the nose." Reactions to the fear stimulus clearly were genuine, also. One woman kept pleading, "Please take the wires off. Oh! Please help me." Another reported that during the fear episode she had prayed to be spared. One man commented, "Well, everybody has to go sometime. I thought this might be my time." That these subjects experienced substantial emotional arousals is indicated by the increase in mean systolic blood pressure (SBP), 20 mm. mercury, and heart rate (HR), 28 beats per min.

Experimental Variables

The maximum rise and fall of each variable during the stimulus period and two minutes following (a total of seven minutes) were recorded as deviations from the resting level before stimulation. Systolic and diastolic blood pressures, scored in millimeters of mercury, were recorded every minute. Heart rate was averaged for six-second intervals in order to select maximum and minimum points. The ballistocardiograph was scored as the average voltage for approximately ten beats, covering exactly either two or three complete respirations.

Respiration was scored for changes in rate, amplitude, and inspiration/respiration (I/R) ratio. Five consecutive breaths judged as maximum volume were selected for measurement. The I/R ratio and amplitude showed no significant difference for fear and anger. An index of volume, the product of rate and amplitude, showed a difference that was significant but less so than that shown by rate alone. Rate was chosen as the variable to represent respiration.

Both face temperature and hand temperature were expressed in log units with the zero of the scale at 15° C., approximately 1° C. below the wet bulb thermometer temperature for the conditions of the experiment. Thus, if the finger were covered with perspiration and blood flow were zero, the temperature on the log units scale would approximate zero.

The sweating index was skin conductance, the reciprocal of the resistance component of the impedance. Two aspects of conductance were scored: (1) the skin conductance rise as the maximum increase in conductance above the resting level prior to the experimental period; (2) the number of increments per unit time in skin conductance of at least one micromho, which must have increased at least one micromho in three seconds.

One score for muscle tension was the maximum change in muscle potential averaged over a fifteen-second interval. The second muscle tension score was the average number of potential peaks per unit time. A peak was defined as an increment that doubled its size within three seconds.

Experimental Results

The results in standard score units both for fear and anger stimulus situations are found in Figure 2, A. The black bars represent changes during anger stimulus, the white bars changes during fear stimulus. A plus (+) sign indicates an increase in a variable, and a minus (−) sign a decrease. Seven variables show significant differences between anger and fear. Four of these variables have greater average reactions for anger: diastolic blood pressure rises (DBP+), heart rate falls (HR−), number of galvanic skin responses (#GSR), and muscle tension increases (MT+). Three other variables have greater average reactions for fear: skin conductance increases (SC+), number of muscle tension peaks (#MTP), and respiration rate increases (RR+).

The seven variables showing significant differences were used to construct "profile difference scores" for each subject. The profiles were prorated for equal average amplitudes and made up of sums of differences of standard scores whose means are zero. By the null hypothesis it follows that the sample of profile difference scores should have a mean of zero. Forty-two of the 43 subjects had positive profile difference scores with a mean difference of 1.087. This difference has a *t* value of over 10, indicating that we

+ .22. Correlations between the two stimulus situations were moderately high with a mean of .516 and a range from .26 (respiration rate) to .77 (maximum change in palmar sweating). These correlations cannot be interpreted as evidence for strong physiological stereotypy of response, since change scores are not corrected for regression on their base levels. The lack of such correction could attenuate but not accentuate the differences found between the fear and anger stimulus conditions.

Our investigation took place at the same institution where Dr. Funkenstein and Dr. Greenblatt were working. Naturally we were interested in relating our results to their work with epinephrine and norepinephrine. Five of our subjects received .025 mg. intravenous injections of epinephrine and norepinephrine on different days. Figure 2, B illustrates the results. The black bars show the response to norepinephrine and the white bars the response to epinephrine. All variables except diastolic blood pressure (DBP) responded as expected. DBP rose higher in response to epinephrine than to norepinephrine, perhaps due to differential blood pressure potentiation favoring epinephrine. However, the response profiles of fear and anger on the one hand, and epinephrine and norepinephrine on the other, were comparable. Nine of the fourteen variables changed in similar ways for fear and epinephrine and for anger and norepinephrine. DBP and \dot{V}_{O_2} were two significant variables that did not agree. Our injection results are suggestive rather than conclusive of a relationship between the two response patterns. Further tests should use the technique of infusing various ratios of epinephrine and norepinephrine.

Dr. Schachter used a similar experimental procedure to arouse emotions, and also used the cold pressor test to arouse pain. He had 33 additional subjects classified either as hypertensive or as potentially hypertensive. His data revealed highly significant statistical differences between the mean physiological response patterns of three stimulus conditions: pain, anger, and fear.

Discussion

A number of recent biochemical studies suggest that the response to fear is an epinephrine-like response and that the response to anger resembles a combined response to epinephrine and norepinephrine. Silverman (12, 13, 14) and Cohen (5) have described the personalities and emotional attitudes associated with various ratios of epinephrine and norepinephrine. The emotion of depression as yet is not clearly defined. Funkenstein (7) has described it as "anger turned inward." Garb, Tiwari, and Chapman (8) suggest that depression is produced when the two catechol amines, norepinephrine and Isuprel, are combined in equal potentiating amounts. If we can assume that Isuprel is the fluid mediator of anxiety, and if "anger turned inward" psychodynamically is the association of anxiety with the outward

expression of anger, we have a condition where both noradrenaline and Isuprel indeed would be present.

Undoubtedly there are varieties of biochemical substances sufficient to mediate any number of subtle emotions. As experimental techniques become more sensitive, they will disclose these substances. Biochemical equivalents often are suggested by an intuitive description of feeling nuances and by a pattern of physiological reaction to variations in emotion.

I should like to consider a few problems in the multivariate recording of physiological reactions accompanying emotion and stressful situations. There was a definite difference between the mean physiological patterns produced by fear and anger, but very large individual differences occurred as well. The mean patterns, constituting a general physiological specificity of emotion, account for less than one-third of the total variance. The greater proportion of variance was between subjects rather than emotions. However, this does not oblige us to conclude with Lacey (9) that marked individual physiological stereotypy prevails. In his reports on "relative response specificity" Lacey bases his conclusions primarily on a "stress level score" that is highly correlated with physiological base levels. His subjects with increased heart rate and sweating levels on one day are likely to show similar elevations on another day. The lability score from which he removes the linear base level regression shows that very little variance is accounted for by "response specificity"—a concept more meaningfully called *physiological stereotypy*. Neither Wenger's studies nor mine show much evidence of such physiological stereotypy.

A major source of non-error variance in physiological reactions to emotion is the patterning differentiated from each individual's constitutional context through an unique personal history of emotional learning. Our goal should be to describe the physiological specificity of each emotion for each individual. Our first step toward this goal would be the development of appropriate emotion arousing stimulus situations, *e.g.*, pain scaled in JND units. By studying reactions to different intensities of pain we may determine patterns of physiological response and recovery that permit the scaling of physiological response to other emotion arousing situations. Other stimulus situations have been useful. Acker (1) discriminated between groups of clinically anxious and non-anxious patients on the basis of seconal-induced change in finger plethysmographic pulse amplitude from waking to sleep; waking measures were not discriminative. Paintel (10) reported that a large group of psychotic patients had a normal GSR to an electric shock, but to the threat of a shock the psychotic group were perfectly discriminated by their much smaller response. Thus physiological differentiation can be measured in terms of the reaction pattern differences to such appropriately discriminating stimuli.

Once armed with measures of individual physiological differentiation we can explore the repertory of emotional patterns, using such techniques as interviewing, psychotherapy, manipulating interpersonal relations, and observing the variations occurring naturally in life situations. But as many investigators have discovered, physiological specificity is a poor index of experienced emotion if no prior consideration has been given to individual variability.

To summarize, physiological action patterns can be useful in the diagnosis of emotional states if they are controlled for individual uniqueness by utilizing appropriate stress stimuli. A physiologic pattern thus can be described in quantitative terms of similarity to and difference from an individual's set of reaction patterns to a series of standard stimuli.

Once we know an individual's response patterns to an array of stimulus conditions, we can specify the degree of differentiation and integration in his psychophysiology. This might provide an adequate measure of what clinicians call "emotional maturity" and "richness of affect." Psychophysiological patterns might aid in predicting susceptibility to psychosomatic illness and even the organ system most likely to be involved, or it might provide an index of improvement during therapy.

The physiological diagnosis and classification of emotional states is basic to the understanding of emotional development and learning. Multiple variable recording of responses is an efficient and fruitful technique for human conditioning experiments. We have found that most polygraph observed variables are readily conditioned to pain stimuli. However, several variables show considerable individual differences in direction and amplitude of change. The differences must be considered when scoring the conditioned response.

There have been many efforts to correlate self-rating scales such as the Taylor Anxiety Scale with physiological measures such as GSR. Three recent studies (3, 4, 6) found nearly perfect zero correlations. These investigations are guilty of over-simplified physiological and psychological observations. Self-rating scales are known to be limited by bias resulting from the social desirability of certain items and from other forms of conscious and unconscious distortion. It is a mistake to assume that the physiology of a chronic anxiety state resembles that of an acute response like "startle." Because his sympathetic system is in an aroused state, a chronically anxious subject might respond with a smaller GSR to experimentally induced stimuli than would a normal, relaxed subject. We cannot assume that a single physiological response defines or measures reliably any complex state like anxiety (or whatever may be measured by a psychological scale). Our proper concern is distinguishing clearly between chronic and transient emotional states.

Conclusions

Dynamic processes are highly specific for a given individual in a particular situation, at a given moment in time. Unique events make interesting anecdotes but they are not the stuff of science. Science must construct a concept that abstracts the element common to two or more events. There are three levels in the orderly hierarchy of classifying such commonalities. The first level describes what is common among subsequent responses of one individual to a given situation. The situation may be specified to include certain behavioral or internal conditions in addition to standard environmental conditions, *e.g.*, that the subject be asleep or performing some standard task, that he tell us he feels a certain way, or that his BP and palmar sweating be within certain limits. This first level of commonality probably accounts for a large portion of the total variance of the population of which the subject is a sample.

On the second level is the commonality that remains after the stimulus situation changes. An infinite number of changes becomes possible, yet for each specified class of stimulating situations both the *commonality* and the *specificity* of response can be identified. The commonality is what Lacey refers to as "relative response specificity" and what I have called "individual stereotypy" or, in our particular area of study, "physiological stereotypy." The specificity is the unique contribution of the stimulus situation to the individual, what I have called "physiological specificity of emotion." By observing an individual's varied responses to different situations we can determine the degree and variety of his psychological individuation.

The third level abstracts commonality found among the individuals of a group. Any such group is a limited sample of a specified population. If we use proper techniques to select an experimental sample, we can make statistical statements of probability about the characteristics of or physiological commonalities in the parent population. An investigator may study the physiological specificity of emotion either from a general level, abstracting the commonalities of a species or culture, or from the more specific level, abstracting the commonalities of an individual while parameters of the stimulus situation change. The simultaneous use of both approaches should facilitate optimum efficiency and more rapid progress.

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CHAPTER 3 • Hostility

Hate as a Transitional State in Psychic Evolution

CHANDLER BENNITT

It is a fair guess that the average person holds one, or both, of two beliefs about hate. One is the moral view that it is a wrong which can be suppressed in favor of more altruistic impulse. And that failure, again and again, simply means that one has not tried religiously enough. . . .

The other belief frankly accepts hate for normal and inevitable, either inherently or by virtue of environmental circumstances over which the individual has little or no control. The "inherent" theory sees hate as the working of an instinct to destroy which arises from the very roots of organic existence. This has been recognized, psychologically, to imply that it is useless to try to extirpate such an innate tendency; that we can only try to outsmart it into socially acceptable outlets. Since we cannot exorcise the demon we trick him into some civilized work. Butchery or surgery, for example, instead of chopping off heads.

The "environmental" theory sees hate as a natural defense reaction to a frustration of the hater's natural wants by some part of the environment, notably other human beings.

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... At bottom both of these are theories of conflict, with no more genuine solution than compromise.

At any rate, a third view of hate has begun to appear in my own studies of, and with, the unconscious side in work with patients. The nub of the matter is that hate is not so much a final anything, moral or instinctive, as *it is a common transitional state in a phase of true psychic evolution*. We usually perceive it as concentrated but it can be relatively diffuse. The transition may or may not be successfully consummated but, proportionately as it is, there remains no hate and nothing which can properly be described as aggressive instinct or aggression.

In approaching this third view of hate we observe that

1. The non-evolutionary accounts are effective only up to a certain critical point, then break down.
2. This is because hate itself represents the breakdown of the organism's own instinctive basis of functioning, in favor of a possible further, and more dynamic, reality basis.
3. Thus to grasp and to exploit the true nature of hate requires a more fundamental analysis of the hate condition as it exists than is afforded by causal attribution to aggressive instinct or to environment. Hate can be understood only as an evolutionary problem and this requires new and further operational concepts.

* * * *

2.

But now let us consider the more qualitative effect of hate, *per se*, regardless of its apparent aim. We observe this not merely as an action upon the hated person, or even bystanders. No one is less immune to its poisonous nature than the hater. It always diminishes, often paralyzes, perspective. It is anything but the functionally true feeling judgment which, however indignant, brings feeling to round out and clarify, not thwart, the total vision. Contrasted even with the dynamics of a natural instinctive response, something about it is extraordinarily inept. In operation it is like a grenade which the thrower can never get entirely away before it explodes. It looks much more like functional failure than functional success. And that, I suggest, is the clue to its most fundamental nature. *Where there is hate there is—no matter what the short term effectiveness—a case of instinctive functioning breaking down under an overload. Problematic material involved by the frustration has simply furnished the last straw.* The destructive quality in the result simply evidences that instinctive breaking down. It is in this sense only, that the last act of instinct is tending to be played out as death—its own death. It is only the person still thru-and-thru identified with instinct to whom this appears as slaying or being slain.

Unless we see that this is an altogether different matter from the normal functioning of a definitive instinct bent on dealing death, we face an irreconcilable discrepancy between the instinctive phenomenon and the factors of life. Whereas if we do, we can see that there may be real organic severance from identity with instinct which is not necessarily aimed at total death of the organism but at displacement of instinctive functioning to a more peripheral position. We can deduce that the breakdown of instinctive functioning happens for the very reason that a central psychic advance to some further, more dynamic, reality basis is under way. Finally we may hope to grasp and aid, with sufficiently more fundamental operational concepts, the nature of this developmental trend.

There are intimations in Jung's dream interpretation theories that the self-arousal of antagonism—as, for instance, toward a father—is for the purpose of freeing from dependence on the instinctive relation in favor of independent individuality. But success of such freeing involves more than a personally desirable goal. Specifically, freeing from the instinctive response as centrally determinative raises the psychological question of what, more penetratingly dynamic and more ultimately substantive, is to succeed it—indeed, must be at work to bring that about.

3.

To investigate this we have to go directly to the total developmental problem of the individual, which we temporarily disregarded in order to consider the non-evolutionary accounts. Here we have to take a new look at the origin and structure of hate, free of special preconceptions like causal frustration or instinctive bent.

As the human being approaches collective psychological maturity he becomes readier for impacts of inner and outer experience to raise the question of his true individuality. Before that, he may have won thru in relatively undifferentiated, relatively superficial patterns.³ Gradually—or sometimes quite abruptly—they prove insufficient for meeting his problems. Quite likely some especially focal one comes to the fore. Involuntarily, he makes gestures of growth toward the necessary deeper, more individual design.

Such evolutionary starts are most inauspicious. Whether or not one has perceived a grave problem to be confronting him, he begins by falling into some confusion. The psychic structure which has been his, up to that moment, necessarily somewhat disintegrates to allow further growth.

Needless to say, it is anything but just a conscious intellectual confusion.

³The quantitative biologic energy invested in them is no proof of depth any more than of differentiation psychologically. Psychology has its own ultimates; psychological development is not just successful attenuation of biologically conceived endowment.

The two discernible, intrinsic responses which emerge out of the total anxiety are pain and fear. Any considerable split-up of the only known structure seems unbearable. The imminent, all-too-meaningful, or all-too-actual, new material is terrifying or painful. His own developmental destiny forces him on. Yet all the inertia of non-evolutionary life seems to bind him to the unchanging, if now inadequate, round. Such, if we look closely, is the underlying dynamic situation, however plausibly (and, as far as it goes, correctly) any current, focal conflict may be explained in its own polar terms.

Under pressure, and beneath the conflict deadlock, the organism blindly pushes out instead of awarely enlarging. In the total milieu it inevitably meets some critical embodiment of further growth material, which is highly meaningful yet actually separate enough from the organism in question to be related to as an other living object—some other person, group, etc. Against the “otherness” of this object it first seeks relief, by instinctive discharge, of its own growth-pain and growth-fear. (To instinct these are net undesirables; to a merely inner-outer awareness there is always some plausible motivation for antagonism rather than further distinction and assimilation.) In such case the other object can only seem to have precipitated the aggression.

Nevertheless the underlying pain and terror in this situation are closer to the individual's identity than frustration or even conflict, *per se*, and more directly signify experience material which can no longer successfully be dealt with instinctively, or on any inner-outer basis, only. Instinct is not merely undifferentiated; it moves with power and power is low-grade dynamics. For both reasons the attempted catharsis is nugatory.

If, and only if, the futility of any mere change in pattern of behavior is finally sensed, the problem can begin to be accepted as one for the individual's genuine psychological development. The hate situation poses such a fundamental question for the hater that he can't begin to answer it as *he* is. He somehow has to get a deeper reality approach.

One of the first steps that occurs in the private laboratory of the consultation hour², is a new inkling of the nature of the central pain and fear. At first their confused precursor, anxiety, had obscured almost everything with its continuous instinctive clamor for discharge of tension. Soon however the pain and fear emerge and becomes separately discernible. This is a gain, but only preliminary to the step to which I refer.

We are not required to take pain and fear for wholly self-definitive. Nor, even, is the patient—overwhelmingly self-evident as they are to him. We discover that pain is the basic response to experience which is too much in one elemental way, and fear to what is too much in quite another, for the respective receptor capacities of the given psychic structure. We further discover that one element (or experience in one of its elemental aspects) enters on the conscious side of the conscious-unconscious threshold and

makes its impact primarily as fact (or factually), the other on the unconscious side as symbol (or symbolically).⁴

Sooner or later, the patient gathers enough of all this to see that his developmental answer to the hate problem will involve more aware assimilative experiencing of symbol and fact for what each genuinely presents. Especially it will involve assimilative experience on the symbolic side since the fear element is so predominant in hate and since the unconscious has been more neglected. He then begins to see the use of integrative psychologic guidance in and for this venture instead of just relief.⁵

Finally, working in these terms, the patient achieves his own grasp of the problem. Although genetic connections have been uncovered, he does

⁴ Unfortunately for an article of this compass, we are here faced with some consideration of the basic postulates of Symbol-Fact psychology. Plainly, fact is here used in a more special, if more final, sense than customarily. It is not the unit of whole reality. Symbol is conceived as equally, objectively real. It is not just a sign-pointer to something else, nor just a subjective portent of unrealized possibilities. Conscious and unconscious are here taken for complementary sides of psychic experiencing, or total dynamic awareness, rather than as containers of the relatively known and unknown. One is primarily the field of factual, the other of symbolic, awareness. *Either* side of the individual may be relatively developed or relatively undeveloped.

Lacking space to go into the investigation by which I reached the conclusion, I simply suggest that we can postulate

1) Ultimate (*i.e.*, non-derivative) *meaning* as well as ultimate *actuality*, as equal, contributory phases of reality. As one or the other preponderates in experience the latter's character is symbolic or factual, its elemental unit the symbol or the fact.

2) Symbol as the holistic, unifying, trans-dimensional container of meaning; fact as the distinctive, differentiating, dimensional focus of actuality. Thus they have their own substantive natures more final than any materiality or immateriality. Rather, one gives content, the other time-space location. They have their own dynamic directions more final than inner or outer. One may encounter a symbol, for example, in any direction—save that of pure fact.

3) Psychic reality as the aware fusion of the two. Save, perhaps, for certain moments of "all-out" living, this is a matter of gradual development. Ordinarily the factual bent of specific conscious attention and the symbolic bent of unconscious attention, tend to be mutually exclusive. Consciously the symbol is inferior, second grade; unconsciously, the fact.

⁵ In this situation the psychological method involves a new and more basic relation to dream life and the process of dream interpretation. Since meaning is a reality phase, experience in that phase—dreaming—is accepted for as real and as much objective as waking experience. It simply is symbolic rather than factual. There we livingly work thru our relation primarily to the forms of meaning rather than primarily to the forms of actuality. We do so with the same personal, sexual and impersonal systems of our own nature, except under the major functional aegis of imagination rather than will.

This approach provides the first real chance realistically to *distinguish symbol and fact*, and separately to assimilate what we do, suffer and achieve in respect of each. This is vital since indiscriminate response to and in terms of, mixed symbol and fact, "normal" as it may be for immediate instinctive functioning, or even for the usual inner-outer motivation, which still does not involve growth, is ultimately the fatal psychic confusion.

Then interpretation, instead of being the decipherment of a merely subjective or merely "psychic" phenomenon according to known conscious "meanings," is truly unprejudiced psychological integration of two equal aspects of total experience by means of the interpretative associational process (free and controlled). Instead of being one way and assimilative, only, it is two way and developmental.

not say, "I see that I am just an unhappy victim of my past." Although he is by no means free of resentment, he does not say, "Since hate I must, let me now get started on a useful path for it." He does say something like this "Now that my own fear and pain are no longer all-controlling, I can see that this hated person *means* something to me that demands a living place in my own nature. That explains why I could not be indifferent except for his actual effects. I still don't want to be like him; that is, I don't want that something in the same actual form. But I had no notion of that something as a meaning that I could separately and directly meet and deal with and livingly work into my own form and design. Now I have."

As progress is made in the psychologically developmental way there is an advance from instinctive response and even inner-outer motivation to still more central, still more dynamic, awareness in terms of true symbol and fact and their living assimilation and inter-conversion in an emerging, individual design of values. There is less and less occasion for the crude process of diverting gross, destructive-seeming energy into collectively approved channels. Finally the makeshift question of sublimation of instinct disappears.

Not merely is sublimation a dubious concept.⁶ No high flown language makes it anything more than a case of accepting some instinctively less direct, pertinent and satisfying goal, simply because the collective parent, society, happens to declare that substitute more acceptable to *it*. There is a true answer only if the individual comes to experience in such elements of reality as to afford him continuing, unconstricted means of *realizing his own design* including, merely as an inevitable part, his most effective mode of relating to society. Indeed, society is not ultimately helped except by a truly individual relation of participant to group.

Retrospectively, this throws a new light on the non-evolutionary accounts of hate, the most radical of which is the Freudian. That theory, while further reaching than the environmental-frustration theory, winds up in the untenable death instinct impasse because it is still a victim of confusion of symbol with fact. Failing to recognize symbol as a true objective entity, and as co-equal with fact, it fails to recognize the ultimate, dynamic natures of each, their different operative effects in experience, and their inter-conversions and fusions in the living process. It simply perpetuates the inadequate conceptual level of antithesis between inner "instinct" and an external "reality," and of negotiation and compromise between their opposing demands, instead of recognizing the single developmental issue of reality in its two phases, integrated with the final, developmental dynamics of life—factualizing the symbol, symbolizing the fact. Compared with

⁶As, for instance, Allport points out. Gordon W. Allport: *Personality* (Henry Holt & Co., 1937) p. 185.

these, sublimation of instinct—as refinement, desexualization, socialization, or whatever—is still no more than a molecular conception and still involves a repressive process.

Hence the Freudian solution is as abortive in practice as it is inadequate psychological physics in conception. It can be frustrating in the most final sense where, as in a profound hate situation, need for a genuinely individuated design of relation to life has become acute. Whereas, in the developmental process of progressive individuating experience with, and interpretative integration of, symbol and fact, the hate impasse begins to open up in a way that is still forwarding.

It appears that no deadly outcome need happen in fact. This however is not because any true potential in the factual direction is dissipated; however penetratingly differential that may be, it is not destruction. The thoroughgoing putting of an end to something which is the other ingredient of the destruction compound, can separately happen in the direction of symbol. The obscuring dominance of instinct itself may have to be terminated by a symbolic death, or death-dealing, experience. It is, literally, *the end of the individual's meaning to himself as identified with, or bound to, that instinctive standpoint*. Then he discovers that even so sweeping an ending of what has heretofore inadequately meant has a sequel. A deeper individuality arises and goes on to truer symbolic business with life, as well as factual. We find no evidence that the eventual death in fact is necessarily the climax of any instinct's power. That death in fact is wholly climactic in its actuality is another matter.

While all this has mainly to do with understanding hate as it appears in the individual development, there are two practical consequences for social concern with it and, specifically, for social psychology. The first is to vindicate the moral attitude and to enlist its aid, in so far as it holds that aggression need not take place in fact. Otherwise, that attitude is wrong. A constructive dealing still begins with admitting the hate wholeheartedly into awareness and accepting its reality as a current state. This is not, as we now see, just for relief nor just for more effective conscious criticism of the hate's factual warranties. It is to put oneself in position to work thru to a sufficient symbolic conclusion which then can also be correlated with what is factually adequate.

The other consequence is to indicate that psychological technique to release and utilize, with or without sublimation, a supposedly permanent aggressive instinct, or to reduce the incidence of frustration, is largely misdirected.⁷ The maximal use of such technique is for a temporary safety-

⁷ Consider the apparently simplest case, release and utilization in war. A psychoanalyst asserts that the "degree of conversions of the fear of death into murderous hatred . . . is the main ingredient of what we call morale." In the battle zone the converter is mainly one's own

valve against explosive expression, in still highly confused fact and symbol, of the transition state's concentrate. Beyond that the effort is a waste of priceless resources for real growth. The implications for society, in respect of its own long-range problem are still far ahead.

In the intensive laboratory of the individual case, if not yet in the more diffuse collective, one thing has already appeared. In final analysis hate is not the "equally immortal adversary⁸ of Eros" that Freud believed. It is a most mortal confusion of love. Its almost identic twin is misunderstanding; for the true immortals are Eros and Logos, whose ever living, and equally living, processes are love and understanding. At bottom, the most mortal confusion is a hurling of symbols at other's fact or of facts at their symbols—for lack of that final awareness of the nature and difference of these complementary elements of reality. *With* that awareness we may find the beginning of a whole intent, and of wholly living means, for the creative resolution of the transition state.

experiences. In other areas mustering up hate would be facilitated "If the general population could be better informed about our losses and could see more of our wounded." (Gregory Zilboorg, Meeting of American Psychiatric Association; *N. Y. Times*, 13 May, 1943.)

I do not deny that this instinctive "conversion" does happen and with certain immediate effectiveness. Hate is better than fear, in war. I do deny that it is either a basic conversion, or an achievement of true morale. Rather, I suggest the following:

It takes extreme factual awareness, even to the degree of great pain, to provide the real converter for the symbolic content of great fear. As that real conversion operates, however, something *beyond any discharge motivation* (flight or aggression) comes to mean more to the individual and actually commands more of his final autonomy. In short *true values emerge*. That is the ultimate achievement of morale, in any situation. Doubtless many so found it in the late war. But enemy fire is only one crucible. Every mortal will have his own. In any case the hate confusion, the "murderous hatred," can sooner or later disappear; the values can only stand out the more surely and steadily.

⁸*Civilization and Its Discontents*. p. 144.

A Formulation for Interpersonal Anger

DAVID M. KAPLAN, M.S.W., AND D. WELLS GOODRICH, M.D.

In order to study interpersonal anger in a systematic way, we decided to observe, to record, and to analyze interactions in which anger in at least one child was apparent to the observer. In this way we hoped to gather data on 1) the immediate precipitating factors leading to the expression of anger; 2) on the nature and psychological meaning of anger in these interactions; and 3) on any distinctive aspects of these anger interactions which relate to the problems of the aggressive acting-out child.

Our objective in analyzing these interactions was to formulate psychologically meaningful descriptions which would include the subjective aspects of the individual participant's experience in these interactions. We hoped to get some idea of the inner experience and meaning of these experiences to the participating individuals, and to avoid describing behavior in mechanistic ways reminiscent of early behaviorism.

The observations we made were not structured in any other way. They were made in the natural settings and of the natural activities of the children, on the unit in the Clinical Center, and on various trips that children regularly make. Our observations were limited to the behavior and events immediately preceding the expression of anger. We deliberately excluded events and behavior that occurred earlier the same day or even days before, which may have contributed to the behavior and the arousal of anger that we observed. This was done because we were particularly interested in describing the structure of these interactions rather than their etiology.

After we had collected a fairly large number of incidents of anger, in many different kinds of situations, we began to analyze these observations. In analyzing these interactions we found that we were describing the behavior of essentially two persons. The behavior of one, whom we called the "provocateur," appeared to be the precipitating factor in arousing

David M. Kaplan and D. Wells Goodrich, "A Formulation for Intrapersonal Anger," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (1957), pp. 387-395. Copyright, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc. Reproduced by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

anger in the other, whom we called the "angry person" in this process of interaction. Our continued study of these observations raised certain questions:

1. What kinds of behavior by the provocateur can call forth an angry and aggressive response from the angry person?
2. What has to go on inside the angry person so that he becomes observably angry?
3. What goes on inside the angry person when under similar circumstances he does not become angry?
4. What is the psychological definition of the kind of anger we have been observing?
5. In what ways can the angry person handle his anger once he has become angry?

The Formulation

In attempting to answer these questions we have worked out a formulation to describe interactions in which anger and aggressive behavior were observed in the children under study. . . .

The first part of the formula refers to the behavior of the provocateur which arouses an anger response in another. This behavior consists of a wide variety of acts which are perceived by the angry person as deliberate and unjustified personal attacks.

These acts can be expressed directly and simply (name calling, direct physical attack, and frank destruction of another's property), leaving little doubt about the hostile intent¹ of the provocateur. Provocation may also be expressed in indirect and less obvious fashion from which the intent to hurt and insult can be deduced. These indirect forms of provocation are often more subtle; the intent to insult is frequently not as clearly manifest.

The other important kind of behavior which can arouse anger is really not provocative behavior but behavior which is misperceived as provocation. Here the angry person mistakes the acts of others as personal attacks, but actually the intent of the other person to hurt and insult him is not present. This broad category of provocative behavior contains a wide variety of acts which we have been studying and hope to report on in greater detail at a later time.

Decisions as to whether an angry person's judgment of provocation was accurate or inaccurate were made in this study by observers who had access to much clinical data about the current ward situation.

The reason or reasons a particular act will call forth an angry response

¹In deciding that the provocateur's behavior carries a hostile intent, the observer is interpreting the connotations of overt behavior; he is not concerned here with the extent to which the provocateur is consciously aware of his hostile intent.

in an individual lie in the history and personality of that individual. In this formulation we are not concerned with the problem of why a particular act calls forth an angry response in a particular individual. Our concern here is with the nature of the anger response itself.

It is important to know here that the anger response which we are describing can take place and usually does in a fraction of a second. While it is possible to distinguish the different phases of the process conceptually, it is important to keep in mind that for all practical purposes these phases operate simultaneously.

The second part of the formula refers to what we think goes on inside the angry person when he responds with anger to the behavior of another person. The first step in the response requires that the angry person perceive or become aware of the behavior of the provocateur. Following this awareness, the angry person can be observed to act or respond with anger to the provocateur. The anger response which has just taken place is a complex one in which the angry person reveals his interpretation of the provocateur's behavior.²

The anger response seems to be primarily an immediate non-self-reflexive response; that is, one is not aware at the time of the response of the various phases which we shall shortly describe (5, p. 22). Awareness of anger follows the response; however, this awareness may come so soon after the response that it appears to coincide with the anger itself.

An analysis of this anger response suggests that it consists of four conceptually separate phases or parts: cognitive, physiological, emotional, and conative.

The *cognitive phase*, which begins with the awareness of the provocateur's behavior, consists of a particular *interpretation* which the angry person makes of the provocateur's behavior. He must apprehend this behavior as being directed at him. He must believe that this behavior by the provocateur constitutes an intended personal injury or insult to himself. He must believe that this insult was unjustified, and finally, he must consider the provocateur to be both responsible and accountable for his behavior.

The *physiological phase* of the anger response includes the muscular, respiratory, visceral and circulatory changes that are characteristic of anger. This phase begins with what has been described as a bodily attitude of preparation for and the beginning of the anger response. This preliminary bodily attitude or readiness for anger is specific to anger as other bodily attitudes are to other processes, for example, joy, disgust, and fear. The completed physiological expression of anger often, but not always, follows

²The relation between response and perception referred to is described in greater detail in Mead (5, p. 114).

the attitude of readiness and is identified by the recognized signs of anger which include raised voice, reddened face, clenched fists, etc.³

In the *emotional phase* of the anger response, the angry person experiences certain feelings: feelings of pain and displeasure at the insult or injury and feelings of dislike and enmity for the provocateur.

The angry person experiences a wish to revenge the insult; he wishes for a retaliatory punishment of the provocateur. This wish for revenge constitutes a tendency to act so as to hurt the provocateur. In this sense, this tendency may be considered the *conative phase* of the anger response. It may or may not be turned into an overt hostile act toward the provocateur. In this phase the conscious, purposive, self-directed quality of the anger response is expressed.⁴

The awareness of these phases of the anger response can be gross and relatively undefined, it may simply consist of a consciousness of "being angry," or this awareness can be carefully differentiated. Retrospectively, it is possible to recall the various phases in considerable detail. The individual can remember how he felt, what he wanted to do, and he can describe his thoughts which were related to the anger episode.

Following these sequences in the process, there may be what we have called a "re-evaluation phase" in which the angry person may eliminate one or more of these necessary cognitive conditions for anger. If this occurs, anger in the angry person is dissipated.

When, however, anger persists, the subject may behave in a variety of ways. 1) He may issue a cease and desist order to the provocateur, in effect, telling him that his behavior is considered provocative and warning him to cease this kind of behavior. In addition, he may demand an apology from the provocateur as a further condition to his not retaliating. 2) He may punish the provocateur in fantasy only. 3) He may openly threaten the provocateur with revenge at a later date. 4) He may displace his anger and aggressive behavior away from the provocateur to another person to whom it is more feasible to express his anger and retaliatory behavior. 5) He may punish the provocateur immediately by an overt act.

We have thought of interpersonal anger as a process resulting from interaction in which the *cognitive interpretation of the behavior of others as constituting deliberate and unjustified attacks on the self* is contained.⁵ These attacks are seen as coming from persons and forces *from without* that affect

³The relationship between physiological changes which according to the James-Lange theory precede feelings in individual experience of emotions has been elaborated further by Nina Bull (2).

⁴For a fuller account of conation in emotional experience see McDougall (3, pp. 314-337).

⁵The importance of the individual perception and cognitive interpretation in situations where anger is aroused is noted by Sargent (8) and by McKellar (4).

the self. Whatever specific form the provocateur's behavior assumes, the thinking described above is the implicit condition necessary for the arousal of anger in interpersonal situations. The anger we have been observing is a response to the specific behavior of another person which is fixed in time and space. From our study anger does not appear to be aroused except by such specific situations or by the recall of such specific episodes.

Anger has as its primary motive a defensive counterattack for purposes of revenge, i.e., the retaliatory hurting and punishing of a person who is thought to have first insulted and attacked the self. The satisfaction involved in the provocateur's suffering seems to be necessary for the successful dissipation of anger in the angry person.

Hurting others, from our observations, may be accomplished in a variety of ways: by causing personal pain or injury to the other, by damaging the other's property, by interference with the other person's activities, by impairing the other person's reputation or status, by frustrating the other's expectations or by wounding the other person's feelings or sensibilities.

If the formulation that has been made here of the anger complex is applicable to anger as it occurs in most of us in interpersonal interactions, what is different about anger as it occurs in children with aggressive acting-out disturbances? While it is much too early for us to answer this question definitively, a number of suggestions may be mentioned. In children who are chronically angry and aggressive, the anger complex plays an important role in providing not only the *source* of provocation for the angry person but a *justification* for the counteraggressive attack or retaliation as well.

While we all perceive provocation by others and become angry at times, we differ in our ability to perceive accurately whether there is a justifiable basis for our becoming angry. One characteristic of children with aggressive acting-out disturbances is the considerable frequency with which they misinterpret the behavior of others to be provocation directed against them. A good deal of this behavior which the children considered to be provocation does not appear to the observer to be intentional provocation. The frequent misperception of the behavior and the motives of other people reflects the strong paranoid quality of the thinking of these children.

We also believe that these children less frequently "re-evaluate" their perception of others' behavior to come out with the judgment that they have made an error in their original perception. They seldom decide that their original judgment of the other's behavior as being provocative was in error.

In children with aggressive acting-out disturbances the problem of cognitive misperception of the intent of the other's behavior is part of the broader problem of their general lack of "realism in the assessment of social reality." The importance of treating this deficiency is of crucial

significance to successful rehabilitation of these children, as Redl and Wineman have pointed out:

For the very nature of the ego disturbances being dealt with involves severe distortion of outside reality factors to the extent of actual delusional misinterpretation of the actions of the adult in many areas even when the adult and total climate are as benign as they possibly can be. In moments when the child may be acting out some of these delusional attitudes and ordinary channels of communication through verbal appeal are un navigable, the clinical adult must convey the basically friendly ideology of the treatment home through what might be termed counterdelusional action patterns. . . . Such occurrences are an everyday event in the lives of children of such primitive ego structures and the need to develop a consistent chain of gestural and action rebuttals for these delusions about the adult is one of the paramount tasks in the treatment environment (7, p. 252).

A number of treatment techniques described by Fritz Redl under the headings of "Interpretation through counterdelusional action" and "Focusing experiences through the interview" apply directly to the problem of cognitive distortion in anger situations found in children with aggressive acting-out disturbance.

These techniques include "gestural and action rebuttals" of the children's delusional thinking and the various kinds of life-space interviewing ("Rub-In," "Guilt Squeeze," Expressional, "Counterdistortional," Interpretational and Group Interviews) that are designed in large part to correct misinterpretations of social reality so frequently made by children with aggressive acting-out disturbances (7, pp. 252-275).

Another characteristic of children with aggressive acting-out difficulties, which has been described by Redl, is that their aggression "seems to flow uninhibited, skipping the in-between stage of fantasy to direct action, action of reckless destruction or into flare-ups of blind and murderous rage" (6, p. 22). This observation is one that we can confirm from our observations. However, it appears that this characteristic is a difference of degree and not one of kind. By that we mean that there are many times when the children do control their aggressive tendencies short of direct attack, even though they more frequently explode into aggressive behavior and less frequently inhibit their aggressive tendencies than other children seem to do.

It is interesting to speculate about the extent to which children with aggressive acting-out problems have inadequate ego controls and to what extent they are simply unmotivated to control aggression as often as other children because of their distorted perceptions of others. The belief in a hostile world in which one is forced to make his own way without outside help, always on the alert against the interference and hostile intent of others, may be sufficient to make inoperable important ego controls that may be present.

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Individual Hostility and Group Integration

ERICH LINDEMANN, M.D.

Hostility between adult individuals and groups, on which the following article is focused, is of urgent concern not only to the psychiatrist but to every citizen of the world today, because of the rapidly expanding destructiveness of weapons of violence. In recent years, psychiatrists have become more and more conscious of the challenge before them to deal in a therapeutic manner not only with individual inclinations to violence but with those of nations and various groups within nations.

Unfortunately, the lag in social science, compared with the physical and biological sciences, is responsible for a baneful gap in well-documented information concerning such everyday phenomena as the creation of hostile emotions and attitudes and their expression in hostile acts. This study can only try to clarify the concepts involved and point in the direction of a possible solution of the problems created by hostility.

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It seems an old question to ask again for the primary source of hostility in human interaction. The appealing answer, documented well by Dollard,⁵ is that frustration, that is interference with goal-directed action, will arouse hostile impulses; that the more severe the interference the more severe the hostility; and that situations of challenge or loss which involve a frustration are often shown to be followed by a sequence of hostile impulses and actions. The frustration theory of hostility has been widely

⁵J. Dollard, N. Miller, L. Doob, O. H. Mowrer and R. Sears. *Frustration and Aggression*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939.

Erich Lindemann, "Individual Hostility and Group Integration," *Human Organization*, published by the Society for Applied Anthropology, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring, 1949), pp. 5-9. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in original.

accepted. Rosenzweig⁶ has traced the consequences of frustration in terms of extra-punitive and intra-punitive hostile behavior, and the psycho-analytic literature is full of examples of the variety of ways in which the hostile response, begotten by frustration or deprivation, may be inhibited, delayed or replaced by apparently non-hostile reactions, or disappear altogether, or be reactivated by subsequent provocation.

In the last few years, increasing doubt has been cast on the all-exclusive role originally assigned to the frustration situation as the source of hostility. David Levy⁷ pointed out that not all frustration leads to hostility. That is, instead it may sometimes lead to a modification or intensification of the goal-directed behavior. It seems that the problem is much more complex, and that a great variety of factors are operating as potential sources for hostility. Consideration of such responses, in terms of the individual only, without due regard to the structure of the human group in which they arise, is apt to over-simplify the answer to the problem.

The time characteristics of the frustrating situation should first be amplified. Security may be considered a state of affairs in which one does not anticipate any threat to the prevailing methods of securing rewards and satisfaction of one's needs. Insecurity, then, is the awareness of a threat of future frustration. An important source of gratification is related to an individual's status within the group, which determines the privilege of expecting certain actions from others in the group, and the obligation to fulfil certain expectations on their part. Interference with group status in this way, or threatened interference, may be brought about by simply altering the number of people in the group; the arrival or departure of one person may serve as a source of hostility.

The term *hostile tension* has been used to indicate a state of readiness for hostile action in the face of such a threat, even though the target for action has not yet been found. Talcott Parsons,⁸ taking threats to security as the starting point, has reviewed some features of the social systems in which we and our patients live, all having in common the production of insecurity and ensuing hostile tension. The high rate of social mobility of a given individual, the unstable family structure with rarely present father and reluctantly present mother, the lack of continuity in family and occupational life, and the exposure to conflicting claims and demands made possible by the over-development of channels of communication, all serve to reduce the opportunity of carrying on the present mode of adjustment

⁶Saul Rosenzweig. *An Outline of Frustration Theory. Personality and the Behavior Disorders*. Ronald Press, New York, 1944.

⁷David Levy. The Hostile Act. *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, pp. 355-361, 1941.

⁸Talcott Parsons. Certain primary sources and patterns of aggression in the social structure of the western world. *Psychiatry*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1947.

with success into the foreseeable future. The forces demanding the transition from one frame of reference to the other become the object of hostile regard and are often personified to become suitable targets for hostile action. Even an individual who is not frustrated to any distressing degree may become a participant in hostile group sentiment in groups which find or consider themselves the victims of arbitrarily imposed changes. A person with a large reservoir of hostile tension will contribute to channeling and expressing the development of group sentiment into group action.

If insecurity widens the time pattern of frustration, a quantitative factor may be introduced by considering that an accumulation of minimal threats or provocations to angry responses may have the same effect of instigating hostile reactions as one powerful hostility-arousing event. This sort of provocation does not have to be a frustrating experience. A hostile action on the part of an individual or group may arouse counter-hostility as the immediate response to the proper stimulus. The so-called rejecting mother, and the group surrounding an individual with inimical emotional climates, may, by the omission of friendly acts, just as by the commission of hostile deeds, create a growing reservoir of hostile tension requiring ever more primitive hostile acts for adequate discharge. Newcomb⁹ recently pointed out the vicious circle by which an individual or a group once ready for hostile response gradually reduces the channels of communication with the potential enemy, thus preventing rectification of the early impressions of hostility and redress by friendly actions. Hostile isolation is likely to make hostile tension more enduring. The dammed-up hostility from other sources will then be channeled against the enemy, and any efforts to make the enemy unsuitable as a target will only arouse renewed and increased hostility. As every psychiatrist knows, the communication of hostile sentiments and their reappraisal in terms of the individuals or groups responsible for their creation is a crucial event in successful treatment, for he himself, in transference, temporarily becomes the target for hostile emotions.

This list by no means covers all the possible sources, but it can at least form a basis for considering the fate of hostile impulses once they are aroused. Hostility, like other basic impulses, carries the demand for action: the removal or destruction of the stimulus. Should the stimulus agent disappear before he can become the object of hostile action, a hostile response still requires execution against substitute targets. The powerful self-punitive response seen in certain bereaved individuals after the death of a hated person suggests such a mechanism.

⁹Theodore M. Newcomb. Autistic hostility and social reality. *Human Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 69-85, 1947.

If the individual or group becomes a target for hostile action, the most direct and most primitive form of such action is killing and mutilation. But there is also a wide gamut of other possible forms, ranging from such primitive behavior to the many refined pursuits and tormentings of a victim which are still possible in our culture and even within the law, for example, malicious gossip or political blackmail. Nevertheless, there seems to be a great readiness for the hostile response to revert to the most primitive form when pressure of hostile tension reaches a certain maximum. The profusion of destructive fantasies in frustrated individuals, the furious self-destruction of melancholics, the arsenal of substitute reactions and more or less well-disguised defenses against hostility and reaction formations which have become common knowledge through psychoanalytic investigation, need hardly be mentioned here.

I would like, rather, to call attention to another form of transformation which has to do with the group relationships of the individual aroused to hostility: the degree to which hostile impulses have to be held back from execution causes a restriction of the forms and execution, and their occurrence is likely to be inhibited by the signal of guilt reactions. Anticipation of self-punishment in guilt feelings, or expectancy of group punishment, will serve as a counterimpulse to block the hostile act or to keep it relatively mild. It is, however, quite possible for an aroused individual to seek to make an alteration in his group's attitude toward his hostile acts, by setting the acts in a more permissible or legitimate context or time.

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...The control which determines license or inhibition for hostile action apparently remains flexible, varying with the group attitude. In turn, the hostility potential of a group may become channelized by the presence of a particularly hostile single member. Freud's¹⁰ analysis of the factors involved in lynching and mob violence, and Fritz Redl's¹¹ description of the behavior of adolescent boys who have formed groups or gangs with special codes of action, rigidly controlling the expression of hostility within the group and facilitating hostile attitudes and actions against out-groups, provide ample illustrations of this sort of individual and group interplay.

Talcott Parsons, in the paper mentioned above, points out that as a nation grows the necessity of avoiding in-group tension is one of the sources of readiness to hate and to make a scapegoat of other national groups, adding to the danger of hostile action in the form of war. National-

¹⁰ Sigmund Freud. Mass psychology and analysis of the ego.

¹¹ F. Redl. Group emotion and leadership. *Psychiatry*, Vol. 5, pp. 578, 1942.

ism, the fight for a religious tenet and the struggle to maintain national superiority, seem to be both broad and vague enough to permit channeling hostility in the direction of poorly defined and little investigated out-groups.

That the type of organization prevailing in a certain group may have great influence upon the hostility felt and displayed by its members, was shown in the well-known experiments of Lippitt, Lewin and White,¹² in which groups of teen-age boys differing in the type of leadership structure, some having centralized leadership (called autocratic), and some with group-determined action (called democratic), were compared for the amount of hostile expression and fighting recorded during certain standard observational periods. It turned out that members of the so-called autocratic group showed considerably more overt hostility than those of the so-called democratic group, and that the same boy would alter his level of hostile expression according to the group of which he was a member at a given time.

Of special interest for our consideration are situations in which there is a sudden disturbance of group equilibrium. Individuals who acquire an increment of hostile tension in situations not suspected by them as being capable of so disturbing them, namely in states of bereavement and the period following major surgical operations, may show remarkable changes in group interaction. We will not deal here with whether or not the source of the hostility is primarily frustration involved in the loss of a beloved person or an organ of the body. We are concerned rather with the disequilibrium of group interaction observed to have occurred in the system of human relations of such individuals.

A marked increment in hostile tension seems to be a common consequence of surgery.

* * * *

Their condition, which we have called post-operative tension state, and which in clinical description comes close to reactive depression, attains special significance when viewed as an event affecting a family orbit. In such an orbit, the altered state of the mother gives rise to anxious concern on the part of the children, who blame their misconduct for their mother's disturbed condition, or on the part of the husband, who withdraws from interaction within the family, rationalizing his withdrawal as avoidance of disturbing the patient. Such disintegration of the family pattern of interaction further increases dismay and tension on the part of the patient and leads to a vicious circle of multiple maladjustments.

Many occasions of severe bereavement demonstrate with striking clarity

¹² K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White. Patterns of aggressive behavior in experimentally created "social climates." *Jour. Soc. Psychol.*, Vol. 10, pp. 271-299, 1939.

how the loss of a recently deceased individual, an important link for the interactions of the survivors, forces the survivors into a hostile and belated execution of hostile attitudes and actions which first become manifest only after his death. In our recent studies we have been greatly concerned with the reasons for certain phenomena of incorporation by which the survivor acquires traits or symptoms of the member of the family who has died.

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In conclusion, it seems important to emphasize that we are still at the very beginning of an understanding of the complicated processes of the development and discharge of emotions in the individual. . . . In the past, psychiatry has culled most of its information from detailed analyses of isolated individuals. For purposes of study, they have been too often considered as living in a social vacuum, with no system of interaction with other human beings already about them. In therapy, they have been too often placed in a new institutional group where human social interaction and stimulus was either not afforded them or not critically observed or controlled. Today, it is to these same neglected aspects of social interaction and stimulation that we must turn. We are justified in having great hopes for new insights if we base our future studies squarely upon the emotional adjustments patients make in the group. . . .

In making such future studies, we must avail ourselves of insights borrowed from the social psychologists and anthropologists. With them, and with the objective of psychiatry in mind—the controlling of disorganized, untoward emotional reactions in patients and normal persons alike—we can, before too long, lay the foundations for a preventive psychiatry, operating in a community setting.

The Role of Hostility in the Appeal of Communism in the United States

HERBERT E. KRUGMAN

The basic data considered in this paper are psychoanalytic case reports of 35 patients who are members or former members of the American Communist party. The paper examines in greatest detail 18 of these patients for whom the two main functions of communism were to permit them to express either hostility or submission without feelings of guilt. By focusing on the most typical family situation for this group of cases, by elaborating the most typical consequences of this situation for personality development, and by linking these with the two particular functions of communism, it is possible to demonstrate the appeal of communism for these patients in terms of generally accepted psychoanalytic insights.

Although hostility seems to play a major role in the personal histories of Communists wherever they are found, it seems to be more conspicuous in Americans than among other groups.¹ This may be attributed to selective factors associated with the more deviant position of the Communist party in the United States. But the role of hostility varies even within the subgroups of the American Communist party. For example, hostility appears at a later period in the lives of Communists who are trade union members than among those who are middle-class intellectuals. Furthermore, the causes of

¹For example, it is more conspicuous among American than among French Communists. The author of this paper had primary responsibility for gathering and analyzing data on the American Communist party. The present article represents a preliminary analysis of data only. In the final report of the Project, such data will be used differently—that is, they will be placed in a broader context of materials and interrelated with them. These other materials will include, for example, the results of interviews with ex-Communists in England, France, and Italy as well as in the United States.

hostility among the trade unionists are more likely to be found in the direct impact on them of real politicoeconomic factors. Among the intellectuals the causes are more frequently found in the problems of emotional adjustment in early family life.² It is the group of middle-class intellectuals, therefore, on whom I wish to focus in this paper. For this group I have sought to uncover the predominant underlying patterns of hostility and to identify those adaptive mechanisms which take the form of susceptibility to communism.

* * * *

Basic Personality Structure

In evaluating the basic personality structure of the 35 cases, it has seemed desirable to me to assume that the bedrock of personality structure is found in the early personal relationships between parents and children.⁷ The child's acceptance of the parents and identification with them provide him with a set of gradually evolving self-images which are designed, so to speak, to lead him finally into the adequate performance of his adult roles in the larger social community. If a person's performance of certain adult roles differs significantly from the societal norms for those roles, then one is justified in asking: To what extent and particularly in what sense did the family in which this person grew up differ from those families in the same society which produced at the same time children who became norm-fulfilling adults?

The most basic determining factors in family structure are (a) cohesiveness, or harmony, and (b) distribution of power. So far as cohesiveness is concerned, conflict between parents was common and intense in the families of 16 of the 20 male cases, and in 8 of the 15 female cases. So far as power is concerned, the mother was most frequently dominant over the father. The father was most frequently rejected by the children.⁸ . . .

The dominant mothers not only held the power in the families but in many cases they indulged their power by open and frequent belittling of the husband. More important, since only two of the 25 mother-dominated families resulted in a divorce or separation, the child had the opportunity

²See H. E. Krugman, "The Appeal of Communism to American Middle Class Intellectuals and Trade Unionists," *Public Opinion Quart.* (1952) 16:331-355.

⁷Although details of psychoanalytic theory are somewhat controversial, the main outlines have come to be accepted by social scientists as worthy of their serious attention. At some risk of condensation and generalization, I have attempted to place the specific findings within the context of these main outlines.

⁸The classic stereotype of the radical youth rebelling from his father's authority carries with it the implication that the father is the dominant parent. While these cases also tend to focus their hostility on the father, it is not because his authority is greater. It is because the relative weakness of his authority is a source of shame and therefore unacceptable and irritating.

to see for himself that what the mother said was, so to speak, really true—that is, the father was weak and did not rebel. It is not known how common the mother-dominated family is in American society. What does seem unusual in the present 25 cases of mother-dominated families is the amount of belittling of the father by the mother—and implicitly of all men. Actually, many of the fathers were not weak and did put up a fight, but they did so against great odds since the emotional need for dominance seemed to be very great among the mothers.

The implications of the situation described above are quite important in terms of the child's development. The early inability of the child to accept the love of the father interferes with the self-image of the boy, who wants to be like his father when he grows up, and of the girl, who wants to marry a man like her father. And this confusion reinforces still earlier confusions in self-image, such as "Am I a boy or a girl?" or "Which is best—to be a boy or a girl?" And the conflicts that come at a later age and reinforce these earlier conflicts are more intense as a consequence of their timing. Thus the problem of identifying with the parent of the same sex comes late and is particularly intense. In the 35 cases under consideration, the underlying confusions were prominent enough so that the later deep conflicts very commonly involved the problem of homosexuality. One case of overt and 12 cases of latent homosexuality were diagnosed among the 20 males, while 5 cases of overt and 3 cases of latent homosexuality were diagnosed among the 15 females.

Latent homosexuality is a deceptive topic. Its presence, in at least some degree, is to be commonly expected since all children have both a male and a female parent. More specifically, all children go through a period of some confusion before they learn, first, to which sex they actually belong and, later, how important it is considered that they want to belong to that sex. In considering the problem of sexual role, it is important to note that in our culture "masculinity" and "femininity" have very different connotations. The term "masculinity" implies strength, aggressiveness, and dominance, while "femininity" implies weakness, passivity, and submission. When, therefore, the adolescent with a history of more than ordinary confusion in sexual self-imagery comes into contact with the role demands of the culture, he begins to have conflicts of self-image which are defined by these role demands. The adolescent's confidence and consistency of behavior is then shaken by such underlying doubts among boys as "Am I weak or strong?" and "Am I a boy or a man?" and by such doubts among girls as "Are girls equal to boys?" and "Should I demand to be treated as an equal?" The doubts among girls are usually more conscious and hence provoke more surface turmoil.

By the time adulthood is reached, these conflicts have usually focused, in overt behavior, on (1) attitudes towards authority, (2) general energy,

activity, and aggressiveness, and (3) interpersonal hostility. Or to put it another way, the identical conflicts have been resolved, on the action and/or fantasy levels, in terms of (1) either defiance or compliance towards authority; (2) either energetic assertiveness or passive dependency; and (3) either hatred or solicitude for others. The extreme choices are made by those with the most pronounced history of confusion and conflict in self-image. Furthermore, there tends to be some consistency in the direction of choice on all three factors. Thus, defiance of authority, hyperactivity, and hostility will often be found together in one person, while compliance with authority, hypoactivity, and solicitude will be found in another. This pair of opposing behavior patterns deriving from a common source will be referred to as the *hostility syndrome*.⁹

Just as some degree of homosexuality is the most frequently mentioned conflict against which these Communist patients are defending themselves, so some variation of the hostility syndrome is most frequently mentioned by their analysts as the basis of their defense. *Thus when the analysts were asked about the functions of communism in the lives of their patients, they were most likely to say something about the way in which communism helped the patient to express either hostility or submissiveness without feelings of guilt.*¹⁰ These two functions were noted in 10 and 8 cases, respectively, whereas no other function of communism received more than four mentions. While some of these other functions are interesting for the light they seem to shed on such factors as intellectual snobbery, devotion to the arts, and political swings from one extreme to another, it seems preferable to focus attention on the two most frequently mentioned functions. Apart from their numerical preponderance, it must also be noted that these two functions form the only polar-pair uncovered.

The Expression of Hostility

I would like to take up first those patients who turned to communism because of the need—largely unsatisfied before joining the party—to indulge in ruthless and hostile behavior without feelings of guilt. Of the 10 cases in this category, 5 are men, of whom 4 left the party, and 5 are women, of whom 2 left the party. This need to express hostility is rooted

⁹The aggressive and passive resolutions of the hostility syndrome do not represent a true polarity, psychoanalytically speaking, but only a difference in repression. This difference is nevertheless fundamental to the present study since it highlights the range of the appeal of communism—from the most aggressive persons, in day-to-day behavior, to the most submissive.

¹⁰In this report any evaluation of the function of communism was necessarily handicapped by the fact, previously noted, that politics was not often discussed during therapy. Thus, the conscious meaning of communism, in the eye of the patient, was not always precisely known by the analyst.

in the dynamics of the hostility syndrome.¹¹ The aggressive resolution of this syndrome represents a choice favoring maleness—that is, the five men in this category are described as trying to remain men, and the five women as trying to become men or something better.

All five of the men show latent homosexual tendencies and fight such tendencies with the aid of actual or fantasied defiance, assertiveness, and hostility. Even in moments of doubt, however, they can find some satisfaction in the knowledge that they are at least biologically male and they therefore consider themselves superior. The women fight against feelings of inferiority by trying, successfully as a rule, to outdo the men in defiance, assertiveness, and hostility. Their problem, however, is much more complex and their goal self-defeating, since they cannot escape awareness of the fact that they are biologically female and they therefore consider themselves inferior. Because of their greater frustration, they are better haters with greater capacities for guilt. Consequently they lean more on the party; for example, three of the five women are called “fanatics” by their analysts in comparison with none of the five men, and three of the women remained in the party in comparison with one of the men.

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For both men and women of this kind, the party provides guilt-free outlets for feelings of power and acts of hostility. For the men in this category, the party supplements feelings of masculine power and justifies covert acts of hostility which fairly frequently are accompanied by feelings of hostility. For the women, the party permits feelings of masculine power and justifies open acts of hostility which are rarely accompanied by feelings of hostility. The explanation of the greater frequency with which men experience feelings of hostility may be found in the fact that emotion of any kind is to a certain extent socially defined as feminine. Though hostility is so defined to a lesser extent than other emotions, it is more masculine—particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries—to be of the strong, silent type or the cool, calm, and collected type. To feel hostility is therefore feminine and consequently to be avoided, especially by the women under consideration in this category. They have, after all, the difficult task of trying to be men—a task more difficult than the men’s task of trying not to be women.

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¹¹ Perhaps the conflicts associated with this syndrome are made more acute by strict and early toilet training. In the total group of 35 patients, the analysts had data on toilet training in only 15 cases, of which 10 involved strict training. Of these 10 cases, 6 are in the category under discussion.

The cases in this category are or were busy members of the party. They do the talking and studying, and tend to be very much interested in the theoretical aspects of communism. For them the expression of hostility is a basic need which is rarely satisfied until they become members of the party and are able to express hostility without guilt feelings. Even then, however, their increasingly frequent releases of hostility are cautious; they must test this new control with which they have been provided. In addition, most of them have had little experience with overt hostility; the women in particular have not previously learned its use. In the party, the most common expression of hostility is verbal, and this becomes the form they use.

For the women the need for hostility release is greater than for the men; their "conversion" is therefore apt to be more sudden and the changes in their overt behavior more rapid upon their joining the party. The men, on the other hand, have always had some release of hostility in their feeling of being superior. In most cases, the men have not behaved defiantly, assertively, and hostilely with any consistency before joining the party, but they have indulged in fantasies and in occasional overt acts which were usually disturbing to them. It should be emphasized again here that these cases are of patients and these patients consist of men who did not successfully resolve the hostility syndrome, and of women who did so only artificially with the aid of the party. The men more readily left the party than did the women; since they had a somewhat lesser need for hostility release, they were less blinded to the submissive character of party membership. Once they recognized this submissive character, they were confronted with the threat of femininity, which is what they were fighting against in the first place. Therefore, the four men who left the party, out of the five in this category, left for basically the same reason that they joined—that is, to be a man, to be masculine, to be aggressive instead of weak and feminine.

The Expression of Submissiveness

The second category is made up of those patients who joined the Communist party because of the need to be submissive without feelings of guilt. Of the 8 cases in this category 5 are men, of whom 2 left the party, and 3 are women, all 3 of whom left the party. This need to be submissive is rooted in the dynamics of the hostility syndrome. The passive resolution of this syndrome represents an underlying choice favoring femaleness—that is, the five men in this category have not been very successful in trying to be men, and the three women are almost childishly submissive. All five of the men have latent homosexual tendencies, and all have some slight history of overt, passive homosexuality in their adolescence. The women, on the other hand, have all had overt passive homosexual experiences as adults

but have broken off these relationships because they found them frightening. This entire pattern is directly opposite to that found in the previous category where the men have never had overt homosexual experiences and the women are either active, overt homosexuals or of a similarly aggressive character structure.

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The self-images of the five men in this category feature dual, conflicting, and extreme attitudes toward their ability; they think of themselves alternately as superior and as worthless people.¹⁵ They are also good, nice people—too nice to be aggressive to others—and in some cases martyrs.

These men fear being aggressive—that is, challenging authority. They also fear aggression—that is, punishment for perhaps wanting to challenge authority. And finally, they fear awareness of the feminine component in their submissiveness. The party gives them compelling reasons for being good, submissive, nonaggressive members, and at that same time offers them the bittersweet role of the martyr as a way of handling the aggression which they expect towards themselves.

Another defense which these men use is the avoidance of areas of competition and hence of possible defeat; thus, the party frequently serves as an alibi for almost deliberate nonachievement. Still another common defense of theirs is hypochondriasis, which they use to handle their fears of aggression towards themselves, and which gets rewarded by fatherly attention—for instance, medical attention.

Throughout the psychoanalysts' case histories of these five male patients, the terms "somasochism" and particularly "masochism" appear. The analysts used these concepts to describe, for example, the cruelty of two of the patients toward their wives, and the self-defeating and self-destructive harshness of all of the patients toward themselves.¹⁶ An important aspect of this pattern is the way in which they handle hostility towards others. The fact that they are passive and are afraid of being aggressive does not mean that they do not have hostility; nor does their being masochistic mean that their hostility is resolved by being turned against themselves. Rather, it means that the men in this category have an ability to *postpone the discharge of hostility*, and that their suffering or martyr-

¹⁵The males in the previous category, involving the aggressive resolution of the hostility syndrome, show consistently high self-regard in their self-images. Deep down they can derive satisfaction from knowing that they are at least biologically male. The cases in this category are less able to do so.

¹⁶For the purpose of this report, I have tried to avoid some of the complexities of the concept of somasochism by developing the concept of the hostility syndrome. For a fuller discussion of somasochism, see T. Reik, *Masochism in Modern Man*; New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1941.

dom allows them to do so.¹⁷ They can be martyrs not because they love people, but because being martyrs allows them to look forward with pleasure to the day of revenge. This is the bittersweet essence of martyrdom. Contrast the following two quotations, the first with reference to a case in the previous category of hostility and the second with reference to one in the present category of submissiveness:

(1) There was an inability to postpone discharge and a need for ready-made objects of hostility which would always be available.

(2) The party represented an opportunity to suffer but with the feeling that "some day I will get revenge."

Men like those in this category have a great deal invested in the party, and it is perhaps more difficult for them to break away than for any others. Three of the five men in this category remained in the party.

Conclusion

The above discussion of two functions of communism is meant to be a summary of the analysts' comments. Assuming for the moment, that it is a fair representation, what general observations can one then make about the middle-class intellectual Communist? (1) It seems to suggest that, from a psychoanalytic point of view, he is not basically different from other people. His emotional problems of mother-domination and sex-role conflict are common and widespread. (2) It seems to suggest that he defends himself against these problems in a manner that is different from other people. With the aid of the party, he exploits his intellectuality in such a way that he can give guilt-free expression to his hostility. (3) It seems to suggest that, because of the guilt-free nature of his hostility, he can be more hostile than other people.

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¹⁷The party takes a very active role in reinforcing the ability to postpone or wait since it destroys the sense of the present. In this connection, see E. Hoffer, *The True Believer*; New York, Harper, 1951; pp. 68-75.

Genesis of Hostility in Children

LAURETTA BENDER, M.D.

After 14 years of trying to understand 7,000 to 8,000 of New York City's problem children, or children with-a-problem, who come to the children's ward of the psychiatric division of Bellevue Hospital, I cannot accept Freud's (1) earliest concept that aggression is hostile and is a primordial reaction to frustration, nor his later (2) concept that aggression is an instinctual drive equated with the death instinct. Many (Sullivan (3), Ferenzi (4), French (5), Horney (6), Hendrick (7), Schilder (8)) have questioned and refuted this theory. However, Anna Freud (9) and Melanie Klein (10) have used this concept in their work with children. They view the child as instinctively destructive and aggressively hostile against the mother, her insides, her unborn children, her subsequently born children and all other related reality. They also see children as turning these primary impulses against themselves with an expanding sense of guilt and anxiety, and therefore postulate a primary educational need for inhibition, restriction, discipline, and sublimation against the inborn infantile hostility and death wishes.

If one takes heed of Webster's (11) first definition of aggression "to go forward or approach," one can believe that children are instinctively aggressive in the sense that Schilder (8) means when he says there is an instinct to action, to seize, to hold, to master, and to incorporate, and that the tendency to construct and reconstruct cannot be separated from action and aggression. Mastery in this context means, at least in part, cognition or understanding, and incorporation means identification. Webster's second definition is like that of our children, "to commit the first or unprovoked act of hostility, to begin the quarrel." The children say, "He hit me first for no reason. I only hit him back." Frank Bodman, an English child psychiatrist, defines most explicitly the relationship between aggression and hostility. "Aggression. . . is the expression by word or act

of a feeling of hostility. Aggressive play therefore will be that kind of play in which the child expresses his hostility in the very act of playing."

Of special interest is Hendrick's (7) attempt to offer "an instinct to master" in place of the death instinct of Freud. He defines it as an "inborn drive in children to do and to learn how to do." The object of this drive, which is more important than the pleasure principle or need for sensual pleasure, is "the alteration (sometimes cognition) of an external situation." Its manifestations are locomotion, compulsiveness (defined as a regression to a lower stage of an unlearned function), and reasoning, which serves the purpose of adjusting the environment to one's self. It is not clear to what extent Hendrick's mastery of the environment represents overwhelming or destroying it. If this were implied it would be aggressive and destructive at least from the point of view of the environment, which presumably includes everyone else besides the child under consideration.

Schilder (13) said that "the behavior of children can only be understood as a continuous process of trial and error which leads to construction and configuration as a basis for action. Behavior difficulties and neurosis are an interruption in this constructive psychological process."

The belief in an inborn or instinctive aggression with related hostility, guilt, and anxiety leads to the assumption that aggressiveness, hostility, guilt, and anxiety would be the expected or normal behavior of children unless they were subjected early and persistently to education and for psychotherapy based on inhibitions, discipline, restraints, and restrictions. They would need to be helped toward sublimation and possibly given insight into their inherent hostility and death wishes. As Horney (6) says: "It is to be wondered why we strive for a better future if man is inherently destructive." Moreover, it is to be wondered from whence came the impulse to strive to educate children.

The doctrine of instinctive hostility has emphasized negative psychological concepts in childhood problems. Inevitably sibling rivalry, disturbed child-parent relationships in all habit formation problems, educational difficulties and mental retardation, all are ascribed to inborn hostile attitudes or arise out of inhibitions resulting from the related guilt and anxiety.

A view of inborn constructive drives, impulses, and attitudes has gradually modified our educational methods to gratify the child's needs with a permissive attitude toward his efforts to master the environment. It also includes a recognition of the constructive nature of his manipulations and the projective expressions of his inner fantasy life.

In 1935-36 Schilder and I (14) studied physical aggressiveness in children and found that the younger child is not only aggressive but is in continuous fear that he might be destroyed by the aggression of the adult who is so much stronger and therefore more dangerous. At the same time the child expects

protection from the adult against hostile influences, support (including physical support for developmental motor limitations), food, clothing, and love. Since the child is under the impression, based upon experience, that the adult can satisfy these needs, he considers any deprivations of them as an act of aggression from the adult and reacts accordingly. The child acts as though there were an inherent awareness of his needs and there is thus the expectation of having them met. A failure in this regard is a deprivation and leads to frustration and a reactive aggressive response. The child needs affection in terms of something very real including fondling, motor support, kisses, food, and personal attention. The child also needs free expression of his motor drives. Any restriction of his motility is felt as a severe counter-aggression. These are all exogenous factors which increase aggressiveness in children. Endogenous factors are closely related to motor drives which may be increased on a constitutional basis or by organic disease. The postencephalitic behavior disorder is one of the best instances of this type. Hyperactivity increases destructive actions. The attempt of the adult to check the hyperkinesis adds a reactive factor to the organic one. Support should be given by determining means of making patterns in the increased motor impulses rather than restraining them. In the plays and games of children as well as in their fantasy, destruction is merely one phase. Construction and regard for objects is the other.

In 1942 in a discussion on aggression in childhood (13) I gave illustrative examples at various age levels in order to show certain characteristic problems of the developmental crises. I also indicated that the sources of frustration arose from every field of the child's totally developing personality. These included brain pathology with disturbances in motor functions, impulse control, and perceptual integration; developmental lags in language; deprivation of the love object in the infantile period; relative deprivation in love in other areas in child-parent relationships; and deprivation in social, educational, and cultural opportunities.

I concluded that aggression in childhood is a symptom complex resulting from deprivations which are caused by developmental discrepancies in the total personality structure such that the constructive patterned drives for action in the child find inadequate means of satisfaction and result in amplification or disorganization of the drives into hostile or destructive aggression.

The treatment for aggression in childhood should be constructive or preventive, aiming at the amelioration of the developmental discrepancies in whatever field they may arise. The treatment should further be supportive, aiming at reducing the counteraggression of the adults against the child and making more compact the pattern of interpersonal relationships. It should further aid the child to find more patterning for his disorganized impulses which arise either from brain pathology or social pathology.

My continuing experience with the problem children of New York City who pass through the Bellevue psychiatric children's ward has led me to new formulations concerning instinctive needs and drives as follows (16):

1. The child has an inherent capacity or drive for normality which is determined by biological maturation, or growth with a pattern, and includes direction toward a goal. This drive for normality is so great that it is hard to block or divert it by any pathology within the child or in the outer world. We most readily recognize this in handicapped, deviate, or problem children for we take it too much for granted in normal children.
2. The child has an inborn capacity to relate to the mother or parent figure and by identification to experience the emotional things of life which make us all human beings, capable of loving and being loved, of acquiring language concepts, social ideologies and philosophies, and of taking active or creative part in social experiences.
3. The child has an inborn capacity for an internal fantasy life which follows the pattern toward normal maturation and interpersonal identification, as well as its own pattern of symbol formation. The symbol formation makes possible short cuts or creativeness and enrichment in the personality maturation process. It leads to the final construction of the personality in society and compensates for inherent defects in the child of his environment. It also carries with it a capacity for articulateness or projection of the inner fantasy life into the social situation and onto the physical world, whereby the physical world and society are reconstructed or altered or mastered. It is certainly not destructive, but rather represents the increasing of patterning in the physical world made possible by projections from the greater energy of biological processes.

The emphasis on the inborn or instinctive features of hostility, aggression, death wishes, and the negative emotional experiences represents a one-sided approach which has led our students of child psychology astray. In connection with behavior disorders we thus hear of infantile hostility, parental ambivalence and rejection, sibling rivalry, distortions in parent-child relationships, and flight from reality. Too little is recognized of the positive emotional responses and active participation in the child's own living process of maturation, of relating himself by trial and error to people and things, and projecting self-created patterns characteristic of his individual personality onto the physical and social world of reality.

The ordinary vicissitudes of life including the ambivalence and inadequacies of two ordinary parents can be well tolerated by children unless they have suffered from long periods of deprivation in personal parental relationships (especially in the early infantile period) or unless they have suffered from disorganizing brain pathology.

The rivalry of siblings is one trial-and-error method of participating in interpersonal relationships, but is only a partial expression of the greater need of a child for siblings. From the latter comes his positive feelings of

love and relatedness to siblings or sibling equivalents—his own contemporaries.

The flight from reality into fantasy is usually a wholly normal process of dealing with social and ideological problems and uses reality in its essence in compensating for limitations in the outer world and the child's limited capacity to experience all reality. By means of symbol formation in fantasy, time is saved, and life enriched. It aids in articulateness and amplifies the possibilities for interhuman relationships.

A brief consideration of some of the disorders of childhood in which hostility or aggression are emphasized will throw more light on the nature of the problem.

Those organic brain disorders (18) of early childhood associated with hyperkinesis and best recognized as the postencephalitic states are found on repeated examination and analysis to have (1) disorganized patterning of motor impulses, (2) an inability to integrate the perceptual experiences, and (3) a diffuse, and also relatively unpatterned, anxiety. Such children are frustrated in their drive for normal patterning of action or of appreciation of perceptual experiences, especially the ones pertaining to their own body image. Their drive for action toward objects is incessantly displayed, and their unsatisfied need for contacting reality leads to their ultimately destroying and devouring objects. Their anxiety drives them further into the catastrophic reaction described by Goldstein (17). However, we do not see children who are entirely dominated by such behavior, and consequently we can only be amazed at the capacity of normal children, or those in whom the pathology is relatively slight, to moderate and modulate their aggressiveness; to configure and appreciate the wealth of their perceptual experiences; to mature along predetermined biological patterns; and to adapt themselves to the culture of their society.

There are children who from birth have been raised in the impersonal atmosphere of institutions and hospitals without personal mothering. They are spoken of as the psychopathic behavior disorders of childhood (19). In part they resemble the postencephalitic child. Their behavior is disorganized and therefore hyperkinetic; it is aimless and often destructive. There are no specific cerebral defects in the patterning of motor impulses or perceptual experiences. Their behavior may prove to be destructive and to all appearances is aggressive, but still it cannot be called hostile. It is aimless, and not directed toward any object, not even the child himself. These children have had no opportunity to experience their inborn capacity to relate to a mother object, and they therefore are incapable of any personality maturation, interpersonal relationships, social relationships, or concepts. Neither do they experience guilt or anxiety. Such children offer an argument against the theory of an inborn instinctual hostility, guilt, and anxiety which needs an inhibitive restraining education.

There are schizophrenic children (20), and in my experience only schizophrenic children, who present the dramatic picture of the hostile, anxious, terrified, and impulsively destructive childhood that Melanie Klein (10) describes especially well. These are children in whom the schizophrenic process has distorted the pattern of their motility and perceptual experiences, of their own body image, their symbol formation, and object relationships. They lose the certainty of their identity in their body image, in their family, or society or time or space. They strive too hard to regain it. Their anxiety exceeds all bounds: beyond that of any other childhood problems that I have observed. Their hostility reverberates against the objects with which they attempt to identify, or to master, and cannot. When the mother is not present the child may nevertheless insist that she is aware of her presence either all around her or inside her, implying that she has devoured the mother and/or been devoured by her; or she may revile the objects or even the time or space that separates and frustrates her in her longing for her mother. If the anxiety and hostility of the schizophrenic child were a prototype for the hostility of all growing children, one should indeed be concerned for the welfare of the race. Here we see hostility as it is, a reaction to frustration which interferes in the normal maturation of the personality, in its normal instinctive constructive drives, and in all object relationships.

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CHAPTER 4 • Aggression

Aggression as a Function of the Attack and the Attacker

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PAULA C. WELTZ

The clinical and especially the recent psychosomatic literature has focused increasing attention on the way in which individuals deal with their aggressive impulses and on how they respond in situations which call for aggressiveness. Experimental studies of aggression have also increased, but only a few have been concerned with setting the problem of aggression in a systematic framework. The present study, employing a paper-and-pencil technique which permits easy manipulation of the situation evoking aggression, investigates the relationship between the frequency and intensity of the aggressive response and two aspects of the stimulus situation. The two aspects were the type of individual being aggressive against the subject (S) and the degree of his aggressiveness.

Because of the restricted meaning of the word "stimulus," these variables are referred to as the *type of instigator* and the *strength of external instigation*. The term *aggression* is used to refer only to *an act whose goal-response is injury to the organism perceived as the instigator to the aggressive response*. Dollard *et al.* define direct aggression similarly, making it clear that "injury" includes

Frances K. Graham, et al., "Aggression as a Function of the Attack and the Attacker," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1951), pp. 512-520. Reprinted by permission. Footnote numbered as in original.

anything which gives distress (2, p. 11). Such acts would presumably be identified from observation that (a) the behavior does, in fact, *effect* injury to another organism and (b) that the injury was not accidental. By accidental would be meant that the injury would not have occurred except for the intervention of external factors beyond the control of S.

In order to investigate the variable of intensity or strength of instigation systematically, a measure of the strength of aggressive behavior is necessary. Is striking another individual more or less aggressive than pulling a chair out from under him? Since, at this stage of the study of aggression, measure of any physical property of the stimulus such as force would present major difficulties, even if desirable, ratings of the strength of aggression by a large number of judges appeared to be the best measure available. The judges were instructed to interpret *strength of aggression* as *degree of injuriousness*. This would seem to be a logical extension of the definition of aggression. If the existence of an aggressive act is inferred from the injurious effects of a response which is not accidental, it should follow that the strength of the aggression might be inferred from the degree of injuriousness.

The argument can be raised that responses differing in kind cannot be ordered along an intensity or strength continuum. Sears, however, referring to the doll play situation, states: "It may well be that *kind* is simply an expression of *intensity*, that children have a hierarchy of symbols which are no more than step intervals on a continuum from weak to strong aggression" (11, p. 220). Certainly, unless aggression can be dimensionalized, it has limited usefulness as a scientific concept. In any case, there are no logical grounds for objection to the scaling of the strength of aggression if (a) judges are able to rate aggressive responses in this manner reliably and (b) such an ordering of aggressive acts can be shown to vary systematically with other variables. It has the further advantage of employing the same measure to judge an individual's action, namely, the opinion of his culture concerning it, that he presumably employs in initiating it. That is, since aggressive behavior is culturally evaluated behavior, a cultural yardstick would appear to be an appropriate and valid one.

Answers of 106 adolescents to 50 incomplete aggressive statements provide the data for the present study. The aggressive statements were varied in such a way that five strengths of external instigation were paired twice with five types of instigators. Results could then be analyzed for each strength of instigation with type of instigator held constant or for each type of instigator with strength of instigation constant. The incomplete-sentence form was employed to obtain greater variety of data than would have been possible by the use of a multiple-choice or other standard questionnaire method.

Discussion

No thoroughly satisfactory theoretical treatment of aggression has been offered to date. The most complete available has been presented by the authors of *Frustration and Aggression* in that and subsequent publications (2, 7, 10). The present results are, therefore, discussed in terms of this framework, which assumes that the stimulus for aggression is frustration. The variables in the present paper were termed strength of external instigation and type of instigator. How are these variables related to variables previously considered?

The strength of external instigation referred to the strength, as determined by ratings, of an aggressive act directed against the *S*. The usual operation of frustrating by blocking goal-directed behavior was, thus, not carried out in the present experiment. That goal-directed behavior may well be blocked by the occurrence of an aggressive act directed against one is very likely, of course, and the present experiment may be fitted into the already existent theoretical framework by considering strength of external instigation as representing degree of blocking, perhaps of a drive such as self-esteem. To the extent that this is true, present findings support the principle that the strength of aggression depends upon the degree of blocking. Previous support for the principle rested on correlations between crimes and economic indices (2, p. 30). An experiment by McClelland and Apicella (6), whose findings agree with ours, may also be interpreted in this manner. They found that the number of aggressive responses increased significantly when *E*, during a frustration procedure, increased the intensity of derogatory remarks made to *S*.

There may be advantages, however, in considering strength of external instigation an additional variable rather than a manifestation of degree of blocking. As Levy has suggested, the effective stimulus for aggression might be better characterized as an attack rather than as a frustration (5). Many frustrations may be perceived as attacks, of course, because they frequently effect an injury. If satisfactory operational definitions of degree-of-blocking and strength-of-attack could be devised, it might be possible to vary these factors experimentally and improve prediction of the percentage of overt aggressive as compared with nonovert and nonaggressive responses to be expected.

The variable "type of instigator" is obviously not precisely defined. It probably varies along several dimensions, of which punishment-threatening value is perhaps the most easily identified. It seems reasonable to arrange the instigators in the following order of punishment-threatening value: Parents, authority (at least as far as adolescents are concerned, teachers and policemen appear to be less likely to punish than parents), contemporaries (siblings and friends), and inferiors. If it is agreed that this ordering of

instigators is sensible, then it can be concluded that the greater the punishment-threatening value of an instigator, the *fewer* and the *less intense* will be the aggressive responses evoked by him. Further, the greater the punishment-threatening value of an instigator, the less the increment in frequency and intensity of aggressive response with increasing strength of instigation.

That *fewer* aggressive responses are evoked by instigators with greater punishment-threatening value is in line with the finding of Doob and Sears that "overtness of aggression varies inversely with amount of punishment anticipated as a consequence of such behavior" (3). The *less intense* aggression evoked by instigators high in punishment-threatening value has not been demonstrated, however, nor is it directly deducible from the principles advanced in *Frustration and Aggression* inasmuch as the inhibition of aggression, occurring as a result of anticipation of punishment, is assumed to be inhibition of specific acts of aggression rather than of aggression in general. If inhibition is only of specific acts, it is difficult to predict the reduction in both frequency and amplitude, for there is no reduction in the strength of instigation and the phenomenon of displacement might be expected to occur. It appears necessary therefore, to assume that inhibition of specific acts constitutes to some degree inhibition of all overt aggression.

This does not imply that overt and nonovert aggression are on different continua, but it does imply that in our culture inhibition tends to spread at least throughout the range of overt aggression. It may also extend to nonovert aggression so that death wishes, for example, are inhibited. There is clinical evidence to suggest that in some individuals this inhibition even spreads throughout the entire dimension of aggression and all forms of aggression are inhibited.

Of interest also is the problem of whether or not the inhibition of acts in response to one individual spreads to other individuals. In practical terms, will the child trained to inhibit aggression to parents also inhibit aggression to authority figures, siblings, etc., or will the inhibition be specific to the parents? The positive correlations found among aggressive scores to all types of instigators suggest that, at least by adolescence, the inhibition has generalized. The fact that the correlation between instigators is higher in some comparisons than in others indicates that inhibition does not spread equally throughout the range of instigators. Those which might be judged to be more similar, as siblings and friends, show higher correlations than those which might be judged less alike, as parents and inferiors. This is in rough agreement with the facts concerning generalization of extinction, demonstrated with stimulus continua for which a measure of physical similarity is readily obtained.

These results, showing positive correlations in the aggressive response to various instigators, and between the frequency and degree of injurious-

ness of aggressive acts, argue for a trait of overt aggressiveness. The individual who is more aggressive to inferiors is also more aggressive to parents. The individual who blows up only at home as a result of trouble at work probably does not blow up as hard or as often at home as the individual who also blows up at work. Overt aggression directed against an attacker would appear to represent a way of responding which has greater potentiality for being evoked in some individuals than in others. Whether these results are true only under the conditions of this experiment or apply over a wider range is difficult to know, of course. They are specifically suggested by the authors of *Frustration and Aggression* (2, pp. 37 and 52) and are in keeping with the theory of trait structure proposed by Allport (1).

The question of the generality of results is likely to be considered of particular importance in paper-and-pencil research. In this connection it is of interest to note that the change in paper-and-pencil response, both aggressive and nonaggressive,⁶ with change in strength of external instigation paralleled the results obtained by McClelland in a laboratory situation (6). At the least, the present study demonstrates lawful relationships in the judgments of adolescents concerning the effect of the investigated variables on aggressive response.

While laboratory procedures have advantages that cannot be duplicated with paper-and-pencil techniques, the possibilities of the present technique do not seem to be exhausted. The ease with which variables can be manipulated is a valuable advantage. The technique would also appear to be a sensitive one for detecting group differences and might be adapted to the study of individuals. Knowledge of deviation from norms such as those established by the present paper has clinical usefulness. It has been suggested, for example, that a characteristic of neurotic behavior is a tendency to respond in an "all-or-none" manner in which response is not graded to the intensity of the stimulus. This is not readily measurable by present-day clinical devices.

Summary

One hundred and six adolescents were asked to complete 50 statements which indicated the nature of an aggressive act and the individual who had committed it. Five kinds of aggressive acts varying in the degree of aggressiveness as measured by judges' ratings were paired twice with each of five types of individuals—parents, authority, siblings, friends, and inferiors—committing the aggressions. The Ss completed the statements according to what they thought an individual who had been attacked in this way would do. The Ss responses were classified as aggressive or nonaggres-

⁶Changes in, and kinds of, nonaggressive responses will be reported in a subsequent paper.

sive, but only the aggressive responses are reported in the present paper. These were scored according to the degree of aggressiveness shown.

1. Reliability of the technique was indicated by a split-half correlation of .86 for the judges' ratings, correlations of .96 and .98 for independent scoring of two samples of 50 cases each, and split-half correlations of .90, .81, and .92 for frequency, amplitude, and magnitude, respectively, of aggressive responses.

2. Both the frequency and the degree of aggressiveness of the aggressive responses were a direct function of the degree of aggressiveness with which the attack had been made. The relationship was approximately linear.

3. Both the frequency and the degree of aggressiveness of the aggressive responses were a function of the individual who made the attack. The greater the punishment-threatening value of this individual, the less the aggressiveness of the response.

4. The degree of aggressiveness with which an attack is made and the kind of individual making the attack interact in their effect on the aggressiveness of response. The greater the punishment-threatening value of an individual, the less rapid is the increase in aggressiveness of response with increase in aggressiveness of the attack.

5. The individual who, compared with others in the group, was relatively more aggressive to inferiors was also relatively more aggressive to parents. There was no evidence of displacement from one instigator to another inasmuch as all correlations of aggressive scores in response to the various instigators were positive.

6. These relationships between response and instigation were obtained, not only for the combined data of the 106 Ss, but also were demonstrated when the data for the three widely different socioeconomic groups, of which the sample was composed, were analyzed separately.

7. The results are discussed in terms of the theoretical framework presented in *Frustration and Aggression*. Additional assumptions concerning the generalization of inhibition of aggressive acts seem necessary to explain the present findings.

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Personal Aggressiveness and War

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I

The purpose of this article is to examine the bearing of some recent biological and psychological work upon the theories of the cause of war.

The authors hold that war—or organized fighting between large groups of adult human beings—must be regarded as one species of a larger genus, the genus of *fighting*. Fighting is plainly a common, indeed a universal, form of human behaviour. It extends beyond the borders of humanity into the types of mammals most closely related in the evolutionary classification to the common ancestors of man and other apes. War between groups within the nation and between nations are obvious and important examples of this type of behaviour. Since this is so, it must of necessity follow that the simplest and most general causes of war are only to be found in the causes of fighting, just as the simplest and most general causes of falling downstairs are to be found in the causes of falling down.

* * * *

... The empirical evidence that is available is far from complete, but we think that it is more than sufficient to sustain a number of most important conclusions about the effective causes of war.

Fighting, as we have already pointed out, is a form of behaviour widely distributed through history and nature. It occurs in the form of group conflict throughout recorded time. It takes place spasmodically between individuals in civilized countries. It occurs among primitives, among children, and among apes. Whether one looks back through time or downwards to simpler forms of social organization, it is a common practice for individuals or groups to seek to change their environment by force, and for other individuals and groups to meet force with force.

But fighting, or the appeal to force; while universal in distribution, is

E. F. M. Durbin and John Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness and War (Morningside Heights, New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), Chapter I, "Personal Aggressiveness and War," pp. 3-31. Reprinted by permission. Footnotes renumbered.

not continuous in time. The most warlike groups and the most aggressive individuals spend considerable periods in peaceful toleration of, and positive co-operation with, other animals or persons. Most organized communities have enjoyed longer periods of peace than of war. The greater part of human activity—of man-hours—is spent, not in war, but in peaceful co-operation. The scientific problem is, therefore, twofold—why is there peaceful co-operation and why does peaceful co-operation sometimes break down into war? The practical problem—at least, for lovers of peace—is how peaceful co-operation is to be preserved against the universal tendency exhibited in history for it to degenerate into war.

* * * *

The Simpler Causes of Fighting

The evidence taken from the observation of the behaviour of apes and children suggests that there are three clearly separable groups of simple causes for the outbreak of fighting and the exhibition of aggressiveness by individuals.

1. One of the most common causes of fighting among both children and apes was over the *possession* of external objects. The disputed ownership of any desired object—food, clothes, toys, females, and the affection of others—was sufficient ground for an appeal to force.

* * * *

... The exclusive right to objects of desire is a clear and simple advantage to the possessor of it. It carries with it the certainty and continuity of satisfaction. Where there is only one claimant to a good, frustration and the possibility of loss is reduced to a minimum. It is, therefore, obvious that, if the ends of the self are the only recognized ends, the whole powers of the agent, including the fullest use of his available force, will be used to establish and defend exclusive rights to possession.¹

2. Another cause of aggression closely allied to possessiveness is the tendency for children and apes greatly to resent the *intrusion of a stranger* into their group.

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3. Finally, another common source of fighting among children is a failure or *frustration* in their own activity. A child will be prevented either

¹This teleological rationalism does not explain the phenomenon of what we have termed irrational possessiveness. Our own explanation of the fact that a child will fight merely to possess objects because they are wanted by others is that the child in question begins to suspect that, just because someone else wants the discarded object he must have been mistaken in supposing that it was worthless. But evidence on this point is not available.

by natural causes such as bad weather, or illness, or by the opposition of some adult, from doing something he wishes to do at a given moment . . . Sometimes the object of aggression will simply be the cause of frustration, a straight-forward reaction. The child will kick or hit the nurse who forbids the sailing of his boat. But sometimes—indeed, frequently—the person or thing that suffers the aggression is quite irrelevant and innocent of offence.

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. . . It shows how it is possible, at the simplest and most primitive level, for aggression and fighting to spring from an entirely irrelevant and partially hidden cause. Fighting to possess a desired object is straight-forward and rational, however disastrous its consequences, compared with fighting that occurs because, in a different and unrelated activity, some frustration has barred the road to pleasure. The importance of this possibility for an understanding of group conflict must already be obvious.

These are the three simplest separate categories of cause we are able to observe in the evidence. One further point, however, remains to be made about the character of the fighting that occurs among apes. It is a marked characteristic of this fighting that once it has broken out anywhere it spreads with great rapidity throughout the group and draws into conflict individuals who had no part in the first quarrel and appear to have no immediate interest whatever in the outcome of the original dispute. Fighting is infectious in the highest degree. Why? It is not easy to find an answer. Whether it is that the apes who are not immediately involved feel that some advantage for themselves can be snatched from the confusion following upon the rupture of social equilibrium, or whether real advantages are involved that escape the observation of the onlooker, is not at present determined. Or it may be that the infectiousness of fighting is irrational in the same way that the irrelevant expression of aggression due to frustration is irrational. Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that fighting spreads without apparent cause or justification—that ‘every dog joins a fight,’ in other and older words. This excitability and the attraction which fighting may possess for its own sake is likely to be a source of great instability in any society. It is one of the most dangerous parts of our animal inheritance.

So much for the simpler forms of aggression. It is now time to consider the light thrown by anthropological and psycho-analytic evidence upon the behaviour of adult human beings.

The Further Causes of Aggressive Behaviour

Are there then no differences between the aggression of more primitive beings and that of adult men? We suggest that there are only two differences. In the *first* place the aggression of adults is normally a group activity. Murder

and assault are restricted to a small criminal minority. Adults kill and torture each other only when organised into political parties, or economic classes, or religious denominations, or nation states. A moral distinction is always made between the individual killing for himself and the same individual killing for some real or supposed group interest. In the *second* place, the adult powers of imagination and reason are brought to the service of the aggressive intention. Apes and children when they fight, simply fight. Men and women first construct towering systems of theology and religion, complex analyses of racial character and class structure, or moralities of group life and virility before they kill one another. . . .

The differences of *behaviour* are . . . not substantial. The form is the same, the results are the same. . . .

We are therefore brought back to the question: What are the causes of aggressiveness in adult human beings? We would maintain that anthropology and psycho-analysis suggest a number of ways in which the powers of the human mind change and add to the causes of aggression. There appear to be at least three different mechanisms discernible in the material of these two sciences.

Animism

The first and most obvious of these is the cause of war revealed so very plainly by the study of primitive inter-group conflict. It consists in the universal tendency to attribute all events in the world to the deliberate activity of human or para-human *will*. All happenings, whether natural and inevitable, or human and voluntary, are attributed to the will of some being either human or anthropomorphically divine. . . . This universal tendency in the human mind is termed *animism*.

It is certain that this imaginative tendency on the part of human beings leads to war. It is obvious why it should. If evil is attributed to the direct malice of neighbouring and opposing groups, the only possible protection against further evil lies in the destruction of the source of ill-will.

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. . . what is noticeable and dangerous is that a vast power and a deep malignity is attributed to the inimical group. The supposed malignity is often purely illusory. The attributed power transcends all reality. When the open conflict of party politics is suppressed by an authoritarian regime the tendency is exaggerated rather than reduced. Some unfortunate minority within the group—'the Jews' or 'the Kùlaks'—become the source of all evil, the scapegoat of all disaster. Or an overwhelming hatred is conceived for another nation. Out of these real terrors and derivative hatreds merciless persecutions and international wars are likely to spring.

We shall go on to show that the sources of aggression among human

beings are much more complicated than either the simple causes operating in animals or this common habit of attributing everything to some human agency. Yet it should be obvious that much of the behaviour of large groups can be explained by the categories of cause we have already discussed. Possessiveness, frustration, animism are potent causes of conflict between groups—whether parties, classes or states. After we have discussed the complex history of aggression within the individual we shall have reason to revert to these simpler forms of behaviour. It seems probable that the complex character of the civilized individual undergoes a degeneration or simplification into simpler forms and simpler reactions when he is caught up into and expresses himself through the unity of the group. The behaviour of the group is in an important sense simpler and more direct than the behaviour of the individual. . . .

The Transformation of Aggressive Impulses— Displacement and Projection

What light does psycho-analytic evidence throw upon the problem of adult aggression? It is, of course, impossible to consider at all adequately the mass of material and theory comprised in the work of this school of psychology. . . . All that we can attempt at this point is a brief account of the main conclusions—as they appear to us—of the evidence. . . .

We suggest tentatively therefore that the evidence of psychoanalysis justifies the following conclusions:

1. That the *primary* causes of aggression (and of peaceful co-operation) are identical with those of children and apes. The character of the *id*—or complex of instinctive impulses—does not change materially as the individual grows older. The same sources of satisfaction—food, warmth, love, society—are desired and the same sources of conflict—desire for exclusive possession of the sources of satisfaction, or aggression arising from a sense of frustration—are present. But in the life of most children there is a controlling or warping influence present in a varying degree, that of *authority*. The child is denied for various reasons—good or bad—an open and uninterrupted access to the means of its satisfaction. . . . The evidence seems overwhelming that such frustration leads to a violent reaction of fear, hatred, and aggression. . . . This original resentment and the aggression to which it leads we would call *simple aggression*.

Further development turns in our view, upon the way in which this simple aggression is treated. The statistically normal method of treatment is, we suggest, further frustration or *punishment*. . . . the result of punishment is to present the child with a radical conflict—either he must control the expression of his simple aggression or suffer the punishment and the loss of love that simple aggression in a regime of discipline necessarily entails.

This conflict in the child is in our view an important source of ag-

gressiveness in the adult. The conflict itself is a conflict between a fundamental tendency to resent frustration and the fear of punishment or, what is just as important, the fear of the loss of love. . . . The overwhelming fact established by the evidence is that aggression, however deeply hidden or disguised, does not disappear. It appears later and in other forms. It is not destroyed. It is safe to conclude from the evidence that it cannot be destroyed. . . . The boy, instead of striking his father whom he fears, strikes a smaller boy whom he does not fear. Disguised aggression has made the boy into a bully. The girl who dares not scream at her mother grows up to hate other women. Again a character has been formed by a simple aggressiveness that has been controlled but not destroyed. And in the same way revolutionaries who hate ordered government, nationalists who hate foreign peoples, individuals who hate bankers, Jews, or their political opponents, may be exhibiting characteristics that have been formed by the suppression of simple aggression in their childhood education.² These aggressive aspects of adult character and the aggressiveness to which they lead we call *transformed aggression*. It is the displaced and unrecognized fruit of suppressed simple aggression.

2. The second great contribution of psycho-analytic evidence is to show the kind of transformations that simple aggression undergoes as the adult faculties develop. The fundamental problem of the child, is, as we have seen, a double one: that of self-control and of *ambivalence*. In order to escape punishment the child must prevent its aggressive impulses from appearing—it must control its natural aggression. But this is not the whole of the problem. The parent has become for the child the object of two incompatible emotions—love and hatred. As a source of satisfaction and companionship the parent is greatly beloved. As a source of frustration and punishment the parent is greatly feared and hated. The evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that such a double attitude to one person puts a terrible emotional strain upon the child. In the growth and development of character a number of imaginative and intellectual efforts are made to alleviate or avoid the severity of this internal conflict.

One other aspect of the subjective life must be mentioned before we examine the processes by which internal strain or anxiety is reduced to a minimum—and that is the question of *moral judgment*.

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²We are not for a moment suggesting either (a) that logical and objective cases cannot be argued in favour of revolutions, wars, and persecutions, or (b) that the positive valuation of such things as justice, liberty, and other social values may not reasonably involve a hatred of their opposites. We are only suggesting that the repression of simple aggression may result in these forms of hatred. The objective cases of these schools of thought are in every case different in kind from the personal and subjective elements in their supporters' view of them.

... The moral sense is neither wholly rational nor wholly subjective and irrational. It is partly the one and partly the other. But whatever the origin of the moral sense, there is conclusive evidence that it can become the source of immense burdens of shame and guilt, both to the child and to the adult. Again we think that the available evidence demonstrates beyond question that such guilt in the adult is composed partly of a sensible consciousness of moral failure, partly of an irrational fear of punishment derived from the experiences and wild imagination of childhood and partly of an half-conscious recognition of the dangerous aggressive impulses within himself. All these elements combine to make a considerable burden of guilt—acknowledged or unacknowledged—for most individuals, a burden that rises to intolerable levels for depressed and suicidal subjects.

... These divisions of our being are at war with each other and are responsible for much of the unhappiness of individual life and are the direct source of the universal phenomenon of *morbid anxiety*.

It is to reduce anxiety and guilt to a minimum and to resolve the conflict of ambivalence that the major psychological mechanisms are developed. These are of two kinds—*displacement* and *projection*: both of them are frequently used for the expression of transformed aggression.

1. *Displacement*. . . . It consists in the transference of fear or hatred or love from the true historical object to a secondary object. The secondary object may be loved or hated for its own sake, but to the sensible degree of feeling is added an intensity derived from the transference to it of irrelevant passion. . . .

The tendency to identify the self with the community is so common as to be obvious.³ The transference of the predominant feelings of childhood from parents to the organs of political life—to the State and parties in it—is almost universal. Hence the importance of symbolical figureheads and governors, Kings and Führers. Hence the fanaticism and violence of political life. Hence the comparative weakness of reason and moderation in political affairs.

The advantage to the individual of these displacements or transferences of emotion from their historically relevant objects should be obvious. In the *first* place the confusion and strain of the ambivalent relation is often resolved. Instead of both loving and hating the mother it is possible to love the schoolmistress and to hate more freely—however secretly—the person who was originally both loved and hated with equal intensity. Instead of both loving and hating the same adults it is possible to love the nation or the Communist Party with pure devotion and hate the Germans or the

³ Nor is such an identification by any means wholly unreasonable. After all, the communities in which we are brought up have entered into us and made us what we are. It is natural that we should feel that what happens to them happens also to us more personally than they really do.

'Capitalist Class' with frenzy. In either case the world of emotional objects is redeemed from its original chaos—simplicity and order are restored to it. Action and purposive life is possible again.⁴ In the *second* place the displacement is often, indeed usually, towards a safer object. . . . It is safer for the individual to hate the capitalists than to hate his wife, or to hate the Russians than to hate his employers. Thus fear and anxiety—though not banished—is reduced. Happiness is increased. Of course greater safety is not always reached in any objective sense. To join the Communist Party instead of divorcing one's wife may result in imprisonment and even death. To become a patriot may mean early enlistment and a premature grave, when the alternative was objectively less dangerous. But unless we are to deny the teleological interpretation of human affairs altogether it seems obvious that the internal conflicts of fear and guilt are alleviated by displacement. And there is ample direct evidence to support this view.⁵

From our present point of view the importance of this mechanism can scarcely be exaggerated. Adult aggression, as we have seen, is normally carried out in group activity. Political parties make civil war. Churches make religious war. States make international war. These various kinds of groups can attract absolute loyalty and canalize torrents of hatred and murder—through the mechanism of displacement. Individuals can throw themselves into the life and work of groups because they find a solution to their own conflicts in them. The stores of explosive violence in the human atom are released by and expressed in group organization. The power of the group for aggression is derived partly from the sensible and objective judgments of men, but chiefly in our view, by their power to attract to themselves the displaced hatred and destructiveness of their members. Displacement, though not the ultimate cause, is a direct channel of the ultimate causes of war.

2. *Projection.* A second group of mechanisms that are of the greatest importance in understanding individual and social behaviour are those of projection. It is not so simple a mechanism as that of displacement, but the psycho-analytic evidence demonstrates that it is of frequent occurrence

⁴When a suitable division of emotion and transference is carried out suddenly the phenomenon of 'conversion' often appears. Persons suddenly decide to give all their devotion to the Church or Party, and all their hatred to the 'world' or the Party's enemies. Conflicts suddenly disappear and a frustrated and unhappy individual becomes a confident and happy Christian or Communist or National Socialist. Of course, which of these things he becomes is determined by other forces—including the social and historical environment.

⁵It is also important to realize that the displacement may be temporary. Certain displacements of hatred or love involve further conflict and guilt. Thus the boy who transfers his hatred to his father into bullying may feel after a time, extremely guilty about his cruelty. Members of extreme parties may find themselves involved in blood guilt. Thus displacement, always bringing temporary relief, may lead in vicious circles more and more deeply into conflict towards final breakdown or suicide.

in social life. The mechanism consists in imagining that other individuals are really like our own unrecognized and unaccepted selves. It is the projection of our own characters upon others.

There are two parts of subjective character that the individual 'projects upon' others in this way—two kinds of unrecognized motives of his own that he imagines are animating other people: first his real but unrecognized impulses, and secondly his unrecognized conscience. In the first case we suppose others to be wicked in the ways that we do not admit ourselves to be wicked; in the second we suppose them to be censorious and restrictive in ways that we do not recognize our own super-ego to criticize and restrain us.

(a) *The Projection of Impulse.*

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To the authors, most cases of political persecution seem to be of this kind. We have already seen that much of this behaviour can be explained in terms of the simplest animism—the tendency to blame some human will for all disasters. But the existence of such a tendency does not explain why persecution continues when no disaster is present or threatening. And yet they do continue after all reasonable and unreasonable occasion has passed. Almost all authoritarian regimes treasure a pet object of persecution indefinitely. The National Socialists persecute the Communists and the Jews; the Bolsheviks persecute the Trotskyists and the Kulaks. It is commonly said that regimes 'need a scapegoat.' We suggest that over and above any objective reasons for persecution—the need for an excuse in case of failure or the desire to crush opposition by fear—and explaining the continuation of persecution long after the objective reasons have lost their force, there is an element of pure projection. The persecuted minorities are made to carry the projected wickedness of the dominant masses. They are truly the scapegoat of the people, not only in the sense that they are hated and despised, but also that they are made literally to bear the 'sins of the people.' We think it important to realize that the National Socialists seriously believe that the Jews are responsible for national degradation—that the Communists seriously believe that the Kulaks threatened the regime—and they believe these things against all evidence because they have successfully projected upon these groups so much of the disruptive elements within themselves. The hated minorities are genuinely thought to be the cause of disruption because they have become the external symbol of internal wickedness.

The advantage of this mechanism is again obvious. It reduces anxiety to force the enemy outside the gate of one's soul. It is better to hate other people for meanness and to bear the fear of their ill-will than to hate

oneself for being miserly. To see wickedness in others, though terrifying, is better than to be divided against oneself. It avoids the terrible burden of guilt.

Its importance for the understanding of group aggressiveness is also plain. If it is possible to project upon other groups all the evil within the group, then, as in the case of simple animism, the forces of hatred and fear against the external group will grow more and more intense. . . . Projection is an admirable mechanism for turning the other man into the aggressor, for making hatred appear as a passion for righteousness, for purifying the hate-tormented soul. By this means all war is made into religious war—a crusade for truth and virtue.

(b) *The Projection of Conscience.* Finally, to complete the story, there is the projection of the conscience. In order to escape the pains of self-condemnation, the individual projects upon others the moral judgments and condemnation of his own heart. This leads to a particular form of paranoia or persecution mania—in which persons resent, not only the real, but also purely imaginary moral judgments and legal restraints imposed by the State. . . . This projection of internal moral censorship, while of great interest in explaining many of the phenomena of political life, is not of central importance in understanding the causes of international war. Displacement and the projection of impulse are the great channels of transformed aggression. The projection of the super-ego is chiefly a cause of revolution and civil war.⁶

We have now completed our survey of the causes of aggression in human beings. We have suggested that there is no substantial difference in behaviour, that adults are just as cruel—or more so—just as aggressive, just as destructive as any group of animals or monkeys. The only difference in our view is one of psychological and intellectual mechanism. The causes of simple aggression—possessiveness, strangeness, frustration—are common to adults and simpler creatures. But a repressive discipline drives the simple aggression underground—to speak in metaphors—and it appears in disguised forms. These transformations are chiefly those of displacement and projection. These mechanisms have as their immediate motive the reduction of anxiety and the resolution of the conflicts of ambivalence and guilt. They result in the typical form of adult aggressiveness—aggressive personal relations of all kinds—but above all in group aggression: party conflict, civil war, wars of religion, and international war. The group life

⁶The projection of the super-ego is a reason for hating and attacking any form of government. If, therefore, the League of Nations or any collective security system became strong there would then arise, if our theory be true, aggressive revolutionary minorities within the collective system. This is an important point made by Dr. Glover. We shall discuss its political significance in the later sections of this part of the article.

gives sanction to personal aggressiveness. The mobilization of transformed aggression gives destructive power to groups. Aggression takes on its social form. And to justify it—to explain the group aggression to the outside world and to the group itself in terms that make it morally acceptable to the members of the group—great structures of intellectual reasoning—theories of history and religion and race—are built up. The impulses are rationalized. The hatred is justified. And it is typical of the complexity of human affairs that something in these theories is always true. But most is false, most of it a mere justification of hatred, a sickening and hypocritical defence of cruelty. This is particularly true of the political persecutions of dictatorships. We must now try to apply the conclusions of this evidence to the theory of the causes of war.

The Theory of War

We hold that the evidence summarized above suggests a certain theory of the causes of war. In the absence of government—the organization of force to preserve the peace—we hold that a group of monkeys or children or men can only achieve at the best, an unstable social equilibrium. It may very well be that an appreciation of the advantages of co-operation and an agreement to continue it will preserve the peace for some time. But underneath there is a powerful and ‘natural’ tendency to resort to force in order to secure the possession of desired objects, or to overcome a sense of frustration, or to resist the encroachment of strangers, or to attack a scapegoat. Fighting and peaceful co-operation are equally ‘natural’ forms of behaviour, equally fundamental tendencies in human relations. Peaceful co-operation predominates—there is much more peace than war—but the willingness to fight is so widely distributed in space and time that it must be regarded as a basic pattern of human behaviour. The cause of the transition from one to the other is simply when some change in the circumstances of the group alters the balance between the desire for co-operation and the conflicting desire to obtain self-regarding ends by force.

* * * *

... What activities of a developed society influence the form aggression takes? We suggest that there are two such activities—that of education and that of government.

1. The character of parental and familial control we have already discussed. In so far as the emotional education of the child throughout human society involves appetitive frustration, and in so far as intellectual education develops powers of reasoning and imagination, the forms of aggression change. It is rationalized, explained, and justified. It is displaced and projected. Above all, it is expressed in the life and activities of groups. Religious, economic, and political groups—churches, classes, and

parties—release for the individual the aggression he dare not express for himself. And the greatest of all these groups—at least in the modern world—is the State. It is by an identification of the self with the State and by the expression of aggression through it, that the individual has in recent times chiefly exhibited his aggressive impulses. Not exclusively so, for religious war and civil war have played an important part, but the great wars and the great loss of life have been in wars between nation states.

2. It is natural that it should be so because the nation State normally succeeds in preventing or controlling all other forms of aggression. The existence of government—with its apparatus of force—enormously increases the penalties of private aggression. Not only does the rationalizing mind and the conscience of mankind condemn private fighting and killing, but the social will to co-operation creates an instrument of force to control and punish any criminal minority that disturbs the peace. Hence private aggression is not only condemned by the conscience—it is also punished by the law. And so long as the State maintains supreme power, the same thing is true of all kinds of group aggression other than its own. Political and racial parties are prevented from taking the law into their own hands. Tendencies to civil war are successfully repressed.⁷ In such circumstances it is natural, in our view, that transformed aggression should be chiefly canalized by, and flow unimpeded through, the State organizations of common endeavour and military adventure. In the service of the State the rationalized and transferred impulses of men find their last remaining and freest outlet.

What then causes the State to embark on war? We offer two conclusions in answer to this question. In the *first* place, as we have already mentioned, the expression of aggression on a group scale appears to restore to it simplicity and directness. In the civilized adult the original and simple causes for fighting are forgotten and overlaid with every kind of excuse and transformation. But when aggression is made respectable by manifestation through the corporate will of the group it resumes much of its amoral simplicity of purpose. Indeed, positive moral obligation becomes attached to it. Nations will fight for simple possession, or through hatred due to animism, or because of national frustration, in a direct and shameless way that would be quite impossible for their individual members. The mutual approval of the members of the group makes conscienceless aggression possible. Hence states will fight for the same reasons as children fight. But not only for those things. In the *second* place states may fight,

⁷Of course, the State does not always succeed in preventing group aggression within itself from breaking out. Not only is there occasional rioting, but in recent years democratic Governments, have frequently allowed Party groups to grow up and make revolutions and civil war. Civil war or group aggression within the State means the breakdown of internal sovereignty.

in our submission, because of the pressure of transformed aggression within their members. The members of the State may be so educated, so frustrated, and so unhappy, that the burden of internal aggression may become intolerable. Such peoples—or the dominant groups within them⁸—may constitute in a real sense aggressive nations. They have reached a point at which war has become a psychological necessity. Ambivalence is so severe, internal conflict so painful, fear and hatred of the scapegoat so intense, that a resolution of the crisis can only be found in war. In such cases war will be fought without adequate objective cause. It will have an objective occasion, some trifling incident or dispute, but the real effective causes will be elsewhere, within the tormented souls of the members of the aggressor nation. Such national neuroses can exhibit any or all of the general psychological mechanisms that we have already examined—animism, displacement, the projection of impulse, or the projection of conscience. Thus nations will exhibit the aggressiveness typical of apes and also the much more complex and obscure aggressiveness typical of humanity. They will fight because they are disciplined, because they are divided against themselves, because they have constructed mythical enemies and conjured terrors out of the darkness, because they are paranoid or sadistic. The balance of impulse between co-operation and force has been shifted against the advantages of peace.

This then is our theory of international war. War occurs because fighting is a fundamental tendency in human things—a form of behaviour called forth by certain simple situations in animals, children, human groups, and whole nations. It is a fundamentally pluralistic theory of international war. If the theory is true, then it follows that nations *can* fight only because they are able to release the explosive stores of transformed aggression, but they *do* fight for any of a large number of reasons. They may fight because of simple acquisitiveness, or simple frustration, or a simple fear of strangers. They may fight because of displaced hatred, or projected hates or fears. There is no single all-embracing cause—no single villain of the piece, no institution nor idea that is wholly to blame. In this sense the theory stands in marked contrast to almost all accepted theories of the day. . . .

. . . it should be obvious to the reader that in one sense the theory is

⁸We should mention in this context that we are quite aware that there is much more to be said on this subject than we have space to say or the learning to write. Large nations are not simple homogeneous groups. Power in them is divided between many groups and dispersed over a varying proportion of the members of the nation. The analysis of the group structure within the nation and of the distribution of power among the sub-groups is a task for sociology and sociologists. We are not competent to perform it. We are only concerned with the type of impulse dominating groups with power, whether those groups are the whole or only part of the nation.

nothing more than enlightened common sense. It is no overwhelming novelty to show that war is a common form of human behaviour. It resembles the familiar doctrine that 'to fight is only human nature.' The authors wish to emphasize this. They wish to make no claims to great originality. The value of the evidence here gathered together is simply that it shows the grounds upon which, and the form in which, such a common-sense theory can be held. It seeks to describe in greater detail the kinds of situation that call forth the impulses to aggression. It traces the causes of simple aggression in individuals, and follows it through the disguised forms it exhibits in them, into its social manifestations. It shows how and why war is a chronic disease of the social organism. It fills out a simple theory with detail and reason.

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The Physiology of Aggression

JOHN PAUL SCOTT

The psychological study of aggressive behavior leaves a great many questions unanswered, particularly with regard to the physiological basis of the feelings and emotions which are associated with fighting, frustration, and avoidance. Where do these feelings come from, and why do they last so long? Does the primary stimulation for aggression come from them, or do emotional states arise from external causes? Why is extinction of aggressive and avoidance behavior so difficult? As will be seen below, the explanation of these questions lies in a complicated network of internal causes, and their understanding leads to important practical conclusions concerning both social control and physical health.

The Biological Basis of the Emotion of Anger

A great deal of what we know about the physiology of aggression comes from studies on the cat, and the earlier work is summarized in Cannon's book on bodily changes in emotional states, which is still an excellent reference (9). These experiments showed that in the cat there is a controlling center in the hypothalamus of the brain. When stimulated, this center will produce all of the appearances of anger. The animal arches its back, fluffs its hair, hisses and growls, and may even extend its claws and strike. At the same time a whole series of internal reactions is taking place. The heart beats more strongly and rapidly, so that the blood pressure is raised. Various arteries contract, so that blood is kept away from the intestinal organs and directed toward the large skeletal muscles. The movement of the stomach is inhibited, and the flow of digestive juices is increased.

The general effect of these internal reactions is to stop digestion, inhibit bacterial action in the stomach with the strong acid of the digestive juice, and divert the major part of the blood to the heavy muscles where it will be needed to provide blood sugar and oxygen. Along with this the

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adrenal gland is stimulated to produce adrenalin, which chemically stimulates many of the same internal reactions. The result is to put the body in shape for the prolonged violent activity which is a part of successful fighting.

Since Cannon's day, a great deal of new evidence has been accumulated regarding anger and the function of the brain. In order to understand this it is necessary for us to have a clear picture of general brain structure. The brain of a higher vertebrate like the cat begins its development as a simple tube on the front end of the spinal cord. It is divided into three parts, the forebrain, the midbrain, and the hindbrain. By a complicated process of folding and unequal growth these simple structures become the complex organ of the adult. However, its connections and functions are still related to the original parts. The hindbrain becomes the cerebellum and medulla, which have the respective functions of motor co-ordination and control of such vital involuntary activities as the heart beat. The midbrain stays relatively small and has little connection with anger. The forebrain divides itself into two parts. The first of these develops into double lobes which eventually become the cerebrum—the part of the brain concerned with sensation, problem solving, and voluntary behavior. The second part, or diencephalon, becomes an important center for modifying and co-ordinating unconscious processes such as blood pressure, breathing, vomiting, sleep, and relaxation. Its lower part, on the very bottom of the brain and just above the pituitary gland, is called the hypothalamus and is particularly concerned with the emotion of anger.

There is one other fact which we need to know in connection with the brain. In primitive fishes such as sharks, the cerebrum, or most anterior part of the forebrain, is not much larger than other parts and is chiefly concerned with the sense of smell. As the brain evolved in higher animals, a new portion of the cerebrum developed, becoming larger and larger and eventually forming the big bulk of the brain in mammals like the cat. This new part of the brain is called the neocortex. As we shall see, it plays an important part in controlling the expression of anger.

A great deal of the evidence linking particular parts of the brain with emotion comes from experimental neurosurgery. Bits and pieces of the brain are removed under anesthesia, and the effects on behavior are observed when the animal recovers consciousness. A striking effect occurs when the surgeon removes all of the cerebral cortex, the outside layer of the cerebral hemispheres (4), leaving intact the inner core of the cerebrum and all of the posterior part of the brain. As soon as the cat comes out of anesthesia, it starts struggling, arching its back, striking with its claws, lashing its tail, snarling, and hissing. Its hair stands on end, and its whole behavior is that of an intensely angry cat. After a while this behavior dies

down, but the cat remains extremely irritable. Merely lifting it from the floor is enough to set the whole reaction going again.

Bard (4) concluded that some part of the remaining brain had an important role in the expression of anger, and he and his co-workers set about finding this by further operations. These soon demonstrated that an important factor was located in the hypothalamus. When a large part of the hypothalamus was removed, the cats were sleepy, inactive, unable to control their temperatures, and much harder to stimulate to anger than previously. However, if a cat was shown a dog or otherwise highly stimulated, it could still show all the reactions of rage. Evidently the hypothalamus is not necessary to produce anger, but contributes to it.

The final experiment was to remove the cerebral cortex, whose absence should have made the animals easily excited, and then to disconnect the hypothalamus from the rest of the brain stem. These cats could still show partial reactions of rage—in fact as much as possible with the motor ability that they had left—but it required a great deal more stimulation to produce this effect than in normal animals. Bard concluded from his own and other experiments that the role of the hypothalamus in the expression of anger is to facilitate or magnify the stimulation which passes down to the actual controlling centers for angry behavior in the lower brain stem.

Since cats with the cerebral cortex removed are hyperexcitable, it follows that the cortex in the normal brain has an inhibitory effect on the activity of the hypothalamus, so that anger is not produced by trivial stimuli. By experimentally removing various parts of the cortex, Bard and Mountcastle (5) showed that if they removed only the neocortex they got a remarkably placid cat. Even the roughest handling produced only a few plaintive meows. It is obvious that the excitatory portion of the cerebral cortex is found in this region, the “new brain” developed by the higher vertebrates and particularly large in mammals. Destroying part of the older cortex by removal of the amygdala on both sides produced a bad-tempered animal with long-lasting rage reactions. Inhibitory control of rage is therefore destroyed when the amygdala is damaged. We may conclude that in the cerebral cortex of the normal cat there is a balance between regions which excite anger and those which inhibit or repress it.

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The technique of neurosurgery has certain limitations. If a particular part of the brain is injured or removed and this in turn causes a certain type of behavior to disappear, we might conclude that the site of the injury was occupied by a controlling center for the activity. However, it is also possible that the injury merely interrupted a connection between two parts of the brain, or that the part injured was one of several, all of which were

necessary for normal activity; e.g., in the way that the cerebral cortex and the hypothalamus interact in the control and expression of anger.

Another experimental technique is necessary to get a clear picture of how the normal intact nervous system works. This is the insertion of very fine platinum electrodes into the brain, an operation which can be done with very little injury. When the cat has recovered from the operation, an experimenter can stimulate particular parts of the brain at will with a weak electrical current.

Ranson (63), who did some of the early experiments in this field, gives a clear picture of what happens when an electrode has been placed in the hypothalamus. The experimental cat is lying quietly with its eyes closed. A weak electric current is turned on, and the animal at once raises its head and looks around with dilated pupils. It begins to breathe rapidly and deeply and its hair stands erect. After a few seconds it attempts to get on its feet. If restrained, it struggles violently to free itself, lashing its tail, clawing, and sometimes snarling and biting. After being stimulated for as long as a minute the cat begins to drip saliva from its mouth and to sweat on the soles of its feet.

All of this gives the external picture. Internally, as can be shown with a barium meal and examination with a fluoroscope, any movement of the stomach and intestine stops immediately when the electric current is turned on. At the same time the blood pressure goes up because of the contraction of the walls of the small arteries. All of these symptoms stop as soon as the electric current is turned off.

This experiment shows that an almost exact reproduction of the normal rage reaction in a cat can be produced by stimulating the hypothalamus. It is interesting that a good many of the involuntary reactions come first, and that the behavior that we ordinarily think of as voluntary, such as biting and clawing, occurs after a few seconds. It looks as if electrical stimulation of the hypothalamus first affects involuntary reactions, then spreads to the centers of voluntary control, but has no lasting effect.

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The general picture which we get from these experiments is that in a normal cat there is a balance between parts of the cerebrum which stimulate the hypothalamus and parts which inhibit it. If the excitatory portion of the cerebrum is sufficiently stimulated by outside events, such as barking dogs or pain, it will overcome the inhibitory portion and activate the hypothalamus. This causes the usual outward symptoms of anger and also sends stimulation back to the cerebral cortex as the feeling of anger. Cerebrum and hypothalamus then act together in some way not yet completely understood to prolong the effects of stimulation.

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The Physiology of Anger

The application of animal data to human beings is justified by fundamental similarities in the nervous systems of all higher vertebrates. The anatomy of the human nervous system has been studied for centuries, and our knowledge concerning the part which is particularly concerned with emotions has been collected and summarized by Kuntz (48). From this knowledge it is possible to figure out the ways in which stimulation takes place and to explain many of the peculiarities of emotional reactions.

Stimulation from outside the body goes to the brain, where additional emotional stimulation is generated. From here it goes through the motor nerves, causing muscles to contract and glands to secrete. There are two kinds of motor nerves, those which go to the muscles of the body which are attached to bone (the somatic or body nerves), and those nerves which go to muscles in the heart, lungs, gastro-intestinal tract, skin, and to various sorts of glands (the visceral nerves). The latter group of motor nerves is quite distinct anatomically from the others and is called the *autonomic nervous system*. It also has very different physiological properties.

One of the most obvious characteristics of autonomic nerves is that they cannot be controlled voluntarily. One can stop a finger from moving, but the contractions of the stomach cannot be controlled except by stimulating it with food, drugs, or other indirect means. Another difference is that most of the internal organs are equipped with a double set of nerves. One nerve excites and the other inhibits. If both work at once, the nerve carrying the most powerful stimulus will win out. In the case of the heart, the vagus nerve slows it down, while another set of nerve fibers speeds it up.

In contrast, the voluntary muscles have one set of nerve fibers which stimulate contraction. Relaxation is accomplished in the central nervous system, which stops the stimulation from proceeding down the nerve. Still another difference is found in the degree of control which can be exercised over the voluntary muscles. The movement of the hand can be modified in an almost infinite variety of ways. The movement of the heart, on the other hand, can be made faster or slower, stronger or weaker, but that is the limit of variability.

The autonomic nerves are different in structure from the voluntary motor nerves. Each fiber in the latter is covered with a heavy layer of fatty material, the myelin sheath, whereas the autonomic nerves lack this covering. The physiological effect of the myelin sheath is to produce a much more rapid nervous reaction, so that impulses in the voluntary nerves may travel as much as sixty times as fast (62). Involuntary action is still slower because the autonomic nerves stimulate either smooth muscle, which contracts much more slowly than the striped muscle of the voluntary system, or the secretion of glands, which takes place even more slowly. This means that

when an animal is naturally stimulated to fight, the voluntary reaction may be very fast, coming a fraction of a second after the stimulus, while the reactions of the internal organs may come several seconds or even minutes later. It also means that any emotions which are the result of the activity of internal organs may follow after the voluntary behavior of fighting. This does not apply to those emotions which arise in the hypothalamus; the speed with which these develop has not been measured physiologically.

The fact that voluntary and autonomic reactions to a stimulus do not occur simultaneously could affect the process of learning. Both voluntary and involuntary reactions are subject to learning. As Pavlov showed, the salivary reflex, which is controlled by the autonomic nervous system, can be associated with various outside stimuli. This raises the possibility that the sensations arising from the activity of internal organs could in any real situation be associated not with the original stimulus but with some later stimulus which happened to occur at the time of the emotional response, although it actually had nothing to do with it. The consequences might be illogical emotional reactions aroused by innocuous stimuli.

We may now consider the reactions of internal organs in more detail. The autonomic nerves which come off the spinal cord in the chest and back region form an anatomical unit known as the sympathetic nervous system. The ends of these nerves produce substances related to adrenalin, a hormone which acts on the internal organs. In this way, the sympathetic nerves stimulate their attached organs. The rest of the autonomic nerves, which come directly from the brain or from the hip region of the spinal cord, work through a substance called acetylcholine, which has the opposite effect from adrenalin. These two sets of nerves go to many of the same organs and tend to work against each other.

When the center of aggressive stimulation in the hypothalamus is activated, the sympathetic nerves react almost as a unit. In this way anger is one of the simplest of emotions. Other emotions may involve different combinations of autonomic nerves, some from the sympathetic and some from the other or parasympathetic portion.

The emotion of fear, which is physiologically somewhat similar to anger, involves both sympathetic and parasympathetic stimulation. It is different from anger in that the activity of the stomach and intestines is stimulated instead of decreased. Any athlete who has been worried about the outcome of a big game or race knows the familiar sensation of "butterflies in the stomach," which makes it difficult to eat or drink, almost to the point of nausea. As for the effect on the colon, there is a tendency to evacuate, and the resulting scenes in the locker rooms before a big athletic contest could be adequately described only by a Rabelais.

Because of the antagonistic relationship between the parasympathetic and sympathetic nerves, it is possible for fear and anger to interfere with

other emotions. By stopping the movement of the stomach, anger interferes with hunger; by overstimulating stomach movements, fear does the same thing. Both these emotions also interfere with sexual reflexes, which are largely produced by the parasympathetic nerves. Some of the autonomic nerve fibers go to voluntary muscles, which makes it difficult to voluntarily relax the muscles completely when in an emotional state.

In his analysis of the physiology of anger, Cannon stressed the importance of adrenalin, which is secreted by the inner part of the adrenal gland during fear or anger and which duplicates many of the effects of nervous stimulation. Since that time it has been discovered that the outer part of the adrenal gland, or cortex, also secretes its hormone—cortisone—following violent emotional reactions and injuries. Selye and his co-workers (76) have collected much of the experimental data on this substance as it applies to the problem of stress and surgical shock. So far there has been little effort to correlate cortisone directly with the emotional states of fear and anger but it obviously must have some effect.

Cortisone normally works in this way: Either by nervous or chemical stimulation the anterior pituitary gland of the brain produces a chemical known as ACTH. This is released into the blood and carried to the adrenal gland where it causes the release of cortisone, which in turn affects metabolism, the circulatory system, the kidneys, and muscular tone in ways which contribute to body efficiency. Being activated through the blood stream rather than by nervous control, cortisone has a somewhat slower effect than adrenalin on the sympathetic nerves. The experimental data show that its effects may not show up for several minutes or even longer. The practice of instructing athletes to warm up thoroughly before a contest thus has a good physiological basis.

Physiological Causes of Aggression

These physiological studies provide answers to certain practical problems regarding the causes of aggression.

One of the simplest explanations of fighting is that you feel angry and this makes you fight. Or that you feel frustrated and this makes you fight. It is logical to argue that the feeling comes from the violent activity of the internal organs described above. This is essentially the James-Lange theory of emotion, which William James put into plain and simple language: emotion is the feeling of bodily change. This idea has been argued and tested ever since it was put forward, and our present conclusion is that it still has some merit but is not a complete theory. Part of emotion is the sensation of change in the internal organs, but this is not the whole story.

In the first place, emotional behavior is not a necessary part of fighting. When mice fight, their emotional reactions consist chiefly of fluffing the hair and rattling the tail. When two male mice are put together, we often

see them approaching each other cautiously fluffing their hair and shaking their tails and then suddenly beginning to fight. However, if we train a mouse to fight with a series of easy victories, he never shows this emotional behavior but leaps upon his next victim in a fraction of a second. Emotional behavior can be produced experimentally by first defeating an animal and then giving him an opportunity to fight (69). As he hesitates before an attack, he shows hair-fluffing and other typical emotional behavior. This means that the sensation of bodily change is not a necessary link in the chain of stimulation leading to fighting.

Cannon accumulated a great deal of evidence to show that the symptoms of anger could still appear when the internal organs were inactive and, conversely, that their stimulation does not produce a recognizable feeling of anger. The injection of adrenalin, which duplicates most of the internal physiological reactions of anger, does not make an animal fight. It is often taken by human beings to relieve asthma, and they report that while they feel some new sensations, the feeling of anger is not one of them. Cannon described cats which had the sympathetic nervous system surgically removed but still seemed to get angry at dogs. He also talked with human patients with similar operations who reported that they could still *feel* anger. It must be concluded that the feeling of anger comes principally from the propagation of stimulation in the hypothalamus and cerebrum. Saying that you feel angry is simply another way of saying that certain parts of your forebrain and hypothalamus are in a high state of activity.

This does not mean that other physiological reactions have no significance as causes of behavior. We have already referred to the fact that animals which have been trained to avoid or run away from a painful stimulus will keep this up for months without reinforcement. Solomon and Wynne (80) found that if the sympathetic nervous system is removed by surgery, the avoidance response disappears after a relatively few trials. This suggests that the internal physiological reactions are necessary for the prolonged maintenance of behavior without reinforcement and that the physiological reactions themselves may act as reinforcing agents. Both avoidance behavior and visceral reactions can be conditioned to a secondary stimulus, and since the latter are slower, their sensation would tend to reinforce the former (74). To translate this into human terms: A person standing in the way of an automobile first dodges. Having barely escaped, he then gets an unpleasant internal sensation and feeling of shock, which should reinforce the dodging in the future. In addition, dodging has become a secondary stimulus for the emotion. The next time he leaps away from a car, both dodging and danger should elicit the emotion. This feeling is now stimulated by dodging as well as reinforcing it, producing a circular reaction which should be very long-lasting.

The effect of removing the sympathetic system on an animal trained to

fight has not been tested. Presumably the sensation of a pounding heart could be associated with fighting and produce the same kind of circular stimulation as that postulated for fear.

However, the visceral sensations in anger are much less marked than those in fear. With the exception of the heart, the internal organs are inhibited in anger. The stomach and intestines are kept still and no sensations arise from them. It is therefore probable that the sensation of activity of the internal organs has little importance in anger. However, we know by experience that it is possible to be stimulated simultaneously to both fear and anger, and in this case the internal sensations would be more noticeable.

All present evidence indicates that the emotion of anger consists of two kinds of stimuli: the "feeling" of anger arising in the hypothalamus, which in turn stimulates the viscera where a later "sensation" arises. Both can affect behavior through learning, and both may be secondarily associated with each other by learning as well as by direct nervous stimulation.

Thus the study of the physiology of aggression leads to the conclusion that there is a complex network of causal stimuli, no one of which entirely accounts for aggressive behavior. When this network is set up in a diagrammatic way, it reveals an interesting fact which has immense practical significance. Fighting may start with a sensation of pain when the fighter is attacked by another individual. He may have been previously excited by the sight of the attacker, and his behavior may be modified by this outside experience. The stimuli are carried to the brain, where a feeling of anger results. This feeling may be one of the things which causes the outward fighting reaction, but in many cases the voluntary reaction may occur so quickly that the feeling arises later and only serves to prolong the reaction. At the same time the hypothalamus passes its stimulation down through the sympathetic nerves to the visceral organs. A little later cortisone may be produced, leading to other sensations throughout the body. These sensations are probably of minor importance as direct causes of fighting, but they still may affect it through learning processes.

The important fact is that the chain of causation in every case eventually traces back to the outside. There is no physiological evidence of any spontaneous stimulation for fighting arising within the body. This means that there is no need for fighting, either aggressive or defensive, apart from what happens in the external environment. We may conclude that a person who is fortunate enough to exist in an environment which is without stimulation to fight will not suffer physiological or nervous damage because he never fights. This is a quite different situation from the physiology of eating, where the internal processes of metabolism lead to definite physiological changes which eventually produce hunger and stimulation to eat, without any change in the external environment.

We can also conclude that there is no such thing as a simple "instinct for

fighting," in the sense of an internal driving force which has to be satisfied. There is, however, an internal physiological mechanism which has only to be stimulated to produce fighting. This distinction may not be important in many practical situations, but it leads to a hopeful conclusion regarding the control of aggression. The internal physiological mechanism is dangerous, but it can be kept under control by external means.

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Psychological Factors Affecting Fighting

JOHN PAUL SCOTT

Learning to Fight

In spite of its frequent occurrence, the effect of learning on the fighting behavior of human beings is not easily studied except by observational or indirect methods. Experiments which injure the participants either physically or emotionally must be avoided, both on moral and scientific grounds. Physical injury harms the individual, and its effects can be confused with those of learning. Because of these limitations, a major part of scientific work on the causes of fighting must be done with other species.

There are two important ways in which the problems of human aggression can be studied in lower animals. One is to study fighting as it occurs in all parts of the animal kingdom, with the idea of discovering general laws which apply to all species of animals, including human beings. The other is to select certain animals in which fighting normally occurs and experimentally analyze its causes in detail. From a practical standpoint, the experimental animals should fight in such a way that they are not likely to injure each other severely and so that the fighting can easily be stopped without danger to the experimenter. There are several species whose behavior meets these conditions, provided certain precautions are taken. One of them is the common house mouse (73). The males fight fiercely but ordinarily do not damage each other unless they are left together for long periods. They are small enough so that they can be easily separated, and even if the experimenter does get bitten, it is not likely to damage him seriously.

The relationship between learning and fighting is by no means thoroughly explored in mice, but certain facts are well established. The *primary stimulus*

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or reinforcing agent appears to be a mild degree of pain. Defensive fighting can be evoked by gently pinching the tail of a baby mouse; the youngster will bite if it is old enough to have its first teeth. The best stimulus for adult fighting is a painful attack by another fighting mouse.

The next question is whether fighting can be *associated* with secondary stimuli. In one experiment, where two mice were housed in separate parts of a large cage and only brought together to fight at special times when a gate was opened, we found that the mice soon learned to run together and fight at the sound of the opening gate. A little later we found that the mice were even more ready to fight if we made a scratching noise on the cage before opening the gate. Fighting was thus associated with the scratching noise. In another experiment, when a mouse that was accustomed to fighting in a particular cage was placed there before his opponent showed up, he exhibited many of the emotional reactions which accompany fighting, such as hair-fluffing and tail-rattling. There appears to be no doubt that fighting can be associated with secondary stimuli.

The problem of producing *experimental extinction* of aggressive responses to secondary stimuli has never been directly solved, but there are several pieces of pertinent evidence. If two mice are allowed to fight repeatedly, they soon form a dominance-subordination relationship . . . in which the beaten mouse always runs away and never fights. This means that the victorious mouse no longer gets the primary stimulation of pain from the other mouse. The result, which has been observed by many scientists, is that the attacks on the other mouse gradually become less and less severe. Conflict may eventually be reduced to one or two mild threats. It is possible that extinction is not so rapid as it is in eating behavior, where a dog, for example, will stop salivating within a few trials after feeding is discontinued. When two mice first fight, the victor will continue to attack long after the loser has quit, and it may take many repetitions at intervals of a day or so before the tendency to fight dies down to any extent. The explanation appears to be that fighting, in contrast to eating, is accompanied by a strong and lasting emotional reaction which has a tendency to maintain the behavior.

That *motivation* to fight can be increased by reinforcement is shown by an experiment in which two mice were brought together once a day and allowed to fight for only a few seconds, so that neither one was injured but fighting was reinforced by painful stimulation. The latency or delay under these conditions decreased rapidly, so that after a few days the mice fought as soon as the gate was opened (24).

The phenomena of *generalization* and *discrimination* are brought out by the "round robin" method of fighting in a group of mice. If an animal wins his first fight, he tends to attack his second opponent immediately. However, he may lose and eventually come to discriminate between a mouse which may attack and one which may run away. In most cases mice tend to generalize

without much discrimination, so that usually one mouse in the group launches all the attacks, while the others always run away from him. Discrimination is better illustrated in flocks of chickens, where every hen is able to recognize every other hen at sight and to run away or fight accordingly.

Probably the best example of *inhibition* of fighting is given by an experiment of Seward (77) in which he first trained rats to fight when brought together in a cage. The rats associated the cage and being brought together with fighting. He then made them hungry and put food in the fighting cage, expecting that they would fight over the food. However, the rats actually fought less than usual. We can explain this by assuming that eating had previously been associated with not-fighting, producing an inhibitory effect. Just as Pavlov found that the sound of a barking dog would tend to interfere with eating, Seward found that stimulation to eat would interfere with fighting in rats.

The idea of *passive inhibition*, or the *association of stimuli with inaction*, provides an explanation for a phenomenon in mice which has been demonstrated over and over again. If male mice are brought together only once a day, they will begin to fight at about the age of thirty-two days. However, if a group of males are raised together in the same pen from birth, they do not automatically start to fight at thirty-two days. In fact, they may live peacefully together for many months with no fighting at all. The mice appear to form a habit of not-fighting while young, and this carries over into later life.

While the evidence is somewhat sketchy, it shows that fighting in general follows the principles of learning which have been set down for other types of behavior. The main exception seems to be the comparatively slow rate of extinction of fighting behavior, which is correlated with the physiological and emotional responses peculiar to fighting.

This exception is even more marked in the closely related behavior of running away in response to attack. Ginsburg and Allee (30) tried to find out how mice which had been accustomed to being defeated could be made into fighters. Such animals would continue to run away, even when not attacked, for periods of weeks and even months. By allowing a mouse to rest a month or two and then exposing it to another mouse which had been trained to run away, fighting could sometimes be restored. The habit of running away was then gradually eliminated by giving the mouse a series of easy victories.

In another experiment Solomon and Wynne (80) tried to teach dogs to avoid a painful but harmless electric shock, using a buzzer which warned them to jump out of the way. After a few trials the dogs jumped as soon as they heard the buzzer, thus avoiding the shock successfully. Then the current was turned off, with the idea of showing the Pavlovian phenomenon of extinction. The dogs continued to jump at the sound of the buzzer for

hundreds of trials over a period of weeks, never waiting to see whether they would be shocked again. This long persistence of avoidance has some relation to the emotional responses connected with the sympathetic nervous system . . .

Persistent avoidance reactions have also been reported in cats and mice. This kind of response is apparently normal among many animals and fits in with observations made in practical contacts with them. For example, trappers of wolves find by experience that if a wolf gets into a trap and escapes there is no hope of catching him again with the same type of trap (87). The memory for danger appears to be very long-lasting.

Training for Aggressive and Peaceful Behavior

Training a Fighter

In one of our early experiments with fighting mice we were surprised to find that when two inexperienced adult males were put together, they usually fought very indifferently and often did not fight at all. This was understandable in terms of passive inhibition, and we looked for a method of training which was based on the principles of learning and would make an animal more eager to fight. To meet these principles, the behavior should be reinforced many times with the primary stimulus of being attacked or hurt by another mouse, although not so severely as to produce avoidance. This situation would have to be repeated in such a way that no extinction of the fighting reaction would occur. Other things taken into consideration were the tendency to fatigue and the principle that a stimulus is a change, as a monotonously repeated stimulus soon loses its novelty and becomes less effective. With these points in mind, we devised the following system.

The inexperienced mouse is placed with an experienced fighter, which attacks him. As soon as he begins to fight back, the two mice are separated, so that there is no danger of injury and no chance for the inexperienced mouse to develop a habit of avoidance. On the second day another mouse is held by the tail and bumped against the trainee in such a way that he is stimulated to attack. The stimulus mouse is then removed at once, so that fighting is apparently successful.

Novelty is maintained by presenting four different mice, the second and fourth being turned loose in the pen for short periods so that the trainee can chase them. The helpless mice are not used long enough to be badly hurt. This procedure is repeated daily, and on the fifth day it is followed by releasing an untrained mouse with the new fighter, who now attacks at once and in almost every case wins the fight. After this no further training is necessary, although the trained fighter will attack more fiercely if briefly stimulated with the helpless mice before each fight. In order to avoid fatigue he should not be fought oftener than every other day, and longer periods of rest will not be harmful.

Fighters trained in this way soon become so ferocious that (as Kahn [43] has shown) they will even attack females and young, which males ordinarily will not do. The trained fighters show few preliminary emotional reactions and attack quickly, savagely, and efficiently.

Similar methods for the training of successful human competitors in athletic contests have been developed by coaches and trainers on the basis of practical experience and without benefit of theory. The usual practice is to start a young boxer in training bouts where no decision is reached, and then let the boy begin his career with an easy win. The careful manager tries to pick opponents in such a way that his fighter will win over more and more experienced fighters. Then he is ready for the big fight with somebody who has been trained like himself. If everything goes well, both contestants will fight long, hard, and skillfully.

Football coaches attempt to train their teams in much the same way. They like to set up game schedules starting with an easy victory and gradually working up to a final big game with an evenly matched team. Actually, since all the other coaches are trying to do the same thing, this seldom works out perfectly in practice. The important things to remember in these more or less harmless outlets for aggression are the principles of reinforcement by success, and the avoidance of inhibitory training, particularly of the long-lasting sort arising from defeat and severe punishment. To put this in practical language, repeated success is extremely important in maintaining a high level of motivation, while the effects of repeated failure are very difficult to overcome.

From a more general viewpoint, the experiments with mice show us that aggression has to be learned. Defensive fighting can be stimulated by the pain of an attack, but aggression, in the strict sense of an unprovoked attack, can only be produced by training. Essentially, the aggressive mouse has learned to associate fighting with certain neutral or secondary stimuli. If it can be established that aggression is produced by training in all species of animals, including human beings, there is a hopeful outlook for the control of harmful aggression.

Training for Peaceful Living

In another experiment with mice we wished pairs of strange males to live together peacefully. From a theoretical viewpoint, the idea was to inhibit the primary stimuli for fighting at the first meeting, so that the animals would subsequently form a habit of not-fighting while living together. The experiment was set up in this way: Mice ordinarily never fight females, nor do they fight over their possession. The inexperienced males were allowed to live with females for a few weeks. This was to build up passive inhibition against fighting with cage mates. Then they were taken out of their cages, held by the tail, and stroked on the back with a finger

five times. They usually struggled a little. Then they were placed back with their respective females, which they did not fight. In this way an inhibition was built up against fighting after handling. When two males were treated in this way for four or five days and then placed together in a pen with one or two females, there was no fighting, and they lived peacefully together for the duration of the experiment, a period of several weeks.

Another example of the use of scientific principles to inhibit fighting may be taken from dog training. In giving psychological tests to a large colony of puppies we desired to maintain peaceful relationships with them without punishing them. As any dog-owner knows, young puppies like to make playful attacks on their handlers, and if this is not stopped it develops into a habit which is quite dangerous when exhibited by a grown dog with a full set of teeth. We adopted the control method of picking up the puppies frequently at a very young age. They were never hurt or frightened, but the puppies were of course, helpless with their feet off the ground. As they grew older, all that we ever needed to do to control them was to pick them up, and they immediately assumed a helpless attitude. The method was effective even on such aggressive animals as terriers. From a scientific viewpoint, this was a successful application of the principle of passive inhibition. The puppies simply built up a strong association between not-fighting and being held. Of course, the technique is not one which could be adopted with an animal like a Great Dane.

Such dramatic results as these make the prospects appear hopeful for the application of general theoretical principles to the inhibitory training of children. The most important of these principles is passive inhibition. A child should acquire habits of non-fighting simply by not fighting. Therefore, a reasonably happy and peaceful environment should automatically produce a child with strong habits of being peaceable with his friends and relatives.

A peaceful environment implies that parents and teachers are in some way keeping the stimulation to fight at a low level. This is relatively easy to do for a young baby but becomes more and more difficult as a child grows older. Some stimulation to fight is unavoidable in normal living.

The effects of minor irritations can often be overcome by providing distracting stimulation which will produce other and happier reactions. This is particularly effective if the distracting stimulus is provided in advance. Games, prizes, and food at a small boy's party can usually stall off most of the fights.

Punishment is a less desirable method of control, since pain itself is a stimulus to fight. Where fighting must be controlled by force, restraint is the most desirable method, and it will be discussed again in a later chapter.

In our enthusiasm for applying the results of psychological knowledge

to fighting behavior, we should remember that learning is not the only cause of aggression. There are many other factors to be considered, and any complete explanation has to take all of them into account. However, we can say definitely that all evidence points to the conclusions that learning and habit formation are very important and that any explanation of aggression based on other causes should be consistent with these facts and principles.

Since psychological methods of training for the control of aggression can be very effective if consistently applied, we may raise the question of whether it is desirable to attempt to control all aggression by various sorts of inhibitory training. . . .

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Aggression as Maladaptive Behavior

JOHN PAUL SCOTT

The frequency of . . . bizarre forms of maladaptive aggression is probably related to the fact that aggression is, next to sex, the most highly regulated and repressed of all types of human social behavior. Aggressive behavior and its causes therefore have great significance in psychiatric practice. Some of the clinical examples of human aggressive behavior seem so poorly adaptive as to conflict with the fundamental theory that all behavior consists of attempts to adapt to stimulation or change. As we shall see, this contradiction is more apparent than real, and most behavior when completely understood has some elements of adaptation.

Experimental Analysis of Maladaptive Behavior

Basic Factors

A great many theories have been advanced to account for maladaptive or abnormal behavior, and the majority have some validity. Most of the attempts to test these theories have been done with animals. One of the earliest experiments was done by a colleague of Pavlov (59), who conditioned a dog to give a salivary reflex to the secondary stimulus of a card marked with a circle, and to be inhibited by a similar card with an ellipse drawn upon it. After the two habits had been established by long practice, he began to make the signals more alike by making the ellipse more circular. Finally it got to the point where the dog could no longer tell the difference, and its behavior became, in Pavlov's words "neurotic." The dog refused to submit any longer to the training situation and became aggressive instead of co-operative, barking and biting at his harness. A modern scientist would probably call the behavior maladaptive rather than neurotic, and label it as an excellent experimental demonstration of the fact that frustration may lead to aggression.

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When the experiment is analyzed we see that three factors or conditions were present. First, *motivation* of the dog must have been quite *high*, since it had been conditioned for a long time (see the effect of reinforcement on the strength of the response). Second, the experiment was designed so that it was *impossible for the dog to adapt* to the situation correctly. Third, the dog was kept in the training harness so that he *could not escape* from the situation.

Since Pavlov's day a great many other experimenters have worked with various kinds of abnormal behavior in animals. They have varied the experimental situation which makes it impossible for the animal to adapt, as well as the method and kind of stimulation, but the three general factors of high motivation or stimulation, lack of an opportunity to escape, and impossibility of adaptation are always present in their methods.

An Experiment with Difficult Adaptation

It is a relatively simple matter to test the effects of the above three factors on fighting behavior (68). If we take an inexperienced male mouse and subject him to the attacks of a trained fighter, he will be strongly stimulated to fight. We can prevent his escape by putting the two mice together in a cage. Adaptation is difficult because the inexperienced fighter is outmatched by the trained animal.

The results are simple and clear-cut. At first the inexperienced mouse tries to fight back, and the two tumble over and over, biting and scratching. However, the experienced fighter is more effective in hurting his opponent, who begins to run away. If he were not confined, the losing mouse could escape from the victor completely, a successful adaptation. Since this first form of adaptation did not work and he cannot get away, he soon shows another type of behavior. As soon as attacked he leaps away and stands still, holding out his forepaws toward the attacker. This is a passive defensive attitude, and as we watch we see that it has the effect of holding off the aggressor. It is also less stimulating, since the aggressor no longer gets hurt. As a result the attacks gradually let up until the attacker is apparently satisfied with merely threatening the losing mouse, who immediately stiffens in a defensive attitude.

If we confine the animals still more and let them fight in a narrow passage where the losing mouse cannot stand up, he simply lies down flat and makes no movement whatever. He has become completely passive and is apparently not adapting to the situation at all, but this very passivity is less stimulating to the attacking mouse, so that the passive animal takes less punishment in the long run. We can conclude that when escape is impossible and adaptation is difficult, an animal tries out a series of reactions, any one of which may be adaptive under certain circumstances, and finally sticks with the one which seems to give the best effect. It is therefore incorrect to say that any behavior is completely non-adaptive.

We are more near the truth in saying that it is either partially or poorly adaptive. In short, the mouse seems to do the best thing under the circumstances.

If we now examine our human examples more closely, we see that they also are partially adaptive. The boy who quarrels with the girl who frustrates him has at least driven her away so that she will not frustrate him again. The man who takes out his exasperation on his wife has not done anything about the relationship with his boss, but he has at least relieved some of his feelings. However, this brings up the problem of the human situations in which a person could make a better adaptation and does not do so. Sometimes the chosen attempt at adaptation may actually make the situation worse than it originally was. For example, if a man takes out his aggressive feelings on his wife too often, she may eventually retaliate, with the result that he has a bad time at home as well as a bad time at work.

Such situations seem to occur chiefly because of suppressive human training which limits freedom of adaptation.

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... results [of animal experiments] are consistent with an idea that comes from human clinical studies, namely that if a strong stimulus to aggression is suppressed, *it tends to emerge in some less adaptive form.*

The form which the outlet takes may be completely inappropriate as an adaptation to the original stimulus. When such things occur in human behavior, we are apt to say that the individual is "queer" or "crazy." The clinician would label him "neurotic" or "psychotic," depending on the severity of the symptoms.

Outlets for Suppressed Aggression

The forms which human aggression may take when blocked are quite diverse. . . .

Type of aggression and the object toward which it is directed are listed in order of descending completeness and directness of the outlet. From the viewpoint of emotional satisfaction, the best outlet for aggression is a physical response toward the person who stimulated it. Next best is screaming at him and calling him names. Having an imaginary fight with him is less satisfactory, and trying to forget about the whole thing gives the least satisfaction of all.

Unfortunately, the kind of behavior which gives the most emotional satisfaction may lead to serious trouble of another kind. A student who has been called a fool by a sarcastic professor may feel like hitting him in the nose or telling the old boy that he isn't so smart himself, but the student knows that this would only get him thrown out of college. So he comes back to his room, boiling with rage. A chance remark from an acquaintance sets

him off, and there is a beautiful scrap in the hall of the college dormitory, which lasts until the contestants are separated by friends.

This sort of thing occurs so commonly that it has received the special name of *displaced aggression*. People let loose their aggressive feelings on their friends, their wives, their children, their dogs, the government, and even an innocent door which receives a kick in passing . . . the kind of outlet which a person finds depends a great deal on the kind of inhibitory training to which he has been subjected. In some cases this leaves an individual with no outlet at all, and the result may in severe cases lead to clinical symptoms.

We should also point out that just as the lack of opportunity for aggression may lead to the substitution of another type of behavior, aggression itself may be substituted for other types, resulting in some bizarre forms of human abnormal behavior. In sadism and masochism, for example, the infliction of pain often has sexual origins.

Clinical Analysis of Aggression

So far we have considered fighting and aggressive behavior from an objective point of view and described it in terms of what it looks like from the outside. But when we attempt to describe human behavior completely, we are forced to use such terms as imagination, emotion, and unconscious thinking, in order to describe not only what fighting looks like but what it feels like. Freud and his followers, including the psychodynamic school of psychologists, have greatly influenced modern thinking on these points. Such things as feelings are very difficult to measure and to analyze by experiment, but they are an important part of human experience, and the ideas of the psychodynamic school have proved useful in dealing with some very important human problems.

One of these is the problem of controlling the indirect causes of aggression, which are often more important than the direct ones. In addition to the obvious causes of fighting, there are many tortuous ways in which repressed behavior and feelings may lead to aggression, all based on the fundamental idea that strong stimulation must find an outlet of some kind. When an individual is unable to adapt to a situation, he must do something about it, and frequently his solution of the problem involves aggression. According to clinical experience, the two most common reactions to an unbearable emotional situation are to fight it or to try to escape from it in some way, and this leads us to the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

Frustration and Aggression

We have described one of the conditions for abnormal behavior as the inability to adapt to a situation. We can say objectively that a person who is unable to adapt is frustrated, but also talk more subjectively in terms of

feelings and say that he has a feeling of frustration. This feeling is commonly associated with aggression, partly because it feels much like anger, partly because one way to remove the cause of frustration directly is to attack it, and partly because frustration of aggression itself may lead to its various indirect and maladaptive forms. The idea that frustration causes aggression is found in Freud's writings, and Dollard and his co-workers (20) at the Yale Institute of Human Relations made important advances along these lines in their book *Frustration and Aggression*. They were interested in reconciling Freudian theory with the objective theory of learning and were able to show that both interpretations of behavior are mutually compatible if not co-extensive. They also made out a very good case for frustration being a frequent cause of aggression in our society and even in some other more primitive human social groups.

However, to state as the authors did in their provisional hypothesis, that frustration is the only cause of aggression and that aggression always follows frustration, is to somewhat exaggerate the case. This simple hypothesis does not explain some of the animal experiments. For example, we have seen that the best way to train a mouse to be highly aggressive is not to frustrate him but to give him success in fighting. Again, Tinbergen (84) has found that when a stickleback defending its nest is approached by another male fish of the same kind, it becomes highly excited and aggressive but is at the same time strongly stimulated to stay at the nest. The stickleback is obviously frustrated, but instead of fighting it may start digging a new nest in the sand with its nose. Here frustration does not result in aggression but in nest-building behavior. Similarly Bauer (6) found that mice which are highly stimulated to fight but are not able to do so may start digging holes in the shavings which cover the bottom of the cage. In short, while frustration is highly likely to produce aggression, the result may also be other kinds of behavior.

Similar behavior in human beings is often described as sublimation, or substituting a socially acceptable type of behavior for one that is forbidden. While this is probably one factor in human behavior, the animal experiments suggest a simpler principle at work, and one which may also be important for humans.

This is the principle of *summation of stimuli*. When nerves are stimulated electrically, a certain level of stimulation must be reached before they react. However, a rapid succession of weak shocks will produce the same effect as a single strong one. Similarly, an animal or person in a high state of excitation often responds to weak stimulation which would produce no reaction in other circumstances.

Sometimes frustration actually interferes with aggression. When two rats had become accustomed to fighting each other, Seward (77) frustrated them by making them hungry and providing powdered food in a dish at

which only one rat could eat. Although frustrated in terms of food, the rats fought less than they usually did.

A similar experiment (70) was done by us in a flock of goats which had a well-established dominance order in competing for grain. Unlike Seward's rats, the goats were already in the habit of fighting over food. The goats were fed in pairs, and the dominant goat always chased the subordinate one away and got all the food. The situation should have been quite frustrating for the subordinate goat, but it did not fight. Then the whole flock was frustrated by taking their food away for several hours before the test. The amount of aggression did increase but only in the dominant goats. When hungry, the subordinate member of the pair would stay around and take more of a beating while trying to get food, but it never became aggressive unless paired with an even more subordinate animal, in which case it would become more aggressive than usual. This and Seward's experiment suggest that *frustration leads to aggression only in a situation where the individual has a habit of being aggressive*. The evidence applies only to actual acts of aggression, but since feelings and emotions can also be modified by learning, it is reasonable to suppose that the hypothesis may be extended to feelings of aggression as well. In any case, it demonstrates the major effects which training and habit formation may have upon aggression . . . aggression, in the strict sense of an unprovoked attack, has to be learned.

All of these experiments add up to a fairly simple conclusion regarding the relationship between frustration and aggression. The frustrated individual is left in a condition of high motivation or excitation whose degree depends on the amount of previous stimulation. When he is in a high state of excitation, he will tend to respond to stimuli which ordinarily would not be sufficient to arouse him. In subjective terms, a frustrated person feels more irritable, and it takes very little additional stimulation to arouse aggression in directions permitted by his training. He is also susceptible to stimuli of other kinds, so that behavior other than aggression may often follow frustration.

In short, the reaction of an individual to frustration is in part explained by the basic physiological principle of summation of stimuli. His behavior will also be governed by the principles of adaptation and learning. Aggression is adaptive if it drives away the cause of frustration, and we would expect that this would be easily learned, thus making aggression a common, but not inevitable, consequence of frustration.

Overcompensation

To give a complete picture of the psychodynamic system of analyzing feelings and behavior would require more space than this book permits. Alexander (1) presents an admirable summary for the interested reader. Besides frustration, there are several other situations and mechanisms

which sometimes lead to aggression. One example is overcompensation. A young adolescent in our society has the problem of breaking loose from his family and becoming a more independent person. He blames his difficulties on his attachment to his parents, and to overcome his affection for them he attacks them verbally and sometimes physically, much to the surprise and dismay of his father and mother, who can see no reason for it.

An adolescent who feels incompetent and inferior compared with older people may also resort to overcompensation. In order to demonstrate that he is really brave and independent he may go out and daringly walk across a railroad bridge, hop on moving freight trains, or even hold up a filling station. The result is aggressive behavior, although the original stimulation has little to do with fighting.

Identification

Other mechanisms which can lead to aggression are those of identification and projection. These terms simply refer to the fact that a person often feels that he is like another person or that another person is like himself. Such feelings can either be the product of conscious imagination or be quite unconscious, so that the person who has them may be completely unaware of their existence. They are extremely important both in family life and in other social relationships. In fact, the feeling that another person has feelings like one's own is a fundamental part of human social relationships. It is therefore not surprising that these phenomena should play important parts among the causes of aggression.

Identification may be defined as feeling that one is like another person and imitating his outward behavior. This is often done consciously, as in the hero worship of children in their teens. If the model who is chosen is aggressive, the person who identifies with him will also try to be aggressive. Such identification may also be completely unconscious, particularly in the case of young children, who tend to identify with their parents.

* * * *

Projection

This consists of attributing one's own feelings to another person or even to some animal, plant, or inanimate object. A very sensitive child may be quite upset by the sight of a tree being cut, because he feels that the tree must be suffering. This kind of reaction is one which has possibilities for study in an objective way, and in recent years scientists have been much excited by "projective tests." One of those often used is the Rorschach test (2) in which a person is asked to state what he sees in a meaningless series of inkblots. It is supposed that the person may so reveal attitudes and feelings which he conceals even from himself.

Other projective techniques have been applied to the study of unconscious and imaginary aggression in several ways.

* * * *

... projection is not highly important as a direct cause of aggressive behavior. Indirectly it can serve as an excuse for aggression, as when one person attributes his own feeling of hatred to another and thus assumes that the other person really hated him first, which provides an excellent reason for open hatred or direct attack. But projection is most important in that it reveals the hidden desires for aggressive behavior. Once revealed, these desires can often be directed into harmless or useful outlets before they build up enough to cause trouble.

Family Life and Aggression

Clinical studies show that many of the desires for aggressive behavior come out of the circumstances of family living. These causes of aggression are very little in evidence in other animals, since they seem to arise out of the long-continued associations between relatives in human families and the cultural attempts to regulate behavior in family groups. The roots of this aggression also lie in the human tendency to be possessive and jealous in any social relationship.

* * * *

Aggression and Mental Health

We could conclude superficially that people who have physical or verbal outlets for their aggressive behavior should be better satisfied and happier people than those who do not. They blow up but calm down afterward as if nothing had happened. They may lead more risky lives as a result of their aggression, and they may be dangerous and aggravating to others, but their own mental health should be good, at least in respect to aggression. However, the same behavior may make them badly maladjusted in a society which puts a premium on friendliness and self-control.

People who have only imaginary outlets for aggression get into many other difficulties, and those who have no outlet at all are even worse off. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could get into the latter situation, but there are children whose parents are so concerned with the problem of aggression that they attempt to suppress it in any form. The child cannot fight, must not swear or call names, and must not even hate anybody else in imagination. This has no particularly bad effects unless there is strong or prolonged stimulation for aggression, which sometimes occurs between members of the same family.

* * * *

We should remember that even the most abnormal aspects of aggressive behavior serve some adaptive purpose in relieving the feelings of the person who shows them and that in many cases they are harmless to others. Aggression is not necessarily a bad thing, and most of the recent psychological advice to parents and teachers is to try to make some distinction between harmless and harmful aggression and let the child have some reasonably beneficial outlets.

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Aggression

BEN KARPMAN, M.D.

Summary and Conclusions

I. General Formulations--Definitions. 1. The animal in order to live and survive must absorb needed material from the environment and metabolize it into its own organism. Instinct stands guard over its needs and the tension it creates is the force that drives the animal on to secure this needed material, expressing itself as aggression. Aggression is thus defined as an attempt to assault, subdue, control or extract something from the environment for its own purposes. Aggression, therefore, is not merely necessary to life; it is coeval with life; indeed it is life itself.

2. In some as yet undetermined way, animal growth is tied up intimately with reproduction, which of its own accord requires the expenditure of a great deal of energy and therefore of aggression.

3. There is a great deal of aggression and competition in the plant and animal world for food, light and water. Even when animals cooperate, such cooperation appears to be chiefly for purposes of aggressive assaults on the environment, or else in defense, to avoid such assaults from others.

II. Types of Aggression. 1. Primary aggression is defined as a kind of unconditioned, instinctive, entirely primitive "reaching out" for what is needed. While this primary aggression is common to all living beings, their differential forms of manifestation appear constitutional. Secondary aggression becomes necessary when the animal encounters difficulties or opposition in its attempt to reach the desired object, leading to the frustrations of the instinct, development of tension, insecurity, hostility and aggression toward the frustrating object.

The existence of primary aggression in us makes the emergence and development of secondary aggression possible. Since most of the aggression we meet with in daily life is of the secondary type, that is, environmentally conditioned, the concept allows the searching for methods (psychotherapy, etc.) that can modify socially disadvantageous forms of aggression.

Ben Karpman, "Aggression," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1950), pp. 694-718. Copyright, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc. Reproduced by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

2. Active aggression is observed when an individual directly and energetically assaults the environment. Passive aggression is observed when the same results are accomplished by the individual's inducing others, through particular behavior, to perform the task for him.

3. Constructive aggression is a kind of activity which results for the individual in definite, socially acceptable, advancement for himself, but not at the expense of other people. Contrariwise, destructive aggression is a socially disapproved type of behavior; it may even be inimical to society.

4. Direct or principal aggression applies to these situations when a particular individual, for whatever reason, becomes aggressive toward another individual, who in turn and defense must respond with counter-aggression.

5. Conscious aggression appears in response to immediate, directly active situations. Unconscious aggression results from lifelong tendencies having their roots in the early life of the individual and the sources of which are unknown to the individual.

III. *Control of Aggression.* Because of the presence in us from birth, as a part of our constitutional endowment, of primary aggression, society continually trains us in control of aggression from earliest childhood and throughout our entire life. However, in spite of great control and curbing, aggression is quite persistent in us, permeating our daily interpersonal, social and international relations, emerging on occasions in the form of social explosions (revolutions, massacres, civil war, and international war).

IV. *The Contribution of Psychoanalysis.* The contributions of psychoanalysis to the problem of aggression come chiefly from two sources: the reconstruction of the analysis of adults; and the study of children.

1. Chief among the former is the contribution of Freud, who postulates two instincts, the Eros (sex or life-preservative instinct) and the death instinct. The death instinct is characterized by aggression and destruction which in part are externalized, destroying everything inimical to Eros; it is aggression flowing outwardly. As external aggression is lessened, it flows inwardly and destructively. Life, according to Freud, consists in the intimate working of the life and death instincts.

2. In the psychoanalysis of children, the contributions of Melanie Klein stand foremost. According to her, at birth the child is pure instinct, knows nothing but want and hunger, and constantly reaches outward to relieve his tension, which can be achieved only by some form of aggressive behavior such as crying, screaming, kicking, temper tantrums. The child's original superego reflects the relationship to parents, is severe, and may even be barbaric, only gradually being softened into a more concordant social type. Through gradual, continuous and unremitting training, society finally manages to impart to the developing child a well-functioning control of aggression, which emerges in the form of constructive aggression. In the course of development, aggression may become conditioned on numerous

emotional situations and expressed as secondary aggression, which may escape social control and thus become destructive.

V. *Clinical Aspects of Aggression.* Aggression finds full expression in many abnormal mental states.

1) In mental defectives there is a greater likelihood of primary aggression with proportionately less control of secondary and constructive aggression. 2) In the psychoses, aggression is often withdrawn from reality and becomes internalized but may break out in aggressive assaults on the environment (excitement, destruction, murder, etc.). 3) Epilepsy and alcoholism provide good examples of escape from aggression.

4) Many of our personality traits, such as kindness, may be reaction formations from original aggressiveness, and friendliness may be an over-compensation for an original hatred. 5) Many psychosomatic phenomena have a large aggressive component in them. To be mentioned here are fatigue, heart conditions, spastic colon, tics, convulsions. 6) Anxiety and depression immobilize aggression, but behind these are often marked original aggressive hostile drives, checked and immobilized by guilt. 7) Many neurotic reactions, however, sometimes overflow the boundaries originally set out for them and assume a marked aggressive antisocial character. Here we find instances of conditioned and defensive aggression that can be socially quite destructive (kleptomania, pyromania, neurotic criminality, murder). 8) In paraphilia (perversions) behavior and fantasies show a large aggressive component. In the case of so-called sexual psychopaths, there is an aggressor and there are, quite universally, aggressive assaults on a victim rather than on a willing partner. 9) In true, primary or idiopathic psychopathy, we have primary aggression, unmodified and uncontrolled by the influences of civilization and culture, whereas symptomatic or secondary psychopathy, however severe, flows from unresolved emotional difficulties and its aggression, therefore, is essentially secondary.

VI. *Conclusions.* 1) Aggression is an integral part of our instinctive life; it is instinct in action. 2) As instinct presses for expression, it develops tension, which can only be discharged through aggression. On the emotional side this tension is accompanied by a strong sense of insecurity which persists until the instinctive drive and its accompanying tensions are discharged and aggression ceases. 3) Because instinct expressions and therefore aggression rarely realize themselves without obstruction or impediment, other emotional reactions, chief among which are frustration, hostility, anxiety and guilt, frequently make their appearance in the course of instinctive drives and aggression. These emotions and their ramifications may be combined in a great many ways, contributing to the complexities of our emotional life. 4) Many abnormal mental states have, as an important component, some significant aspect of aggression. 5) Society's chief task is the control and taming of aggression. However, human society has never

adequately learned how to curb and control human aggression, which fact is responsible for many of our social ills. 6) From the standpoint of psychodynamics, the individual may learn the control and constructive use of his aggressive trends through a personal analysis. This, however, can reach only a relatively small number of neurotic individuals. Superiorly, it can be accomplished by training aimed at education of children in the control and constructive use of aggression. At the purely social level we must seek a state of society that will allow for a superior relationship between the individual and society, for a minimal expression of primary and destructive aggression. This may be best accomplished by a progressive educational approach combined with a progressive social reorientation.

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Aggression from Anxiety

THEODOR REIK

This communication is not intended to be a critique of Anna Freud's book, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (1) . . . it is merely a contribution to the discussion of a theme which is developed in the ninth chapter of that book. This aim has been facilitated both by the clarity and precision of the author's thought and by the conspicuous directness of her approach to the difficult psychological problems involved. . . .

Let us take as our point of departure Aichhorn's case, cited in the chapter entitled 'Identification with the Aggressor', of a young boy who habitually reacted to the blame and reproaches of his teacher by making faces which caused the whole class to burst out laughing. These grimaces were simply a caricature of the angry expression of the teacher. When the boy had to face a scolding by the latter, he tried to master his anxiety by involuntarily imitating him. He identified himself with the teacher's anger and copied his expression as he spoke, though the imitation was not recognized. Through his grimaces he was assimilating himself to or identifying himself with the dreaded external object. . . .

Anna Freud observes that this process of transformation strikes us as more curious when the anxiety relates not to some event in the past but to something expected in the future. . . . Anna Freud holds that this 'identification with the aggressor' forms a by no means uncommon middle stage in the normal development of the super-ego. . . . the internalized criticism is dissociated from the child's own reprehensible activity and turned back on the outside world. By means of a new defensive process identification with the aggressor is succeeded by an active assault on the outside world.

I do not attach great importance to the distinction made between the two kinds of reaction, according to whether the stimulus which has aroused anxiety is to be found in the past or in the future. Primarily of course this mode of reaction serves the purpose of mastering an unpleasurable impression. But the recollection of the past experience must at once awaken

fears of its repetition. Thus the form of reaction in question is Janus-headed, one face looking towards the past and the other to the future. Closer examination, however, reveals that each of the two faces is possessed of certain distinctive features. The process of transformation which takes place in connection with an anxiety-experience of the past is a special instance of the ego's efforts in the realm of the psyche to achieve the mastery over an unduly powerful or sudden stimulus. Identification with an aggressor (or with one who one fears may become an aggressor) is a special instance of *identification for the purpose of mastering anxiety*. This process can also take place in regard to inanimate objects. A small boy who has seen and been terrified by a railway engine may very well later on his return home play that he himself is the engine which rushes past with a deafening roar.

It would be tempting to correlate the violence of the aggression which, regarded psychologically, is a reactive one, with the strength of the assailing stimulus. But it would be a mistake to do so, because then we should fail to do justice to the subject whose anxiety is stimulated. The strength of the ego has to be considered in each case. We shall therefore follow Anna Freud and decide in favour of correlating the violence of the aggression with the intensity of the fear giving rise to it. I propose to call the specific mode of reaction which arises here *aggression from anxiety*. I may say at once that this reaction is not confined to the individual. Aggression from anxiety also plays a part in the lives of nations and other communities.

The other face of this Janus-headed reaction is turned forward to an event which has still to take place. Here the aggression is brought about by fear of an attack or a punishment. This state of anxious expectation would be impossible if it did not go back to an unconscious memory or (more correctly) memory-trace. The family resemblance of our Janus face becomes more marked at this point and we perceive that it has two parts—an older and a more recent one.

This identification with the future aggressor has one specific mental determinant. It would be inconceivable but for the operation of a mechanism of forestalling. In a book (2) first published in 1935 I tried to explain how this mechanism works. Identification with the future aggressor is a reaction to his expected anxiety-arousing attitude.

... [In] a study of mine (3) published in 1929, ... I ... stated that it was in conformity with the principle of retrogression of affect that fear of an object, once it had reached a certain height, should be transformed into aggression. ... 'The impressions we derive from our analyses of neurotics may help us to a dawning realization that we have hitherto underestimated the significance of this mechanism whereby anxiety is transformed into hatred and so into aggressive tendencies. In the course of psycho-analytical practice one meets with experiences which point to the conclusion that sudden actions of an aggressive or hostile character are often the result of

an attempt to ward off excessive anxiety. . . . More important still is the investigation of this defensive mechanism and this process of transformation for the psychology of the criminal. Criminal psychologists, judges and criminal lawyers would be well advised to study these difficult processes with the help of the psycho-analytical method. A great many otherwise inexplicable crimes become intelligible in the light of that psychical process whereby aggression is employed as a means of reducing the tension caused by anxiety.'

In this passage we find an early attempt to formulate aggression from anxiety in psychological terms. Anna Freud has enlarged my view that an act of aggression on an object is designed to overcome fear of that object, by adding the more valuable piece of knowledge concerning the process of identification with the aggressor. Her theory also explains how, with the assistance of a projection of guilt, identification with the aggressor develops into aggressive action against the external world. . . . By introjecting the authorities to whose criticism it is exposed, the ego is able to project its prohibited impulses outwards and then to condemn them. When an ego develops along this line, 'its intolerance of other people is prior to its severity towards itself. It learns what is regarded as blameworthy but protects itself by means of this defence-mechanism from unpleasant self-criticism. Vehement indignation at someone else's wrongdoing is the precursor of and substitute for guilty feelings on its own account.'

* * * *

In connection with this part of Anna Freud's theory, I do not think it is right to say that an ego of this kind is intolerant of other people before it is severe towards itself and that we have here an intermediate stage in the development of the super-ego which at the same time represents some kind of preliminary phase of morality. On the contrary I am of opinion that the subject's perception of his own guilt has in these cases assumed such an exceptionally severe and acute form that he must drive his aggressiveness outwards if his ego is to remain intact. I hold that we are here confronted not with a defective development of the super-ego, but with a hypertrophied activity on its part—with a development which is excessive at any rate in relation to an ego that is still weak and unconfident of itself. If the ego, finding itself in this situation, were not to seek relief by such a method of unburdenment, the sense of guilt, now become too powerful to bear, would turn against the ego and the result would be, not a greater awareness of guilt (which indeed is often perceived consciously) but an attack of melancholia. The turning of aggressiveness back on to the outside world must be regarded, in my view, as an attempt at cure, the aim of which is to ward off the unduly powerful reproaches of the super-ego by 'a repetition of the crime'. . . . An apparent objection to this view of the matter might be found

in the fact that the reaction we have described is, in fact, accompanied by an aggressiveness which is incompatible with a normal development of the super-ego and is intended to injure the outside world. Against that it may be said that the ego by acting in this way ultimately does far more harm to itself than to anyone else, so that this result alone entitles us to infer the existence of an undue sense of guilt. But it is precisely the intensity of this reaction which is proof of a hypertrophied development of the super-ego relatively to the ego.

* * * *

Perhaps I may be allowed to carry this discussion of the theory of aggression from anxiety a stage further. As Anna Freud has well shown, identification with an aggressor has the important function to fulfil of avoiding anxiety. Nevertheless two facts militate against the assumption that the avoidance of anxiety can be the primary motive of that reaction. The first of these facts is the exaggerated nature and frenzied vehemence of the attack which is characteristically sudden and explosive in quality. It would not bear these features if the motive were simply to avoid anxiety, even assuming the anxiety to be acute. The second fact is derived from an observation made on a child and may perhaps shed some further light on the subject. I was watching a little boy who had hidden himself and who, with a cry which was meant to be terrifying, suddenly rushed out of his hiding-place and fell upon his playmates. I knew that the boy's elder brother was fond of frightening him suddenly in a dark passage in their home. The little boy had identified himself with his assailant, whose part he now played in relation to his friends. But his attack on them was intended to inspire fright rather than anxiety. We must assume that the original affect against which he was trying to defend himself was fright.

I must, I fear, once again refer to a theory of my own. According to this it is not anxiety but the primary and much more violent affect of fright which underlies most of the defensive measures taken by the ego. Anxiety, I maintain, is a secondary reaction, at once a repetition of the affect of fright in a milder form and a safeguard against its repetition. To appreciate its function we might compare it with an injection of bacilli given as a prophylactic measure in order to diminish the virulence of an infection.

Anxiety is a defensive reaction to something that threatens to break through; fright is the reaction to something that is actually breaking through (2). Thus anxiety may be regarded as a buffer or safeguard adopted by the ego to ward off fright. To experience anxiety is to forestall in imagination the frightening event and thus to protect the ego against the catastrophic effects of that event.

Aggression based on identification with an aggressor is originally a response evoked not by an anxiety-situation but by a danger-situation.

Later of course it comes to be employed secondarily as a defence against anxiety. But its primary object is to ward off the more sudden and violent affect of fright which threatens to overwhelm the ego.

* * * *

This is also the proper place for me to expand the theory I have put forward by showing how I picture the psychogenetic development of anxiety from fright. The affect of fright, the earliest and most powerful affect in young animals and children alike, leaves deeply-buried memory-traces (not memories) in the ego. Any external situation which seems to offer a suitable opportunity for re-animating those memory traces, just grazing their surface one might say, ultimately leads to a repetition of the affect of fright which, however, gradually declines in strength as it becomes inured to the stimulus. We may proceed to define this re-animation of a memory trace as ideational fright, that is to say as a reaction of fright to the emergence of a frightening idea. I consider it likely that fright succeeds in being transformed into anxiety when the idea of the frightening thing has appeared in the ego a sufficient number of times. A reduction in intensity of affect from fright to anxiety would accordingly come from having successfully gone through this ideational fright on many occasions and would be the result of a better adaptation to the constantly recurring frightening images. It is to be assumed that those ideas originally possessed the character of hallucinations and had a correspondingly strong affective influence.

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... familiarity succeeds in diluting the primary affect of fright in the small child to one of anxiety.

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The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis

NEAL E. MILLER (with the collaboration of ROBERT R. SEARS,
O. H. MOWRER, LEONARD W. DOOB, and JOHN DOLLARD)

The frustration-aggression hypothesis is an attempt to state a relationship believed to be important in many different fields of research. It is intended to suggest to the student of human nature that when he sees aggression he should turn a suspicious eye on possibilities that the organism or group is confronted with frustration; and that when he views interference with individual or group habits, he should be on the look-out for, among other things, aggression. This hypothesis is induced from commonsense observation, from clinical case histories, from a few experimental investigations, from sociological studies and from the results of anthropological field work. The systematic formulation of this hypothesis enables one to call sharp attention to certain common characteristics in a number of observations from all of these historically distinct fields of knowledge and thus to take one modest first step toward the unification of these fields.

A number of tentative statements about the frustration-aggression hypothesis have recently been made by us in a book.² Unfortunately one of these statements, which was conspicuous because it appeared on the first page, was unclear and misleading as has been objectively demonstrated by the behavior of reviewers and other readers. In order to avoid any further confusion it seems advisable to rephrase this statement, changing it to one which conveys a truer impression of the authors' ideas. The objectionable phrase is the last half of the proposition: "that the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression."

The first half of this statement, the assertion that the occurrence of aggression always presupposes frustration, is in our opinion defensible

²J. Dollard, L. W. Doob, N. E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears. *Frustration and aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

Neal E. Miller, et al., "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (1941), pp. 337-342. Reprinted by permission. Footnotes numbered as in original.

and useful as a first approximation, or working hypothesis. The second half of the statement, namely, the assertion "that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression" is unfortunate from two points of view. In the first place it suggests, though it by no means logically demands, that frustration has no consequences other than aggression. This suggestion seems to have been strong enough to override statements appearing later in the text which specifically rule out any such implication.³ A second objection to the assertion in question is that it fails to distinguish between instigation to aggression and the actual occurrence of aggression. Thus it omits the possibility that other responses may be dominant and inhibit the occurrence of acts of aggression. In this respect it is *inconsistent* with later portions of the exposition which make a distinction between the instigation to a response and the actual presence of that response and state that punishment can inhibit the occurrence of acts of aggression.⁴

Both of these unfortunate aspects of the former statement may be avoided by the following rephrasing: Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression.

This rephrasing of the hypothesis states the assumption that was actually used throughout the main body of the text. Instigation to aggression may occupy any one of a number of positions in the hierarchy of instigations aroused by a specific situation which is frustrating. If the instigation to aggression is the strongest member of the hierarchy, then acts of aggression will be the first response to occur. If the instigations to other responses incompatible with aggression are stronger than the instigation to aggression, then these other responses will occur at first and prevent, at least temporarily, the occurrence of acts of aggression. This opens up two further possibilities. If these other responses lead to a reduction in the instigation to the originally frustrated response, then the strength of the instigation to aggression is also reduced so that acts of aggression may not occur at all in the situation in question. If, on the other hand, the first responses do not lead to a reduction in the original instigation, then the instigations to them will tend to become weakened through extinction so that the next most dominant responses, which may or may not be aggression, will tend to occur. From this analysis it follows that the more successive responses of non-aggression are extinguished by continued frustration, the

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9, 19, 58, 101-102.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-38; also 27, 39-50, 75-87, 111, 166. In this later exposition a distinction is made not only between instigation to aggression and acts of aggression but also between conspicuous acts of overt aggression and inconspicuous acts of non-overt aggression. It is assumed that the former are more apt to be culturally inhibited by strong punishments than the latter.

greater is the probability that the instigation to aggression eventually will become dominant so that some response of aggression actually will occur. Whether or not the successive extinction of responses of non-aggression must inevitably lead to the dominance of the instigation to aggression depends, as was clearly stated in later pages of the book, upon quantitative assumptions beyond the scope of our present knowledge.^{5,6}

Frustration produces instigation to aggression but this is not the only type of instigation that it may produce. Responses incompatible with aggression may, if sufficiently instigated, prevent the actual occurrence of acts of aggression. In our society punishment of acts of aggression is a frequent source of instigation to acts incompatible with aggression.

When the occurrence of acts of aggression is prevented by more strongly instigated incompatible responses, how is the existence of instigation to aggression to be determined? If only the more direct and overt acts of aggression have been inhibited, as is apt to be the case because such acts are the most likely to be punished, then the instigation to aggression may be detected by observing either indirect or less overt acts of aggression. If even such acts of aggression are inhibited, then a different procedure must be employed. Two such procedures are at least theoretically possible. One is to reduce the competing instigations, such as fear of punishment, and observe whether or not acts of aggression then occur. The other is to confront the subject with an additional frustration which previous experiments have demonstrated would by itself be too weak to arouse an instigation strong enough to override the competing responses inhibiting the aggression in question. If the instigation from this additional frustration now results in an act of aggression, then it must have gained its strength to do so by summing with an already present but inhibited instigation to aggression. The presence of the originally inhibited instigation to aggression would be demonstrated by the effects of such summation. Thus the fact that an instigation may be inhibited does not eliminate all possibility of experimentally demonstrating its presence.

At this point two important and related qualifications of the hypothesis may be repeated for emphasis though they have already been stated in the book. It is not certain how early in the infancy of the individual the frustration-aggression hypothesis is applicable, and no assumptions are made as to whether the frustration-aggression relationship is of innate or of learned origin.

Now that an attempt has been made to clarify and to qualify the

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶The notions used here are similar to those employed by Professor Hull in describing trial-and-error learning. See Hull, C. L. Simple trial-and-error learning—an empirical investigation. *J. comp. Psychol.* 1939, 27, 233-258.

hypothesis, four of the chief lines of investigation which it suggests may be briefly considered.⁷

1. An attempt may be made to apply the hypothesis to the integration and elucidation of clinical and social data. Here the fact that certain forms of aggression are spectacularly dangerous to society and to the individual is relevant. This means that acute personality conflicts are apt to arise from the problem of handling aggression and that the problem of aggression is apt to play an important rôle in shaping certain great social institutions such as the in-group as an organization against the out-group.

2. An attempt may be made to formulate more exactly the laws determining the different ways in which instigation to aggression will be expressed under specified circumstances. Some of the problems in this field are suggested by the phenomena of displacement of the object of aggression, change in the form of aggression, and catharsis of aggression.

3. An attempt may be made to secure more information concerning the other consequences which frustration may produce in addition to the instigation to aggression. Such an attempt would lead into studies of rational thought and problem solution as suggested in the classical work of John Dewey, and into studies of experimental extinction, trial-and-error learning, substitute response and regression. Work along this line of investigation may deal either with the clinical and social significance of these other consequences of frustration or with the discovery of the laws governing them.

4. An attempt may be made to improve or to reformulate the basic frustration-aggression hypothesis itself. The determination of the laws which allow one to predict exactly under which circumstances instigation to aggression may be expected to occupy the dominant, the second, the third, or some other position in the hierarchy of instigations aroused by a frustrating situation is a most important problem of this type. Another problem is the reduction of the frustration-aggression hypothesis to more fundamental principles and the more accurate restatement of the hypothesis in terms of these more basic principles. One of the steps in this direction would be to scrutinize any exceptions to the hypothesis as now formulated. Another step would involve a careful study of the early stages of the socialization of the individual in an attempt to analyze the interlocking rôles of three factors: first, innate physiological reaction patterns; second, learning mechanisms; and third, the structure of the social maze which poses

⁷Both of the first two of these chief lines of investigation have been developed at length in *Frustration and Aggression*. No attempt was made there to elaborate upon either the third or the fourth. Thus that first effort does not purport to be a complete systematization of all principles within a single field, but rather, an exploratory attempt to apply a strictly limited number of principles to several different fields. *Op. cit.*, pp. 18, 26.

the learning dilemmas and contains the rewards and punishments. An empirical and theoretical analysis along these lines might lead to a fundamental reformulation giving a closer approximation of the socially and scientifically useful truths imperfectly expressed in the present frustration-aggression hypothesis.

A Note on the Frustration-Aggression Theories of Dollard and His Associates

GEORGE K. MORLAN

Parallel to the confusion in the public debate on civil rights legislation, and perhaps one of the causes of that confusion, are two conflicting psychological theories concerning what happens when an aggressive impulse is expressed. According to some psychologists, the expression of aggression serves as a catharsis; the frustration of an aggressive impulse simply increases the strength of the aggression.

According to another theory, the expression of an aggressive impulse does not result in catharsis, but, on the contrary, sets up a vicious cycle that leads to further aggression.

Thus we have a variant form of the old James-Lange controversy: Do we abuse minorities because we hate, or do we hate minorities because we abuse them? Since psychologists are not clear about this issue, it is no wonder that in public discussion many people are confused and disturbed. Important, practical issues are involved, and a clarification of the underlying psychological theory is urgent, for before supporting or opposing civil rights legislation, we need to know whether laws designed to prevent lynching and the like would make the dominant group more malevolent or whether the net result would likely be pacifying.

These two unreconciled psychological theories have both been advanced by John Dollard in different places, but in conjunction with the same general topic of frustration-aggression. Since these two contradictory theories clearly define the issue, Dollard's writings will be used as the basis for the following discussion.

George K. Morlan, "A Note on the Frustration-Aggression Theories of Dollard and His Associates," Psychological Review, Vol. 56, No. 1 (1949), pp. 1-8. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.

Catharsis Theory

In *Frustration and Aggression* (6), under the joint authorship of John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, the authors argue that frustration causes aggression. Childhood, adolescent, and adult experiences are frustrating. Illustrations of each are given, and the resulting aggression is described and explained in terms of frustration. It is asserted that the intensity of frustration varies according to the number of areas that are involved as well as the intensity of the original drive that is thwarted. Other factors that determine intensity or the likelihood of expression need not be reviewed here, but in the conclusion of Chapter Three, two correlative principles, numbered 2 and 4, state in different ways the same fundamental principle of catharsis as follows:

"2. The inhibition of acts of direct aggression is an additional frustration which instigates aggression against the agent perceived to be responsible for this inhibition and increases the instigation to other forms of aggression. There is, consequently, a strong tendency for inhibited aggression to be displaced to different objects and expressed in modified forms . . ."

"4. The expression of any act of aggression is a catharsis that reduces the instigation to all other acts of aggression. From this and the principle of displacement it follows that, with the level of original frustration held constant, there should be an inverse relationship between the expression of various forms of aggression" (6, pp. 53-54).

* * * *

Conclusions

Frustration is one among many dynamic factors that influence behavior, and in the flow of life it rarely if ever exists without the blending of other factors. Although the authors of *Frustration and Aggression* have recognized that "a number of antecedent conditions must sometimes *all* be present before any instigation occurs" (p. 4, footnote), they have not adequately recognized other complicating factors, and have too largely ignored the correlative complexity of expression of aggression. No aggressive act is the simple atomistic expression of feeling toward another as the catharsis view assumes. Therefore it is not true that the expression of hate or antagonism necessarily releases and dissipates that feeling as is stated without qualification in conclusion No. 4 (6, p. 54).

As Dollard pointed out in *Social Forces*, our hurting others may make us fear them, and therefore cause us to be stirred up further. Perhaps people realize that whatsoever they sow, that shall they also reap. Hate still leads to hate. It is probably not true as Gardner Murphy has claimed that "Most people forget that the gun kicks when fired . . ." (12). The fact is that most people do realize that the gun does kick when fired and that is the reason that the expression of hate makes one hate more.

The tension of our feelings may also not be released because we may have a sense of guilt or shame from hurting others. Apparently, in an attempt to be scientifically universal, the aggression hypothesis of the Yale group has been formulated in such an abstract form that it has been stripped of the human variability necessary for it to be psychologically valid. Neither frustration nor aggression is a simple entity to which a specific remedy such as catharsis is applicable in all cases. The theory of catharsis has about as much validity for behavior as castor oil has as a medicine. Because castor oil may be useful for treating certain cases of constipation, we would not be warranted in using it to cure flat feet.

Frustration *often* results in aggression, but frustration does not necessarily cause aggression. Moreover, aggression can occur in the absence of frustration. This conclusion is in agreement with Sargent's view that

"Certain kinds of behavior which are definitely aggressive seem to be the socially sanctioned ways of behaving in some communities (*e.g.*, a tough city slum area or a primitive culture). Such behavior may well be learned and practiced without having its origin, necessarily, in frustration" (13, p. 111, footnote).

The catharsis theory and the interaction theory are both half truths. Since the latter theory has not presumed to be an overall explanation of behavior, it is not subject to the same weaknesses of the former. However, the catharsis hypothesis has limited validity and usefulness, though it needs to be defined more definitely and its scope set more clearly. The likelihood of a healthful catharsis resulting from the expression of aggression is considerably less under some conditions than under others. Some of the conditions and complexities are as follows:

1. The expression of a feeling may serve as a release for the aggressive feeling or may increase it. To achieve a healthful release, aggression must be expressed in a therapeutic situation. A therapist or one who acts in the rôle of a therapist must be present and *influencing* the individual or group. A psychiatrist observing a riot would not automatically make that situation a therapeutic one because of his presence. Unless the therapist is interacting in the situation, the expression of antagonism is more likely to strengthen antagonism, and runs the danger of teaching others to share the same feelings.

2. Those who are expressing their enmity must not be rewarded for doing so. The Woltmans and Peglers have been writing venomous columns in newspapers for years; yet their piled-up aggression has not been dissipated by their freedom of expression. The *raison* is obvious. They get paid well for hating. So, too, were the hatreds in Germany rewarded. They were whipped up for a purpose, and the people, in turn, got satisfaction and support from others by their uninhibited hates.

3. If people believe that aggression should not be inhibited, they are

more likely to be frustrated and feel more aggressive if they do not vent their worst feelings. If, on the other hand, they accept the interaction hypothesis, the frustration of a mean impulse is not nearly so likely to instigate further aggression. The effect of frustration depends on the attitude of the individuals toward their frustration as well as their attitude and that of society toward the expression of the aggression.

4. If there is doubt about the character of the situation and the possible consequences, we should act on the basis of the interaction hypothesis. Although the expression of some feelings may be dissipated by their expression in a nontherapeutic situation, the expression is just as likely to strengthen the feeling of aggression. Laws enforced against lynching in the long run are more likely to pacify the South than cause serious frustration and increase aggression—as seems to be the result as this is being written. With lynching more effectively frustrated and the poll tax eliminated, Southerners can feel more honest as Christians and citizens in a democracy. Such feelings of personal integrity do not lead to an inverse relationship between hostility and its expression.

5. Finally, whether we should express our feelings or inhibit them should not be determined merely on the basis of the effect on ourselves. We must be guided also by the effect on others. Our own emotions do not exist apart from the attitudes of others. If the expression of aggression harms no one, it is more likely to help dissipate feelings than if others are injured. If the venting of our feelings hurts another, we shall be none the worse off by having the injurious tendencies thwarted. Repression, as D. B. Klein (10) has pointed out, is not only inevitable but essential for individual freedom. It is essential for self-emancipation.

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The Concept of Aggression in Modern Psychiatry

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When the terminology of a concept has acquired a high degree of popular currency, it is often a good time to review the concept itself. This appears to be true as concerns "aggression" and "aggressions," as they are understood in the fields of psychology and psychiatry.

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In this study it is my purpose to consider the distinctions between the self-assertive impulses and drives that help to satisfy one's needs without harming others and the aggressive behavior that is essentially antisocial. Self-assertion, to use the distinctive term, must be regarded as socially beneficial. It is the self-assertive tendency that makes us defend ourselves against attack, that gives us the stimulus to further ourselves in our work, to earn a position of respect among our neighbors, and to set up and work for a goal in life. (Aggressive behavior, on the other hand, can be defined as behavior that is not called for by the objective situation—that is directed against others or one's self and is essentially antisocial in nature. Aggressive activity, so defined, is not a healthy reaction, but rather an evidence of some damage to the psychological organization of the individual.)

But what is the source of aggression? Is it something we are born with and that must come out in some form? Or is it a distortion of a positive drive to be loved, to be accepted, to share in the good things of life?

(Freud, in 1922, advanced the theory that aggressive behavior is a manifestation of the death instinct.) He developed this theory as a result of the first World War, being struck by the fact that millions of men appeared ready to don uniforms and, without great resistance, face up to death or mutilation on the firing line. These actions he was unable to explain in terms

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of his libido theory—the theory that considered all human motivation to arise from a broad sexual instinct. The desire for life and pleasure that was the basis of the libido theory could not be made to account for the seemingly willing mass slaughter to which man subjected himself. Hence, an anti-thetical instinct—the death instinct—was assumed. The death instinct is presumably an instinct of destruction and aggression.

There are many objections to this theory. First, an instinct is a drive, a characteristic that is inherited and that should appear in all men. Modern anthropology, and particularly the comparative personality-structure studies of different cultures by Abram Kardiner, prove conclusively that there is no instinct of aggression that is universal in all cultures. Societies have been found in which people are free from the acquisitive, annihilating, destructive characteristics that are found in some other cultures.

Second, it can be demonstrated that where aggressive antisocial forces are evident in an individual, these are reactions to frustration or psychological injury. They are distortions of the healthy self-assertive drives in people who have developed the misconception that acting against others will bring them the things they want and need in life. Further, if this type of aggression were an instinct, rather than a pathological reaction, it would not be very amenable to alteration. But this is not so. Numerous individuals with severe aggressive tendencies have been successfully treated—not by channeling the aggressive instinct into socially acceptable outlets, but by removing the distortions of concept and perception that led these individuals to a view of the world as a threatening place in which one can survive only by besting the other person.

Pathological aggression—or, as it sometimes appears in its seeming opposite, over-compliance and over-acquiescence to others—is present to an important degree in all emotionally disturbed patients. How, then, does aggression come into the picture if it is not an instinct? If we watch mothers or fathers with their children in the park or at home, we are able to see very clearly how aggressive behavior begins to develop in the child as a reaction to the many frustrations his parents and the rest of his environment impose on him.

In Central Park I once heard an harassed mother say to her four-year-old child, fourteen times in twenty minutes, “Don’t!”, “Drop it!”, or “Stop it!” Two of these negative admonitions were accompanied by swats on the posterior and two by arm-levering. These demonstrations must have overwhelmed the child and convinced him of his helplessness before his mother’s force.

Such a child will surely develop aggressive behavior—and actually was demonstrating it by running away and doing the things his mother had expressly forbidden one minute earlier. He also will develop a feeling of

underlying inferiority in himself. This feeling of inferiority becomes the frequent source of aggressive behavior. Unfortunately, nearly all children in our culture are so brought up as to develop a basic feeling of unsureness regarding themselves and their abilities. The child is made to feel in a thousand different ways that he is small, inadequate, puny, incapable, and insufficient. Emphasis is on how big and strong he will be when he grows up, but not on how big, strong, smart, and so on he is for a four- or five- or six-year-old child. Comparison is almost invariably with adult standards—particularly in terms of his own father or mother.

Coming off second best in such a comparison, the child gains the feeling that there is something wrong with him, that he isn't as good as his mother or father. He is made to feel that his realistic dependence on his parents is an evidence of inferiority. Superman, an impossible standard to attain, is held up as the ideal for the child who, when he compares his own mortal and youthful prowess with it, can only feel inferior and inadequate. Unfortunately, each youngster keeps his fears about himself to himself and does not appreciate that most other children have the same fears and doubts about themselves.

Children compare themselves with their parents, too, in their ability to get love and affection and frequently find themselves realistically, or perhaps only in their own phantasy, coming off second best. They are not taught to appreciate that there need be no competition for love, but that their mother and father have the capacity to love them as well as each other—that there are different relationships that do not denote any inferiority and that are not mutually exclusive. That a mother can love her husband and also her daughter or her son or several children without taking something away from any of the other relationships, is hard to conceive and many people never do learn this. Many a parent has been jealous of his child—feeling unloved because he does not get all love from his beloved. The child must learn that there are these different relationships which are not competitive with one another.

The young boy has a difficult burden, usually starting on the day of birth—to be a “man.” At the age of two, when he bangs his finger and cries, he is told to be a man and stop crying. But having only the normal physiological and emotional development of a child of two, he is unable to stop and so is made to feel that he is inferior by adult standards. At a little later age he will be able to stop crying, but will still have the desire to cry and this in turn will leave him with a feeling of inadequacy, because he has been taught that a man should not even have such a desire.

Girls suffer in a similar fashion, and are incapacitated further by the growing knowledge that they are living in what is essentially still a male-dominated society.

✓ Even under the most ideal circumstances a child will frequently be frustrated by his parents or his environment. At such times the child may,

and rightly, react with rage. Under such circumstances he should be allowed to express his reaction—channeling it into a socially acceptable form. If the mother of a five-year-old is obliged to break a promise to him, she should expect a reaction. Rage at being deprived of a promised trip to the circus would be justifiable and its channeling into tears, recrimination, or striking out with the fists would be socially acceptable, as would be an effort by the mother to offer a constructive alternative. The adult must keep in mind that what is justifiable rage from the child's point of view, at his particular physical and mental maturation level, is not the same as justifiable rage judged by adult standards. The adult must be flexible enough not to judge the child by the same standard he does his peers.

In the same frustration situation, a child might pick up a hammer and attempt to hit his parent over the head. This would be a non-acceptable channeling of the rage. Please note that the expression of rage must be permitted—but how it is channeled determines whether it is helpful or injurious to the psychological growth of the child. The child who is not allowed to express his rage will develop feelings of guilt and will find devious antisocial and hostile ways of dealing with an environment against which he feels powerless.

The overpermissive—and usually vacillating—parent is responsible for the type of child frequently referred to as a “monster.” This “monster” is the child who has been allowed to express his rage in an uninhibited manner with no respect for the rights or welfare of others. Such parents are not helpful to their children, but, instead, give them a misconception of the world that will lead to future emotional problems.

If people grow up with the false concept that they are inferior, and that they will be accepted and loved only by appearing as superhuman, they frequently develop neurotically aggressive traits which, in their functioning, are a mistaken attempt to win love through power and domination. We are all familiar with the bully, who, unsure of himself, bolsters his ego by lording it over others, or the deprived group that is diverted away from the realistic problems it should face by turning to aggressive action against another minority group considered inferior.

Many aggressive traits are much more subtle. Shakespeare delineates one important mechanism of human conduct when he says: “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.” The male who repeatedly refers to his athletic prowess and his sexual conquests obviously protests too much, and one may well suspect him of being unsure of his masculinity. The same is true generally for the woman who finds it necessary to be constantly preoccupied with her appearance and her conquests.

Other subtle aggressive traits appear in the individual who feels every man or woman to be a competitor for the good things of life—in the person who sees himself better than and entitled to more than others and in the

person who can only begrudgingly admit the worth of another. Finally, there is the parent who has to show and to prove his own ability and perfection to his children and by doing this completely blocks the children's own expression and development.

These aggressive traits also usually arise from a basic feeling of inferiority that had its origin in early childhood. Although subsequent realistic success can soften this neurotic reaction somewhat, it is always present under the surface and will reappear on the slightest pressure or challenge.

There has been a great deal of discussion in recent years of the psychological origin of delinquency and criminality. Although crime is certainly an aggressive act against one's environment, on careful study it becomes apparent that the basic factor that makes for crime is poverty rather than some particularly poor resolution of the Oedipus complex. Psychological criminals as such are the rarity rather than the rule despite what many of our newspapers and movies have recently led us to believe. At best, psychiatric treatment, whether it be psychoanalytical or some other form of psychotherapy, is an attempt to repair psychological damage. The prevention of such damage through the clearance of slums, economic security, and equal opportunity for all will go infinitely further to reduce our delinquency and criminality rate than will a psychiatric clinic on every corner. Until we have such preventive measures, I do believe that increased psychiatric facilities are necessary and will be of some small help. But let us not lose sight of the forest for the trees.

All these aggressive feelings that were discussed earlier are antisocial. They are harmful, at least in terms of good human relations, and often in terms of happiness for one's self and other people with whom one comes in contact. Fortunately these neurotic and character-structure difficulties can be helped by modern psychoanalytical techniques.

The most important form of aggression that confronts us all to-day is war. I use the term, aggression, advisedly as I have defined it. Much has been written in recent years about the causes of war from the psychiatric point of view.

* * * *

My own feeling is that psychiatry and psychoanalysis can make some ancillary contribution to the cause of peace and an understanding of war. However, I believe the major contribution on this all-important question will have to come from economists and political scientists rather than from students of individual behavior.

Perhaps our greatest contribution can be that of making it clear that war is not inevitable, not an expression of the innate structure of human psychology. This important fact was agreed on by the U.N.E.S.C.O.

Conference on "Tensions that Cause War." Outstanding psychiatrists and social scientists from countries of various political beliefs, including three Americans, agreed on twelve basic points in their joint statement. The ones that have the greatest bearing on the question of aggression are quoted below. The joint statement, as well as the individual reports were recently published as a book by the University of Illinois Press.

"(A) To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence to indicate that wars are necessary and inevitable consequences of 'human nature' as such. While men vary greatly in their capacities and temperaments, we believe there are vital needs common to all men which must be fulfilled in order to establish and maintain peace: men everywhere want to be free from hunger and disease, from insecurity and fear; men everywhere want fellowship and the respect of their fellow men; the chance for personal growth and development.

"(B) The problem of peace is the problem of keeping group and national tensions and aggressions within manageable proportions and of directing them to ends that are at the same time personally and socially constructive, so that man will no longer seek to exploit man. This goal cannot be achieved by surface reforms or isolated efforts. Fundamental changes in social organization and in our ways of thinking are essential.

"(C) If we are to avoid the kind of aggression that leads to armed conflict, we must, among other things, so plan and arrange the use of modern productive power and resources that there will be maximum social justice. Economic inequalities, insecurities, and frustrations create group and national conflicts. All this is an important source of tensions which have often wrongly led one group to see another group as a menace through the acceptance of false images and oversimplified solutions and by making people susceptible to the scapegoating appeals of demagogues.

"(D) The prospect of a continuing inferior status is essentially unacceptable to any group of people. For this and other reasons, neither colonial exploitation nor oppression of minorities within a nation is in the long run compatible with world peace. As social scientists, we know of no evidence that any ethnic group is inherently inferior."

* * * *

To summarize, this paper is an attempt to separate the normal self-assertive drives from the antisocial, pathological aggressive reactions. The latter play an important rôle in most neuroses and have their origin in the contradictory, frustrating, and depreciating situations in which children find themselves. For many of us, these situations are perpetuated in other aspects of our life as we continue to function. In their struggle to survive and get the good things of life, people who have been psychologically injured are forced to utilize many mechanisms, including that of aggressive antisocial behavior. Aggressive behavior is always a reaction to injury or frustration and is not itself an instinct.

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A Comparative Approach to the Problem of Destructiveness

ABRAHAM H. MASLOW

Before a final agreement can be reached on a conception of destructiveness, there are certain invalid arguments which must be considered. Perhaps the most plausible of these is the appeal to the behavior of animals. It is asserted in a pseudo-biological fashion that animals seem to be primarily aggressive or destructive, that the human being is after all an animal, and therefore it is quite plausible that he should also have an instinct for destructiveness. It is precisely because there is some truth in the first two of these affirmations that a semblance of validity is given to the third. But it can now be said definitely that there is also a good deal of error in these same statements; so much in fact, that psychologists must now reject the final conclusion that the study of evolution points to an instinct of aggression in the human being.

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A summary of the comparative data, scant though it may be in certain areas, still seems quite sufficient to prove that the human being must be regarded as being potentially either destructive or coöperative. There is not yet enough evidence to indicate that there is any priority or prepotence of one over the other. Perhaps one is as much a learned product as the other in so far as the available evidence is concerned. I may, and do, suspect that it is easier to make a child into a coöperative, friendly adult than it is to make him into a destructive adult, but I cannot prove this yet. In any event, one thing is certain, destructive behavior is a surface manifestation like any other symptom, and must be studied like any other symptom. One certainly dares not rest content with any overly simple statement of instinct

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or animal nature or the like. The problem of destructive behavior is simply another example of those many other problems which must be attacked by the various analytic and dynamic tools and methodologies now available. The way is clear for such study if it be finally recognized that destructiveness is behavior and not motivation.

Some Theoretical Considerations

It is my task to demonstrate the contention that destructiveness or aggressiveness is secondary or derived behavior rather than primary motivation. By this I mean that aggressive or destructive behavior in the human being will practically always be found to result from an assignable reason of some sort, to be a reaction to another state of affairs, to be an end product rather than an original source. The view with which this contrasts is that destructiveness is the direct and primary product of some instinct of destructiveness.

In any such discussion the most important single distinction that can be made is the one between motivation and behavior. If I neglect this distinction I must of necessity become involved in a morass of double meanings and logical fallacies. Behavior is determined by many forces, of which internal motivation is only one. I might say very briefly that any theory of determination of behavior must include the study of at least the following determinants: first, the character structure, second, the cultural pressures, and third, the immediate situation or field. In other words, the study of inner motivation is only one of three major areas involved in any study of the main determinants of behavior. With these considerations in mind, I may rephrase my question to read, "How is destructive behavior determined?" and, second, "Is the only determinant for destructive behavior some inherited predetermined *ad hoc* motivation?" These questions of course answer themselves at once on an *a priori* basis alone. All the possible motivations, let alone a specific instinct, do not determine in themselves the occurrence of aggression or destruction. The culture in general must be involved, and the immediate situation or field in which the behavior occurs must also be considered.

There is still another way of stating the problem. It can be shown certainly for the human being that destructive behavior derives from so many different sources that it becomes ridiculous to speak of any single urge to destructiveness. This can be illustrated by a few examples.

Destructiveness may occur quite incidentally as one sweeps something out of his path to the goal. A child, who is trying hard to reach some toy at a distance, is not apt to notice that he is trampling other toys in his path.

Destructiveness or aggression may occur as one of the concomitant reactions to basic threat. Thus any threat of thwarting of the basic needs, any threat to the defensive or coping system, any threat to the general way of life is likely to

be reacted to by anxiety-hostility, which means that hostile, aggressive or destructive behavior may very frequently be expected in such reactions.

Any damage to the organism, any perception of organic deterioration, will probably arouse in the insecure person similar feelings of threat, and destructive behavior may therefore be expected, as in many cases of brain injury where the patient frantically attempts to support his faltering self-esteem by a diversity of desperate measures.

One customarily overlooked reason for aggressive behavior, or, if not, then phrased inaccurately, is the insecure view of life. If a person were actually to live in a jungle in which all other animals were divided into two classes, those who could eat him or those whom he could eat, then aggression would become a sensible and logical thing. People, described as insecure, and also authoritarian, must frequently tend unconsciously to envisage the world as just such a 'jungle.' On the principle that the best defense is a good attack, these people are apt to 'lash out,' to strike, to destroy with no apparent reason whatsoever, and the whole reaction remains meaningless until it is realized that this was simply in anticipation of an attack by the other person.

There are many other forms of defensive hostility which are sufficiently well known to require no more than this mention.

The dynamics of sadistic-masochistic reactions have now been well analyzed and it is generally understood that what looks like a simple aggression may actually have very complex dynamics behind it. These dynamics make it quite unnecessary to appeal to some putative instinct of hostility.

The same is true for the overweening drive for power. Analysis by Horney and others has shown clearly that, in this area as well, recourse to instinctual explanation is quite unnecessary, and furthermore it is simply inaccurate.

Today, in 1942, the lesson that the attack of the gangster and the defense of the righteously indignant are not the same psychologically, is all too painfully clear.

This list could well be expanded. I cite these few examples to illustrate my point that destructive behavior is a symptom, a type of behavior which can result from many factors. If truly dynamic psychology in contradistinction to behaviorism is to be served, one must learn to be alert to the fact that these behaviors may appear alike despite the fact that they derive from different sources. The dynamic psychologist is not a camera or mechanical recorder. He is interested in knowing *why* things happen as well as *what* happens. More and more the study of psychodynamics veers away from the study of behavior itself and more and more it turns toward the study of the determinants of this behavior.

I therefore think it is quite fair to consider destructiveness merely a symptom and then to treat it and study it precisely as I do other symptoms. Imagine the absurdity of an instinct for headaches. Yet, people have headaches. The fact that headaches are symptoms that can arise from many different sources is accepted as a matter of course. They are usually treated

as the manifest indication of trouble—only an indicator that trouble exists—not the cause of the trouble. The discovery of the sources of disturbances is a separate task in itself. In the same way destructiveness in the human being is chiefly a surface indicator of underlying trouble, the ingredients of which cannot be revealed without further examination. It is a symptom like any other symptom and not a determiner or cause of symptoms. It is a behavior and not a motivation.

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CHAPTER 5 • *Conflict*

Incompatibilities and Conflicts: Breakdown

ARTHUR LAPAN

The following is an analysis of the relationship between incompatibility, conflict and breakdown. It is restricted to situations of a certain sort—to the isolation of the conditions under which breakdowns occur. These conditions are specific and defineable. Under certain circumstances incompatibilities and conflicts culminate in growth, under others in separation, under others in outright destruction of one of the incompatible elements, under others still in dominance-subservience relationships and under others in breakdowns. . . . Conflicts vary, their consequences vary and the conditions under which they occur vary. For empirical analysis the important thing is the disengagement of the differences making for different culminations as well as the relations common to all; and the working out, as far as possible, of the way in which alterations in certain basic factors make for changes in result. A specific analysis of this sort may be valuable for foresight and even for a degree of control where the conditions are accessible to our manipulation.

In this paper, however, we are confining ourselves to the relationship between incompatibility, conflict and breakdown. If the following analysis is correct the conclusion would seem to be that where certain conditions

Arthur Lapan, "Incompatibilities and Conflicts: Breakdown," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1947), pp. 261-265. Reprinted by permission.

are present the outcome is breakdown regardless of the context in which these conditions operate. Since this conclusion is of some significance we would like to underline it. Breakdowns have been known to occur under specific conditions in animals as in Pavlov's experiments with dogs, Liddell's with sheep, Maier's with rats; in humans of which the psychoanalysts have many examples, Horney's being representative; in conflicts between individual men, many a tragedy having had this as its subject; and in conflicts between classes and states, the class and state wars in ancient Greece and medieval Italy being typical. Now what we are saying is that all the events in which breakdown occurs have a common structure in virtue of which this common effect (breakdown) follows. The type or kind of event (animal, man, class, state) is unimportant—what is important rather is the type of relationship within or among these events. When these relationships are present breakdown will be the outcome regardless of the field in which they operate.

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... every situation which is a) coercive, b) possesses exhaustive alternatives which c) are incompatible and which d) mutually inhibit one another, produces breakdown. Being coercive some action must occur; being exhaustive, none can occur other than those of the alternatives; but since these are incompatible, not more than one can occur; and since they mutually inhibit one another, neither will occur. Hence every situation of this kind reduces to a coercive, non-alternative situation.

Where the incompatibility is between the occurrence and non-occurrence of one and the same act the situation is exactly like the above. For in the experimental instances the total situation is such as to compel a given act (to jump or flex the leg) and at the same time to compel its inhibition as where punishment is involved. Inhibition, however, is not the same as the non-occurrence of an act; it is a separate, single act which makes for non-occurrence. Consequently what we really have are two acts which are mutually inhibitory and since the situation is coercive and no other alternatives are possible, breakdown will ensue. Thus in Maier's experiments the animal is compelled to jump at a card it previously had been trained to avoid; in Pavlov's to respond to a stimulus for which it has no available behavior for whereas in previous instances it had clearly learned which stimulus required a positive and which a negative reaction, in the new situation the stimulus is so indeterminate as to simultaneously evoke both; and in Horney's analytic instances breakdown is the issue of histories which entail hostility but in which the training of the person is such that hostility cannot be acted upon, perhaps not even recognized.

However every non-alternative, coercive situation of the sort described does compel both the occurrence and non-occurrence of one and the same

act. For the total situation constrains its occurrence and its inhibition; and its inhibition does hinder its occurrence. Total situations which produce breakdown are thus such as simultaneously compel the occurrence and non-occurrence of one and the same act; or which, since this is impossible, such as produce impossible situations.

Situations in which the incompatibility is between two separate entities produce breakdown in the same manner as those in which the incompatibility is between two acts in one and the same entity. Dyadic incompatibility situations (to distinguish them from the other) are generated by a specific sequence of acts; in Rome by the social changes expressed by Pliny's phrase *'latifundia perdidere Italiam'*, in Greece, by those issuing from the growth of an economy of exchange, and, to select a more personal instance, in the Hamlet situation by the impact of Hamlet's uncle's murder of his father and marriage with his mother. In relationships of this sort the actors and their characters are an intrinsic part of the total framework; and when seen in this way, as they must, dyadic situations are coercive since they compel a response in one or other of their actors. (Hamlet could not help but react to his father's murder and mother's marriage, the displaced in Greece and Rome could not help but react to their displacement). But like other instances of breakdown, dyadic situations possess no other alternatives than those given in their actors. Their actors can behave in no other way than in opposition either because of their internal structure (again Hamlet's inability not to come to grips with his uncle was a result of his character structure) or because of external impediments (Rostovzeff mentions as a factor in the failure of the Greek mainland to solve its problem of unemployment in the 4th century B.C. the preempting of foreign markets by its former colonies). Further such situations, where they produce breakdowns, are uninhibited; there is nothing external to hinder the action of the things in incompatibility or, differently, there is no common power to keep them in awe. Also, their actors are mutually and not one-way inhibitory; it is not the case that one is predominantly an inhibitor and the other predominantly inhibited; which is evidenced by the fact that in these situations the struggle between the actors is usually long drawn-out with one, and then the other, party gaining the ascendancy. There is thus an identity in structure between situations of this sort and those in which the incompatibility is in one and the same thing; in both the total situation is such as to be a) coercive, b) produce exhaustive alternatives which c) are incompatible and which d) mutually inhibit one another; and in both the consequence is breakdown.

Uninhibited, mutually inhibitory dyadic situations issue in breakdown through mutual destruction. This can be seen from the following:

The state in which a thing is kept from existing is frustration and

frustration always has aggression as a consequence.¹ Where nothing else intervenes such aggression will be directed against the frustrating entity. Aggression can be defined as an action which has as its end the injury of an object where by end is meant an outcome which is seen as implicated by an action and which also acts as an instigator of the action. Conflict is that relationship between two entities in which the injury of the one is the end of the other and conversely. Further, aggression is proportionate to frustration and the amount of injury to aggression, the endurance of the conflict and the instrument of aggression in use. Also, the outcome of injury is destruction and this varies with the extent of the injury incurred.

Hence every dyadic situation will move to a conflict and where it is of the kind described it will issue mutual destruction depending upon the severity of the incompatibility involved (by 'severity' is meant the amount of frustration present). This can almost be formally demonstrated for so long as both elements in opposition continue to exist, they will entail each other's non-existence and therefore have each other's non-existence as a consequence; which is the same thing as to say that they will entail and issue in each other's frustration, from which all the consequences follow. Moreover, the extent of the destruction will depend upon the amount of frustration involved as well as upon the other factors mentioned.

From the foregoing it therefore seems to be the case that breakdown is both entailed by and is the consequence of conditions of a specific and defineable sort and that it is from these conditions that conflicts and breakdowns result; also, since the conditions *are* specific, that their outcome can be foreseen and, where accessible, changed and their denouement averted.

¹ Dollard, J. Frustration and Aggression. Principles.

Conflict, Frustration, and the Theory of Threat

ABRAHAM H. MASLOW

Types of Conflicts

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1. *Sheer choice.* This is conflict in the simplest sense of all and would include such examples as a rat at a choice point in the maze. The daily life of every human being is filled with numberless choices of this sort. I would conceive the difference between this kind of choice and the next type to be discussed to be as follows: Type 1 involves a choice between two paths to the same goal, this goal being relatively unimportant for the organism, or else not being threatened at all. The psychological reactions to such a choice situation is practically never a pathological one. As a matter of fact, most often there is no feeling of conflict at all.

2. *Choice between two paths to the same (vital, important) goal.* In such a situation the goal itself is important for the organism but there are alternative ways of reaching this goal. The goal itself is not endangered. The importance of non-importance of the goal is, of course, a matter to be determined for each individual organism. What is important for one may not be for another. An example could be a woman trying to decide whether to wear one pair of shoes or another, one dress or another, to a party which happened to be important for her and at which she hoped to make a good impression. When the decision is made here the apparent feeling of conflict usually disappears. It is true, however, that such conflicts may become very intense as in a woman's choosing, not between two dresses, but between two possible husbands. We are reminded here of Rosenzweig's distinction between "need-persistent" effects and "threat" effects (9).

Abraham H. Maslow, "Conflict, Frustration, and the Theory of Threat," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1943), pp. 81-86. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in the original.

3. *Threatening conflicts*. This type of conflict is fundamentally different in kind from conflicts of the first two types. It is still a choice situation but now it is a choice between two different goals, both vitally necessary. Here a choice reaction usually does not settle the conflict since the decision means giving up something that is almost as necessary as what is chosen. Giving up a necessary goal or need-satisfaction is threatening, and even after the choice has been made, threat-effects persist. In a word, this sort of choice can eventuate only in chronic feelings of conflict and in chronic thwarting of a basic need. These are pathogenic.

4. *Catastrophic conflict*. This might better be called pure threat with no alternative or possibilities of choice. All the choices are equally catastrophic or threatening in their effects or else there is only one possibility and this is a catastrophic threat. Such a situation can be called a conflict situation only by an extension of the meaning of the word. This can be seen readily if we take the example of a man who is to be executed in a few minutes, or the animal who is forced in the direction of a decision which he knows to be a punishing one and in which all possibilities of escape, attack, or substitute behavior are cut off, as is the case in many experiments on animal "neuroses."

Conflict and Threat

Speaking from the point of view of psychopathology . . . there are, in general, two types of conflict situations or conflict reactions, non-threatening and threatening. The non-threatening conflicts are quite unimportant, since they are not ordinarily pathogenic; the threatening types of conflict are important because they very often are pathogenic.² Again it would seem that when we speak about a feeling of conflict as an originator of symptoms we should do better to speak rather about threat or threatening conflict since there are types of conflict which do not create symptoms.

We may then proceed to a reclassification of our concepts in the general field of psychopathogenesis. We may speak first of deprivation and, secondly, of choice and consider them both to be non-pathogenic and, therefore, unimportant concepts for the student of psychopathology. The one concept that is important is neither conflict nor frustration but the essential pathogenic characteristic of both—namely, threat of thwarting of the basic needs of the organism.

²I wish to warn the reader not to read logical fallacies into these statements. Threat is not *always* pathogenic; there are normal healthy ways of handling it, as well as neurotic or psychotic solutions. Furthermore, an apparently threatening situation may or may not produce feelings of psychological threat in any particular individual. A bombardment or threat to life itself may not be as threatening as a sneer, a snub, the defection of a friend, an illness in one's child, or an act of injustice perpetrated against a total stranger a thousand miles away.

The Nature of Threat

But again it is necessary to point out that the concept of threat includes phenomena that are subsumed neither under the head of conflict nor frustration as these words have been used in the past. Severe illness of certain types can be psychopathogenic. A person who has had a bad heart attack very frequently behaves in a threatened fashion. It is my impression that much illness in young children is directly threatening quite apart from the deprivations that are imposed thereby.

Another kind of patient in which general threat has been demonstrated is the brain-injured patient as studied by Gelb, Goldstein, Scheerer (3, 4), and others. The only way in which these patients can be ultimately understood is to assume that they feel threatened. It has been pointed out elsewhere (7) that all organic psychotic patients of any type may be considered to feel basically threatened. In these patients the symptoms can be understood only if studied from two points of view—first, the direct effect on the organism of the damage to function or loss of function of whatever kind (loss effects), and, secondly, the dynamic reactions of the personality to these threatening losses (threat effect).

From Kardiner's monograph on *Traumatic neuroses* (5) we find that we can add the effect of very basic and severe traumatization to our list of threat effects which are neither conflict nor frustration.³ According to Kardiner, these traumatic neuroses are the effect of a basis threat to the most basic executive functions of life itself—walking, talking, feeding and the like.

* * * *

Perhaps it is possible to extend the concept to include phenomena that are ordinarily included in a different category. For instance, we might speak of sudden intense stimulation, being dropped without foreknowledge, losing footing, sheer pain, anything unexplained or unfamiliar, the upset of routine or rhythm in the child as threatening to the child rather than as emotion-producing.

We must of course also speak of the most nuclear aspects of threat, namely, the direct deprivation, or thwarting, or danger to the basic needs—humiliation, rejection, isolation, loss of prestige, loss of strength—these are all directly threatening.

Often I have seen an extension of this threat effect to the defensive system of the individual. That is, we may expand the above statement to read "danger to the basic needs or the necessary conditions upon which they rest

³Again it must be pointed out that a traumatic situation is not the same as a feeling of traumatization, *i.e.*, a traumatic situation *may* be psychologically threatening, but it doesn't *have* to be.

for the individual." If we had the space this would involve a discussion not only of specifically individual defense mechanisms, *e.g.*, identifying keeping a job with masculinity, but also broader conditions like freedom to speak, to complain, to be ambitious, to move away, to determine one's own fate. We may summarize by saying that, in general, all the following are felt as threatening in our sense: danger of thwarting of the basic needs, or the conditions upon which they rest, threat to life itself, threat to the general integrity of the organism, threat to the integration of the organism, and threat to the organism's basic mastery of the world.

Finally it might be said that however we define threat, certainly there is one aspect which we must never neglect. Clearly an ultimate definition, no matter what else it might include, must certainly be related to the basic goals or needs of the organism. This means that any theory of psycho-pathogenesis in turn must rest directly upon theory of motivation. For this reason as well as for others the concept of threat and the theories arising therefrom must be considered to be dynamic in their nature.

Dynamic theory as well as various empirical findings would indicate the necessity for individual definition of threat. That is, we must ultimately define a situation of threat in terms of the individual organism facing its particular problem. Thus, frustration and conflict both have very frequently been defined in terms of external situation alone rather than in terms of the organism's internal reactions to or perception of these external situations.

* * * *

A last point which would certainly follow from dynamic theory is that we must always consider the feeling of threat to be in itself a dynamic stimulation to other reactions. No picture of threat is complete in any organism unless we know also what this threat-feeling leads to, what it makes the individual do, how the organism reacts to the threat. Certainly in the theory of neuroses it is absolutely necessary to understand both the nature of the feeling of threat and also the reaction of the organism to this feeling.

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Conflicting Value-Orientations and Intra-Personality Conflicts

SOLIS L. KATES

Attention will be directed initially to a description of value-orientations. Value-orientations as objects in a cultural situation may be distinguished from value-orientations as internalized components of the individual (7). Value-orientations at any given time in a particular society implicitly indicate what dimensions of choice and preference are of decisive significance in the organization of behavior. The value-orientations define the patterns of reciprocal rights and obligations which constitute the role-expectations and the sanctions that society may impose. On the other hand, these value-orientations may be internalized to become part of the structure of the individual's personality. When, for example, the individual cannot violate a moral rule without intense feelings of guilt, the rule is functioning as a part of his personality. These internalized value-orientations may become part of the superego structure of the personality, of institutionalized role-expectations, of life goals, and of preferred subjective states.

Value-orientations within the social system may be thought of as modes of organizing conduct, and as meaningful, affectively invested patterns of principles that guide human action (11). Internalized value-orientations refer to those aspects of the individual's orientation which commit him to the observance of certain norms, standards, and criteria of selection, whenever he is in a situation which allows him to make a choice.

There are three value-orientations which in the interiorized form have been regarded as crucial for the healthy personality. These value-orientations within society are external conformity, individual personality, and secular rationality (science) (11). Within the individual personality, these value-orientations have become known as adjustment to the environ-

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ment, unity of the personality, and correct perception of reality (the self is included) (5,9). . . .

External conformity has been defined as sheer adherence to conventional group patterns without consideration of their worth and their meaning. The emphasis on upward mobility, combined with mass communication has resulted in widely conforming socio-psychological attitudes (10). Rigid control over the expression of sexual and aggressive impulses, over consumption patterns, over the uses of time and resources has become vital to attain economic and social success. In addition, the dependence upon acquisition of power and possessions as signs of personal excellence has furthered contributed to the devaluation of the individual personality, our second value-orientation. The marks of the individual personality are personal worth; an autonomous responsible person with an internal center of stability; and a unitary social personality possessing qualitative uniqueness, that is not merely a reflection of external pressures.

The third value-orientation is secular rationality. Significant here is the premise of an ordered universe with rational human beings devoted to the continued improvement of their conditions and themselves. It may be further characterized as a mode of thinking and a system of procedures for the interpretation of experience so as to allow in part for the creation, prediction, and control of the conditions of experience. This value-orientation, however, has been linked, to some extent, with efficiency, practicality, and purposive technical mastery of the environment. Secular rationality has become expedient rationality because it is concerned chiefly with the goals of and the solutions for immediate situations, to the neglect of long-range conditions.

Most persons in our society have internalized the above described conflicting value-orientations, and thus have not been able to escape intra-personality conflicts. Because of overt regimentation and invisible compulsions of conformity pressures, we may hypothesize that the individual in our society attaches most importance to the value-orientation of external adjustment, usually of the passive type. As a consequence of external, passive adjustment, an arrangement is established between the environmental conditions and the individual's impulses that results in rigid repression of these impulses. Such passive adjustment to the environment has been noted as common in our society, and has been believed to be furthered by the individual's overwhelming feeling of powerlessness and insignificance (4). This curtailment of the individual's impulses conflicts with the value-orientation of individual personality or unity of personality in its internalized form. Unity of personality is marked by a relative freedom from conflicts among the constituent elements of the personality, with its full energies free to be mobilized in the service of a central purpose rather than being devoted to the handling of unintegrated

strivings. But ordinary social interaction of our society has reinforced conformity in personal morals, and in emotional-intellectual endeavors, at the expense of individuality. The individual suppresses, represses, or at best sublimates those impulses dissonant with cultural standards. This curbing of impulses reflects a personality in state of conflict. When this situation continues for any time, unity of personality is sacrificed for external, passive adjustment. The unity of the personality suffers further if the curbed impulses could have resulted in a higher level of personality integration. What happens frequently is that apparent unity of personality is attained at the expense of correct perception of the self. As a consequence of apparent personality unity, the individual is at peace and has no conscious conflict simply because he has repressed all deviant sexual and aggressive impulses. Nevertheless, he is in conflict since he must maintain the reactive alterations of the repressive impulses in order to ensure their continued repression. The affective life, hence is poorly controlled, has little possibility of conscious assimilation, and is reactively modified and distorted. Correct perception of the self is distinctly impaired (3).

External conformity presupposes that the social order is basically good. Because the conforming individual fits into society with little discomfort, he draws the conclusion, usually unformulated, that he, too, is basically flawless. The other internalized value-orientation, unity of personality, implies that society should be changed if its elements deny the expression of impulses necessary to the fulfillment and integration of the individual. The individuals' impulses, too, may have to be modified. But for the individual who is largely conformist and who is passively acceptant of society's elements and of himself, the fact of change inevitably disrupts his informal and formal arrangements in family and work groups, and disrupts as well his established ideological systems, all exceedingly important to his security and stability (6). Where the individual has internalized scientific rationality as correct perception of reality, the desire is strong to recognize and to discriminate his own impulses and to see reality clearly. But if external, passive adjustment is dominant, cultural patterns become unassailable and the perception of one's impulses unimpeachable. By a process of subtle and profound distortion, the individual in his passive acceptance of society and himself, has eliminated the ambivalences arising from the discordant elements of society and from within himself. What follows from the resolution of this conflict includes loss of spontaneity, greater dependence upon others for standards of behavior, and the lack of reliable direction (1).

Objective yardsticks are largely absent to determine whether the perception of reality is valid. When these objective yardsticks are lacking, dependence is placed upon reference groups to determine correct percep-

tion of reality. An opinion, attitude, or norm becomes correct and/or stable if the members of the individual's reference groups hold a comparable opinion, attitude, or norm (2,8). The greater the feeling of belongingness or the need to belong, the more passively acceptant of the groups opinion, attitude, or norm is the individual. The individual's perception of social reality reflects the group pressures for conformity. If the group has deviant perceptions of reality and coercively prescribes the content of such perceptions as proper, the individual will be faced with the conflicts between the value-orientation of adjustment and that of correct perception of reality. It must be noted here that this conflict may not always be part of the individual's subjective awareness. If the group abruptly demands standardized adjustments inconsistent with individual's past experience and stifling of individual initiative and expression, such adjustments will not only distort reality but will impair personality integration. This external passive adjustment will play havoc with cognitive adequacy and will externalize the control of behavior.

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Oliver Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution

GUSTAV BYCHOWSKI, M.D.

The record of the Cromwell dictatorship is very instructive, for its psychological structure reveals several basic individual mechanisms as well as certain laws of the collective psyche.

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A moderately well-to-do member of the landed gentry, Cromwell was brought up in a Puritan environment. We know virtually nothing about his relationship with his father, always a significant factor in the formation of personality. We do know, on the other hand, that his relationship to his mother was exceedingly close, that the future Lord Protector relied greatly on her opinion and authority and that even in the midst of pressing state tasks, he never retired without first paying her a visit. The strict educator of his early school years was the Puritan Dr. Thomas Beard, who instilled into the regicide-to-be the principles of Puritan fanaticism, a belief in the constant intervention of Providence in human affairs, and a conviction that the Pope and Antichrist were the same. The role played by this teacher in shaping Cromwell's ideals was so great that when the latter had already become a member of Parliament, he dedicated to his former pedagogue one of his early brief, violent and unfinished speeches.

Calvinism, as a point of departure for Puritanism, was the fundamental medium through which Cromwell regarded the world and its affairs. This tendency, deeply rooted in early youth, became increasingly evident as Cromwell matured politically and participated more in public affairs.

We need not go into detail here about the contents of the Calvinistic doctrine. We should like to emphasize, however, the inexorable severity of its teachings on predestination and eternal perdition on the one hand and

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the omnipotent grace of salvation on the other. The uncompromising austerity of the superego imposed a continuous and unusually vigilant repression, while the repressed impulses reappeared under the guise of an ever menacing Satan. Hence, the 17th century saw a million witches burned at the stake—of whom not a few met their death in England and even in Cromwell's native locality.

Cromwell's Bible was not the Bible of contemporary man. It had not passed through the filter of critical exegesis. It was to him what it still is today to the absolutely orthodox Jew, namely, the Book of books, the sole revealed word of God, in which every phrase, every text is equally binding and holy. The God to whom Cromwell turned directly, throughout his entire life, on every question and in every crisis, was the real Lord of Hosts of the old Testament, whose direct intervention in all human affairs could not possibly be doubted.

As far as other elements in Cromwell's psychic development are concerned, mention must be made of the old family antagonisms with respect to the monarchy: The protoplast of the family, Thomas Cromwell, Earl of Essex, Minister of Henry VIII, was executed because of his excessive zeal in support of the Reformation and his part in the King's marriage to the soon hated Anne of Cleves. Some scholars surmise that the future regicide may have met his future victim, later the King of England, on his family estate in his youth.

The meagre facts in our possession regarding the early years of Cromwell indicate the presence of markedly neurotic traits, or more precisely, phobias and death fears resulting from a religious feeling of guilt and sinfulness. He would not infrequently rouse the local doctor at night in the belief that he was dying. Later, in the first period of his sojourn in London, he likewise consulted a physician, who in his notes characterized him as "valde melancholicus."

In subsequent years Cromwell often returned to his old, allegedly great sins. He writes as follows to his cousin: "You know what my manner of life hath been. Oh, I lived and loved darkness, and hated the life, I was the chief of sinners. This is true, I hated godliness, yet God had mercy on me." Of course, one should not deduce from these *ex post facto* reflections of a neurotic that the conduct of the youthful Cromwell was indeed deserving of condemnation. We know full well how deceptive such a neurotic perspective can be. There is only a bare possibility that the outbursts of a childish or boyish temperament, whether of an aggressive or an aggressive-erotic character, merited such a severe appraisal from the neurotic superego.

Then there was the mysterious moment of religious conversion which restored to Cromwell a seeming calm, alleviated his fears and awakened within him the hope or perhaps even the certainty of salvation. . . .

Henceforth Cromwell's activity was increasingly steeped in a religious

atmosphere, as if he wished to prove himself worthy by his deeds, as if he were anxious to provide God with proof of his gratitude for the mercy shown him. It appears natural that his attempts also tended to protect others from transgression, to offer redemption from old and future sins and above all to stifle the ever present, though repressed, feeling of guilt.

His growing self-confidence, together with an ardent sense and need of justice, gained for Cromwell a leading position among his neighbors and finally a seat in Parliament. Several minor matters in which he became interested in the province bear witness to his fervent sympathy for the wronged and to his fanatical passion for justice. Nonetheless, even in these early activities, the uncontrolled violence of his temperament was fully in evidence, resulting in sharp censure being heaped upon him.

In Parliament he was gradually drawn into the whirlpool of the House's fight with the King, in which religious considerations came to the fore. The conflict with Archbishop Laud assumed in his eyes the proportions of a war against the diabolic intrigues of papism, while the King's attempted coups against independence and the guaranteed rights of Parliaments appeared to him directed not only against the rights of the citizens but also against the sole certain and unmistakable means of saving the human soul. In this way, the political fight became closely identified with the religious struggle, thus acquiring holy sanction and consuming intensity.

* * * *

From the moment he took up the fight, he was absolutely certain that the cause for which he fought was just. In his successes on the battlefield he saw the visible sign of divine grace which could manifest itself only in a cause as just as the suppression of a tyrant, the restoration of freedom and of respect for the law. "Good laws, nay, the best laws, were no advantages when will was set above law."

The very beginning of the struggle in Parliament disclosed the basic characteristics of Cromwell's nature, violent, absolutist in thought, guided by powerful emotions and secure in the feeling that he was unconditionally right. In this connection a rather characteristic illustration is furnished by Cromwell's struggle against the bishops in which he took—very early in the contest—a most radical and uncompromising stand. He was one of the so-called "root and branch men," a group which aimed at extirpating the institution of bishops at its very roots. In Cromwell's mind the bishop question became the test of the purity of his own infallible faith, the crux of his innermost religious beliefs. It was also associated with the treacherous and despotic personality of the King. Thus, the struggle assumed forthwith the dynamic impetus and the coloring of religious absolutism.

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The King's doom was demanded by the army whose feats, just like his own, Cromwell viewed as a direct act of Providence. The successive stages of war which led him—until then an unknown and modest member of the landed gentry—from victory to victory, gave him food for meditation on the ways in which Providence was accomplishing its holy and just objectives. Since, however, he was at the same time achieving his own purpose—both conscious and unconscious—the two categories of objectives merged more and more strongly with each other, until at last the dividing line between his own desires and the dispositions of Providence became completely blotted out thus throwing wide open the approach to the most glorious rationalization of his own desires and impulses.

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It seems that the sense of divine sanction in relation to a deed as atrocious as the killing of the monarch, afforded Cromwell a feeling of peculiar, painful satisfaction. In connection with the appointment by the House of Commons of a board, which was to try the case against the King, Cromwell is reported to have said: "If any man had deliberately designed such a thing he would be the greatest traitor in the world, but the Providence of God had cast it upon them."

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Let us at this juncture turn our attention away from the focal personality of Cromwell to examine the psyche of the English people. The struggle against the King was being waged by a portion of the landed gentry and of the well-to-do middle-class. In the eyes of the people at large and of an overwhelming majority of the aristocracy, the King never ceased for a moment to be the Anointed of the Lord and the very thought of opposing him was bound to arouse horror, since it aimed at the most essential foundations of the super-ego. The army, at first only a tool in the hands of Parliament, very soon made itself independent and formed its own objectives and ideals. The negative side of these objectives and ideals was the struggle against the "tyrant," whereas their positive side was the securing of power and privileges. Once it became apparent that even a King could be done away with without the world crumbling as the result, there was no cause to relinquish power and turn it back to its original holder, the Parliament, weakened as it already had been by the first great "purge" executed by Colonel Pride. Let us take note, in this connection, of the highly important fact that the purge in question had as its objective the removal from the House of Commons of all those members, who might have opposed the execution of the King. Thus it was possible to have a unanimous but subservient Parliament, a body which having once abdicated its now

ideal ego, was bound to become a feeble and impotent tool in the hands of the new rulers.

The social background of the revolution began to take shape very soon. Under the guise of militant and victorious puritanism the bourgeoisie began to take power, thus giving rise, for the first time in English history, to a party of middle-class democracy. Nor were more radical elements including communistic "Levellers," lacking. Their political aspirations, were—quite in keeping with the spirit of the period—steeped in mysticism. Before their eyes hovered as the ultimate ideal and objective of the struggle, a sublimated vision of the community life of the early Christians. Opinions, quite unusual for that period, were voiced, that private property in general and the ownership of land in particular were the work of Satan. The personnel of Cromwell's own army, even in the highest grades, included individuals who came from the very lowest strata of society. Colonel Pride, who executed the famous purge of Parliament was a driver by profession, Cornet Joyce who captured the King and delivered him into the army's hands was a tailor, Colonel Gordon was a lackey, etc. . . . The Puritans of whom the "Long Parliament" was mostly composed, were recruited chiefly from the bourgeoisie. During the civil war the southern and eastern portions of England which were by far the wealthiest and the most industrialized, sided with Parliament. In these sections a nobility of the new type, contaminated by tendencies pervading the bourgeoisie, then in the process of formation, was in the ascendancy. On the King's side stood the northwestern counties, which were economically backward and still preserved a substantial measure of the feudal economic system. The King's partisans, the so-called "Cavaliers" were the direct successors of the old-time feudal nobles.¹

When the King was escorted from the court along the street, the soldiers shouted loudly "execution, execution." The windows, however, and the store fronts were full of people many of whom wept or prayed aloud for the King. Popular sentiment was on the side of the King who by his actions at the time of the execution and his last words addressed to the people strengthened the emotional ties linking him to the great family of the English people.

* * * *

The course of events and Cromwell's subsequent actions made him master of the entire United Kingdom. The real and final silhouette of the dictator became visible against a background of battles and political manoeuvres.

As a warrior Cromwell was not only a general and a strategist; battles were his joy, the slaying of his foes his delight. "The repeated evidence

¹ See the interesting but one-sided work: F. Kapelusz: "Religioznyj druman w period anglijskij rewolucij XVII wieku." Pod znamiem marksizma 8.1940.

of Oliver Cromwell's joy at the slaying of his enemies is a continual fact which cannot be neglected as a very substantial part of his character." (Stirling Taylor.) In a letter to Walton, written after a battle he described to him the death of the latter's son on the field of glory in these words: "As he lay dying, young Walton said one thing lay upon his spirit. I asked him what it was. He told me it was that God had not suffered him to be more the executioner of His enemies."

Combat gave him happiness since it afforded him the opportunity to practice and to gratify his innate sadism and violence in a manner which not only did not run counter to the exigencies of his superego, but on the contrary, was supposed to have been ordained by the latter. In another letter to the same Walton, Cromwell assures him that: "we study the glory of God, the honour and liberty of Parliament, for which we unanimously fight without sitting our own interest."

Cromwell's violent nature manifested itself with increasing clarity in his first moves in Parliament. It was obvious that he brooked no opposition and when meeting it he not only wanted to convince, but also to smash his opponent. This was still more the case when an opponent seemed to attack his sacred religious tenets, of which the justness even in the smallest details was in his eyes a dogma not permitting of the slightest doubt. When riots broke out in Ireland, Cromwell, then an ordinary member of Parliament, contributed his entire annual income to defray the costs of the expedition against the execrated Papists. Neither then nor at any later time did he bother to penetrate more deeply into the causes underlying the quarrel with Ireland. Blinded by hatred, he was unable to perceive the shadow of England's guilt, but saw in the Irish riots a manifestation of Papism's rebellious spirit and a splendid opportunity for a ruthless crusade.

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To Cromwell each victory seemed a proof of divine grace and he deemed himself, as Carlyle said: "a minister of divine justice, an executor of God's verdicts on God's enemies." Disobedience to God was disobedience to Cromwell and vice versa. His own principles and commands emanated directly from God, he thought, and therefore had to be carried out with utter ruthlessness. Even when he attempted to show some degree of kindness and forbearance towards the vanquished he made it contingent upon implicit compliance with every one of his commands. Otherwise, woe to them for offending the holy cause of God and Cromwell.

The sense of justice, at all times very strong in Cromwell, was gradually and very noticeably assuming the character of a vindictive and ruthless fanaticism. Defeats suffered by his enemies were always in his eyes a well-deserved punishment, his own victories an infallible sign of God's justice.

He himself was becoming a representative of a super-justice, an instrument of God, the chosen man who had a great mission to perform.

The violence and ruthlessness he displayed on the field of battle were but one manifestation of his general tendencies which now came to the surface more and more strongly. The primitive phobias of his early youth became transformed into an everlasting unsatiated religious fanaticism, as if his consciousness of sin and guilt was seeking assuagement in applying the inflexible principles of an austere and aggressive superego. That controlling force, never ceasing in its demands, increased not only its aggressiveness and ruthlessness, but also extended the purview of its influence and domination. The austere morality of the "parliament of saints," convened and directed by the dictator, penetrated, as we know, into all the phases of community, family and personal life, subjecting everything to strict control and censorship. The country was slowly transformed into a school, into a large correctional institution managed by neurotic, sadistically aggressive schoolmasters. If we stop to consider the trend in the method of government followed by a man who, even at the time of his struggle for power, displayed tendencies indicating a magnanimous tolerance, we perceive in its full magnitude the problem: how does the dictator's soul become callous, how do elements of aggressiveness and ruthlessness gain ascendancy over Eros. What did after all prevent England's ruler from carrying out a program which Barebone developed in such inspiring words in a speech before Parliament: "We should be pitiful . . . and tender towards all thought of different judgments, love all, tender all, cherish and countenance all, in all things that are good . . ."

* * *

Cromwell even contrived to see some particular sublimity in renouncing power and even in completely effacing his own person. Exalted to the highest pitch he referred in an almost ecstatic speech before the "parliament of saints" to the examples set by Moses and Paul "who could wish themselves blotted out of God's book for the sake of the whole people."

And here again we see the other side of the medal. The ruthless dictator who had so quickly assumed an enormous power in the country, seemed to regret his prominent position, to humble himself, to hesitate before making weighty decisions, to display even something akin to weakness. Moreover, he rejected the royal crown offered to him although he most obviously aspired to it. It is plain that he did not feel sufficiently strong to overcome restraints in his innermost being and the opposition of a portion of the army. These hesitations and the sense of weakness—deeply hidden, to be sure, but manifesting themselves from time to time—as well as the fear of a final supreme preferment, supplement the picture of the leader, who

after exterminating the lawful ruler, by quick stages became himself a dictator.

Perhaps most essential for a proper understanding of Cromwell as a ruler as well as for the understanding of the very nature of the psychic processes taking place within him, is an analysis of his relationship to Parliament.

A republic, as Buchan aptly remarked, cannot be established by simply decapitating the monarchy. The psychic make-up of the various social groups was just as far removed from the Commonwealth as was the psyche of Cromwell himself. His attitude with regard to the democratic principle of majority rule, without which a republic is wellnigh unthinkable, is best reflected in a conversation with E. Calamy (which incidentally occurred in the later years of the Protectorship). The latter informed him that out of every ten people in England nine were against him, to which Cromwell replied: "But what if I disarmed those nine and put a sword into the hands of each tenth person?"

At first it might have seemed that Cromwell, since he was Parliament's champion and protector would collaborate with it, the more so, as it was to Parliament that he in fact owed his power. However, the situation very soon became completely reversed. In a considerable measure, Parliament's own weakness and clumsiness, its unproductivity, though it was covered up by much talk and excessive solicitude for its own rights and prerogatives, contributed to this turn of events. A body of such a type, lacking support among the broad masses of the people and opposed by a determined and strong-willed army had no chance of survival.

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After the civil war, the regicide, and the destruction of Parliament, the need for a strong government was generally felt. Cromwell's favorite delusion was that he was straining every effort to preserve Parliament. This is evident from a conversation between him and Whitelock, which took place long before the second coup d'état (dissolution of the Long Parliament—April 1653). Cromwell complained of Parliament and pointed to the need of a strong authority, which would be able to curb the encroachments of a body seeking the supreme power, but incapable of governing. Whitelock expressed the hope that Parliament would mend its ways and remarked that it would be difficult to create such an authority. To which Cromwell replied: "What if a man should take upon him to be a king?"

Our last observations point plainly to the double background of collective and individual mentality which favored the formation of Protectorship or, in other words, of Cromwell's dictatorship. The relationship of the dictator to the subsequent Parliaments was but a consistent evolution of the tendencies we have just indicated. His feeling that he

was the chosen person, his inability to brook any opposition, his desire to make subservient tools of the elected members were steadily growing.

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Thus Cromwell's soul oscillated between the pure aggressiveness of austere despotism and glowing emotional faith in the automatic workings of ideal forces. His failure in the one direction increased the psychic tension in the other.

But opposition movements and even conspiracies—stifled by force and ending with executions—occurred within the army itself. Hence the history of the Protectorship is but the history of the growing supremacy of Cromwell who gradually emancipated himself from the political influence of the army which had elevated him to power until at last he became a full-fledged autocrat. In this he was helped along not only by his powerful personality which it was hard to oppose, but also by the general attitude of the body social upon which military rule weighed heavily and which still yearned for a government of laws under the sway of a strong, but just father.

Just as the intensely intimate fusion of realistic tendencies with religious zeal constitutes a characteristic trait of Cromwell's entire personality, so did the prophet apostle of the true faith blaze the trail for the consummate statesman in his foreign policy. The solicitude for the salvation of not only his own soul and that of every Englishman, but also of the souls of all the people of Europe and other parts of the world, imperceptibly became a solicitude for the trade routes and the might of the United Kingdom.

The Lord-Protector, the great fore-runner of modern imperialism, was anxious to secure for his country new markets and maritime supremacy on all the seas. But at the same time he wanted to assure the victory in Europe of the cause of God, that is of Puritanism, by forming a great Protestant alliance against the alleged machinations of aggressive Papacy. In the dictator's mind there was taking shape a vast paranoid idea—perhaps the first figment of the persecution mania in modern history—centering around the Catholic menace. This idea obscured the horizon of the great men and completely distorted the political situation of contemporary Europe in his eyes. Spain was "England's enemy by disposition of God himself" and the great plunderer, Charles X., King of Sweden, was in his eyes "a poor prince, indeed poor . . . and a man that hath adventured his all against the Popish interest in Poland and made his acquisition still good for the Protestant religion." These words referred to the great wars of conquest waged by the Swedish monarch, who attacked Poland, occupied West Prussia, the estuaries of the Oder, the Elbe and the Weser, Livonia, and the archbishoprics of Bremen and Verden . . . Poor Tartuffe!

In Cromwell's imagination the great powers of Continental Europe were

getting ready to attack virtuous England and the best means of defense was an attack . . . Sweden's seizure of the archbishoprics was to form—so reasoned Cromwell—a perfect basis for aggression against the Catholic states of Germany since, as he tried to convince Parliament, Catholic Europe was seeking “everywhere Protestants to devour.”

“Popish plot,” he inveighed, “it is a design against your very being, this artifice and this complex design against the Protestants interest wherein so many Protestants are not so right as were to be wished. If they can shut us out of the Baltic Sea and make themselves masters of that, where is your trade?”

Thus the fanatical aggressiveness of the superego plus the rapacity of imperialistic tendencies, were woven together into one coherent whole, and became the source of an immense scheme representing a paranoid political idea. Its scale was vast, commensurate with the dictator's stature, with the purview of his ambition and with the tension of his violent desires. The one who fought sword in hand and burned with the fire of fanaticism saw himself all of a sudden surrounded by enemies, his country and the holy faith imperiled by the ruthlessness of the foe.

Eminently successful as Cromwell was both in his internal and foreign policy, immense as was his prestige which shed glory upon the entire United Kingdom, still the discontent and uneasiness among the people kept on growing. It seemed that by refusing the crown which was offered to him, he only strengthened his position, the more so as he succeeded in making his power hereditary and in thus establishing a dynasty. All of these successes, however, were illusory as new conspiracies broke out more and more often and strong opposition movements multiplied. The very soul of the English nation defended itself against the new despotism and, on the other hand, far from having forsaken its traditions of royalty, longed for the old form and symbols. As the hopes placed in the new father of the country gradually proved vain, the memory of the country's erstwhile father became idealized in a proportionately higher degree.

Small wonder that, with matters going as they did, Cromwell felt more and more lonely and isolated. Moreover, his iron physical constitution began to fail him. The shadow of death reached out to envelop the Lord-Protector. One of his last conversations before he passed away, reveals the earliest cares and anxieties of his tormented soul. “What do you think,” he asked of one of those nearest to him, “if one once experienced the grace of God could he lose it again?” “No,” was the answer. To which Cromwell replied with a sigh of relief: “Then I may rest peacefully as I once experienced it.” Thus his old phobias returned before death and were assuaged. After examining his conscience and taking stock of his deeds Cromwell decided that the capital of his morality and religion was sufficient to redeem his sins. He spoke of having always labored for

the good of God-fearing people, for God's cause, for England. He was well aware of the fact that while some people extolled him far too high, others hated him beyond his deserts.

While the Lord-Protector lived, his power kept oppositional tendencies in check, but as soon as he died, the Restoration quickly approached.

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In conclusion, we shall attempt to make a psychoanalytical synthesis of Cromwell and his destiny. Because of the extremely complex nature of Cromwell's personality this task appears so difficult, that we would much rather content ourselves with the material as presented, the more so, as our main problem, to wit, the relationship between the masses and the dictator appears quite clearly outlined against the background of this material. The searching mind, however, seeks a synthesis and we would be loath to part from our hero without having found a proper niche for him.

Knowing nothing of the basic conflicts of his childhood days we can at best imagine them. In a boy of a violent disposition, nurtured in an atmosphere of puritan constraint and austerity, processes of forcible repression of the Oedipus complex must have undoubtedly occurred. Such forceful repression of wicked tendencies left behind a visible trace in the shape of a sense of sinfulness and guilt, as well as a recurring fear of death. The latter is undoubtedly linked up with the impulses of an early sexualism. The youthful "sinner" seems to have reached out for salvation. Some of the letters he wrote later in life give the impression of "a cry from the depths."

Another vestige of his childhood experiences was his consuming ambition, the desire for preferment—restrained though it had been by a sense of guilt—his craving for power and domination constituting an additional derivative of sadistic tendencies. The austere superego contains substantial amounts of repressed aggressiveness and keeps in check fermenting impulses, all the while, however, instilling into his ego the never-satiated longing for ideals and for harmonizing his actions with the exigencies of severe, Puritan piety. The deep sense of sin exacts ever-new deeds to atone for old transgressions.

His entire personality carries the imprint of a strong ambivalence. Its organic, biological elements are in all likelihood connected with the violence of his temperament, the acquired structure of his personality, however, is unquestionably very complex.

On the one hand a powerful current of the libido strove to tie Cromwell to his environment. This is quite plainly evidenced by the affection for his family, the strong attachment he felt for his soldiers and collaborators as well as by the sentiments he in turn inspired in them. The frequent

reflexes of sympathy, kindness and compassion, the tendencies towards tolerance and forbearance constitute additional evidence.

The currents of his libido are closely welded with aggressive tendencies. Affection is rather domineering, friendship possessive and despotic, readiness to help combined with the desire to impose his own principles and to gain control. Woe to the weak who refuse the price demanded for affection and protection. Cromwell immediately sees resistance, but since he brooks no resistance, that resistance must be broken. One may love his fellow-men, but at the same time one should uplift, judge and educate them. In this connection we see the aggressive impulses serving the despotic super-ego. In the desire to repair injustice his fanatical aggressiveness easily gains the upper hand over kindness and sympathy. The object of affection which refuses to be completely absorbed and mastered becomes a symbol of hostile reality and as such must be destroyed. This happens particularly whenever religious interests, dictated by commands of the super-ego, are involved. At such times the gratification of his own aggressiveness signifies not only complete control over the object, but also doing justice to the severe ideal, uplifting his own sense of worth and, last but not least, the appeasement of the ever-ready-to-erupt sense of guilt. From this stemmed the fanatical moralizing and proselytizing practiced not only on the groups of obedient adherents close to him, but on the country at large as well. At such times his sense of power was endowed with the sanction of a high mission.

The rationalization of his own desires by endowing them with a sanction of predestination and a divine mission was a characteristic technique of Cromwell the general and Cromwell the dictator. A critical appraisal of the factual data at our disposal does not justify us in interpreting this phenomenon as hypocrisy. In this instance the sincerity of Cromwell's conviction was complete and it sprang from the deep well of his personality which evolved from the doctrine of Calvin and the teachings of Dr. Beard.

Operating against these dynamic elements of Cromwell's mind were, as we have seen, mighty dams of inhibitions. Special circumstances, as well as increased tension in the sphere of impulses, time and again overthrew these restraints whereupon the dictator displayed violent and elemental fits of wilfulness. It is obvious that with such strong inhibitions Cromwell could never had played his part in history, had it not been for the specific situation in the socio-historical evolution which he faced. Due to this situation Cromwell took the lead in the struggle against the monarch and eventually guided the axe that cut off the head of the Stuart King. To this high tension in the aforementioned situation Cromwell owed his opportunity for putting into effect on a vast scale the aggressive component of his Oedipus complex. And he is one of the few mortals who ever achieved this.

The moment he did it, there were laid in the collective mind the foundations for the future Restoration, in other words for the turning back. As for himself, the powerful discharge led rather to an increase in the sense of guilt which he sought to compensate inwardly by identifying himself more and more with the murdered King—father, as well as by striving more and more severely towards an ideal regime that would reconcile all contradictions and gratify all tendencies.

He himself was not only to become ruler and father of the country and people, but a better ruler and father than the King, that is the most recent incarnation of that idea, had been. If the King had to be put out of the way because of his transgressions, of his opposition to divine commands and to the true faith (as the reformed understood it) then the King's successor should strive to govern and organize the state in a more perfect manner, so as to carry out the Lord's will and atone for his own sins as scrupulously as possible. Cromwell's mind seems to have been possessed by the great dynamic idea of creating an ideal, model Kingdom of God, of transforming the existing state by lifting the people to the highest moral level, by elevating them to ideal standards such as obtained in his own group of God's people, in other words, in the small Puritan clique. The images into which these dreams of Cromwell crystallized contained, quite in keeping with his education and reading, elements from the Old Testament, whereas he himself, as we have seen, grew in these images to the proportions of a prophet, almost a Messiah.

After having fought Parliament tooth and nail, he would address it again as an assembly of chosen, godly men. At such times his idealistic attitude hid reality from his sight and drew it from him in a sublimated, ideal shape. And he extolled the lucky members of Parliament whom Providence had chosen to be the executors of Its great dispensations.

These idealistic attitudes were so closely intertwined with aggressiveness, that as Britain's power increased, Cromwell dreamed of spreading the same idealistic patterns over other countries as well, perhaps over all of Europe. This meant establishing, in cooperation with similarly thinking allies, the true faith and the kingdom of God far beyond the confines of his own mother-country.

The close union between such idealistic desires and aggression manifested itself in other symptoms, too. Whenever experience (and his sense of reality) convinced him of the distance separating his dreams from stark actuality and whenever it turned out once again, that not all the people were willing to be the submissive tools of his lofty designs, he flew into fits of rage and indignation. At such moments he was seized by an irresistible desire to remove all obstacles and destroy his opponents.

Cromwell's famous saying that he who knows not whither he is going, goes highest, was most closely related to his customary method of

searching—at times—very slowly—for God's designs and intentions in events as they occurred and of drawing from them guidance for his further actions. The deeper sense of this statement is quite clear. To reach the topmost gratification of one's own ambitions it is necessary to hide them from one's own self and not become conscious of them. Then and only then, will the Almighty Father himself permit such preferment, will modesty and unconditional submission to His will be magnificently rewarded.

While serving his own ambitions and desires Cromwell never ceased to serve the commands of his highest ideals as well. The measure of his satisfaction was the feeling of being in harmony with that high authority and perhaps also the feeling of sin atoned for. As we have mentioned before, there is a deep sense in his asking about the grace of God in the last moment of his life. It is clear that eagerness for and worry over God's grace penetrated him to his very depths.

We do not know whether or not Cromwell originally had a conscious desire to be a leader and a dictator (it is reported that as a child he once dreamed of being king), but it is certain that he had to become one, impelled as he was by his own genius, by the dynamic force of his own impulses and unconscious desires, and by the imperative of events, as well as by the fatalism of his own transgressions, transgressions of a youthful Oedipus and an adult regicide.

Personality Characteristics and the Resolution of Role Conflicts

ELLIOT G. MISHLER

The general area of inquiry into which the present paper falls is that of personality and social structure. Specifically, this investigation is concerned with determining the relationships between some characteristics of the authoritarian personality and certain ways of resolving a particular type of conflict among social roles.¹

Despite a good deal of speculation about the relations of personality and social role, the number of empirical studies remains rather small, and there has been a general lack of consistent and positive findings. Since recent critiques have pointed to serious methodological and theoretical shortcomings in previous work,² no discussion of this material will be undertaken here. It appeared to the author that some of the difficulty in past studies has come from defining social roles in terms of certain qualitative, concrete characteristics which differentiate one role from others (as the leader of a group is defined by the things he does which are different from what an ordinary member does). Attempts to relate personality characteristics to these complex total performances have not been too successful. Studies of leadership, for example, have led to the conclusion that there seem to be no specific traits of personality which

¹Adorno, T. W., et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper, 1950.

²Lindesmith, A. R. and A. L. Strauss, "Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15 (1950), pp. 587-600; and Sargent S., and M. Smith (Eds.) *Culture and Personality*, New York: Viking Fund, 1949.

Elliot G. Mishler, "Personality Characteristics and the Resolution of Role Conflicts," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1953), pp. 115-135. Reprinted by permission. Footnotes and tables numbered as in original.

are systematically related to leadership behavior.³ It was believed that it might be more fruitful to look for analytical dimensions which could be found in varying degrees in a variety of roles.

Some theoretical work by Parsons⁴ and recent empirical studies by Stouffer and Toby⁵ seemed to offer the necessary lead. The latter authors were concerned with developing instruments to measure the perception of social norms and of conflicts among them. They developed a set of hypothetical situations in which the individual had to choose between two simultaneously present and conflicting role obligations. All of the situations posed a conflict between duty to a friend and duty to a more general social norm. One of their major findings was that individuals showed general tendencies to resolve in the same way all situations in which this particular conflict was present. This pair of conflicting "simultaneous role obligations" was taken from an analysis of role relationships by Parsons in which he isolated as one aspect of all role relations the bases on which rights are claimed or obligations accepted.⁶ He defined one possible basis as *particularistic*; here the claims are made on the basis of the particular relationship to the individual involved (this would be the obligation to the friend in the Stouffer questions). The second basis was defined as *universalistic*, and here the rights which are claimed are independent of the personal relationship to the individual involved (the obligation to society in the Stouffer questions).

The general question formulated for the present study was whether the tendencies to resolve this conflict in either a particularistic or universalistic direction are related to other personality characteristics. In view of the newness of the particularistic-universalistic dimension, the choice of specific personality characteristics for investigation must remain somewhat arbitrary. It was believed, however, that those which were selected should be expected, on some theoretical grounds, to influence the way in which this role conflict is resolved.

Although individuals have not been thought of before as being either particularistic or universalistic, certain social systems have been looked at in this way. In particular, sociological theorists have described bureau-

³Gibb, C. A., "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 42 (1947), pp. 267-85; Stogdill, R. M., "Personal Factors Associated With Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," *Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 25 (1948), pp. 35-71.

⁴Parsons, T., *Essays in Sociological Theory*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949, Chs. viii and xiv; Parsons, T., and E. Shils (Eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1951. Part 2.

⁵Stouffer, S. A., "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 14 (1949), pp. 707-717; Stouffer, S. A., and J. Toby, "Role Conflict and Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 56 (1951), pp. 395-407. Reprinted in T. Parsons & E. Shils (Eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1951.

⁶Parsons, *op. cit.*, ch. 8.

cracies as institutional forms embodying universalistic criteria.⁷ For example, Merton writes:

The Bureaucracy, as we have seen, is organized as a secondary, formal group . . . the substitution of personal for impersonal treatment within the structure is met with widespread disapproval . . . these reactions serve the latent function of maintaining the essential structural elements of bureaucracy by reaffirming the necessity for formalized secondary relations and by helping to prevent the disintegration of the bureaucratic structure which would occur should those be supplanted by personalized relations.⁸

If this definition is accepted, the search for fruitful personality characteristics to investigate may be reformulated in the question: What kinds of persons would adapt most easily to the requirements of bureaucratic system? In other words, what is the good bureaucrat like?⁹ Specific studies are not available, but there are some threads of agreement in the speculative literature. Characteristics like rigidity, submission to authority, and impersonality are often mentioned as features of the bureaucratic personality. Similar dimensions have recently been emphasized in the extended and intensive studies of the *authoritarian personality*.¹⁰ It appeared that the authoritarian characteristics which were described fit in with the general picture of the bureaucrat that has been presented in the literature. On this basis, seven personality characteristics were drawn from this earlier study for investigation here:¹¹

1. *Interpersonal relations*: the extent to which people are viewed with either suspicion or trust. The perception of people as threatening vs. an open, trusting attitude toward people.

2. *Attitude to parents*: the extent to which there is a tendency to conventionally idealize parents, or to objectively appraise them.

3. *Attitude to opposite sex*: the extent to which there is an underlying attitude of disrespect and resentment toward the opposite sex, or one of genuine, affectionate respect for them.

4. *Impulse control*: the extent to which there is a need to control one's

⁷Merton, R. K., "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1948; Selznick, P., "Foundations of The Theory of Organization," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 13 (1948), pp. 25-35.

⁸Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁹Universalism is only one of the important structural features of a bureaucracy. Defining the bureaucratic personality by the single criterion of a tendency to make universalistic responses (as is done here) grossly distorts the true state of affairs. The justification for using such an artificial device lies in its utility for simplifying an exceedingly complex phenomenon for purposes of empirical research.

¹⁰Adorno, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹¹Three other variables were included in the original formulation but were discarded on the basis of initial results with the measuring instruments.

own impulses, or the tendency to accept the expression of one's own impulses.

5. *Evaluation of deviant behavior*: the extent to which the deviant behavior of others is condemned on a moralistic basis, or is generally viewed with permissiveness.

6. *Attitude to authority*: the extent to which authority figures and demands are submitted to or rejected.

7. *Achievement values*: the extent to which the sources of an individual's satisfaction and security are believed to lie in the achievement of certain external goals, or in individualized personal goals.

The considerations guiding the selection of personality characteristics have already suggested the central hypothesis of the present study. It is expected that the universalistic role orientation will be found embedded in the authoritarian character structure.

It is, of course, expected that the seven personality characteristics will be positively related to each other, and that each of them will be related to universalism-particularism in the same way. Because of the crucial way in which the earlier studies of the authoritarian personality influenced our thinking, it seemed advisable to collect some information which would permit a comparison of those findings with the present ones. For this reason, F and E scales were administered. It was assumed that the relations between the personality characteristics and these questionnaires would be the same as those found earlier.

In addition, the inclusion of these scales permits a more direct examination of the relation between universalism-particularism and "predisposition to fascism." The expected relation, implicit in the foregoing discussion, is that universalistic individuals would be more prone than particularistic individuals to possess an ideology involving "implicit anti-democratic trends" and "ethnocentrism." It should be pointed out that Parsons' formulation would seem to lead to a contrary hypothesis, namely that particularism would be positively associated with high F and E scores.¹²

* * * *

... For the purposes of the following discussion the relative standing of each of eight different types of persons are presented in summary form in Table 6. . . .

... two aspects of the pattern of relationships are now brought into full view. One is that the relation of orientation toward internal or external values to particularism, F, and E . . . appears to be of equal importance with the other two personality indices previously isolated as effective. Second the personality clusters underlying the two ways of resolving this type of

¹²Parsons, *op. cit.*, especially Ch. xiv.

TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTICULARISM, E, AND F.

	<i>Internal Values</i>		<i>External Values</i>	
	<i>Benignity Universalistic</i>	<i>Cynicism Particularistic</i>	<i>Benignity Particularistic</i>	<i>Cynicism Particularistic</i>
Rebelliousness	Low E Low F <i>Universalistic</i>	Low E Low F <i>Particularistic</i>	Low E Low F <i>Universalistic</i>	High E Low F <i>Universalistic</i>
Conformity	High E High F	High E High F	Low E High F	High E High F

role conflict do not simply parallel those underlying the indices of a fascist potential, but the patterns crosscut each other in a quite complicated fashion.

The initial hypothesis that the authoritarian character is the same as the bureaucratic personality has been found to be in error. A particular way of resolving the role conflict situation is not consistently associated with scores on the E and F scales. If the four cells with the highest E and F scores are examined . . . , two are found to be universalistic and two are particularistic.

There is, however, one important sense in which the original hypothesis is borne out. The one type of the present eight which corresponds in all details with the description of the authoritarian personality is also universalistic. This is the group of persons who are oriented toward external values, are cynical, and are conforming. Not only are their mean E and F scores the highest of all, but they also resolve the role conflict by choosing the universalistic alternative. It is for this extreme group (containing only six of the fifty subjects) that one may speak of the equivalence of the authoritarian and bureaucratic syndromes.

At the data level, there is no real discrepancy between the present findings and those of the original study of the authoritarian personality. If, for example, that study's procedure of selecting for intensive study persons who were high on E and F had been followed, the personality characteristics which would have emerged as significantly related to these scores would have been cynicism, conformity, and an external value orientation. However, the data also indicate that the three personality dimensions are relatively independent of each other and that the number of persons in which all three would be found as a cluster may be rather small.

No full explication of the psychological meaning of the particularistic or universalistic act to all the personality types can be attempted here, but some general observations which seem to warrant further research might be

made. In particular, reference will be made to two features of the act itself, investigation of which would serve to provide evidence either for or against these speculations. One of these concerns the importance of the "friend" as a factor in creating conflict. The second question refers to the degree of conflict which these types of persons may be expected to experience in selecting a particular action alternative.

The cynicism of the internally oriented particularistic types suggests that turning inward in the search for satisfaction and security is a defensive act. The world is a hostile and uncertain place, and safety lies in giving up the attempt to reach culturally defined external goals. The rebellious sub-type continues to actively reject all authority and social rules. His adjustment may be labelled as "bohemian," and his low E score perhaps reflects his general acceptance of the esoteric and strange. His particularistic response would not seem to depend on the "friend" character of the other person, but is rather an act in which he not only can break a social rule but let someone "get away with it" at the same time. It may be expected that these persons would experience little conflict in choosing this alternative. For the conforming subtype, the adjustment seems to be on the order of an "identification with the aggressor." It may be suggested that the important determinant of choice for these persons is that a "friend" is involved. This places the other in the category of in-group on whose behalf certain actions which may be against the interests of others may be taken. Some conflict may be expected within these persons where neither choice completely resolves the tension set up by the situation.

The rebelliousness of the two externally oriented particularistic types indicates that their response is against the restrictiveness of the social rules. For the benign sub-type, it is probable that he would give anyone a "break," friend or not. He is likely, however, to take into consideration the consequences of his act on other persons and would probably regard the obligation as more than a routine every-day occurrence. It may, therefore, be expected that he would experience a rather high degree of conflict. The cynical subtype (the only rebellious group which is relatively high on E and F . . .) comes closest to the particularistic syndrome suggested by Parsons' analysis.²³ There are no rules which cover all situations in a moral sense, but exceptions are made on the basis of personal relationship—for friends in the role conflict situation, and against minority groups on the E scale. This suggests that the character of the other person as "friend" may be an important determinant of the choice, but that there would be little conflict experienced in making the choice.

Among the internally oriented and benign universalistic groups, the

²³[Snedecor, G. W., *Statistical Methods* (4th ed.), Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College, 1946-1948, pp. 284ff.]

rebellious sub-type has rejected the rules set by authority but appears to have a set of consistent standards by which all persons are equally judged, regardless of their personal relationship to them. This group seems closest to the universalistic type implied by Parsons, and one might expect there to be little conflict in choosing this act and little consideration of the fact that it is a "friend" rather than anyone else who is involved. The choice of the conforming sub-type seems to depend more on a rigid adherence to the rules set forth in his social group. The rules are seen as unquestionably correct, and no person (including a friend) has a right to ask that they be disregarded in his favor. The high E and F scores suggest that the stability of the traditional and established feature of their world are seen as threatened by certain groups and activities which, therefore, have to be kept under strict control. The fact that a "friend" is involved may be expected to create little conflict in this situation.

There would seem to be a generally complete acceptance of the social norms by both the externally oriented and conforming universalistic types. The trust of persons exhibited by the benign sub-type indicates a recognition on their part that people may sometimes deviate with no malice aforethought, but this does not mean that the rules themselves do not deserve to be maintained. The cynical sub-type, as has already been pointed out, corresponds to the prototype of the authoritarian personality. For neither of these would the fact that the other person is a "friend" appear to make much difference. Both would probably be low on conflict, especially the latter.

Conclusions

The general problem of the study was to determine whether certain personality characteristics are associated with a tendency to resolve conflicts between obligations to a friend and the obligations of a social role in a particularistic way (i.e., in favor of the friend) or in a universalistic way (i.e., in favor of the social role). Specifically, the hypothesis was tested that a particularistic role orientation is positively related to the characteristics of the authoritarian personality.

Two types of particularistic persons were found. One is oriented toward satisfaction and security in *internal* goals and is *cynical* about other persons. The second is oriented toward satisfaction and security in *external* goals and is *rebellious* against authority and social rules. Correspondingly, two types of universalistic persons were found. One is *internally* oriented and has a *benign* attitude toward others. The other is *externally* oriented and *conforms* to authority and social rules.

* * * *

The present study has shown that tendencies toward engaging in the same

social behavior may be found within a number of different personality structures. It has, moreover, also demonstrated that the range of possible types is limited and that systematic relationships between social behavior and personality may be found. The relative success of the investigation underscores the possibility that further work on role conflicts and their resolutions may provide the much needed bridge between the polar concepts of role and personality.

Principles of Intrapersonal Conflict

JUDSON S. BROWN

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, from the very dawn of life, living organisms have been constantly subjected to the disrupting effects of conflicting tendencies to action. Whenever and wherever they have moved, the forces inciting them to action have been opposed by other agencies demanding either alternate responses or the cessation of action; for even the simplest movement cannot be executed unless the friction and inertia of bodily members are overcome; and no movement can long continue if the chemical products of fatigue are allowed to accumulate or if competing muscular contractions are not inhibited. For the individual organism, then, conflict is an inevitable consequence of an inherent capacity to act in any manner and especially of the ability to perform a multiplicity of acts.

It is with these intrapersonal conflicts, arising from competitions among incompatible tendencies to act, that the present paper is concerned. Its specific aim is to review in brief, and in some cases to enlarge upon, a selected group of explanatory principles that have proved valuable in the analysis of intra-individual conflict behavior.

A Basic Paradigm for Intrapersonal Conflict

A fundamental paradigm to which all intrapersonal conflicts can perhaps be reduced is shown in Figure 1. Here *S* designates a stimulus complex or pattern of cues having a high probability, when presented to an organism, of evoking two different and incompatible responses, *R*₁ and *R*₂. In any specific situation, the tendency (*T*₁) for *S* to elicit *R*₁ may be stronger than the tendency (*T*₂) to evoke *R*₂, or the reverse may be true, or the two may be equal; and, when equal, they may be strong or weak. When one of the

Judson S. Brown, "Principles of Intrapersonal Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1957), pp. 135-153. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted. The figures are as drawn for this publication.




Fig. 1. Basic conflict paradigm. S is a stimulus complex capable of arousing two tendencies (T_1 , and T_2) to perform antagonistic responses (R_1 , and R_2). For simplicity, it has been assumed that only two antagonistic reactions are involved.

antagonistic tendencies becomes strong enough to modify the behavior-determining action of the other, the paradigm illustrates conflict, as it has been described above. But if one of the tendencies is too weak to modify the action of its competitor, the paradigm is descriptive of commonplace, unambivalent behavior. Here and in what follows, unambivalent behavior refers to actions that can be satisfactorily explained by the invocation of a single dominant tendency, with minor disrupting effects of weakly antagonistic tendencies being ignored.

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


Fig. 2. Diagrammatic representation of relationships characterizing the continuum between unambivalent behavior and conflictual behavior.

An attempt has been made, by means of the diagram in Figure 2 to summarize the critical elements . . . of conflict and to expand the fundamental paradigm for conflict. In this diagram the base line represents any variable, such as frequency or intensity of punishment, that might lead to an increase in the strength of T2. For simplicity, the strength of T1 is assumed to remain constant. Now if, as the diagram shows, T2 increases from a very low value at the left up to equality with T1 at the right, the difference between the strengths of the two tendencies is reduced, and the effects of competition should become greater. On the present view, a marked inequality in the strengths of the tendencies is characteristic of unambivalent behavior, and equality is typical of conflictual behavior.

* * * *

Varieties of Conflicts

Of recent years, psychologists have rather commonly classified conflicts into three major groups: (1) spatial conflicts, (2) discrimination-induced conflicts, and (3) temporal conflicts. If tendencies are present both to approach and to retreat from a given point in space, the conflict is identified as *spatial*. Conflicts arising from pressures to avoid objects on the left as well as on the right or from tendencies to approach two spatially separated goals would also be described by the adjective "spatial." *Discrimination-induced* conflicts are marked by the requirement that a difficult discrimination must be made between quite similar cues. As we have seen, this was the method used by Pavlov to produce experimental neuroses in his dogs. The third group, the *temporal* conflicts, includes those in which the degree of equality of competitor tendencies varies as a function of nearness in time to a particular event. These temporal conflicts have never been critically analyzed, and a preliminary attempt will be made to alleviate this deficiency in a later section of this paper. The central point to be stressed, however, in connection with these varieties of conflict is that, *in essence, they are simply three different techniques for manipulating the stimulus complex of our simple paradigm*. Shifting an organism's position in space cannot possibly affect its tendencies to action unless that shift produces a change in stimuli. Space, as such, can have no causal efficacy with respect to behavior. Nor, for that matter, can the passage of time. . . . In the case of conflicts arising where difficult discriminations are required, it is evident that the relative strengths of the competing tendencies are changed through the experimenter's manipulations of the positive and negative stimuli.

Spatial Conflicts

Up to this point, as a consequence of an attempt to reduce the problem of conflict to its barest essentials, the discussion has been couched in

extremely general terms. To increase the intelligibility of a subsequent treatment of temporal conflicts and to illustrate concretely the type of analysis that currently seems most fruitful, we turn now to a brief review of some typical spatial conflicts. The type of analysis to be followed is essentially identical with that of Miller, whose treatment rested on a foundation laid down by Lewin and Hull.

In a *spatial approach-avoidance conflict* . . . the organism is both attracted to and repelled from a specific region in his environment, and conflict increases as the antagonistic tendencies approach equality. For any practical analysis of such conflicts, however, information as to the manner in which the tendencies might normally be expected to vary with distance from the point of reward and punishment is an important prerequisite. Previous research and theory provide strong support for the idea that in a wide variety of situations the numerical values of both approach and avoidance tendencies increase as the organism moves nearer to the goal, with the avoidance tendency rising more rapidly than the approach. Figure 3 represents these




Fig. 3. Schematic diagram representing a single approach gradient (solid line) and three avoidance gradients (dashed lines) of differing over-all strengths. The gradients have been drawn as straight lines merely to simplify exposition.

assumptions in a purposely oversimplified form. Here the solid line denotes the approach tendency, and the dashed lines are weak, moderate, and strong avoidance tendencies. If, for the moment, we consider only the approach and the moderate avoidance tendencies, it will be apparent that their

intersection near the center marks the region of maximum conflict. With departures from equality in either direction, the situation tends, increasingly, to evoke unambivalent behavior. If the individual is placed at the starting position, he should approach in an unambivalent manner toward the goal, since the avoidance tendency is relatively weak at the starting point. Or, if placed in the situation near the goal, where the tendencies are also unequal, the subject should exhibit unambivalent avoidance. Let us assume, for the moment, however, that the avoidance subtracts from the approach at the left and the approach subtracts from the avoidance on the right. On this assumption, both approach and avoidance reactions would become weaker as the center is neared, and the subject would remain at the point of intersection of the gradients so long as their values remain unchanged. Reasoning in this manner, one arrives at an acceptable account of such conflict-situation behavior as going partway forward toward an ambivalent goal object or retreating partway and then pausing.

If the height of the avoidance gradient is reduced (lower dashed line) through the extinction of fear or if the positive gradient is elevated, the locus of conflict will be shifted toward the goal. This will produce an expansion in a goalward direction of the region of unambivalent approach in which the positive tendency is dominant. Throughout a greater proportion of the distance from the start, therefore, the behavior will be free of competition, and the goal may actually be reached without excessive slowing down or hesitation. Conversely, either an increase in the negative gradient (upper dashed line) through intensified punishment or a decrease in the positive tendency following satiation will shift the intersection toward the left. This will expand the region throughout which unimpeded avoidance should occur and will lessen the likelihood of the organism's ever reaching the goal.

As to the resolution of this type of conflict, under the restriction that the intersection of the gradients occurs between the starting point and the goal, the following may be said. Whenever the individual behaves by avoiding when the negative tendency is clearly dominant or by approaching when the positive is pre-eminent, he is inevitably sucked into the maelstrom of conflict. Behavior is self-regulating in this situation, but, since the position of equilibrium is conflictful, it can best be described as a kind of pernicious homeostasis. Because of this self-balancing aspect, an approach-avoidance conflict can never be resolved unless the values of the tendencies are markedly altered. Perhaps this self-regulatory feature of behavior in ambivalent situations accounts for the relative inescapability of such conflicts and for their stubborn resistance to therapeutic amelioration.

In a *spatial avoidance-avoidance conflict*, an individual in attempting to avoid one threatening object, must move toward another that is equally threatening. On the assumption that the strength of the tendency to avoid each object decreases with distance, the situation would be marked by relation-

ships like those of Figure 4. Here again, for purposes of simplification, the avoidance gradients have been drawn as straight lines of essentially equal slopes, with their intersection falling halfway between the two fear-arousing regions. Subtracting one tendency from the other yields the dashed-line gradients to the right and left on the upper surfaces of the crosshatched areas. The left-hand one of these is the net tendency to avoid the region at the left, and the right-hand one is the net tendency to escape from the right.

From our preceding analysis it should now be obvious that, at the extreme ends of this spatial array, behavior will be unambivalent, and unimpeded avoiding reactions will take place. But the occurrence of such avoidance




Fig. 4. Schematic diagram of gradients in the strength of tendencies either to avoid or to approach two spatially separated goals. The dashed-line gradients denote the net tendencies obtainable by algebraically summing the overlapping gradients.

drives the organism into the central region, where the tendencies are equal, and conflict results. If barriers are present to prevent the individual from leaving the situation, conflict must continue. Again, the regulatory mechanism is pernicious, since behavior consistent with the dictates of the tendencies always leads back to a region of conflict. Under these conditions, conflict can be alleviated by drastically reducing the strength of one or both tendencies. If the object at the right is no longer feared, the corresponding gradient would be eliminated, and behavior throughout the entire space between the two negative regions would qualify as unimpeded avoidance behavior with respect to the left-hand object. In the absence of restrictive

barriers, of course, an individual can resolve or reduce the conflict by moving away from both feared objects at the same time. By moving far enough, the tendencies, though still theoretically equal, would be too weak to operate effectively in the production of any behavior.

The diagram of Figure 4 may also be used to illustrate the relevant variables in an *approach-approach conflict*. Here the two points of reinforcement are equally desirable objects, and the solid-line gradients represent increasing positive tendencies to approach each. The dashed-line gradients represent increasing positive tendencies to approach each. The dashed-line gradients now denote the net tendencies to approach either side. In an environment where these relations hold, the organism can never undergo prolonged conflict. In contrast with the approach-avoidance and avoidance-avoidance kinds of conflict, the behavioral homeostatic mechanism in this case has benign rather than pernicious consequences. Regardless of the individual's position, if he responds in accordance with the demands of the tendencies, he will always progress from a region of relative equality and conflict to a region of conflictless inequality. Even if he were placed precisely at the point where the tendencies are equal, any slight change in the stimulus conditions would upset the momentary balance, and he would tend to move toward one or the other goal. The approach-approach conflict is thus self-resolving, whereas the others are self-perpetuating. Presumably, such self-resolving conditions would never lead to neurotic tendencies, and clinical experience probably bears this out.

Under the circumstances of everyday living, however, it is doubtful whether pure approach-approach conditions such as these ever exist. In nearly every case, the choice of one goal generates an avoidance tendency due to the fact that the other goal may have to be relinquished. As Godbeer and Miller have shown, such double approach-avoidance conflicts are not readily resolved. By and large, these double approach-avoidance conflicts reduce to a kind of avoidance-avoidance paradigm, and they need not, therefore, be considered further here.

Discrimination Conflict

Conflict arising when an individual is required to perform difficult discriminations are amenable to theoretical analyses (3) that parallel, in many respects, those we have discussed in connection with spatial conflicts. Suppose, for example, that a subject has been trained to push a lever forward when a high-frequency tone is sounded and to refrain from responding when a low-frequency tone is sounded. Now, if on successive trials, the pitch of the high tone is progressively reduced and the pitch of the low one is raised, the accuracy of the subject's performance will decline, and, as the two tones approach equality, he may exhibit symptoms of indecision and conflict. Clearly, this discrimination situation differs from

those we have already described as spatial, since the subject neither approaches nor avoids a spatial region and since the conflict-inducing stimuli, being under the experimenter's control, are not altered appreciably by the subject's behavior.

In interpreting discrimination-induced conflicts such as these, it is convenient to invoke the *principle of stimulus generalization*. According to this principle, after a response has been associated with one stimulus, other stimuli similar to the first will also elicit the same response without further training. Moreover, the greater the similarity between the old and the new cues, the higher the probability that the new ones will elicit the same response as the old.

The application of this concept of stimulus generalization to our hypothetical discrimination problem with the high and low tones is illustrated in Figure 5. Here the abscissa represents the tonal continuum ranging




Fig. 5. Generalized tendencies to respond and to refrain from responding as a function of distance on a frequency dimension.

from the low to the high tone used in the problem. And the ordinate, as before, represents the strengths of the reaction tendencies. The solid-line gradient on the right indicates, in accord with stimulus generalization, that the tendency to respond by pushing the lever is strongest at the point where training has been conducted (high tone) but is present in appreciable degree at all other points on the dimension. Similarly, the dashed line depicts the generalized tendency to refrain from responding to the low tone.

If the actual relationships were as shown in this figure, it would follow

that if either the high tone or the low tone were presented, no conflict would result, since the generalized tendencies to make the incompatible responses are minimal at those (unambivalent) points. But tones near the middle of the dimension would tend to elicit both positive and negative generalized responses. And the closer the stimuli approached the middle of the dimension, the more equal would the competing tendencies become and the stronger the conflict.

With respect to the resolution of discrimination-induced conflicts, it is clear from Figure 5 that an increase or decrease in the height of either gradient will increase the disparity between the strengths of the two tendencies at certain points on the dimension and thus reduce conflict at those points. This can be accomplished by retraining, by extinction procedures, by changing the nature of the stimuli, or by alterations in the individual's motivational level.

Temporal Conflicts

As has been indicated, conflicts may arise from changes in an organism's temporal nearness to any event that elicits competing tendencies to action. There are almost no experimental studies of temporal conflicts in the psychological literature, however, and even in Miller's (21) extensive review only a sentence or two is devoted to them. In view of this relative neglect of what may be an important area, it is interesting to see whether a meaningful analysis of temporal conflicts can be achieved within the general conceptual framework employed here.

To extend the principles of conflict from the spatial and similarity dimensions to the dimension of time we must begin by asking whether it is realistic to suppose that both positive and negative tendencies change systematically as a consequence of stimulus variations attending the passing of time. That is, are there positive and negative gradients in time?

Positive temporal gradients. The presence of a positive temporal gradient would be implied by the observation that the tendency to perform a periodically evoked response increases with nearness to the moment at which the response has usually been elicited and rewarded. Such observations have indeed been made in the case of both classically conditioned (27) and instrumentally conditioned responses (31). Moreover, human subjects, when required to make simple manual movements to a regularly recurring signal, exhibit progressively shorter reaction times as the customary time for the appearance of the signal is approached (25). These data are paralleled by such commonplace observations as that of the mounting excitement shown by children with the approach of Christmas. There appear to be adequate grounds, therefore, for supposing that after a response has been reinforced at regular intervals the strength of the tendency to make that response will increase as the usual time of its elicitation

approaches. This is clearly analogous to the approach gradient described previously for spatial conflict situations.

Negative temporal gradients. It is also reasonable to believe that the strengths of tendencies to avoid or to fear an expected noxious or painful event increase with nearness to that event. If one arranges to have a wisdom tooth extracted at some time in the future, the dread of pain is relatively mild when the appointment is made. But, as the fateful hour draws close, fear mounts increasingly. Everyday observations of this kind are supported by experimental data from studies by Brown (2) and by Rigby (29). These investigators have shown that rats' fears of a painful shock become intensified as the customary time for being shocked grows near.

Incidentally, much of the process of socialization in children seems to be directed toward extending their gradients of fear in time. If the child's fear is not aroused until the actual moment of punishment, the fear cannot function as a deterrent to the performance of socially tabooed acts. One must learn to fear parental displeasure long before the strap descends if disapproved actions are to be inhibited. To achieve a disciplined society, anxieties concerning the punishments to be expected for robbery, arson, rape, and the like must be aroused long before the penitentiary doors swing open.

Having decided, then, that both positive and negative temporal gradients may reasonably be assumed to exist under specific conditions of learning and reinforcement, the next question is how conflicts, if any, develop or decline through time. A number of different possibilities suggest themselves here, and we shall consider each of them briefly.

Thwarted-avoidance conflict. One variety of temporal conflict which might be called *thwarted-avoidance conflict*, is characterized by the fact that, as time passes, a noxious state of affairs comes nearer and nearer, but escape is prevented by physical barriers. The convicted murderer awaiting certain death in the electric chair provides a grim but realistic example. For such an unfortunate individual, dread of the coming traumatic episode increases with time, but all avoidance responses are thwarted by strong barriers.

A comparable situation, more directly analogous to the kinds of conflicts we have already considered, exists where the restraints against escape are social or cultural rather than physical. Thus the tradition that one's honor must be maintained at any cost might force one to engage in a duel having a high probability of leading to death. Such conditions existed for Gary Cooper in the movie *High Noon*, as you may recall. The time-induced conflict here involves an increasing fear of death as the dueling hour approaches and a competitive fear of social disgrace or ostracism. Assuming the fear of dishonor to remain constant, the conflicting tendencies may be represented by the solid-line gradient and either of the dashed-line gradients in the sketch of Figure 6. If the fear of dishonor is greater than the weak fear

of death, the duel will actually be carried out. But if the over-all strength of the tendency to fear death is increased, the gradients will cross at an earlier point in time. The period of maximum conflict will then occur sooner, and the individual may well escape entirely from the situation. There are also, of course, various factors that would operate to increase the strength of the tendency to carry out the feared act and to decrease the anticipation of trauma. Primitive tribesmen, when going to war, commonly fortify themselves by specialized rituals involving singing, dancing, and appeals to the gods for supernatural aid. Even civilized man knows that alcohol may sometimes function to alleviate or obliterate fears of impending pain. The relationships diagramed in Figure 6, though superficially different from




Fig. 6. Competing tendencies involved in thwarted-avoidance temporal conflict.

some we have considered, are comparable in many respects to those of spatial avoidance-avoidance conflicts. Time moves in only one direction, however, and hence the difference between the competitive tendencies must always decrease (up to the point of equality), and conflict or frustration must always increase.

Thwarted-approach conflict. Conflictful situations also exist in which, for assorted reasons, *one simply cannot perform a given response until a certain period of time has elapsed*. In some localities, eager young couples cannot become legally united until a "cooling-off" period of several days has elapsed following the purchase of the marriage license. And many of us often find that we must wait until the arrival of a salary check at the end of the month to buy a much wanted, but expensive, article. In these and in similar

instances the tendency to perform the thwarted act increases with time. But time cannot be hurried, and its very stodginess is often frustrating and irritating. Social rules and taboos, of course, are the primary factors providing the restraints, but the restraints are inextricably geared to the flow of time.

A diagrammatic representation of the reactive and restraining tendencies in a conflict of this type would be essentially identical with the previous sketch. For example, let the line labeled "fear of dishonor" in Figure 6 represent the strength of the restriction against marrying, and let the temporal base line represent the "cooling-off" period. If the lower of the two dashed-line gradients is taken to indicate the strength of the young couple's tendency to get married, it follows that conflict should increase with nearness to the deadline. And, so long as the restriction or fear of punishment is stronger than the positive desire, the couple will wait until the approved time. But if, as a consequence of biological or social incentives or goads, the tendency to consummate the marriage becomes excessively strong, the period of maximal conflict will occur during the waiting period, and the lovers may rush off to a Gretna Green to get married more quickly.

This situation also resembles, to a degree, the spatial approach-avoidance conflict. In the thwarted-approach paradigm the strength of the inhibiting tendency is greater than the positive tendency up to the point of equality, and hence the response is prevented from occurring until that point is reached or passed. In the spatial approach-avoidance, however, the positive tendency exceeds the negative at the more remote distances from the goal, and the response will tend to occur up to the point of equality, but not beyond.

Temporal approach-avoidance conflicts. An attractive possibility in considering temporal conflicts is that there might exist situations which could best be described by appeal to positive and negative gradients of the sort already utilized in spatial approach-avoidance behavior. For example, when the amorous swain, under the influence of a full moon and other stimulants, proposes marriage the positive aspects of an imagined life with his inamorata are doubtless preeminent. As the succeeding days of the engagement period pass, however, the potentially negative aspects of marriage—loss of freedom, family responsibilities, and financial burdens—may loom larger and larger. The result may be—and often is, apparently—that the period just before the wedding becomes especially conflictful. And in extreme cases, when the avoidance becomes stronger than the approach, the bride may be left standing at the altar.

To explain such behavior it might be assumed that the strength of the tendency to avoid marriage increases at a more rapid rate with nearness to the event than do the more positive aspects. Assuming, further, that the positive and negative tendencies summate algebraically, it follows that the

likelihood of getting married decreases, but conflict increases, with nearness to the nuptial day. Perhaps this is co-ordinate with the common notion that long engagements are less likely to lead to marriage than short ones.

Apparently, the only published experimental study of a temporal approach-avoidance conflict is that by Rigby (29). As has already been observed, he obtained gradients in the amplitudes of both approach and avoidance responses as a function of nearness to an event that was both rewarding and punishing. He was unable, however, to support the suggestion that the avoidance gradient might be steeper than that for approach. Such experimental verification will be needed if further attempts to extend the theory into temporal dimensions are to prove fruitful.

It is also possible to describe, within the general outline of the temporal conflict paradigm, situations analogous to the approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance scheme we have already considered. Since these have not been previously described, a brief analysis of them appears justified.

Conflict as a function of temporal nearness to an approach-approach situation. In this type of conflict the passage of time brings an organism increasingly close to a situation in which strong incompatible approaching responses will be simultaneously evoked. Suppose, for example, that equally attractive movies are announced a week in advance at two different theaters. On the day when these productions are actually being shown, the situation is identical with the simple approach-approach type of conflict. But when the "coming attractions" are announced, the tendencies to approach both theaters, though equal, should be extremely weak or non-existent. As the days go by, the two tendencies should increase in strength and reach their maximum at the instant of final decision when the moviegoer is standing between the two theaters with his money in his hand. In these circumstances the moviegoer is, in a manner of speaking, drawn into the presence of cues to competing actions by the passage of time. Ordinarily, there is nothing he can do either to hasten or to delay the appearance of the movies. Time flows past the motionless individual, and in so doing brings to him events capable of arousing incompatible proclivities to respond.

An attempt to diagram these relations is reproduced in Figure 7. Here the back wall of a three-dimensional structure represents, in its left-right dimension, the spatial separation of the two positive goals, i.e., the movie theaters. The height of any point on that wall indicates the strength of the tendency to approach, and the lines ABC and DBE represent identical intersecting approach gradients. To this spatial wall there is added another dimension, that of time. This is shown as extending outward from the wall toward the viewer. Finally, it is assumed that the approach tendencies spread out into this new dimension in such a way as to form two conical surfaces. The plane of intersection of these cones is indicated by the letters BFG and the dotted shading. Our attention centers on this plane. If, when




Fig. 7. A tridimensional space-time structure designed to represent changes in the strengths of competing tendencies as a function of temporal nearness to either an approach-approach or an avoidance-avoidance conflict situation.

the movies are announced, the movie fan is at the space-time point G, the strength of the tendencies to approach either theater are equal but negligible. As the days go by, the back surface of the figure may be thought of as moving forward toward the moviegoer. Consequently, the strengths of the two competitive tendencies increase simultaneously in a manner indicated by the changing height of the curved line GB above the floor of the structure. At the final instant of decision, the subject is at point F, and both tendencies are maximally strong, having a value corresponding to the length of line BF.

The behavioral consequences to be predicted from this analysis depend on one's theory of whether variations in the absolute strengths of two equal positive tendencies do, indeed, lead to modified actions. Approach-approach conflicts are presumably always self-resolving unless covert avoidance tendencies are also present. Ease of conflict resolution may not, therefore, be affected by variations in the absolute strengths of two competing positive tendencies. But it is quite possible that degree of emotional arousal and hence drive level would increase as the time for decision approaches. It is also clear that if the slopes of the gradients varied with changes in their absolute heights at the point of intersection, differences in the speed of conflict resolution might be predicted. Thus, if the gradients were very flat at the crossing point, we would expect a definite

reaction toward one of the two alternatives to have a longer latency than if the gradients rose steeply on each side of the junction.

Conflict as a function of temporal nearness to an avoidance-avoidance situation. Consider now the case of an infantryman who is told that in exactly one hour he must charge forward from his relatively safe dugout into the face of strong enemy fire or remain and struggle with enemy forces advancing from the rear. Both these alternatives are undesirable, and at the zero hour he will be enmeshed in a strong avoidance-avoidance situation. But until that hour arrives he is temporally remote from both these fear-producing possibilities. When the gravity of the situation first becomes clear, his fears may be aroused, but, since he is still somewhat remote from the crucial moment, the conflict should not be exceptionally strong. As time passes, however, he finds himself in the presence of cues which, to an ever increasing degree, elicit incompatible avoidance reactions and stronger and stronger fears.

The principal variables in this type of spatiotemporal conflict may be represented by a geometrical figure like the one we have just seen. Thus in Figure 7 the lines ABC and DBE may be taken to represent the strengths of the tendencies to avoid the two enemy forces situated at the two negative regions on either side. When the dilemma is presented, the soldier may be thought of as located somewhere near G on the line GF. With each tick of the clock, however, point F comes closer, and the absolute strengths of the (equal) negative tendencies increase along the line GB.

Since the flow of time is unidirectional, the soldier in this example cannot back up along the line FG toward G and thereby effect a simultaneous reduction in the strengths of both negative tendencies. By and large, escape is impossible and one might predict that the degree of emotional arousal would become magnified with nearness to the "moment critique," that the level of motivation should increase, and that the frequency and magnitude of oscillations might change. Precisely which of these alternatives would be predicted would depend upon the specific assumptions one makes as to the shapes of the avoidance gradients. Curvilinear gradients would lead to different predictions than linear gradients.

It would also be possible to describe conflicts which are a function of temporal nearness to double approach-avoidance situations. As we have previously noted, however, such types of competition reduce essentially to the avoidance-avoidance type, and a separate analysis of them seems unnecessary.

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A Theory of the Origin of All Conflict and the Mechanism of Psychoanalysis

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The paper on the genealogy of a drive for apparent heterosexual relations indicates the correctness of Dr. Otto Rank's contention that sex, as it appears in analysis, is always a cover for something else. The thing covered appears to be invariably a drive for power the attainment of which is symbolized in sex and other phantasies and later, in many individuals, in sex and other acts of various sorts. This suggests the possibility of agreement with Dr. Alfred Adler in his repeated statement that all the manifestations of mental disease represent a drive for power which is based on feelings of inferiority. Thus far I am in accord with him. I will go further and agree that the feeling of inferiority has its origin in comparative physical weakness. But I do not believe that this weakness need be present in the adult patient.

The inferiority feelings originated in infancy when the individual undoubtedly is weak compared to others in his environment. These stronger people, especially his parents, exhibit much evidence of their desire for power over the infant. He is unable to meet this on a physical basis. He feels inferior to them, as he is. As a reaction against their attempts to dominate him and to compensate for the true state of affairs, he turns first to phantasy. He dreams methods of overcoming them and attaining greater power than theirs.

These he later translates into innumerable acts which to him symbolize conquering them. Negativism is an example.

These two, the phantasies and the acts, are a source of such great satisfaction that even when his power does approximately equal theirs, as a result of his growth, he suffers a great temptation to pretend that he is still the weakling as an excuse to retain his imaginary control over them. This

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temptation is increased by the impossible grandiosity which his dreams have attained by this time. He really cannot actually do the things of which he has dreamed. He fears that reality would be less satisfactory than the dreams.

But, in order to make the symbolic acts of power acceptable to his increasing emotional and intellectual development, he must fool himself regarding the meaning of the acts. He must pretend that they occur in spite of himself. Thus a splitting of ideation is developed.

Emotional conflict arises thus: The child feels the parents' drive for power over him. He retaliates by developing dreams and acts which symbolize obtaining power over his parents. He separates these in his mind from the stream of consciousness. This group of ideas, highly charged with emotion, becomes one side in the conflict. There are often many subdivisions within this.

The other side represents what I believe to be the natural drive to grow which finds satisfaction in creating things which represent the individual. This has no particular regard for power over other people *per se*. This side finds joy in developing methods of playing one's own game in his own way and yet doing it in such a manner that his universe is not disturbed. Environment serves as a friendly opponent.

Acceptance of self in this way would, of course, dissipate the feeling of inferiority which is carried over into adult life as a foundation for the other side of the conflict. The loss of the foundation results in the disappearance of the conflict.

This acceptance of self occurs as the result of successful analysis. This suggests an explanation of the mechanics of analysis as follows: The patient attaches to the analyst in turn the various repressed feelings he has developed toward his parents. Symbolically he attempts to gain power over the analyst and thus carry out the phantasies again. With the successful analyst it does not work. He fails to respond. Ideally he exhibits nothing of the emotional responses which the same devices of the patient elicited from his parents and others, which emotional responses were the symbols of power attained. The patient tries his entire repertoire of tricks, or at least enough to satisfy himself that they will not work. When the last occurs, the job is complete. He gives them up.

This means, in my opinion, that his real desire is to accept himself. But he feels he cannot do it as long as there appears to be no one else in the world who does the same. He must, therefore, before ending the conflict, find one person who will not try to maintain power over him as did his parents. Trying his tricks on the analyst is the logical way to discover whether the analyst will retaliate in kind and endeavor to seize the power over the patient. Through them he pretends to offer the analyst every opportunity to control him. If the analyst does not respond emotionally, the underlying self gains confidence. This is repeated until it asserts itself and ends the conflict.

If this theory as to the origin of conflict is correct, the prevention is also obviously simple in theory. It would require that parents avoid the assumption of an appearance of power which they do not really have. Instead of pretending to be gods they would assume the attitude of the analyst, *i.e.*, that they could not assume responsibility for the acts of the child. Parents would need to recognize the fact that nature, through pleasure and pain, invariably informs the child whether he should repeat an act or not. I believe that the child would act accordingly if the parents did not interfere with his reading of the signals of nature. I am quite sure, too, that children under such circumstances would exhibit far more real affection for their parents and that they would show great respect for the knowledge their parents had gained through greater experience. The rejection of good advice of parents always appears to be based upon the drive to gain power over them which drive should not be present in the ideal circumstances I picture.

I cannot, as yet, see how this ideal can even be approached except through improved emotional adjustment of parents which is not so simple.

It should be understood that these theories are stated as my present working concepts. As such, they appear to be very useful. Only time, experience and the criticism of others will determine their relation to the ultimate truth.

Research in Psychoanalytic Information Theory

KENNETH MARK COLBY

Background of Information Theory

Information theory is a comparatively young discipline which has developed since World War II. It has had its greatest impacts in the past five years although it has not yet penetrated very far into the medical disciplines. Originally the work was begun by communication engineers and mathematicians interested in telegraph, telephone and radio systems. Later contributions came from all sorts of directions. The initial mathematicians were Wiener, Shannon, Von Neumann, Gabor, Mandelbrot and Brillouin. There were physicists such as MacKay in England, philosophers such as Carnap and Bar-Hillel, linguists such as Chomsky, computermen such as Turing, Newell and Simon, the neurophysiologists Ashby, McCulloch and Pitts, Gray-Walter. Early applications of the theory were made by Miller in psychology and Ruesch in psychiatry.

Through all of this work the term *information* remained somewhat vague, loose and difficult to define in unambiguous words. The concept of information is akin to primary undefined notions such as space in mechanics or state in thermodynamics. There was agreement as to what information is not. Information is not matter, it is not energy—it is just information. I will use the crude working definition of information as knowledge in a symbolic or coded form and contrast two aspects of the theory, the quantitative and the qualitative.

It is in the quantitative aspects that mathematicians and statisticians have made their contribution. They are concerned with measures of amounts of information. . . .

Notice that this measure says nothing about what the symbols *mean*. A

Kenneth Mark Colby, "Research in Psychoanalytic Information Theory," American Scientist, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1961), pp. 358-369. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted.

mathematician is interested in the frequency of the symbols, in how many one can get through a wire accurately regardless of what the symbols stand for, regardless of their value or even of their truth status. This branch of the theory is termed mathematical or statistical information theory.

The other aspect of the theory is qualitative. It has to do with directions and paths along which information flows in some system. It is concerned with properties of direction, order of effect, stability. If we say that information flows from A to B, we mean that an action at A selects or determines the form of some action at B [1]. The most familiar example is that of a modern furnace controlled by a thermostat.

Another way of contrasting the quantitative and qualitative aspects is given by Weaver [2]. It is important to emphasize and distinguish these two aspects of information theory since most people are inclined to think only of its statistical aspects. Weaver lists three sorts of problems, (1) technical, (2) semantic, (3) effectiveness. The technical problems concern the correct transmission of signals inevitably accompanied by noise. The semantic problems involve an identity or approximation of the *meaning* of messages as intended by a speaker and as interpreted by a receiver. The effectiveness problems deal with the *influence* of messages on the behavior of receivers. It is in the semantic area, using the concept of meaning, and the effectiveness area, using the concept of influence, that psychoanalytic methods apply.

If you feel that information is difficult to define, fuzzy concept, *meaning* is even worse. Traditionally, it is a term used by poets, artists, metaphysicians who speak of the meaning of life, the meaning of art, even the meaning of meaning. The concept seems nebulous enough to be laughable as a scientific construct. We used to say that the concept of teleology was like a mistress, a lady you live with but would not want to be seen in public with. But nowadays, the concept of teleology has become respectable since we have found a mechanism for it. In dealing with persons we certainly live with *meaning*. Can we propose a mechanism for it? It is empirically inescapable that it is the meaning of spoken utterances which influences persons. It is not the number of letters or number of phonemes in a message that is important in human communication. It is something which we have intuitively called *meaning* which affects receivers of messages.

Psychoanalytic Information Theory

The clinical psychoanalyst finds himself daily and several times a day coupled with a patient in a two-component information processing system in which utterances bearing meaning are exchanged. This clinical situation I will not describe in detail. It is familiar to all of you who read *The New Yorker*. An analyst sits behind a couch and listens to a patient free-associating out loud. From time to time the analyst speaks and then observes what

happens in the patient's subsequent associations. The patient functions as an observer of what comes into conscious awareness and tries to describe it as inclusively as possible.

Earlier I stated that psychoanalytic information theory was concerned with (1) semantic problems, the fit between the meaning of a sent and a received message and (2) effectiveness problems, the influence of meanings on persons. Why call this *psychoanalytic* information theory? It is not very important what we call it at this time as long as we know what it refers to. I term it that, since the method of observation, the guiding theory and the method of operation on the subject matter I will describe are psychoanalytic [3]. The clinical psychoanalytic situation or variations of it give us a way to study systematically the semantic and effectiveness problems since (a) we have a speaker and a receiver of messages meeting under constant conditions which are repeatedly reproduced over long spans of time (b) we know that sometimes what the analyst says has a powerful and observable effect on the receiver.

The Problem of Meaning

What is the meaning of what an analyst says? Let us consider his utterances in this context of the clinical psychoanalytic situation in his relation to a patient. I will suggest we use the following formula, adopted from Leonard [4], to explicate this notoriously slippery concept of meaning.

$$M = I'(s, f(r, p))$$

The meaning, or *meantent*, of an utterance is equivalent to the intent, I ; of a speaker s at time t ; that a receiver r stand in the relation, f , to a proposition, p . I shall use the term *meantent* here to indicate the intentional aspect of the meaning of an utterance. In the term *utterance* I am including both the words and their vocal modifiers but I omit the kinesic or gestural aspects of an utterance since the patient on a couch does not see them.

Suppose the analyst says to a patient, "how old were you when your brother died?" What is the meantent of this utterance to the speaker and to the receiver? What is the degree of correspondence between these two meantents, the encoded one of the speaker and the decoded one of the receiver? The encoded meantent of this question would be, "my intent at this time is that you recall and tell me your age when your brother died." The decoded meantent by the receiver might show a perfect fit or congruence, "his intent at this time is that I recall and tell him my age when my brother died." The receiver then replies to the question, "I was five." He could reply of course in all sorts of ways but he usually follows such an instruction, if he can, as his first response—not always, but with a very high probability. Persons are highly rule-following and, when asked a question by another

person important to them, they usually answer it. One can imagine various degrees of imperfect correspondence between encoded and decoded meantent. Also there very often occurs more than one decoding on the part of receivers. In the above example, the patient's first decoding might grasp the encoded meantent while his second might wonder what other intents the analyst had in mind, such as, "his intent is to indicate that this event if of special importance to me in some as yet unknown way."

In order to clarify the *f* (relation) and *p* (proposition) in the meantent formula, we can compare it to the instruction of a computer program. A program for a computer consists of a sequence of instructions telling the computer what to do. Each single instruction consists of an operation (what is to be done) and an operand (the object of the operation). A computer instruction says "do *a* to *y*" and the next instruction says "do *b* to *w*." Similarly, an utterance on the part of an analyst can be looked upon as a type of instruction requesting a patient to carry out certain operations on certain kinds of data.

The Riddle of Psychotherapy

But why make such a detailed and systematic study of the meantent and influence of utterances? It seems a trivial enough problem. From a basic science standpoint one might like to know more about the programming effects of an ordinary conversation. But there is also a clinically important problem here. We tend to think that in psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic treatment the utterances of a therapist somehow come to have a beneficial effect on the patient. They alter or modify certain psychopathological states. They have been observed to produce enduring changes in a patient's cognitive code, in the way he has organized his past experience to meet a future which is expected to be much like the past.

If this is so, how does it come about? How does the use of a linguistic code by a therapist change a cognitive experiential code? How do spoken inputs with meantent modify a person's neurotic state? What is the mechanism of action and which inputs, if it is the input, accomplish this when it does happen. We well know that this beneficial effect does not always occur and that a specific effect is highly unpredictable.

The basic and still unsolved mystery of all psychotherapy is; how does it work when it does work? how is meantent processed by a receiver to achieve an influence which is ultimately beneficial? . . .

Psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic treatments consist of many variables besides those of a therapist's utterances. If we could only sort out and disentangle from the shotgun prescription what is essential from what is unessential, what is active from what is inert! Conant [6] has remarked that "the usual descriptions of 'the scientific method' are descriptions actually of the very limited procedure by which a person can improve a particular

practical art." Psychotherapy as a practical art is still highly empirical in that it is based on observation of facts with very few satisfactory principles to explain them. If we could reduce this degree of empiricism by finding dependable explanatory principles, we should be able to improve our efforts at relieving neurotic suffering.

A great deal of research, both clinical and experimental, has been carried out in pursuit of this elusive problem. Most of this work has utilized the clinical interview or other variations of a psychotherapeutic situation. We know, for example, that affect statements from a patient can be reinforced by utterances of agreement by the interviewer. Plural nouns can be reinforced by the um-hm utterance. Incidentally, to illustrate the importance of decoded meantent, those subjects who received the um-hm utterance as a "yes" increased their plural nouns while those who received it as a "no" decreased theirs. Rather than review this literature on operant conditioning which is available in review articles [7], I would like to describe some research attempts using the psychoanalytic situation—or, more precisely, experimental variations of it, trying to retain the strong effects of its characteristic inputs while keeping variables under some degree of control.

Experimental Variations of the Psychoanalytic Situation [8]

In one experiment, persons were paid to place themselves in a psychoanalytic setting four times a week for three weeks. They lay on a couch and free-associated out loud, trying to describe everything which came into their minds as inclusively, continuously and unreservedly as possible. At times the experimenter sat silently behind them. The sessions were tape-recorded for repeated study and measurement of the events. This experiment was designed to study effects of the experimenter's silent presence, comparing free-association when he was absent with when he was present. The findings indicated that the frequency of significant persons mentioned in free-association rises when another person is present and the sex of the persons mentioned shifts from an equal distribution between male and female to the sex of the experimenter. This experiment supported clinical impressions that utterances regarding significant other persons are both a relevant and manipulable variable [9].

In another experiment subjects were placed in the same experimental variation of the clinical situation but now certain spoken inputs were made by the experimenter. The guiding hypothesis was that not all spoken inputs from an analyst have the same degree of power or influence. In the course of psychoanalytic treatment an analyst says many things. Here we wanted to test out differential effects of a question, a resemblance correlation and a causal correlation, three types of input commonly found in the clinical situation.

What are the meantents of a question, resemblance correlation and causal

correlation? As illustrated by the previous example of a question, "how old were you when your brother died?" the decoding of the explicit instruction might add other implicit instructions. A resemblance correlation consists of a statement such as, "your girl is like your mother in this respect." The encoded meantent is an instruction to compare (operation) girl and mother (operand). The decoded meantent might be identical or even something such as, "his intent is to tell me I want my girl to be a mother to me." The following is an example of a causal correlation, "you feel uneasy near a man because you fear he will touch you." Such a causal correlation consists of a compound statement linked by the term *because*. The first part of the statement has been recognized by the subject but the second part has been pre-conscious or unrecognized by her. This input carries a meantent instruction of confirm or disconfirm, i.e., to respond by reporting whether the input is accepted as true or rejected as false. The findings were that a causal correlation has a greater immediate effect than a question but only slightly (not statistically significant) greater than a resemblance correlation. This is perhaps due to the surprise value of resemblance and causal correlations in which the resemblance or causal relation has been unrecognized.

Returning to the Wiener-Shannon formula, we recall that it is a mathematical definition of surprise. Can we relate this precise formula to the subjectively experienced surprise reported by experimental subjects when an unrecognized resemblance or causal relation is brought to their attention? Would the degree of surprise indicate the degree of a gain of information? If so, then the least expected utterance from an analyst would contain the most information. This might be true if two additional conditions were involved. Besides being least expected the input must be (a) confirmable (b) valuable in some way. . . .

. . . in clinical discourse, an input to be most effective might have to be unexpected, true and valuable in that it contributes to the solving of a problem such as a neurotic conflict.

In speaking of the meantent of utterances I have thus far emphasized the operation part of the instruction saying little about the operands except to mention that they concern personages in a person's life experience. I do not wish to make this a seminar in the theory of psychoanalytic treatment so I will only say that the chief operands are those non-rational unrecognized beliefs which constitute unconscious fantasies. These fantasies are partially or totally unrecognized and determine inappropriate behavior with personages. Originating mainly in childhood experience, they are maintained at unconscious or pre-conscious levels since they are highly conflictual. Once the operations of the analyst aid in getting the fantasies into awareness, the final operations are carried out by the patient as self-corrective attempts, using his rational beliefs, to change

or modify the influence of nonrational beliefs. The value of an analyst's utterances lies in their capacity to bring unrecognized beliefs into awareness so that eventually self-corrections can be made in them by a patient.

★ ★ ★ ★

Mind and Brain

★ ★ ★ ★

Let us try the familiar analogy—a light is flashing at night from a distant mountain. Upon observing it we ask a physicist to tell us what is happening there. He reports that light of a certain intensity is being emanated intermittently with a certain frequency. If we ask a telegrapher what is happening, he reports that a person is sending a message in Morse code to the effect that the other side of the mountain is on fire. What is the relation between the light and the message, the data of the physicist and of the telegrapher? Does the light cause the message? No, we would not want to assert that since in a causal explanation the events A and B must be different events and A must precede B in time. Here the light and the message are aspects of the same event and they are simultaneous. Does the message cause the light? No, we would not want to assert that either. Light is necessary to send the message, but unless there was some need to send a message the light would not be flashing. Light is being used for a message; they are welded into a unity by the sender who is a person.

If this analogy is useful, it implies that mind and brain represent not a fortunate concomitance but a unity which is queerer and more puzzling than we think, perhaps queerer than we can think. It would appear that the brain is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for human behavior. . . .

. . . As we know from deafferentiation experiments in animals and sensory deprivation experiments in humans, a living brain cannot function adequately without an input and a living human brain cannot function to produce characteristically human behavior without having received coded inputs from other persons. Persons are programmed, controlled and stabilized by experiences with other persons.

. . . With persons a psychoanalyst becomes another person important to them. He can influence them only through exchange of information and messages. He wants to find out how and which messages achieve beneficial results. He is a dualist in the sense that he assumes something in addition to matter or energy. He assumes arrangement, pattern or order. It would be more precise to say that he is a pluralist in that he uses several concepts to organize experience. Even the monist materialist uses concepts of space, time, number and causality. So he too is really a pluralist.

The monist-dualist argument about mind and brain often glides off into

the double-language argument. We have one language for mental properties and one for brain properties for very good reasons. They are justifiable because they are indispensable. An analyst deals with the properties of certain kinds of inputs and outputs from a person. He takes for granted that a person has a brain but considers the brain simply as a transducer (certainly a marvellous one, if we must compliment it here), a living physico-chemical system which can convert signals from one form into another. The neurophysiologist, neuroanatomist and neurochemist take for granted that a living brain has inputs and outputs but concentrate on the properties of the transducer.

* * * *

I realize this position has been and still is unpopular in the medical sciences. In the past, anyone who suggested there might be something in persons in addition to matter and energy was suspected of being a vitalist. My position is that to understand and explain human behavior you need other irreducible concepts in addition to matter and energy. These concepts do not refer to any mysterious vital spirit, or entelechy, or soul. They refer to order, information, and to the programming of persons by other persons. . . . As we learn more about information, about meaning and the selective effect of persons' utterances on other persons we should come to think about human behavior and its influencing in quite a different way from the conventional materialist view medicine has had in the past. To those of you who are humanists this different view of persons as coupled information-processing systems may seem just as outrageous as viewing persons in terms of particles obeying laws of motion. But at least it is a testable outrageous. With it we can formulate answerable questions, come closer to the facts of mental life, and conduct controlled experiments both on persons and on working models designed to simulate persons.

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The Meaning of Conflict

KURT SINGER

II

It is characteristic of our age of twilight that in recent literature on conflict the cases in which a decision is *avoided*, and the pathological implications of such weaknesses, have not only been treated with preference, but that such phenomena have come almost to monopolize the name of conflict. Men of former epochs, if asked to cite a case of conflict, would have named Antigone, facing the choice between her duties to the dead brother and to the king of her city-state, Hercules at the crossroads, St. Antony tempted, Caesar before crossing the Rubicon, or Goethe leaving Friederike at Sesenheim. Today the archetypical cases appear to be a laboratory cat thrown into a quasi-neurotic state; or a badly constituted human member of our late Christian society, unable to master his instinctive impulses otherwise than by repression into a hypothetical unconscious and by the formation of patently neurotic symptoms. It is not less characteristic that this change in emphasis and approach is mainly due to the genius of two psychologists starting from mechanistic philosophies and interested mostly in the elaboration of methods appropriate to inorganic systems.

Pavlov, a great experimenter endeavouring to inaugurate a strictly objective science of animal behaviour on physiological lines, observed that in some cases the animals subjected to his experiments on the conditioning of reflexes developed chronic disturbances of their normal activity, with symptoms surprisingly similar to those of human neuroses. Following his principle of interpreting mental activity in terms of the mechanical reactions of the cerebral cortex to positive or negative stimuli, Pavlov saw in such quasi-neurotic disturbances instances of a collision between antagonistic excitations and inhibitions, and he showed that such conflicts can be artificially produced by linking a stereotyped motor reaction

Kurt Singer, "The Meaning of Conflict," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1949), pp. 145-170. Reprinted by permission of the editor, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in the original.

to a wider range of external or internal signals than those to which unconditioned or instinctive reflexes are adapted. We are not here concerned with the merits and demerits of this mechanistic theory of reflex conditioning nor with the question whether the findings of Pavlov and his pupils could not with much advantage be analysed in terms of motivational behaviour, as some leading psychologists have suggested. But we may be allowed to ask whether those experiments inflicted upon unhappy rats, dogs and cats prove more than the possibility of destroying the mental structure of an animal by demanding of them the solution of problems with which they could not deal effectively; and the diffusion of such disorganisation in such intensities that the whole organism is put in a state of extreme distress and disorder, apparently accompanied by feelings of pain and helplessness; a result that could only surprise such psychologists as were not ready to see the organism react *as a whole* to disturbances strong enough to affect the basic conditions of well-ordered adaptation to typical conditions of survival.

The only inference to be drawn from these experiments, relevant to the interpretation of human behaviour, seems to be the warning that men living on the lowest levels of mental life and thus restricted to reflex-like behaviour will react to novel situations, full of critical implications, with blind despair and passivity; a well-known phenomenon with which the student of revolutions and other crises is very familiar, and on which no new light is shed by skilful ways of torturing animals, except for the suggestion that even human adaptability may have its limitations and that beyond a certain range of sudden innovations no other reaction can be expected but pathological disorder.

It should be noted that Pavlov, in contrast to later writers of various schools, does not regard conflict, defined as a collision of elementary processes, as the only or even as the most important source of quasi-neurotic animal disturbances. In one of the most mature formulations of his theory⁴ he enumerates four typical causes, the other three being: an excess of strength and complexity of stimuli; a straining of the inhibitory processes; and castration. He was probably wise in not attempting to achieve a specious unification of his aetiological scheme by defining conflict in such a loose sense that it provides a formal common denominator. It is not less noteworthy that he found the emergence of his "animal neuroses" to be mainly contingent upon the animal's type of organisation, or in Greek terms, its temperament: phlegmatic, sanguine, choleric or melancholy. Whether or not a conflict or any other cause leads to a lasting deviation from normal behaviour or even disorganisation, is thus seen to depend upon

⁴ *Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes. Vol. II: Conditioned Reflexes and Psychiatry*, tr. by W. Horsley Gantt, with an introduction by the translator, 1941, pp. 73ff.

structural characteristics. Although to the last faithful to his conception of the cortex as a "mosaic", Pavlov recognised the limitations of an atomistic theory, claiming even that his own work allowed for the reconciliation of associationist and Gestalt methodologies. Like Freud in a similar situation, he finally acknowledged that the possibility of healing is strictly limited by typological and structural factors which cannot be modified by the experimenter or the physician.

III

While Pavlov was as a physiologist venturing further and further into the field of animal and later human pathology, Freud began as a specialist in nervous diseases but by the logic of his discoveries was led on to theories and speculations to which he gave the name of meta-psychology and which in fact deal with the metaphysics of organic life. Both analysts combined rare gifts of observation with an audacious propensity to generalise ruthlessly from a comparatively slender basis of established facts. Both built their theories not around a new insight into the essence of man but around a new method. Both seem to have discovered conflict as a source of mental disorganisation almost by accident. Pavlov noticed that what he calls experimental neuroses "were liable to occur in the early stages of our work, since in planning the experiments we had at first not even the slightest idea of the limitations and the natural resistance of the cortex".⁵ Freud, in his *Autobiographical Study* (translated by James Strachey, 1935) has told how a "chance observation" (p. 34) made by his older colleague and friend Breuer in the treatment of a hysterical girl led up to a new way of relieving clouded states of consciousness by inducing the patient "to express in words the affective phantasy by which she was at the moment dominated". It was this observation which urged him on to consider a large number of neurotic disturbances as the outcome of a conflict of tendencies, antagonisms between a wish and a factor making for its repression.

"In all those cases", Freud wrote in his early account of *The Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis*,⁶ "it happened that a wish had been aroused which was in sharp opposition to the other desires of the individual and was not capable of being reconciled with the ethical, aesthetic and personal pretensions of the patient's personality. There had been a short conflict, and the end of this inner struggle was the repression of the idea which presented itself to consciousness at the bearer of the irreconcilable wish. This was, then, repressed from consciousness and forgotten. The incompatibility of the idea in question with the 'ego' of the patient was the motive of the repression, the ethical and other pretensions of the

⁵ *Conditioned Reflexes, An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex*. Transl. by G. V. Anrep, 1927, p. 285.

⁶ Five lectures delivered at Clark University, Worcester, Mass., 1909.

individual were the repressing forces. The presence of the incompatible wish, or the duration of the conflict, had given rise to a high degree of mental pain; this pain was avoided by the repression. This latter process is evidently in such a case a device for the protection of the personality."

In a slightly later article, *Some Character-Types met with in Psycho-analysis* (1915), we read: "For a neurosis to break out there must be a conflict between the libidinal desires of a person and that part of his being which we call his ego, the expression of his instinct of self-preservation which also contains his ideals of his own character. A pathogenic conflict of this kind takes place only when the libido is desirous of pursuing paths and aims which the ego has long overcome and despised, and has henceforth proscribed; and this the libido never does until it is deprived of the possibility of an ideal satisfaction consistent with the ego. Hence privation, frustration of a real satisfaction, is the first condition for the outbreak of a neurosis, although, indeed, it is far from being the only one."

At this stage, then, conflict consists in the clash between two incompatible tendencies organised in different systems of the personality, one aiming at satisfaction, the other at preservation. Neurosis is one form of solving such a conflict.

* * * *

... Freud, even in his latest writings, clings to his first analysis of the core of the repression conflict. In *An Autobiographical Study* (which appeared first in German in Vol. VI of *Die Medizin in Selbstdarstellungen*, Verlag Meiner, and was published in America in 1927, in England first in 1935), by far the most lucid introduction to his thought, he describes the situation leading to repression as follows:

"Let us keep to a simple example, in which a particular impulsion had arisen in the subject's mind but was opposed by other powerful tendencies. We should have expected the mental conflict which now arose to take the following course. The two dynamic quantities—for our present purpose let us call them 'the instinct' and 'the resistance'—would struggle with each other for some time in the fullest light of consciousness, until the instinct was repudiated and the charge of energy withdrawn from it. This would have been the normal solution. In a neurosis, however (*for reasons which are still unknown*), the conflict found a different outcome. The ego drew back, as it were, after the first shock of its conflict with the objectionable impulse; it debarred the impulse from access to consciousness and to direct motor discharge, but at the same time the impulse retained its full charge of energy" (pp. 51-2, *my italics*).

This process of repression is likened to a kind of flight movement of the ego which protects itself against the constant threat of a renewed advance of the enemy by effecting an "anti-cathexis", thus impoverishing itself. The repressed impulse seeks gratification by circuitous routes producing

neurotic symptoms whenever it succeeds in breaking through the ego-defences. It is interesting to see Freud here, as elsewhere, conceiving psychic life under the form of a perennial internal warfare.

It is probably this aspect of his theory which has led to such an extension of the conflict concept that it now includes the aftermath of the primary conflict phenomenon from which his analysis started. This "war-character" of psychic life is for Freud the basic phenomenon of *all* psychic experience and a necessary corollary of his mechanistic conception of psychology: where we have to do with natural energies blindly modifying each other's courses by interfering with their direction the outcome can only be an "all-war" interpretation when such processes are translated into the language of psycho-sociology. Such generalisations have their uses, provided they do not imply the dogma that all conflicts can be explained in terms of their most elementary and mechanical forms. It is worth recording that originally Freud not only reserved the term conflict to the sphere of consciousness, but that his theory leads up to a conscious choice. The therapeutic aim of his analysis is to uncover the repression, replacing it by "acts of judgment which might result either in the acceptance or in the rejection of the formerly repudiated". This means that the conflict, by the method called psycho-analysis, is to be brought to a *decision* in full consciousness, after the manner in which a normal personality acts. Seen from this point of view the repression, far from being the cause of conflict, is but a means of evading its being solved by the only genuine method; i.e., deliberate choice.

The limitations which psycho-analysis encounters in performing this operation are candidly exposed in one of the very last writings of Freud, *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*.¹⁰ The outbreak of a neurosis is here attributed to a combination of two factors: (1) the existence of instincts that prove too strong to be restrained by the ego in question; (2) the persistence of suffering caused by an early endangering experience (trauma) which the immature ego was unable to surmount. Both factors are assumed to be generally coexistent and to reinforce each other in their pathogenic effects. But only when the second factor dominates can psycho-analytic treatment hope to arrive at definite results; and even in this case healing may not occur if the construction of the defence mechanisms, through which the ego had tried to protect itself against attacks from repressed impulses, had led to a lasting "crippling" of the ego. Nor is it yet possible to answer the question whether the struggle between "instinct" and "ego" can be resolved for all time. The task of integrating the instinctual forces in the "synthesis of the ego" can be successfully resolved only in the case of a "normal" ego; it is likely to prove impossible in the case of

¹⁰ *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, October, 1937, Vol. 18, pp. 373-405.

"psychotics", a statement to be further qualified by the reminder that normality is to Freud an "ideal" fiction.

These statements of Freud are not only important by virtue of their contrast to the less critical expectations of lay-brothers and sectarians; they indicate also the points where Freud's (or Pavlov's) work can be co-ordinated with two other major ways of approach of contemporary psychological thought: the structural view of the psyche, inaugurated by Wilhelm Dilthey, and Pierre Janet's effort to express the findings of psychopathology in terms of psychic strength and weakness; two methods of thought which it should not be impossible to combine, for the strength of an organic structure will largely determine the force of actions and reactions. The pre-eminence of the structural factor is shown by Freud's admission that in the case of its constitutional or functional weakness (relative to the strength of the instinctual forces), psycho-analysis is likely to fail and that a similar result is to be expected if an unsuccessful attempt at integration or of avoidance has led to structural or dynamic "impoverishment" of the ego-structure. It would then appear that conflicts are pathogenic only if they occur in a psyche (ego) of insufficient strength of structure, relative to the tasks set by the actual urges coming from non-conscious sources. Only conflicts that find the ego comparatively weak, cowardly, immature, debilitated or unprepared are liable to cause illness and to prolong distress.

In spite of much loud criticism paired with much silent assimilation of his thought, the work of Freud still dominates contemporary psychology in almost every field that can claim a more than technical interest. Most writers on conflict are concerned with the process of clarifying, amplifying, diluting and "secularising" Freudian theories, the philosophical principles and first great formulations of which are due to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but which have become a matter of empirical research and systematic therapy mainly through Freud's tenacious and inventive intellect. We owe to G. C. Jung some profounder interpretations, free from mechanistic limitations, which open a wide range of applications to mental and spiritual phenomena, treated with deeper respect for the dignity of mental life and creation.

In the analysis of the fundamental neurotic conflict situation there is, however, no great difference between Jung and Freud except for Jung's stressing of the significance of actual and recent conflicts in contrast to Freud's tendency to insist on the infantile traumata most accessible to the method discovered, or re-discovered, by him. Jung's approach is less method-centred and instrument-bound than Freud's; it thus gains in elasticity and scope but must forego the questionable advantage of supplying a school with typical recipes; healing becomes again the work of the creative person, the spiritual guide; and concepts which transcend the sphere of empirical research become symbols meaningful in the hands of the

true mystagogue, dangerous in the hands of the sneaking dilettante of Eleusis.

* * * *

IV

In the work of some recent American psychologists the tendency towards unconditional stability seems to be on the increase to rather alarming levels. Professor Guthrie, of Washington University, in his instructive and lively book on *The Psychology of Human Conflicts* (1935), defines conflict as "a tug of war in which two incompatible systems are both active. The rival systems fail to settle their rivalry in the central system, so both systems appear in the muscles" (p. 27). "Such a condition often causes exhaustion, which may prolong and exaggerate the conflict; action may become confused and inefficient. Conflict thus appears as a most important source of exciting emotion defined as a physiological condition in which the general musculature is tense, and where any action occurring is likely to be exaggerated" (p. 28).

While even Freud conceived conflict as something to be resolved in a decision, for Guthrie the phenomenon of conflict is plainly identical with a lack of decision due to a failure of inhibition. The desirable state would be a situation "in which one of two competing action systems suppresses the other through the nervous system" (p. 27). By giving stimuli to muscles and tendons an action can forestall a competing action. In an ideal state such prevention, i.e., elimination of the rival action, could always be achieved, either by the use of stronger stimuli by one action, or by more complete integration, or through assigning priority, i.e., through an established hierarchy of objectives. Conflict occurs when these methods fail.

It is easy to see that such a narrow circumscription of the phenomenon is suggested by the very methodology of the school which Guthrie represents. In order to secure a maximum of scientific reliability the external aspects of every phenomenon are stressed, i.e., those features which can be measured directly or indirectly by methods borrowed from the natural sciences. The deliberations resulting from a conflict cannot be described in physical terms, nor is the struggle between instinctual and reflective impulses capable of objective measurement. The tensions in the muscular system, however, by which an "action system" tends to realise itself *in space*, exhibit electric phenomena which can be recorded by laboratory methods. To define conflict as co-extensive with deadlock of tendencies, or "action-systems", implies therefore the possibility of determining experimentally whether or not conflict occurs. It is thus the existence of a certain method which, here too, suggests the formation of the fundamental concept and the

setting of the problem, whereas a healthy state of research and thought appear to require that methods should be chosen according to the nature of the set of facts that is to be investigated.

There is here, however, more than this motive at work. According to the great French psychiatrist Janet, whom Guthrie follows in many ways, most neurotic conditions are caused by the patient's inability to make a choice (pp. 171, 250). "Conflict" defined as such an inability gains thus from another point of view a central place in the theory of those pathological phenomena whose growth seems to characterise more than any other single trait the psychology of the present age. Conflict is here identified with the very conditions which threaten to make the solution of a genuine conflict impossible. As with Freud the task of the healer is to help the patient to arrive at a decision; most conflict-difficulties would vanish if both the contending action systems were articulate in speech. With Guthrie, however, accent is laid on habit-formation, and the psychologist is mainly concerned with teaching or training the individual to evolve habits that will allow him to adapt his behaviour to an external environment. "All disturbances of mental health are habit maladjustments" (Guthrie, p. 70), and the chief obstacle to a cure is that a breakdown, the effect of indecision and "conflict", like all habit-adjustments, strongly tends to be self-maintaining. According to Guthrie the way in which the deadlock is broken does not concern the psychologist. Speaking of fascist and communist dictatorships he writes: "We may deplore both kinds of régime, but the fact remains that the generation reared under that régime does not deplore it. From the psychologist's point of view the order must be judged first on the basis of its stability" (p. 393). For "habit can be depended upon to adjust us to any cultural order provided that we are given our chance to confront its realities early and provided that it does not change more rapidly than our habits can be led to change. Only for the middle-aged are the times out of joint in this dictatorial age" (p. 393).

The psychologist is here regarded as a kind of engineer who solves by technical means the problem of adapting our life with a minimum of waste and friction to a certain condition of the outer world. If the new equilibrium is reached by a radical impoverishment of our social and mental heritage this epiphenomenon does not concern the psychologist. His main concern is that the machine man is functioning without breakdowns and other accidents. The fact that a science which purports to deal more profoundly and radically with the nature of man than any other empirical discipline is about to define its object in such a way that the character of man and of human life is systematically dehumanised, is a not unimportant symptom of the Spirit of the Age.

Even when the psychologist, from motives issuing from other parts of his personality, is not ready to believe in totalitarian methods of

"conditioning" whole populations according to the wishes of their ruling sets, be they majorities or minorities, his method would just seem to wait for such optimal opportunity of proving its value. Both the political form and the scientific habitus belong to a world where true problems have *ceased to exist*; only technologies can survive in a brave new world which would reserve the name of reality only for processes that can be tested under laboratory conditions.

In these circumstances it cannot surprise us that the conflict situation has come to be exemplified by the perplexities of animals forced by their master to face the choice between two doors marked by mysterious signs one of which will prove to give access to food, the other to electric shocks. The quasi-neurasthenic cat, perplexed by the shape of new signs in which the two original characters seem to have entered a diabolic union, is indeed a suitable symbolic representation of the moderately intelligent "man in the street" unable to choose between socialism and individualism, marriage and companionship, impressionism and expressionism, all of which seem to promise increased happiness and all of which take on traits of their opposites the longer one looks at them; in the meantime he develops neurotic traits, refusing to see that any alternative is a *task* demanding to be resolved by an act of choice, rather than an opportunity for getting confused and excited, and in the end being treated by an expert in psychic conditioning.

V

In Western literature on the psychology of conflict the aspects of suffering and of waste appear to dominate, in accordance with the hedonistic and economic preoccupations of the cultural environment. It is perhaps symptomatic of recent developments in the eastern sphere of Europe that in the work of A. R. Luria, Professor of Psychology at the Academy of Communistic Education in Moscow¹¹ the accent has shifted from pain to disorganisation and from emotion to control. It may be more surprising that the post-revolutionary Russian author claims to be the first to overcome the limitations of what he calls "the preliminary period in the development of psychology" because he was the first to experiment systematically on "the behaviour of the living, concrete personality" while former empirical psychologists have failed in the examination of the individual psychological process. Such regard for the individual in Bolshevik Russia becomes, however, understandable if it is realised that it is under the aspect of complete rationalisation that the concrete living person is here investigated. In former psychology, he holds, "will and intellect were

¹¹ *The Nature of Human Conflicts, or Emotion, Conflict and Will, An Objective Study of Disorganisation and Control of Human Behaviour*. Translated from the Russian and edited by W. Horsley Gantt, with a foreword by Adolf Meyer, Johns Hopkins University, 1932.

considered as separate entities, and the latter was not seen as the key to the development of will”.

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Like Freud's theory, the psychology of Luria is profoundly *paneristic*, if we may form this term from the Greek *eris*, strife, in order to designate a state in which the warring of elements against each other is the prototypical fact. Conflict emerges, with Luria, in every case where one tendency or feeling collides with another; the control of behaviour itself which terminates the affective disturbances is thus due to the introduction of a new conflict between the emergent cortical and the older sub-cortical systems of behavior. In fact, Luria regards this development as a “newly regulated system coming into conflict with the primitive sub-cortical activity and overcoming it, creating all the new forms of organisation” (*The Nature of Human Conflict*, Am. edition. p. 10). Conflict gives thus rise to disorganisation which is overcome by a new conflict, an interpretation which makes the theory fit well into a cosmological framework expressed in the formalised language of dialectics—the new orthodoxy of eastern Europe.

VI

Is it possible to arrive at a definition wide enough to embrace conflicts emerging at every level of organisation and yet sufficiently characteristic (*prägnant*) to make significant statements possible? We are with good reason accustomed to speak of conflicts between individuals, between collective entities, between motives in the individual mind, between elements of a civilisation (e.g., religion and art), between cosmic agencies, God and Devil; we may thus speak of inter-individual, inter-group, inter-cultural, inter-mundane conflicts if the relations of the striving parties to the wholes of which they are a part are to be disregarded; or of intra-group, intra-oecumenical, intra-cultural, intra-cosmic conflicts if strife between the two parties affects strongly the integrating unit. In the first case such implications may be too small to be considered: a State is not in danger of disorganisation if two ordinary citizens occasionally come to blows; it is different if such collisions become chronic or happen to concern two heads of powerful factions. It seems advisable to speak in the first case of *collision*, as also in the case of the “conflicts” of elementary tendencies studied by Luria; and thus to reserve the term conflict for cases in which the collision *threatens the stability and viability of the integrating unit*. This would relieve us from the necessity of speaking of conflict if one restaurant guest is disappointed by another guest's not passing him the salt without further request, or if savages, expecting to see gods arriving on their shores, learn that they are mere mariners and traders.

Only if the integrating unit is affected, actually or potentially, are we seriously concerned. In many cases this unit is not of the organised type of which States and Churches are the outstanding examples. Even in the case of one solitary wanderer slaying another wanderer on a lonely road, the situation concerns members of two groups, or outcasts thereof, and all phases of their fight are coloured by these connections and background relations. (Fight itself is a form of association, however short, rather than the termination of social bonds, as Georg Simmel suggested.)

In all these cases the threat of disorganisation is caused by the tension generated in a sphere (or "field") of interaction through the presence of a hormic incompatibility. Conflict thus appears as a process, or a pattern of a concatenation of processes, resulting from antagonism and tending to resolve it. In a state of deadlock such solutions seem to be out of reach. We are concerned with conflict just because they demand to be terminated by one solution or another, and the striving for such a solution is an essential ingredient of such processes.

Taking up the problem of conflict where it arises in actual life, harassing individuals and groups and making them aware of vital dangers, but enlarging the scope of vision so as to include all analogous antagonisms in the non-human sphere, we may thus define conflict as a *critical tension in an organismic field induced by hormic incompatibilities*. "Critical" here refers to the danger of disruption and disorganisation of an organismic whole, be it an atom, a personality, a trade union, or the cosmos. The definition is wide enough to embrace not only conflicts occurring at all levels of organisation but also all phases of conflict from the first stage of ultimate urges to the last chapter of restored peace and order (the terms tension and field to be defined in accordance with recent bio-psychological work). The definition designates the point where human concern is aroused and where the need of counter-action may be felt and satisfied; it is not implied that conflicts *per se* are good or bad but that they are liable to lead to a crisis of the structure, or configuration, in which they occur. Solutions of conflict situations thus become intelligible as a means of preventing the strain from reaching critical intensity or extension, or of overcoming the danger of disorganisation after that critical mark has been overstepped.

Experimental Studies of Conflict

NEAL E. MILLER, Ph.D.

Conflict is produced by competition between incompatible responses. But not all situations tending to elicit such responses produce that hesitancy, tension, vacillation, or complete blocking, which are ordinarily considered to be conflict behavior. Almost every situation tends to elicit a variety of responses which cannot all be made at once; nevertheless, first one and then another of these responses usually becomes dominant so that behavior rip-
ples smoothly on. What are the factors which make some choices easy and others so difficult?

Some Fundamental Distinctions. Smith and Guthrie (1921, pp. 126-127) have pointed out that some types of competition are much more likely than others to produce a stalemate. They make the useful distinction between states of stable and unstable equilibrium.

In *unstable equilibrium*, as soon as one response gets started it produces effects which either increase its own strength or decrease that of its competitors. Therefore, the first response to get started continues to increase in relative strength and becomes completely dominant. The situation is like that in which a pencil, balanced on a razor-sharp point, starts to fall one way or the other and always topples completely over in that direction. Though incompatible, the responses do not continue to inhibit each other.

In *stable equilibrium* the dynamics are reversed: as soon as any response gets started, it produces effects which either reduce its strength or increase that of its competitors. Thus, unless the first response is very strong to begin with, it is likely to lose its dominance before it is completed. The situation is like that of a ball, suspended on a string, always tending to return to a point of balance. Incompatible responses continue to inhibit each other unless there is a great difference in their relative strengths.

A basic type of situation producing stable equilibrium is one in which

Neal E. Miller, "Experimental Studies of Conflict," Chapter 14, pp. 431-465, in *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, edited by J. McV. Hunt. Copyright 1944, The Ronald Press Company. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in the original.

the subject has strong tendencies both to approach and to avoid the same goal. For example, a timid person, urged to demand a higher salary but fearing to do so, has tendencies both to approach and to avoid the chief's office. This type of situation is likely to produce conflict behavior. It will be referred to as an *approach-avoidance* competition.

A second type of situation likely to produce stable equilibrium, and hence conflict behavior, is one in which the individual is hemmed in by stimuli all of which elicit only avoidance. This is proverbially called being placed between the devil and the deep blue sea, but will be more drably described as an *avoidance-avoidance* competition.

Both of these situations are to be contrasted with a third type, one in which the competition is between tendencies to approach two or more desirable goals. Such situations produce a state of unstable equilibrium unless concealed tendencies to avoid are also involved. As soon as the response of approaching one goal gets started, it becomes completely dominant and choice is easy. The behavior actually observed is in striking contrast to the mythical plight of Buridan's ass starving in conflict between two equally desirable stacks of hay. This type of situation will be referred to as an *approach-approach* competition.

Lewin (1931) has made a penetrating analysis of these three types of conflict situation. His analysis is in terms of spatial diagrams of so-called field forces. The important thing about Lewin's analysis is that it indicates clearly the reasons why the first two types of situation tend to produce stable equilibrium with indecision, while the third leads to unstable equilibrium in which no conflict is expected. Hull (1938) has translated this analysis into the terminology of the goal-gradient and Miller (1937) has elaborated upon it. A considerable body of experimental work has grown out of this analysis. These experiments have started with simple situations involving spatial approach or avoidance and led toward a better understanding of some of the more complicated conflicts met in the clinic.

* * * *

Four Fundamental Principles

A theoretical analysis verified by experimental work indicates that four simple assumptions are fundamental to an understanding of conflicts between tendencies to approach and to avoid:

1. The tendency to approach a goal is stronger the nearer the subject is to it. This will be called the *approach gradient*.
2. The tendency to go away from a place or object avoided is stronger the nearer the subject is to it. This will be called the *avoidance gradient*.
3. The strength of avoidance increases more rapidly with nearness

than does that of approach. In other words, it may be said that the avoidance gradient is *steeper* than the approach gradient.

4. The strength of the tendencies to approach or avoid varies with the strength of the drive upon which they are based. Thus, an increased drive may be said to raise the *height* of the entire gradient.

These assumptions are closely related to the still more basic idea of a *gradient of reinforcement* and to other general principles of learning which have been found useful in explaining a wide range of human behavior.³

* * * *

Contrast between Types of Choice Situations

The results of theoretical analysis verified by experimental evidence may be briefly summarized to bring out more clearly the contrast between different types of situations:

1. *Approach-approach* competition should be resolved quickly without vacillation unless contaminated by latent avoidance.

2. *Avoidance-avoidance* competition should be characterized by compromise resolutions; the individual should escape both evils unless restrained by physical limitations or additional sources of avoidance. When lateral escape is impossible, vacillation and blocking should occur.

3. In *approach-avoidance* competition no barriers will be needed to hold the subject in the conflict situation; the approach tendency will bring him into it. As long as the gradients cross, the subject should remain trapped part way to the goal, unable either to achieve or leave it.

4. In double *approach-avoidance* competition no barriers are needed to hold the subject in the situation. Choices between goals toward which the subject is ambivalent may elicit vacillation and blocking even though the avoidance tendencies are too weak to prevent approach when the subject is confronted with each goal separately. Furthermore, additional avoidance may be aroused by the necessity of renouncing one of the goals in making the choice.

5. In each of the three preceding types of competition, conflict behavior does not appear if the opposing tendencies are so unequal that the gradients do not intersect.

The Relation between Anxiety and Conflict

In the preceding analysis it will be noticed that pure approach-approach choices are easily resolved; conflict only appears when avoid-

³For a simple exposition of the broader scope of learning theory and a more detailed discussion of some of the more general concepts referred to in this chapter, see Miller & Dollard (1941); for a rigorous technical exposition, see Hull (1943).

ance is present. This suggests that whenever unexplained indecision and conflict appear, it may be wise to look for concealed sources of avoidance. Since fear is one of the strongest sources of avoidance, one may often profitably ask: What is feared?

The relationship also works the other way. As has been suggested, the subject who is not physically restrained will soon escape from most fear-producing situations unless he is prevented by conflicts arising from other sources of avoidance keeping him away from the avenues of escape or unsatisfied drives stimulating him to approach goals in the region of the danger. Therefore, when unexplained anxieties persist, one should ask: What conflicting tendencies prevent the subject from escaping the fear-provoking stimuli?^{12,13}

Discrimination Conflict

According to the principle of generalization, after a response has been connected to a given stimulus there is a tendency for similar stimuli to elicit the same response; the more similar the stimuli, the stronger the tendency. Spence (1936) and Gulliksen and Wolffe (1938) have pointed out that this principle affords an explanation of why the discrimination between similar stimuli is more difficult to learn than that between dissimilar ones. When the two stimuli are more similar, the greater tendency for the response attached to each of them to transfer to the other interferes with the learning of differential responses; thus discrimination is more difficult.

Brown (1942b) has collaborated with Miller in further applying the principle of generalization to the analysis of the type of conflict behavior which difficult discriminations should produce.

* * * *

In short, the types of conflict situation produced by difficult discriminations should range on a continuum from pure approach-approach at one extreme, through intermediate degrees of double approach-avoidance, to pure avoidance-avoidance. The kinds of behavior expected to characterize the different points in this continuum are respectively: indiscriminate approach, blocking and vacillation at the choice point, and withdrawal from the choice point.

The behavior should be shifted toward the approach-approach type the more the stimuli being discriminated resemble the one that was originally

¹²In addition to physical limitations and conflict, two other conditions may prevent escape: the anxiety may be conditioned to internal stimuli, such as primary drives over which the subject has no control; or it may be attached to stimuli which are ubiquitous.

¹³Mowrer (1941) has clearly called attention to the relationship between conflict and anxiety, though tending to emphasize a different type of explanation.

positive, and toward avoidance-avoidance the more they resemble the one that was originally negative.

* * * *

Throughout this analysis the conflict was between tendencies to approach or avoid a region in space. In other types of discrimination the reactions may vary in their temporal nearness to a goal or point of reinforcement. It remains for further work to indicate whether or not an analysis in terms of approach and avoidance can be made relevant to all such instances.

In all cases, however, it seems probable that the principle of generalization will be found relevant, and that the discrimination will be more likely to break down the more similar the stimuli. Thus, in psycho-physical investigations, the choice time increases when the stimuli being compared are more similar (Kellogg, 1931).¹⁵ Furthermore, Gibson (1940) has successfully used an analysis in terms of generalization to explain the type of interference commonly called retroactive inhibition. She has shown (1941) that learning a new set of responses causes more blocking and errors in the performance of previously learned habits the more similar the stimuli eliciting the old and new responses.

Other Factors Influencing Type of Equilibrium

As has been shown, gradients in the strength of approach and avoidance tendencies are very important in determining whether the situation will be one of stable or unstable equilibrium. They are not, however, the only factors which can be involved.

Any crucial changes which the responses produce in the stimulus situation will influence the type of equilibrium. If the response creates additional stimulation which facilitates it, unstable equilibrium will be produced. Similar results will be produced if the response removes sources of stimulation supporting its competitors. In most approach-approach situations, starting for one of the goals involves turning toward it and away from its competitor. This increases stimulation from the chosen goal and decreases that from the competitor. Therefore it strengthens the tendency to continue and summates with the effect of the approach gradient in producing easily resolved, unstable equilibrium.

If the response tends to remove its own stimulus, or to produce stimuli

¹⁵If the subject is not limited to two responses, but instructed to make judgments of "equal" also, then there will actually be two discriminations involved: the difference between the stimulus of *A* greater than *B* and that of *A* equal to *B*, and the difference between the latter and *A* less than *B*. As Cartwright (1941b) has shown, the longest choice times will then appear at the points at which each of these discriminations is difficult. His theoretical interpretation of this phenomenon is couched in Lewinian terms (Cartwright, 1941a).

facilitating its competitors, opposite results will be produced. Thus, when the subject is between two sources of avoidance without opportunity for lateral escape, turning away from one evil and toward the other will tend to cause him to turn back even before he has gone far enough for the gradients to have much effect.

These effects are not limited to external stimulation in spatial situations. Proprioceptive stimulation facilitating the response producing it . . . tends to produce unstable equilibrium. On the other hand, stable equilibrium is produced in postural reflexes by the fact that the response of leaning forward stretches the muscles down the rear of the leg and stimulates them to reflex contraction pulling the body back up.

Finally, in addition to changes in the stimulus situation, other factors such as refractory phase, fatigue, and experimental extinction, which weaken whatever response is occurring, tend to produce that vacillation and blocking which is characteristic of conflict situations.

* * * *

Interference of Complex Habits

Sometimes habits interfere with each other at one stage of learning but not at another. When a person is first learning to drive, handling the car and carrying on a conversation interfere with each other; the experienced driver can do both at once. In such cases it seems plausible to assume that the difference in interference at various stages of learning is due to the fact that somewhat different responses are involved. The novice thinks out each move, giving himself cues by rehearsing directions he has received from the instructor. These verbal links are a source of incompatibility between talking to someone else and driving. Since the expert reacts directly without them, he is free to carry on a conversation. . . .

Studies of associative interference and retroactive inhibition (Melton and Irwin, 1940) demonstrate that practicing one habit tends to interfere with other habits involving different responses to similar stimuli. In the early stages of learning the amount of interference produced by a habit increases with practice; eventually, however, a point is reached where it decreases with further practice. Here again the stimulus-response elements involved in the two habits may overlap more in some stages of learning than in others. The way in which the range of response elements may vary during the different stages of learning has been studied by Beritov (1924). He observed that if dogs are trained to lift a paw to a stimulus which precedes shock, the conditioned response during early trials will be relatively generalized, involving movements of almost all parts of the body. As training proceeds the scope of the reaction gradually becomes more limited, until

finally only the specific muscles essential to paw raising are involved. Girden's observations (1938) indicate that this narrowing may be produced by trial and error. Experiments on stimulus generalization (Pavlov, 1927) suggest a trend of initial widening, followed by gradual narrowing. In many habits a greater specificity may be produced by non-reinforcement of responses to irrelevant stimuli. Whenever the range of stimulus and response generalization becomes narrower with thorough practice, fewer different stimuli and responses are involved in an overlearned habit. Thus two such habits are less likely to involve units incompatible with each other.

Sometimes in a complex habit two or more responses are being learned at the same time but at different rates. If one of these facilitates while another interferes with some other habit, it is easy to see that the net effect will be different at different stages in learning.

* * * *

Experiments on dynamogenesis have demonstrated that the way in which complex responses interact may also depend on their relative strengths. A typical experiment, Courts' (1939), tested the influence of requiring the subject to grip a dynamometer upon his performance in learning a list of nonsense syllables. It was found that the response of weakly gripping the dynamometer facilitated performance, while gripping strongly interfered with it. Similar results have been found for responses to sound and other types of distraction.

In some cases the different effects of distractions may partly be explained by physiological factors. For example, if each response is made up of a series of action units whose thresholds vary in a normal distribution, the cumulative curve will form an ogive. If the responses involved in the task which the subject is performing are moderately excited, while the muscles antagonistic to these responses are at a low level of excitation, a slight increase produced by dynamogenesis will be expected to add more to the responses in the task than to their antagonists. A much stronger general increase in excitation may raise the already excited responses involved in the performance of the task to the flat portion of the ogive, where relatively little additional effect can be produced, while the reactions antagonistic to these responses are raised to the steep portions of the ogive, where many additional units are thrown into action so that the net result of further increases will be interference.

In many cases, it seems plausible to assume that psychological factors play an important role. The individual may have learned to compensate for distractions by exerting additional effort. If a weak distraction produces effort appropriate to a stronger one, the net result will be facilitation. If the distraction is strong enough, the conflicting responses which it elicits may override the effects of the habit of exerting additional effort.

Compromise Responses

One kind of compromise response has already been discussed: the lateral escape in a simple spatial situation of avoidance-avoidance conflict. The deduction of this response hinged on the proposition that each of the competing avoidances is composed of a whole hierarchy of habits. Responses of direct withdrawal from each of the stimuli are incompatible and tend to inhibit each other; responses of lateral escape are compatible and tend to summate. Similarly, many nonspatial responses are actually not simple but composed of a large number of subunits. Some of these may be elements which are present as parts of the overt, complete response. Others may be alternative modes of reaction which were originally used in earlier stages of trial-and-error learning, but later lost their dominance to other, more strongly rewarded reactions. Still others may always have been latent tendencies produced by the mechanism of response generalization. It seems reasonable to suppose that when two complex response hierarchies are in conflict, those elements which are incompatible will tend to summate so that the one whose combined strength from both hierarchies is the greatest will tend to appear as a compromise response.

In an attempt to study this problem, Miller (1943) trained subjects to depress both of their hands to one stimulus and to depress the left hand and raise the right to another. Then both stimuli were given simultaneously. The apparatus was designed to measure the latency and force of the movements of each hand. He found that the depression on the left hand (i.e., the part of the patterns which was not incompatible) was stronger than the response of either depressing or raising the right, but that it was much weaker than that occurring on nonconflict trials. This apparent spread of the conflict to the compatible elements of each pattern suggests that each pattern was facilitated or mediated as a whole by a different central cue-producing response. To the extent that these were crucial, conflict between them would be expected to affect the whole pattern as a unit. It should be noted that, according to Freudian theory, displaced and other compromise responses are more likely to occur when the conflict is not on a conscious level—i.e., when it is not mediated by verbal, or other cue-producing responses.

When a newly introduced reaction conflicts with the dominant response but is compatible with some weaker member of the hierarchy which was a part of earlier trial-and-error learning, the resultant reappearance of this response is called regression. Experimental evidence (Mowrer, 1940) indicates that such responses do reappear as compromise resultants of conflict situations.

In addition to the mechanisms just described, it seems likely that the conflict itself, as Miller and Stevenson (1936) have suggested, may produce

strong stimulation. Thus, any response terminating the conflict will be rewarded by a reduction in the strength of this stimulation. In this way the subject may learn responses which take him out of the situation. That conflict can produce strong stimulation tends to be confirmed by Finger's (1941) finding that the force with which rats jump across a gap from the starting platform to the stimulus card is increased when the animals are placed in a discrimination conflict.

Spread of Conflict

Clinicians often observe that one situation seems to be the focus of a conflict which spreads to invade other areas of the patient's life. It has been shown that the generalization of responses from one stimulus to another can induce conflict in situations demanding fine discriminations. It can also induce an apparent spread of conflict. This is illustrated in a simple experiment which the author has performed for a class demonstration.

Hungry albino rats were trained to secure food in three different situations. The first was a flat board, two feet square, surrounded by celluloid walls, and placed on top of a table. In the center of the board was a food cup elevated by a small metal peg. The second was a smooth, long, fairly broad, elevated path leading to a similar food cup, and the third, also leading to a similar food cup, was a relatively short, narrow, elevated strip of quarter-inch wire screen. After the animals had learned to secure food in the three situations, the experimenter placed them on the flat board and just as they were commencing to eat gave them an electric shock through a grid of fine wires wrapped around the board. After a few trials of this kind the animals showed obvious conflict, remaining well away from the food cup, tentatively approaching and then hastily withdrawing, first from one side and then from another.

The animals also showed definite vacillation when tested in the other two situations in which they had never been shocked. The fear generalized on the basis of the similar food cups and created new conflicts in both of these situations. On the first trial the animals approached very near to the food cup, started to stand up to reach for the food, then vacillated back and forth several times and suddenly withdrew. Apparently the generalized fear and withdrawal was quite specific to reaching up toward the cup. On successive trials the conflict behavior appeared at progressively earlier points in the path leading to the cup. The fear and withdrawal originally elicited by the stimulus of standing up and seeing the cup became conditioned to the other cues which had preceded that stimulus. In a description of phobias, Fenichel (1934, pp. 53-54) gives a description of human cases in which a similar enlargement of the area of conflict seems

to be occurring by a process of progressively higher order conditioning.¹⁷

In a more formal experiment Miller (1935) has observed that avoidance, and hence conflict, can generalize from a device in which animals are fed when hungry to a somewhat similar device in which they drink when thirsty. He also observed that anticipatory goal responses can mediate a type of generalization which would ordinarily be described as foresightful. In all of these cases, of course, it is not the conflict itself which spreads; one or more of the competing tendencies responsible for the original conflict generalizes to new situations and creates new conflict there.

The experiments cited have shown that a simple approach situation can be changed to an approach-avoidance conflict by generalized fear. Similar generalization will also be expected to occur in more complex situations originally involving a choice between two goals. If avoidance generalizes to each of the goals, it will be expected to change the situation from an easily resolved approach-approach competition into a double approach-avoidance conflict. Thus, when the fears producing a severe conflict generalize, they tend to make all choices more difficult. Furthermore, it seems possible that the act of making a decision may produce stimuli which are relatively similar in different choice situations, so that after an individual has been severely punished for the immediate consequences of one decision, he may have anxiety about making others. These interpretations contrast with Janet's (1925) view that a severe conflict makes other choices harder by depleting the store of mental energy needed to make decisions.

Studies of experimental neuroses . . . have demonstrated that after an animal's behavior has been seriously disrupted by an attempt to force a discrimination between stimuli that are too similar, responses conditioned to other stimuli may also be disrupted. On the basis of generalization one would expect the habits involving stimuli most similar to those in the original conflict to be the ones most disrupted. But, can the effects of generalization account for all the disturbance observed, or must one also assume some more fundamental upset or damage? No one has yet aimed an experiment at deciding this issue.

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¹⁷From this description it seems probable that a more complicated mechanism may also be at work. Anxiety may be conditioned to the stimuli produced by certain anticipatory goal responses. As the drive motivating these anticipatory responses mounts, they generalize to more and more stimuli in the environment, carrying with them the anxiety which they mediate.

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Conflict, Interference, and Aggression: Computer Simulation of a Social Process

RODNEY M. COE

Introduction

* * * *

Since not every social scientist and probably few humanists view the advent of simulation with an unjaundiced eye, it may be well to begin by stating their position. An article in the *Saturday Review* entitled "Hamlet's Low-Speed Computer" presented an edited conversation between Elting E. Morison, Professor of Industrial History, and Norbert Wiener, Professor of Mathematics, both of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The gist of Morison's comments was that scientists are asking the wrong questions of the right mechanical apparatus. He went on to say there is "... the persistent human temptation to make life more explicable by making it more calculable; to put experience into some logical scheme that, by its order and niceness, will make what happens seem more understandable, analysis more bearable, decision simpler" (*Sat. Rev.*, 1962, p. 46). Although Morison admits that the attempt to work with quantified elements and logical systems is in accord with the aims of science, he feels there is a danger of losing the significance of qualitative elements of affections, feelings, etc. He suggests, therefore, that we not ask problem-solving-type questions, as has been done in the past, but rather "learning"-type questions that will lead to new answers based on past experience and evidence. For example, one should ask the computer to relocate a factory successfully, or find the common elements in revolutions, or devise a program for aiding underdeveloped countries undergoing the impact of modern technology (*Sat. Rev.*, 1962, p. 47).

Professor Wiener's counterargument was that these goals lie in the

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future, but in the near future. . . . The criticism being made here can be summarized as follows: there are two main limitations in simulating human behavior; machine and human. Machine limitations are relatively simple, such as inadequate storage space for symbols (which is being overcome). In addition, however, the machine is an automaton—it can do only exactly as it is told and no more—and this reflects the human limitation. Simulation programs can only be as good as the men who write them. At the present time the complexity of social relationships and the social scientist's knowledge about these relationships places a very real limit on the sophistication of the programs he can write.

Advantages of Computers

If it can be said, however, that we are willing to work toward the goal of highly sophisticated, learning-type programs in small steps, then the many advantages of simulation can be utilized. For example, one of the ever-present problems in social science research is control of variables. Simulation permits the examination of 2-variable or even multivariable relationships with the effects of confounding variables removed. Unfortunately, as in contemporary field research, the effects of only those variables "known" to be related to the variables under consideration can be removed. Similarly, simulation permits rigor and precision through simulated measurement seldom found in field research. This, in turn, allows minute examination of complex relationships, which under ordinary field conditions may not be separable. Furthermore, simulation programs are perfectly reliable in the sense that they produce *exactly* the same results every time. Finally, there is the considerable advantage of speed and accuracy. Simulated programs can produce results in a small fraction of the time required for more conventional field research and except for mechanical malfunctioning, the computer never makes a mistake (unless introduced by the human operator).

Previous Simulation Studies

. . . There are, however, relatively few good examples of simulation in the social sciences. One exception is a recent publication (Orcutt, Greenberger, Korbelt, & Rivlin, 1961) which examines the modern American economy by simulating the consumption patterns of a representative "sample" of the American population. It is interesting to note the effective use of demographic data such as births, deaths, marriages, and geographical *and social* mobility of the simulated population (Greenberger, 1960).

In the field of psychology there are programs for the simulation of human thinking. One program (Newell & Simon, 1959) consists of several integrated programs representing current theory about human thinking. The total program is designed to simulate certain salient characteristics of human

problem-solving and, at the same time, to permit a rigorous and detailed examination of a significant area of human symbolic behavior. Another program, on cognitive organization, has been reported (Gyr, Thatcher, & Allen, 1962).

In sociological research, simulation has been primarily in the area of voting behavior (McPhee & Smith, 1958; Coleman & Waldorf, 1959). A paper by MCPhee and Smith is particularly interesting in light of the criticisms made earlier. The model presented by MCPhee and Smith is indeed a learning-type model. It is composed of three separate processes which represent the "real" processes found in previous field research (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & MCPhee, 1954; Campbell, 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). First, there is the response to external political stimuli represented by certain characteristics such as degree of political interest, current party choice, probability of partisanship, and socioeconomic standing, and these same characteristics of friends, spouse, or parents which modify the interests and voting intentions of the voter. This modification takes place in the second process, that of the mutual influence of individuals within the immediate social environment, that is, the influence of family and friends on each other. Finally, the third process is one of "learning" over time. Learning is not used in the ordinary sense, but rather it is the process by which the habit of partisanship is acquired. With the IBM 650, this program can provide simulated data on a sample of 200 voters who can be stratified in any way the investigator desires. One can only speculate on the usefulness of this program in predicting the outcome of elections when further demographic and social structural parameters are known.

Concept of Aggression

Before reporting the details and results of the simulation program to be presented, it would be appropriate to describe first the conceptualization of aggression used here as well as some assumptions made about the behavior of persons in a dyadic relationship. The concept of aggression used in this paper is based on the investigations of Hamblin (1962a). After a critical review of the literature and considerable experimentation with small groups, he concluded that for the majority of persons, aggression is an operant activity, the goal-response of which is compliance or acquiescence of the agent or agent-surrogate of frustration. . . . For this simulation program, then, aggression is defined as *any activity intentionally designed to injure the agent or agent-surrogate of frustration and result in the acquiescence or compliance of the agent.*

Dyadic Relationship

In describing the interaction that takes place between two persons, here labeled Ego and Alter, it is necessary to first make explicit the

assumptions upon which this description is based (Simmel, 1950; Heider, 1958; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1961). First, it is assumed that Ego and Alter are known to each other before the interaction takes place. . . . Second, it is assumed that Ego and Alter are in a voluntary relationship, that is, either is free to terminate the relationship at any time. Third, they join this relationship for the purpose of achieving the same goal, perceived by each as beneficial to himself. . . . The fourth assumption is that each perceives in himself an inability to achieve the goal through his efforts alone, i.e., cooperation is necessary for the collection of rewards. Fifth, it is assumed that through previous learning, whether from experience or vicariously, each actor has some expectation with respect to outcomes and an appropriate course of action which will lead to the attainment of the goal. Finally, it is assumed that both Ego and Alter are capable of carrying out the mechanical details of their planned course of action.

Same Expectations. With the goal in mind, each actor expresses his opinion on the appropriate course of action for Ego and Alter based on his expectations, i.e., his prediction of successful outcome of their joint venture. If it happens that their expectations are the same, they proceed immediately by comparing their intentions. . . . If they are successful in reaching the goal they will be rewarded (their intentions will be reinforced); if they are unsuccessful they will not be rewarded. There are at least two considerations here. First is the fact that their expectations match. This in itself could be rewarding although it says nothing about the outcome of the behavior. Secondly, if they are successful and are rewarded in proportion to their expectations, their expectations will be reinforced to the extent that in a similar future situation, this course of action will be the first one attempted. If the actual rewards do not equal the expected rewards, they will probably still be rewarded, but less strongly (Hamblin, 1962b). As a result the perceived rewards of this particular goal will probably be revised downward. On the other hand, if they are unsuccessful in attaining the goal, they will not only not be rewarded, but they will, by definition, experience frustration. In this case, negative reinforcement occurs and the probability of the response reoccurring will decrease. . . .

Different Expectations. If, when expressing their expectations for an appropriate course of action, they find their expectations diverge, they will immediately experience frustration from the delay in working toward the goal. In addition they will be faced with the task of aligning their intentions . . . before they can proceed.

This task is similar to a problem-solving process and is thus named in this paper. In order to examine this process, it is necessary first to define what are thought to be the relevant variables involved. *Intention to act* means a mental set or predisposition to exhibit certain behavior.

This set is reached through a conscious assessment of the following variables. *Perceived effectiveness* is the degree to which a particular course of action is deemed efficacious in attaining a goal. This, of course, stems directly from the actors' expectations. *Perceived rewards* refer to what Ego and Alter each expect to receive from attaining the goal. It does not, in this case, refer to what they expect to get from the relationship, *per se*. *Perceived costs* are what the actors expect to contribute to the relationship in order to reach the goal. Finally, *Expectations* are a set of learned beliefs upon which are based an actor's predictions of his role partner's behavior. One way of expressing the relationship in an arbitrary, quasi-mathematical form is

$$\text{Intention to act} = (\text{Effectiveness} + (\text{Rewards} - \text{Costs})) \times \text{Expectations}$$

Frustration. When Ego's intentions are very different from Alter's or vice versa, in effect, when one member has little investment, that member voluntarily capitulates and they can proceed with an attempt at goal attainment without incurring any frustration. If, on the other hand, their intentions are sufficiently the same to delay attainment of the goal, each should experience frustration. Frustration is seen as an additive variable, e.g., a series of frustrating experiences increases the total amount of frustration and a series of successes can decrease it (Hamblin, 1961). In addition, the perceived value of the goal should decrease while the costs to the individual actor should increase. Perhaps, also, when their intentions diverge, each actor "takes a second look" at his approach to reaching the goal, thus decreasing the perceived effectiveness. Taking these modifications into consideration, there will be changes in their intention, that is, each actor's intention can also decrease. Consequently, when they attempt to resolve their differences in intentions, they will be operating under a different set of considerations, e.g., the variables will have changed in value. If the attempt to resolve differences fails, each actor should further experience frustration. If the second or later attempt is successful, however, some of the frustration should be alleviated and there should also be an increase in perceived effectiveness and rewards and a decrease in costs for each actor. It is felt that attempts to solve their differences in intentions will probably continue until (a) they are successful and can proceed toward the goal, (b) the reward-cost differential becomes zero, that is, the costs of the endeavor are perceived as too great in comparison to perceived rewards, or (c) the level of frustration of one or the other of the actors reaches a point where he engages in aggressive behavior. In either (b) or (c) there are several alternatives which could occur.

When the reward-cost differential becomes zero, the actors could decide on a rational basis that "it just isn't worth the effort" and quit trying (in

effect, breaking the relationship for this set of expectations). On the other hand, the more utilitarian aspects of the situation may be ignored, and they may continue to try to solve their differences (with increasing frustration) until the costs become prohibitive or the level of tolerance for frustration is exceeded.

Aggression. Throughout this paper, reference has been made to "level of frustration" and "level of tolerance for frustration." In the tradition of Dollard *et al.* (1939), aggression is seen as a *necessary* consequence of frustration except where there is an expectation of strong punitive sanctions. The latter expectation is excluded from this discussion so that some form of aggression can be anticipated when the individual's tolerance for frustration has been exceeded. Further, it is postulated that the greater the amount of perceived frustration, the greater will be the amount of aggression exhibited. For the purposes of this paper, aggression is divided into three levels, each with different consequences.

Low-level aggression (produced by a low level of frustration) is conceived as mild verbal reprimands, perhaps caustic remarks of one actor towards the other, especially with respect to intentions. . . . In any event, this is not regarded as a serious threat to the relationship. About all that occurs is an increase in frustration (greater for the member whose intentions proved to be unsuccessful) and in costs to both actors. Concomitantly, there should be a decrease in effectiveness and rewards for both actors. Under these conditions, they attempt to re-establish their intentions, that is, they again attempt to resolve their differences.

When frustration has reached a level that produces *moderate aggression* there occur serious verbal assaults such as personal insults, casting aspersions on the capabilities of the other in sensitive areas, perhaps even a mild form of physical abuse or threats of physical abuse or of dissolving the relationship. Under these conditions, the victim of the attack capitulates to the aggressor, that is, his intentions are disregarded. In effect, the victim is saying "okay, okay, we'll do it your way." Now if the aggressor's intentions lead to goal achievement, he will be disproportionately rewarded while the victim's rewards are less since he gets little credit for having reached the goal, even though it was essentially a cooperative effort. In other words, although the victim of the aggression is rewarded, his costs also increase. If, however, the aggressor's intentions do not result in goal attainment, his frustration is increased more than that of the victim and so are the former's costs. In addition, the victim may terminate the relationship since the aggressor "had his chance and failed to produce."

Finally, under conditions of *high aggression*, it is felt that whatever form it takes, the form is severe enough to cause the relationship to break down. In this situation, their respective *expectations* with respect to the

goal disappear, analogous to extinction in learning theory. This is in contrast to *intentions* of the victim becoming inoperative under conditions of moderate aggression. In any event, no further attempt is made by Ego or Alter to resolve their intentions or reach the goal. . . .

Perhaps one last word should be said about reinforcement. This process is seen here as more than just receiving rewards. In addition, costs decrease, since presumably when the situation arises again, there will be less difficulty in establishing coincident expectations. Furthermore, the perceived effectiveness should increase at least to the extent that the actors' original course of action is rewarded by successful goal achievement.

Simulation Program

This program, like some of those noted in the introductory paragraphs, consists of the integration of four separate programs representing certain processes. The four processes are (a) establishment and comparison of expectations; (b) attempted goal achievement; (c) reinforcement; and (d) aggression. . . .

Comparison of Expectations. In comparing expectations, randomly generated numbers are drawn from a matrix of paired expectations. These numerical values are tested for differences. If they are equal, that is, if there is no difference, the program proceeds to computing intentions. If there is a difference, however, each of the actors is frustrated and each time their frustration is increased, the level of frustration is tested against the level of tolerance for frustration. If the former exceeds the latter, the program shifts into the aggression process . . . ; otherwise there is a further test to determine if the reward-cost differential of each actor exceeds the power differential of the other. In this paper, power is a relative variable, i.e., the ability of one actor to influence the other is greater than, the same as, or less than the other. In the program, power is established by randomly generated numbers for each set of expectations. If the power differential is exceeded, aggression occurs; if not, the actors are again frustrated, but proceed with establishing their intentions. If their intentions are very different, this represents the case when one has little invested in this goal and is willing to let the other do what he wishes, i.e., the former capitulates to the latter, but without additional increase in frustration. In this case, the two actors are ready to attempt to achieve the goal. If, however, their intentions are the same, they must strive to align their intentions so that they may proceed with attempts at goal achievement. In this part of the process, perceived effectiveness and rewards are decreased while costs and the level of frustration are increased. New intentions are recomputed and compared. This process continues until either their intentions are sufficiently different for one to capitulate so

they may proceed or until the level of frustration of either actor exceeds his tolerance, in which case aggression occurs.

The Goal-achievement Process. This process of goal achievement consists of computing row and column entries to a matrix of probabilities of success and then comparing that cell value with an independently established value representing the "required" level for success. Table 1 shows this matrix and the criteria for entry. The cell entries represent probabilities of success. . . . Whatever probability value is selected, it is compared with a randomly generated value from zero to nine. If the former equals or exceeds the latter, the actors have successfully achieved their goal and proceed to reinforcement. If they fail, frustration is increased, effectiveness, rewards, and costs are modified, and they proceed to realign their intentions. This continues until they are again ready to attempt goal achievement or until the level of tolerance for frustration is exceeded.

TABLE 1. MATRIX OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT.

<i>Degree of Difference in Intentions</i>	<i>Degree of Difficulty of Problem</i>		
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>
High	9	8	7
Moderate	6	5	4
Low	3	2	1

The Reinforcement Process. The simplest process in this program is reinforcement. This consists merely of increasing perceived effectiveness and rewards by the amount by which the probability of goal achievement exceeds the randomly generated value representing the required level necessary for success. Costs are decreased by this same amount. In addition, the amount of frustration is also decreased.

The Aggression Process. Finally, the aggression process is designed to approximate the results of the few research reports noted above. For example, when the program is shifted to the aggression process (which can occur in several ways), the level of frustration of each actor is tested to determine whether low, moderate, or high aggression will occur. Low aggression consists of a modification of effectiveness, rewards, and costs for both actors and a consequent re-establishment of intentions, i.e., the program shifts back out of the aggression process. If moderate aggression occurs (approximately 80 per cent of the time, depending on the level of tolerance) the victim of the aggressive act capitulates (with an increase in frustration), i.e., his intentions become zero. The program then shifts to the attempts at goal attainment. Finally, under conditions of high aggression, the expectations of both actors become zero and the program

stops. It should be noted again that these processes are integrated into the over-all program and it is possible to shift from one to another depending on the values of the variables.

Results of Trial Runs

In this program, the variables which can be controlled by the researcher are perceived effectiveness, rewards, costs, required level of successful goal attainment, and levels of tolerance for frustration. The "intervening" variable is the level or type of aggression that occurs, while the dependent variable is the resolution of intentions, e.g., which participant capitulates and for what reason. In this investigation, the trial runs were conducted under conditions of high, moderate, and low levels of various combinations of the independent variables.

Each run consists of fifteen trials or fifteen sets of paired expectations. Although the independent variables are modified as the program proceeds, they are restored to their original assigned values before interacting with the next set of paired expectations. As a result, the fifteen trials can be compared with each other and the summary results of one run can be compared with the results of another run which had different values for the independent variable.

High Tolerance for Frustration

When the tolerance for frustration was high for both members, as might be expected, very little aggression occurred, regardless of the values of effectiveness. The only recorded instances of aggression were low, and probably occurred when an attempt at goal achievement failed, requiring the actors to realign their intentions with modified variables. Apparently, however, the second attempts at goal achievement were always successful since no further aggression occurred. It is interesting to note that of the fifteen trials in the first run, only eight were resolved in favor of the more powerful actor, and in fact, resolution was made on the basis of stronger expectations, since effectiveness, rewards, and costs were the same for both actors. Even though this would be expected because of the nature of the quasimathematical relationship, it is also theoretically feasible. That is, if both actors have a high tolerance for frustration, both have the same degree of perceived effectiveness, and the reward-cost differential is the same, it seems reasonable that the person who has the lowest expectations for outcomes of successful goal achievement would be the one who capitulates, i.e., gives up his intentions

Low Tolerance for Frustration

When the tolerance for frustration of both participants was low, it was found that in the first five trials the amount of moderate aggression

accounted for 85 per cent of all the acts of aggression. After ten trials this had dropped to 78 per cent and after all fifteen trials of this run, the percentage was only 66 per cent. It should be recalled that field research data showed that about 80 per cent of the cases of aggression were deliberate attempts to produce conformity with the aggressor's expectations, that is, compliance-seeking behavior. On this run, the occurrence of moderate aggression (conceived as compliance-seeking behavior) is close to the findings of real data. The deviations noted in the last five trials are due primarily to the high level of frustration which had been accumulating over the whole run. As a result, there were several instances of high-level aggression occurring which, of course, would dissolve the relationship. In addition, it was found that 80 per cent of the time, intentions were resolved in favor of the more powerful actor, although the amount of difference in power did not matter appreciably. In two trials, however, the occurrence of moderate aggression on the part of the less powerful actor was enough to make the more powerful one capitulate. Furthermore, the actors successfully achieved their goal in the first seven trials, but failed thereafter. This resulted from an increase in high aggression which broke up the relationship before a new attempt on the goal could be made. The increasing frequency of high aggression, of course, was due to the increased frustration which had accumulated over the trials.

A second run was conducted, again under conditions of low tolerance for frustration for both members, but this time with a supposedly ideal condition of high perceived rewards and low costs. The results were somewhat surprising inasmuch as only on the first trial did the actors reach their goal successfully after Alter had capitulated to Ego who had slightly higher expectations and power. Even so, it required one act of low aggression and three acts of moderate aggression before Alter capitulated. On the second trial, there was one act of moderate aggression on the part of Ego, but after Alter capitulated, they failed to reach the goal, Alter committed an act of high aggression against Ego, and the relationship dissolved. For the remaining thirteen trials, the level of frustration rose so rapidly that only one act of high aggression was enough to break the relationship. That aggression occurred early in the relationship was shown by the fact that the actors broke off the interaction before either had time to capitulate (their intentions were identical in each case), and no attempt was made to reach a goal (in each trial following the second, the probability of success and the required level were the same as the previous trial, indicating that new values had not been entered into those storage areas).

These results, while somewhat minimal, are still theoretically reasonable. It seems possible that when both actors perceive high rewards but low costs in achieving a certain goal, that each would tend to maintain his position longer, that is, argue for his point of view. The result of this inability to

align their intentions is increased frustration. Since a low tolerance for frustration was characteristic of both actors, one would expect that aggression would probably occur rather early in the relationship. As indicated above, the level of aggression that occurred was high, thus breaking up the relationship before the actors had a chance to agree on their intentions and attempt to achieve their goal. Furthermore, while power is an important variable, it is not always the predominant one. When the more powerful actor has either low expectations with respect to some goal or low perceived effectiveness, he may capitulate early in the relationship (without increasing his frustration) because he "doesn't care one way or the other," that is, he has a low investment in this particular relationship. In addition to this case, however, it was noted from the results that the less powerful actor may use a moderate level of aggression on the other actor even when their respective expectations and instrumentalities are high or at least equal. This occurs when the less powerful actor perceives the rewards as sufficiently high enough to risk punitive sanctions on the part of the more powerful actor. These results, of course, are also consistent with the theoretical framework.

High and Low Tolerance for Frustration

In the last series of runs, the two actors had different levels of tolerance for frustration; one was high, the other low. The trials from these runs show results similar to those indicated above. For example, in the six trials when the goal attempts were successful, intentions were resolved in favor of the less powerful actor five times, always after at least one instance of moderate aggression. Interestingly enough, in two of these trials, the aggression was committed by the actor with the higher tolerance for frustration. This, too, has some theoretical relevance. This is a situation where the less powerful individual (with the higher tolerance for frustration) has the higher expectations and perceived effectiveness. Being unable to implement his intentions because he lacks the necessary power, he is continually frustrated until the point is reached where frustration exceeds tolerance and aggression occurs. In the nine trials when the goal was not successfully achieved, the less powerful actor five times committed aggression which resolved the intentions in his favor. Being unsuccessful, however, precipitated an act of high-level aggression on the part of the more powerful actor, thus severing the relationship.

A final series of trials, again under conditions of low tolerance for frustration for one actor and high for the other, but with high rewards and costs, showed that the goal was successfully achieved only once, on the first trial. In this case, intentions were resolved in favor of the less powerful actor on the basis of one act of moderate aggression. The less powerful actor also had the lower tolerance for frustration. In all the remaining trials, the actors

were unable to make any attempt on the goal because they could not resolve their intentions before an act of high-level aggression occurred to break up the relationship.

In summary, it can be said that these trials, conducted under varying levels of tolerance for frustration, effectiveness, rewards, and costs, yield results that can be given a theoretical interpretation. It has also been noted that these results approximate the data collected in field studies. More important, however, this study points to the considerable efficacy of tolerance for frustration, a variable which has received little experimental investigation. There is also an indication that the relative degree of power is less important than other variables in determining the outcome of interaction. In other words, this simulator program not only can reproduce results from field research, but also points to gaps in our knowledge which will require further research.

Conclusion

It is appropriate at this point to recall the criticism of simulation made by Professor Morison that what is needed is a type of program which would respond to "learning" types of questions with answers based on past experience and evidence. It was noted that Professor Wiener's reply was to the effect that this development is in the immediate future, but that at the present time, arbitrary controls are still needed in operating simulator programs.

It is felt that the simulator reported in this paper, while somewhat short of Morison's expectations, at least is a step in the right direction. It has demonstrated that programs can be written to reproduce results from field research and further, that based on these results, various situations which yield theoretically relevant data can be examined in detail. This program, then, appears to have two main advantages: first, it permits utilization of the favorable characteristics of high-speed computers, that is, speed, accuracy, control of variables, etc. Second, and most important, it permits the researcher to test hypotheses deduced from theory.

It is clear that much remains to be done. As experimentation progresses and experience accumulates, it should be possible to design and carry out highly sophisticated simulator programs. It is equally clear that simulation is not supposed to *replace* field research, but to *supplement* it. The increased usefulness of simulators will depend upon technological improvements in development of computers, but also, especially for social scientists, upon the increasing accuracy and scope of social research in the field. In sum, computer simulation is a relatively new research tool. Like questionnaires, psychometric examinations, etc., it has certain limitations, but also great potential for the advancement of knowledge in social science.

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CHAPTER 6 • Behavior under Stress

Mazeway Disintegration: The Individual's Perception of Socio-Cultural Disorganization

ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE

The Disaster Syndrome

It is often reported after major physical disasters that many survivors in the impact area are initially found by rescue workers in a state variously described or denoted by such words as "shock," "dazed," "stupor," "apathy," "stunned," "numbed." In such persons, awareness of the extent and severity of damage to self, family, and community, is limited. Efforts at first aid, rescue, and evacuation are often perfunctory and inadequate, and sometimes virtually absent, especially in regard to helping non-relatives and the community at large. Some people simply sit or stand motionless, or wander aimlessly, or "putter about" at inconsequential tasks. Expressions of strong emotion and feeling (pain, grief, fear, anger) are missing or sporadic and inadequate. This shock may persist for minutes or hours.

Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Mazeway Disintegration: The Individual's Perception of Socio-Cultural Disorganization," Human Organization, published by the Society for Applied Anthropology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer, 1957), pp. 23-27. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted.

As organized rescue workers from the filter area and the community begin to arrive in quantity, the pattern changes. Uninjured survivors emerge somewhat from the cocoon of apathy and take some part in extrication, fire fighting, first aid, evacuation, and communication. Injured persons, however, tend to remain longer in the dazed state. Both groups are relatively docile and obedient, are extremely anxious to hear that others have survived too, are grateful for help and for gestures of concern, and are anxious that others be cared for first. This docile state may persist for hours or days.

After a day or two, both injured and uninjured survivors often show a mild (and perhaps rather superficial) euphoria, marked by thankfulness for survival and by intense public spirit and eagerness to work for the community's welfare; people give up old grudges, ignore barriers of social distance, and merge themselves in a kind of neighborhood revival or revitalization movement. Structures symbolic of community solidarity, such as churches, are cleaned up and put into temporary repair; neighbors help one another in rehabilitation. At the same time, however, considerable complaint is apt to be directed at mass care organizations and at relief and rehabilitation services furnished by persons outside the impact area; the mass care organizations are accused of being cold and indifferent to personal feelings; the necessity of applying for aid is sometimes resented; charges of looting, profiteering, and general inefficiency are voiced. Furthermore, many persons suffer from feelings of depression, from sleeplessness, nightmares, and general "edginess."

These three stages of behavioral reaction to disaster I have called the "disaster syndrome" because they are reported so widely and because they seem to have a coherence of process. The shock state can be called a regression to an extremely disorganized, pseudo-infantile level of adaptive behavior, and the other two stages can be described as a restitution of more adult modalities of action, with a notable emphasis on the individual's identification with the community and its way of life. We do not, however, have adequate statistics on how many persons in any particular disaster could be described as showing any one phase of this syndrome; and because the interviews on which I depend were taken before this syndrome had been delineated as an hypothesized type of prolonged reaction, no single case history in my files shows it clearly in all its stages, except perhaps for one case. Nevertheless, I am confident that inquiry of disaster survivors, pointed to the syndrome's evolution over a two-week period, would show it occurring in full form in many individual instances.¹

¹See Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of Individual and Community Behavior in an Extreme Situation* (Washington: National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, Publication 392, Disaster Study No. 3, 1956).

A Theory of Cultural Identification

It is the thesis of this paper that in major physical disasters many persons will suffer "shock" and the subsequent characteristics of the disaster syndrome, partly or wholly as a result of the perception that *a part of their culture is ineffective or has been rendered inoperative, and that the person reacts (unrealistically it may be) to this perception as if a beloved object were dead.* All survivors perceive cultural damage. Many survivors perceive also that they themselves, family, friends, and personal property have been injured, and these perceptions too call for the reactive behavior, so that the etiology in many individual cases will include not merely cultural loss, but also loss of beloved persons and valued property. But for a great many persons, I believe, the emotional impact of the perception of cultural damage is as "shocking" as, and for some is more shocking than, private loss; and conversely, many persons will suffer any degree of private loss, even death of self and family, before permitting loss of identification with their culture. . . . Human beings can be described as organisms whose peculiarity it is to construct and modify, slowly and laboriously, over centuries, very complicated sets of mazes for themselves and their posterity, with elaborate inter-connecting doors and pathways; and also to construct complex rules for interaction and even mutual aid in operating the maze, as "the way" to satisfy their multifarious wants. . . . In man, certainly, various positions in the maze and various instrumental responses to these positions, which have no biological satisfiers in them become satisfying, and men will (provided certain minimal biologic wants do not become critical) work very hard merely to be able to sit (literally and metaphorically) in a biologically arid corner of the maze. Man, in other words, falls in love with his maze and his way of running it because they are associated with every satisfaction he derives from life, and, indeed, with the maintenance of life itself. The maze-way is "loved" whereas the "rewards" are merely enjoyed.

* * * *

To summarize, then, this formulation, which combines elements of culture, learning, and psychoanalytic theory: it is proposed that we regard physical objects external to the individual's perceptive apparatus, including natural objects, elements of material culture, and human bodies, as constituting a "maze" which presents the individual with cues. This maze is for the adult infinitely more complex than the mazes run by laboratory rats, and it has various characteristics, such as mobility, changeability, and inconsistencies; furthermore, it can be mapped as if it were a group of a great many component, but also elaborate, mazes. The infant's "maze" is much more limited, centering in the mother, whom the child learns *about*

before he learns *from*. As the maze elaborates for the child, it retains for him nevertheless the affective significance of the mother, and of other early maze objects, of which it is in a sense merely an extension. The individual's behavior in running the maze in order to obtain satisfactions is the learning of a *way* (systems of action-sequences), and to the extent that the way of using the same maze is similar among many persons, the anthropologist can denote the modalities of individual ways as elements of culture or national character. These ways, furthermore, can in man be abstracted, analyzed, verbally described, and reified, and be presented as cues by persons, by writing, and so forth. The perception of the maze itself, or parts of it, and of the way as a reified abstraction, constantly maintains in the individual, to a greater or lesser degree, a sort of conditioned satisfaction, which derives both from developmental associations and from current reinforcements.

Now the individual's way is a system of behavior which articulates very neatly, and preponderantly but not perfectly to his satisfaction, with the cues presented by the maze about him. His *way* and the maze itself, in other words, are complementary functions, even though his way may not be the same as that of his neighbor. When the individual has reified his way, furthermore, he considers that it is part of the maze itself (and hence shared by others), and responds to it as if it were an external cue, so that for him maze and way are identified. In this sense, therefore, I am using the phrase, "the individual's identification with his culture."

The Disruption of Cultural Identification

The identification of the individual with his culture can be disrupted under various conditions. One condition of disruption is sudden physical destruction of the maze itself, or of a part of it. Another condition of disruption is the introduction of systematic changes in the maze by substitution rather than destruction, such that the individual is no longer able to employ his way in obtaining rewards. In the former case, the individual experiences a shock comparable to sudden and drastic bereavement, which temporarily interferes with his capacity to act with insight or to carry out such elements of his way as the remaining portions of the maze permit. His reactive depression is apparently disproportionate to the "real" situation: in other words, in a maze large enough for most visible (from a given point) portions to be destroyed or damaged without the whole maze actually being destroyed the destruction of part results in a reaction as if the whole maze were gone. The impact, furthermore, precipitates a regression to a very early, infantile, and primitive way, and the restitution of more mature learned ways should come about as he discovers, to his great joy that the maze has not in fact been entirely destroyed after all.

In the case of the individual faced by a changing maze, there is first of all a considerable reluctance ("drag") to changing the old way, because of

its symbolic satisfying value. As the old way, however, leads to less and less reward, and as frustrations and disappointments accumulate, there are set in motion various regressive tendencies, which conflict with the established way and are inappropriate to the existing maze. The individual can act to reduce his discomfort by several means: by learning a new way to derive satisfaction from the new maze; by encapsulating the regressive strivings in a fantasy system; and by reifying to himself his current way and maze, regarding a major portion of it as dead, and selecting (from either traditional or foreign regions, or both) part of the existing maze-way as vital, meanwhile mourning the abandoned (or abandoning) portion.

A major qualification, however, must be made here. If the individual has learned a way to use destroyed or rapidly changing mazes as a special type of maze itself, with its own system of cues and rewards, he is able to act in maze-destruction or maze-way-inconsistency situations with less shock, in the one case, and less tendency to regress, in the other, than the untrained individual.³

Implications for Disaster Control

Assuming for the moment that the foregoing considerations are valid, certain corollaries can be deduced for application to disaster control planning. An obvious one, and one intuitively recognized in practice, is the value of indoctrination and training in reducing emotional shock, and in increasing efficiency in the carrying out of verbally defined tasks. The person who is trained so as to view maze-destruction situations simply as mazes of a different kind, which present recognizable cues which he has a way of running, and which lead to rewards of one sort or another, particularly rewards of social approval and esteem, ought to experience far less shock than the person who is not so trained. Training of combat troops by exposing them to "infiltration courses," and the like, and the expectation of behavioral differences between "green" and "veteran" units, illustrate this principle. . . . Two further corollaries should follow: If the *specific* cues in a "real" disaster are to evoke the response called for, the training process must be carefully designed so that the individual can generalize without difficulty; and the nature of the reward should be such that it adequately replaces the loss anticipated from the sight of destruction. In regard to the latter point, it should theoretically be more effective to couch disaster training suggestions (such as Civil Defense popular instructions) in terms of "you ought to do thus and so for your community as well as yourself" than in terms of "take it or leave it: if you want to survive personally, send 25 cents for booklet X." In the former case, it is being suggested that the

³For a later elaboration of the mazeway concept, see A. F. C. Wallace, "Mazeway Resynthesis," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Ser. 2, 18 (1956): 626-638.

individual *can* lose his maze-way, but that if he does thus and so, no matter what happens, "somebody" will be appreciative. In the latter case, there is no mention of the danger of loss of the maze-way, and the issue is reduced to the level of accident safety warnings.

It would seem also reasonable to infer from the theoretical outline that therapy for "cases" of disaster syndrome should be based on "tender loving care," on reassurances that the maze-way is not in fact completely destroyed, on demonstration that it (or a visible substitute) does still work, and on permitting people as much as is possible to remain in the area to repair and to "make-do" with the remains. While evacuation may be dictated by other needs, it would seem that in itself evacuation is a kind of second disaster which intensifies the disruption of the individual's identifications. Furthermore, evacuation interferes with the survivor's learning to regard the destruction situation as a runnable maze. Evacuees should, other things being equal, display more severe and more prolonged symptoms of emotional trauma than non-evacuees.

Still further, the sooner the isolation period is ended, the shorter should be the duration of the disaster syndrome, since the appearance of rescue and relief workers is in itself a visible evidence of part of the maze-way still being in existence, and of the love and concern of surviving persons.

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Problems of Perception in Extreme Situations

F. P. KILPATRICK

Perception is that complex process whereby we transform the code of our nervous impulses into the world as we know it; the world of space, objects, sounds, colors, people and of dangers and disasters. Each of us acts in terms of the world he thus creates. Consequently, knowledge of the perceptual process should be useful in our effort to understand human behavior in disaster.

A review of the disaster literature indicates that this fact is not always fully appreciated. Disaster victims are often described as "notoriously inaccurate reporters," or as "giving completely different accounts of the same event." Then the effort is made to piece together all the "fragmentary" accounts into the story of "what actually happened." Once a composite reconstruction of events is obtained, the researcher then attempts to relate large categories of behavior found with certain frequencies in the population to the "objectively determined" series of events. This is a legitimate approach for many purposes, but from the point of view of the student of perception, the key to understanding why people act as they do is in understanding what they are reacting to. Why is one man calm and collected, while another is stunned and bewildered? Why do some people flee while others remain? Perhaps part of the answer lies in age differences, sex differences, personality differences or other such factors. But an equally good possibility is that the answer lies mostly in the individual's unique perception of the situation from his own unique point of view as it relates to his past experience, his purposes, and his experientially based estimate of his own capacities to act effectively.

A complex predictive equation is involved in any instance of behavior.

F. P. Kilpatrick, "Problems of Perception in Extreme Situations," *Human Organization*, published by the Society for Applied Anthropology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer, 1957), pp. 20-22. Reprinted by permission.

Included in this equation is this person's assessment of "what is out there," and the assessment of "what is out there" depends in large degree on where the person is, what he is attending to, and his experience in decoding patterns of nervous impulses of that kind. Included also in this equation is the person's perception of himself; including among other things, his purposes, his ability to act in certain ways, and his relationships with others. Somehow these perceived attributes of "other" and "self" are brought into relationship in the perceptual process. Emerging from this relational process is a prognosis of "best bet," unique for the individual, as to the probable consequences of the total situation as perceived. If I have one suggestion to make which I feel sure would be concurred in by most students of perception, it is that more study of the factors involved in this complex relational process of perception be included in future disaster research.

Such a highly individualistic approach to human behavior does not rule out the possibility of generalization. Our perceptual research at Princeton has suggested several general principles which seem highly relevant. . . . A note of caution is needed here. Our perceptual research has not been concerned specifically with disaster or other extreme situations. Consequently the principles which follow are, for the most part, extrapolated from basic laboratory research and should be regarded as hypotheses.

1) *There is an initial tendency to establish a dominant percept and assimilate all happenings to it. Usually, but not always, this dominant percept is a familiar one.*

This tendency emerges very clearly in a great many of the Ames perceptual illusions.¹ It can be illustrated by referring to one of the small distorted rooms. This is a room about 4' by 4' in which the floor slopes down sharply to the left, the ceiling slopes sharply up to the left, the back wall recedes from right to left and the windows are trapezoidal in shape. However when observed from the proper point with one eye the room is seen as normal; that is, with level floor and ceiling, back wall at right angles to the line of sight and the windows rectangular. Once this basic percept of normality is established all kinds of events will be assimilated to it in spite of the fact that many of them become ludicrous and logically impossible. Marbles will be perceived as rolling up hill; another person's face will be seen as radically different in size when viewed in the right window as compared to being viewed in the left window. Only after a considerable period of being exposed to such incompatible evidence does the viewer's dominant percept begin to alter, and the rate with which such alteration occurs is a highly individual matter. Some people even hang on to the dominant percept so strongly that available incompatible evidence is suppressed, and they fail to perceive it.

It was this tendency to assimilate all happenings to the familiar which was

¹William H. Ittelson, *The Ames Demonstrations in Perception*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952.

noted by the NORC investigators in several of their studies, including one of a destructive tornado. It was reported that many of the victims interpreted the roar of the approaching tornado as the sound of a train.² Assimilation to a dominant, but rather bizarre, percept was described in Cantril's analysis of the effects of *The Invasion from Mars* broadcast. Among people who attempted, by looking outdoors to check the reality of the Martian invasion, many interpreted an empty street as "everybody has fled," while others a street full of traffic was interpreted as "everybody is fleeing."³

The practical implications of this assimilative tendency for problems of disaster are many. For example, it suggests that, during an emergency, presenting just the facts or the "truth" is simply not enough. The facts must also be interpreted. Facts alone, or truth alone, are apt to be assimilated by the hearers to their dominant percept; and thus may actually facilitate the very actions which the communicator desires to prevent or modify.

2) *Actions tend to be appropriate to the situation as perceived, even though they may seem illogical or inappropriate to others.*

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A quotation from the NORC disaster studies is much in point here. The authors say, "Our data indicate that the immediate problem in a disaster situation is neither uncontrolled behavior nor intense emotional reaction, but deficiencies of coordination and organization, complicated by people acting upon individual (and, often conflicting) definitions of the situation. It is this aspect of disaster behavior which is frequently identified erroneously as "panic."⁴

3) *Under stress there is a tendency to isolate oneself from immediate on-going events, and hold on to a familiar stable perceptual organization. Concurrent with this perceptual restriction, there is a tendency to act in familiar ways that have proved reliable in the past, even though they are no longer appropriate to the immediate occasion.*

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4) *In the absence of reliable guides from past experience for perceiving or acting, suggestibility is high.*

There is little point in a lengthy discussion of this generalization as it is a familiar one to students of social psychology, first clearly formulated in Cantril's *Psychology of Social Movements*.⁶ Much of our experimental work in which we systematically place perceptual cues in conflict has not only

²Charles E. Fritz and Eli S. Marks, "The NORC Studies of Human Behavior in Disaster," *Journal of Social Issues*, 1954, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 26-41.

³Hadley, Cantril, *The Invasion from Mars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

⁴Fritz, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁶Hadley, Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*. New York: Wiley, 1941.

demonstrated its validity, but has added some qualifications of interest. During the period of perceptual conflict, cues which would otherwise be extraneous are often seized upon and utilized as a means of resolving the conflict and ordinarily the conflict will not be tolerated for long if there is any means of avoiding it. As noted before, once a dominant percept and action pattern is established, there is a tendency to suppress inharmonious cues and to enhance harmonious cues. One practical implication of these findings is that if suggestions in an emergency are to reach the audience when it is in a state of maximum receptivity, timing is of great importance. The suggestions must be given early in the period of perceptual conflict.

5) *Prolonged subjection to conflicting perceptual cues induces emotional depression, followed by elation when the conflict is resolved.*

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The leads in such studies of understanding the emotional reactions of disaster victims are numerous. Also they suggest that, in an emergency, immediate structuring of the situation is important in avoiding psychological after effects. Perhaps this is true even if the structure which must be given to the situation is unpleasant.

6) *The most effective way of accomplishing perceptual reorganization is through action by the perceiver.*

Although this point emerges quite clearly from a number of our experiments and from the experiencing of a number of our perceptual demonstrations, it can be illustrated quite well by referring again to the small monocular distorted room previously described. We have found that if a naive individual is brought to such a room and observes it from the proper point of view, he can sit and look at the static configuration for an indefinite length of time without any perceptual reorganization occurring. However, it is possible for him, by other means, to learn to see the room more and more in its true distorted shape.

Such perceptual learning occurs, but only very slowly, if the individual merely sits passively and observes while events, such as the bouncing of a ball in the room or the movements of a wand, yield him clues as to the inappropriateness of his original percept. Perceptual learning occurs much more swiftly if the observer himself tosses the ball and feels around the room with the wand.

Strangely enough, advance intellectual knowledge about the true shape of the room has no helpful effect on perceptual reorganization through action. In fact, one experiment by Bagby shows that it has an initial inhibiting effect.⁷ Apparently, the clues being generated through action are

⁷[F. P. Kilpatrick, "Final Report, Contract N6onr27014 with Princeton University." Princeton: Psychology Research Center, 1955 (mimeographed).]

initially checked against a set of abstract concepts if they are available, and only sometime later does the observer actually get down to the business of attempting to correlate them with what is actually being seen. Some later experiments of my own have indicated, however, that when the abstract information is given *after* instead of *before* some testing out through action has taken place, perceptual learning is speeded up.

The results of these experiments merely underline the importance of securing common action and common experience if people are to perceive the situation in similar ways. They also leave us with the tentative suggestion that if the period of perceptual conflict in an emergency has passed and undesirable perceptual structuring has taken place, attempts at verbally restructuring the situation for the participants should not come *before* the initiation of some common action, but should follow shortly thereafter.

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Some Functions of Communication in Crisis Behavior

HARRY B. WILLIAMS

We may conceive of crisis—for our purposes here—as a situation in which the actor faces the necessity of making an appropriate choice of action in order to avoid or minimize severe punishment. In this context, the function of communication is to enable the actor to make choices by providing him with information.¹ He has received information when his perception of the number or the relative value of available choices is changed.

Our analysis of communication functions in crisis is based upon the cybernetics concept of communication. When the actor has made a choice he seeks or receives further information about the results of the choice and compares it with the desired outcome. We may call these parts of the

¹This paper was prepared for oral presentation and discussion in a panel discussion and has not been rewritten for publication. Obviously, it does not contain the many qualifications and elaborations which would be made in a longer and more formal publication. Three general qualifications should be expressed here: 1) The title refers to behavior in "crisis," but the hypotheses and examples are drawn from only one kind of crisis, sudden community disaster. It was the writer's hope that some of these points would be found to have applicability to a broader range of crisis events, but no attempt is made to establish this relationship in this paper. 2) Many of the points concern mismanagement or ineffective crisis behavior. By seeing what went wrong in a system, we are enabled to learn more about its general functions and behavior as a system. The reader should not be left with the impression, however, that these examples of malfunction represent a norm or majority of behaviors in disaster. For a proper corrective to any such impression, the reader is referred to Charles E. Fritz and Eli S. Marks, "The NORC Studies of Human Behavior in Disaster," *The Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. X, No. 3 (1954), pp. 26-41; and Charles E. Fritz and Harry B. Williams, "The Human Being in Disaster: A Research Perspective," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 309, January 1957, pp. 42-51. 3) The hypotheses and discussions attempt to account for selected behaviors, and for only certain aspects of these. They have no implication of theoretical exhaustiveness or of statistical normality.

process "feedback" and "comparison" respectively. The information which he possesses about the desired outcome and against which he compares the feedback messages about results we may call "reference messages" or "reference inputs." This comprises the area of pre-existing information and predisposition—including values, attitudes, set, motivation, etc.—which is so important in determining the responses of human behavioral systems and in the investigation of which other theoretical frameworks may be required. After comparison of feedback and reference messages he may modify his choices or make new choices to achieve results more consonant with desired outcomes.

A classic and very simple example of this circular communication system—sometimes called a "servo system," sometimes a "feedback control" system²—is the familiar home furnace. In the home furnace system, the thermostat compares actual room temperatures with the desired temperature fixed by the user. Finding error, it signals the furnace to turn on, or off; then it continues to compare actual against desired results, and so on, around the circle. A properly functioning feedback control system is thus a self-correcting system. We assume that this model describes much of the communications behavior of individuals, as well as social systems.³

We will examine behavior in one type of crisis—sudden community disaster—using the feedback control system model and speculating quite freely, in the hope of generating some insights on the subject. Full examination of human behavior in disaster requires other points of views and models.

The general function of communication in crisis is to provide the actor with information which will enable him to make choices to avoid, minimize, or remedy the consequences of the crisis. This implies information about: 1) the probability and characteristics of future crisis; 2) the fact that crisis is at hand; 3) the alternatives for action during the crisis; 4) what has happened as a result of crisis; 5) why the crisis occurred.

It is not possible here to examine each of these functions systematically; instead, let us advance a series of rough working hypotheses which are pertinent to the several functions and which are suggested by disaster research.

1) *Information about a future possible threat, which has not been previously experienced, tends to have relatively low value.*

Disaster research and common experience indicate that individuals and communities are frequently caught unprepared for disaster which could

²For a good exposition see, the Editors of *Scientific American* (eds.), *Automatic Control*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955.

³Does Dr. Schneider's article in this issue of *Human Organization* describe self-correcting mechanisms in the Yap culture?

have been anticipated. Civil defense agencies struggle constantly against the barrier of so-called "public apathy."

From the communication point of view we can see that while threat is in the future, abstract, and not certain, preparatory actions are in competition with other current choices, most of which have the important advantage of relatively immediate feedback and potential rewards. Warning information is coexistent with and in competition with all the normal input of information to the actor. How does an actor choose, in competition with other alternatives, an alternative for which he has not already experienced feedback or reinforcement, for which he cannot be sure of rewards, and from which he receives no feedback by which to evaluate the action in terms of its primary purpose?

* * * *

If the actor chooses preparatory actions from among the other competing choices which offer immediate rewards, we may assume that two good reasons are: 1) He has had previous experience with the threatening situation or one analogous to it, and therefore knows the potential punishments; or 2) he has high confidence in the source which is providing the warning information.

He may take someone else's word for it because previous experience has shown that source to be an accurate predictor, or because one of his instrumental goals is to please or obey that source by following its suggestions. Also, the actor may operate within a system which has as a system goal preparation for future crisis, but which offers immediate and personal rewards for actions which are appropriate to the system goals. The various non-combat rewards available to soldiers in peacetime would be an example. These considerations strongly suggest that when applied to human behavior, the feedback control model must include feedback loops which are based upon substitute or intermediate sources of feedback and reinforcement. Hence, analysis of the structures of behavioral systems is necessary in order fully to understand their communication processes, just as analysis of their communication processes helps us to understand changes in structure.

2) *Recognition of the existence of crisis tends to follow an emergent or non-linear pattern.*

In sudden disasters, at least, recognition of the existence of crisis often lags behind the occurrence of immediate threat or even behind the impact of disaster itself. Individuals will often persist in interpreting tornado cues as "bad storms," the "roaring of a train," or other familiar cues even as the tornado rushes upon them. Community communication centers are often not aware that serious disaster has occurred for some time after impact. Examination of the message records of some of these centers shows a series of

fragmentary and local reports leading up to and following actual impact. Only when these incomplete reports cumulate to a certain point, apparently, does a *Gestalt* perception emerge that something abnormal has occurred.

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3) *Information about survival choices is a major determinant of survived behavior.*

Given a situation of immediate, severe danger, the individual's goal is to survive and, in many cases, to help others to survive. He may flee, seek cover, or fight against the destructive agent. Clearly, he requires information about which of these choices have the highest survival value. It is not surprising that much behavior during the immediate threat and the onset of disaster impact is essentially a search for information. Thus certain behavior, such as milling about and talking, may seem stupid to the outside observer who possesses more information, but it may be very important to the endangered people. Obviously the relationship between time required to define the situation and time available for completing survival actions is critical.

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4) *Compelling pressure to act and a compressed time perspective lead to error.*

Although outsiders may exaggerate its extent, there is usually some degree of confusion and disorganization in disaster rescue efforts. This can be seen clearly—if not measured—in the logistical system. Supplies seem to arrive in waves, often unrequested, like manna from heaven, as Rosow puts it.⁶ Because supply substantially exceeds need in peacetime disasters, this system usually works. In a wartime attack, where needs would exceed supply, such a crude system would be entirely inadequate.

Needed coordination of decisions and activities is often conspicuously absent. In short, errors are made more frequently than under normal conditions.

Inadequacy and overload of physical communication facilities and noisy communication channels contribute to the difficulties. Another factor also contributes. In a servo system, rapidity, sensitivity, and stability of response are reciprocally related. One result of a sharp increase in rate of response can be a decrease in the system's sensitivity. There is an increase in the probability of errors.

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5) *Sudden crisis creates great disparity between input from the environment and reference input, cutting down output.*

⁶Irving Rosow, *Authority in Natural Disasters* (to be published by the Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council).

This applies especially to individuals who have been in the impact area—the victims. These people are frequently described as being in a state of shock, stun, or daze. Here, rather than increase of output, there is decrease; the system seems to have stabilized at a much simpler level. This is sometimes attributed to communication overload which results in jamming the internal circuits and a resultant decrease in output. Rather than accepting this phenomenon as strictly a matter of quantitative overload, I suggest we also consider the enormous disparity between the input signals which the actor receives from his broken, disorganized environment and the reference information in terms of which he normally evaluates signals from his environment—he has no frame of reference in terms of which he can readily define this radically different situation.⁸ In our present terminology, he lacks a code by which to decode the new signals from his environment. Thus the sight of destruction all about is sometimes interpreted as meaning “the end of the world” or “atomic bomb.” Furthermore, he is unable (relatively) to generate feedback signals from his environment by manipulation of his own output. The disparity is reinforced and the inability to define the situation and to make choices increases. As his communication with environment breaks down, the actor’s sense of control over environment, and therefore, his sense of potency may be diminished.

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6) *The sector of life subject to reference input through institutionalized channels and sources is radically reduced.*

For normal life activity, culture has provided the actor with a body of information against which he can evaluate inputs from his environment and make comparisons by which to decide upon his next outputs. Institutionalization enables him to have a working body of information to deal with the infinite variety of inputs from the environment. It reduces the number of information sources and channels he must heed, and it reduces the number of problems he must solve, by placing them in classes of problems. The area of life which is made more manageable in this way is radically reduced for most people in sudden disaster.

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7) *There is great need for assistance in the communication and decision making processes.*

The ready response of people to authoritative figures and the rise of

⁸ Cf. Anthony F. C. Wallace in this issue of *Human Organization*; also his *Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of Individual and Community Behavior in an Extreme Situation*, Committee on Disaster Studies, Disaster Study No. 3. Washington: National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, Pub. 392, 1956, pp. 109ff.

emergent leaders have been repeatedly observed in disaster during the emergency period. These phenomena have several facets. From the communication point of view, we can see how a leader substitutes for missing or weak links in the process of communication with the environment—the leader can provide feedback, informing the actor he is doing the right thing or the wrong thing; he can supply part of the missing reference input, providing information to help the actor understand and evaluate information from the environment and he can serve the comparer function to some extent, telling the actor what to do when the actor cannot decide for himself. No wonder, then, that leadership is so important in crisis. No wonder, either, that outside agencies are sometimes able to accelerate the reorganization of forces in disaster-stricken communities.

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8) *Crisis events need to be interpreted and re-integrated with the actor's value system.*

There is much talk in disaster-stricken communities about "why it happened." It seems to be important to people to find an answer which can be accommodated in their value systems. In a highly religious sub-culture this provokes much theological discussion—how could God let this happen? Ministers have been observed going around to their membership, helping the people to interpret the event in a way consistent with their theology.

The prevalence of these interpretive efforts and their apparent importance to people suggest that it is important to the actor to re-establish his body of reference information as an integrated body—not just piece by piece as new problems arise. Crises may show us that people depend upon an interrelated, consistent body of knowledge and values more than we realize in normal times. But this will be more true of some individuals than others, and more true of members of one sub-culture than another, which suggests that study of crisis behavior is an entre to basic research on value systems and their functions.

Psychological Aspects of the Organism under Stress—Part II: Regulatory Devices of the Ego under Major Stress

KARL A. MENNINGER, M.D.

... regulatory devices of a first order or degree of pathological nature may be employed by the ego in situations which overtax the ordinary or normal devices. These consist essentially in exaggerations of normal functions, but they now appear uncomfortably and unpleasantly. They are apt to be described as evidences of "nervousness." The more familiar ones are: Hypersuppression; hyperrepression; hyperalertness; hyperemotionalism; hyperkinesis; hyperintellection, including mild obsessional thinking; hypercompensation; minor somatic dysfunctions.

These processes, although purposeful, may become more troublesome than the original disturbance or danger by which they were aroused, just as the swelling from a bee sting near the eye may obscure vision and cause other difficulties more serious than the irritant. They always represent a drain on the energies of the individual, and reduce his efficiency and satisfactions. They are apt, therefore, to become an expensive nuisance, causing fatigue, discomfort, and even pain. The ego institutes them as protective necessities, but the total individual is affected by them unpleasantly, and often tends to regard himself as their victim rather than as their beneficiary.

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Karl A. Menninger, "Psychological Aspects of the Organism under Stress. Part II. Regulatory Devices of the Ego under Major Stress," *American Psychoanalytic Association Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1954), pp. 280-310. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in the original.

But whether it be called illness, or nervousness, or some more euphemistic name, the utilization of these devices of a first degree of emergency and pathology is (nearly always) a transient—at least an unstable—phase. The tendency is toward subsidance; presumably the irritation is removed, the occasion for alarm passes, the aroused aggressions are mastered or channeled or dissipated. The need for the emergency devices disappears, and likewise the devices. The patient “recovers,” the “illness” terminates.

But not always. The situation may not be altered (or even alterable). The satisfactory rearrangement of energy investments may not be immediately possible. And just as Selye (33), in his account of *physiological* adaptation to stress, describes how the resistance reactions of the body to alarm become exhausted in time, so the intensification of psychological defenses may be described as having a tendency toward exhaustion. In spite of them, the tension rises. To some extent, it rises *because* of them. These first-order devices are emergency measures, first aid steps. They are too expensive to be continued indefinitely, and even they may be insufficient for the emergency.

And when these first-order defenses fail—whether from inadequacy or from exhaustion—we can say that the ego has been unsuccessful in its efforts to handle its stresses. It hasn't been able to repress, neutralize, deflect or appropriately direct the increased quantity of aggressive energies. Hence, something further *must* be done by the ego. What does it do?

Regulatory (Stress-Relieving) Devices of the Second Order

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. . . I submit a brief tabular resume of these second-order devices, devices which enable the ego to effect homeostatic maintenance at a lower but still tolerable level. They are characterized by partial withdrawal, partial reality renunciation or distortion, and attempted compensation by substitution. . . .

Resume of Regulatory Devices of the Second Order (Partial Withdrawal)

1. *Dissociation*: Syncope, narcolepsy, amnesia, fugues, dual personality, sense of unreality (estrangement), depersonalization.
2. *Displacement (to substituted objects)*: Aversion, prejudice, phobias, counterphobic attitudes, obsessions, projection, provocative transiency, persistent unmanageableness (e.g., of children).
3. *Substitution of (magic) symbols and modalities for more frankly hostile discharge*: Compulsions; rituals; “kleptomania,” “pyromania,” etc.; undoing and restitutive gestures; perverse sexual modalities and objects, without violence.

4. *Substitution of the self or part of the self as an object of displaced aggression:* Self-imposed restriction and abasement (asceticism); body mutilation (self-inflicted, "accidental," surgical); self-intoxication or narcotization; somatic involvement (unconscious simulation, physiological production of somatic disorders, exploitation of somatic affection).

All of the stress-relieving devices of the first and second orders are temporary and emergency devices. The ego never "expects" to retain them permanently (although it often does!). If a woman sees a shocking automobile accident and faints, she doesn't think of her fainting as a symptom of illness; she doesn't expect to continue fainting. If a man has a fatiguing and discouraging day and takes a few drinks too many, he doesn't think of this narcotization as a symptom. It is only when the fainting becomes frequent or the alcoholic relief imperative, so that other satisfactions are sacrificed, that the "device" becomes a symptom. We may sometimes refer to these as "habits," but it is not merely the accustoming of one's self to an expedient, but rather the hypertrophy and solidification of a definite emergency measure which makes for pathology.

As has been mentioned . . . such symptom formation adds many obvious burdens to the ego; it eliminates satisfactions; it precludes previous outlets; it increases guilt feelings; it diminishes self-esteem.⁶ What appeared as a relief measure comes to be a factor in the need for more relief. This often leads to the incorporation of the "symptom" into the psychological system in such a way as to lose its ego-alien quality and to appear to be a part of what has been called the character structure. The symptom persists, largely independent of its original purpose (that of maintaining homeostasis under conditions of stress) and is supported by its secondary usefulness, in spite of its concomitant nuisance value. Thus a vicious circle becomes established, which accounts in part for the curious inertia and resistance to change, even for the better, which characterizes these illnesses clinically.

* * * *

Nevertheless, the actual intrapsychic state of affairs is never static. The stresses continue, and are augmented by the necessary compromises. And the trend of pressure is in the direction of ego rupture, which would correspond to the neurophysiologist's "exhaustion state." An already stretched, compromised, injured, wearied, overtaxed ego may simply have to yield. It does the best it can as long as it can, but the pressures may be too great for it; it may give way. This does not mean that the ego is destroyed or annihilated; intact portions or functions persist, of course. But in certain "weak"

⁶cf. Alexander's "vegetative retreat" (1).

spots it yields. The result is catastrophe—not for the ego, but for the total organism.⁷

Regulatory Devices of the Third Order

The uncontrollable emergence of dangerous instinctual impulses is always something of a catastrophe. As we shall see shortly, it is not *the* catastrophe, the ultimate and *most* dangerous explosion, but it is always serious, because of consequences to be expected from the environment (retaliation, punishment, etc.) and from the superego. In this ego rupture the dangerous impulses are apparently outwardly directed, but the “recoil,” the concomitant self-damage, is always detectable also.

Clinically and empirically we know these catastrophes in two forms—as continuous phenomena over a considerable period of time, and as relatively brief, episodic, discontinuous phenomena from which there is prompt recovery with a continued tendency for them to recur. It would seem that these episodic explosions serve to relieve enough tension to prevent the development of the continuous forms.

* * * *

... stress-relieving devices of a third order of pathology are represented by episodic, explosive outbursts of aggressive energy, more or less disorganized.

Resume of Regulatory (Tension-Relieving) Devices of the Third Order (Transitory Ego Rupture)

1. Assaultive violence—homicidal, suicidal, self-mutilative, sexual
2. Convulsions
3. Panic attacks
4. Catastrophic demoralization
5. Transitory dereistic episodes

Regulatory Devices of the Fourth Order

Rupture of the ego permitting an episodic explosion may be sufficient to relieve the tension, and the ego quickly “heals” with or without a “weak spot.” Its boundaries are restored (Federn, 6). And a catastrophe has been averted! Freud pointed out how suicide may be a substitute for a murder, and Reichard and Tillman (27) have recently proposed and illustrated the idea of murder and suicide as “defenses” against psychosis.

⁷The behavior observed in some experimental animals is analogous to the catastrophic breakdown reaction of Goldstein's human patients. But a continuing neurotic defense compromise can also be built up in animals to prevent catastrophic breakdown. See Maier (17), Liddell (15), Liddell and Anderson (16), Masserman (18), and others.

Thus, the victory may be a Pyrrhic one. The cost of salvation may be fatal. The damage done may be irreparable. Furthermore, the rupture may be too great for the ego to reconstitute its homeostatic patterns in a quick restoration. The ego may be exhausted or semipermanently damaged. In that case, a further retreat and detachment from reality must occur. This actually represents the net effect of the aggressive intent: destruction is accomplished symbolically in the form of a total repudiation of reality and of reality testing to a permanent degree. Not only is the process of reality testing (almost) abandoned, but the established loyalty to reality is (largely) renounced. With this, of course, goes a disruption of interpersonal linkages and the separation from love objects which presages psychological starvation to the ego [Ferenczi's aphanisis, see (10)].

It is this state of affairs to which most psychiatrists refer by the word "psychosis," a word which I earnestly hope we can abandon. (Adolf Meyer, George Stevenson, Karl Bowman, and other psychiatrists have expressed the same wish.) It is illustrated in the delirious states, many schizophrenic pictures, some stupors, and various conditions associated with organic brain damage. I am not concerned now with names of specific "causes," but rather with the psychological picture and the psychological process that is represented.

I believe this stage of the process represents a near-catastrophic rearranging of homeostatic balance in which the dangerous impulses, aroused by threat, pain, fear, guilt and frustrations are controllable only (or chiefly) by absorption into fantasy, including narcissistic preoccupations, denial and destruction in fantasy of some or all of the real world. Disorganization of a high degree is conspicuous. An internal equilibrium and relative peace are indeed re-established, but at a fearful cost in effectiveness. Edward Kempf (11) described this as his fifth and most extreme stage of personality decompensation—"a further flight from adjustment, really an almost complete failure to compensate, so that the individual is dominated by the uncontrollable elements of the unconscious. Then there appear, as if they were a part of real life, such very unreal things as delusions, hallucinations, etc. These, in short, are symptoms popularly known as 'insanity.'"

This is truly disorganization, and the sacrifice of much of the self to the situation. It is self-destructive. But from the other standpoint, which we have been emphasizing, it is also self-preservative, a device to *avert* a more complete self-destruction. It is not a complete surrender, but a retreat—almost a rout, perhaps. But the organism is saved, even though its productive level has fallen to almost zero. We know that such patients feel, on the one hand, desolate, estranged and hopeless because of the disruption of their linkages with reality love objects; and, at the same time, seek to bolster their egos with omnipotent fantasies of destroying the whole world. The picture is

apt to be complicated by numerous fragments of second- and third-order devices which are carried over. Indeed, it is these which give color and form to the various clinical pictures in which this near-total disorganization of psychic function appears. The following are some of the commonly observed varieties:

(1) Erratic, disorganized excitement—with corresponding verbal and motor productions—at times destructive, at times self-injuring, at times only bizarre and ineffectual. These pictures have been called delirious, manic, maniacal, catatonic, epileptic, and other names.

(2) Conditions of extreme hyperthymia—chiefly melancholy, with or without stupor, agitation, delusion formation, retardation or restless activity. The characteristic feature is the overwhelming of the wish to live, the mood of resignation and obligation to suicide.

(3) Silly, incoherent, manneristic, autistic speech and behavior, without excitement or clear meaning or direction. Such pictures are often called hebephrenic.

(4) Extreme and continuous apathetic inertia and extreme inactivity, sometimes rigidity, often with mutism, hallucinations and other rarely revealed fantasy indulgences and occasional outbursts. Such conditions are called hebephrenic, catatonic, “deteriorated,” “regressed,” and other undefinable and unjustifiable names.

(5) Delusional preoccupation with one or several themes, usually persecutory, and usually supported with defensiveness, suspiciousness, grandiosity, condescension, irascibility, etc., with or without hallucinations. A good façade of “normality” may partially or occasionally obscure the underlying picture. Such states have classically gone under many names containing the adjective “paranoid.”

(6) Disoriented, confused, uncertain, amnesic, bewildered disorientation typical of senile regression and organic brain injury.

... they are not different *diseases*; they are different exposures, different glimpses, different constellations of compromise, fusing and defusion, of compensatory effort and change. The important fact is that an ego rupture has occurred, overwhelming aggressive impulses have emerged, extreme withdrawal has been necessary, effective contact with reality has been severed. What one has left is disorganized rubble, the mangled body of an organism that is still breathing.

At this cost, the final catastrophe of dissolution has been averted. A kind of equilibrium has been re-established at a very low level. Here it may remain until death. BUT empirically we know that complete restoration may still occur! Indeed, with any help at all, it usually does! Thus the survival

function of this catastrophic retreat is demonstrated, and the ego's regulatory powers seem to be justified even in its so-called failure.

The Ultimate and Irreversible Catastrophe: The Fifth Order

But despite the successive inauguration of progressively more "radical" measures, the ego may really fail completely. Things may go from good to bad, to worse, to worst. And what is the worst that can happen? From the biological standpoint, one would say death; from the psychobiological standpoint, and in line with the concept here presented, one would have to say complete disorganization, which is perhaps not quite the same. We might borrow the term entropy from physics.

Since the basic function of the ego is integration, i.e., holding the personality together, its complete failure is to be seen in disintegration, which occurs when the destructive drives overwhelm it. These drives are—by hypothesis, and from clinical observation—headed in two directions: toward the self, and toward the outside world. If we stick close to the theory, self-destruction is the truly ultimate goal, but this need not imply the crude external form of lifting a hand against one's own body. For there are many other modes of self-destruction. Complete failure of ego control releases enormous violent energies of destruction in all directions. Clinically one sees occasionally such dreadful cases of continuous, wild, furious, violent mania ending—nearly always, I believe—in complete exhaustion and death. Perhaps going "berserk" and "running Amok" are comparable.

Actual self-propelled physical self-destruction in the clinical form of suicide should probably be treated as an indication of not-quite-total disintegration. It is certainly terminal and irreversible, and it is certainly a kind of failure of ego control which turns out to be fatal. But it does involve some conscious direction and hence falls a little short of complete reality renunciation. . . . suicide in the ordinary form represents a direction of violence toward the self which is always tintured with elements of the integrative efforts of the ego. In other words, no suicide is ever completely wholehearted. Nevertheless, and unfortunately enough, it can be sufficiently wholehearted to accomplish the result. . . . Suicide as an occasional fantasy, suicide as an obsessional preoccupation, and suicide as a gesture, must be distinguished from successful or unsuccessful but *bona fide* suicidal attempts (Raines and Thompson, 25). The great excess of suicidal attempts as compared with "successful" suicides (even after one excludes "thwarted" suicides) suggests, as Stengel (35) has recently pointed out, that many so-called "successful suicides" are actually bungled attempted suicides. The gesture function, the appeal effect, and the ordeal character of the attempt are of great importance. Stengel agrees with us, however, that even the suicidal attempt is "a catastrophic reaction to an intolerable social and emotional situation."

Interpretative Addenda and Conclusion

On this dismal note of complete disintegration, we must terminate this analysis of the progressive steps or stages in the temporary arrest of the trend toward disintegration by the various regulatory expedients available to the ego. Please bear in mind that this was, by design, a schematic rather than a clinical presentation. As has been pointed out repeatedly as we went along, the ego always does *more* than attempt to manage the immediate emergency. In spite of resistances implicit in the semistabilized emergency adjustment, the ego perennially endeavors to return to its original normal adjustment level. These restorative efforts of the ego have been little touched upon here for the reason that we have been trying to describe the disease process rather than the recovery process, which in no way diminishes the importance of a further consideration of the latter, including those artefactual facilitations afforded by "treatment." That recovery actually may take place, wholly or in part, after arrival at any of the stages described has been repeatedly mentioned, but perhaps needs repeating. That recovery may fail to take place is unfortunately also an empirical fact.

This recovery trend is, indeed, constantly interacting with the trend represented by the five stages of progressive disintegration described. As is well-known clinically, there can be slow or rapid shifts from one level to the other, both upward and downward. This fluctuation is especially observable in children, where the ego is both less developed and more flexible.

Nor would I leave the impression that the demarcation of these five hierarchical orders of stress-relieving devices is something sharp, clear, and invariable. As in all scientific description, they appear more so in a verbal description of this kind than in real life. In the course of a progressive maladjustment in which second-order devices, for example, are gradually or even suddenly superseded by third- and fourth-order devices, there is apt to be a trailing or continuing use of some of the devices belonging to earlier orders (i.e. the first, and second). It should not be forgotten that we psychiatrists see the patient only after months or years of a fluctuating struggle to attain a tolerable adjustment. By recapitulating the history, we can determine which of the present devices are revivals and which are new, and what former "emergency reactions" had been partially accepted by the patient as inevitable character traits rather than symptoms. These may now have become hypertrophied to the point of rejection as "ego-alien," or they may have been supplanted by a new series. Thus a sequential order may be discoverable, but often it is not.

Any of the devices described may occur as a primary reaction or may be one of the links in a chain of reactions, which proceeds until a certain equilibrium is established. This is not merely additive; various (if not all) of

the devices intended to relieve tension may do so temporarily only to aggravate the disequilibrium and increase the tension subsequently. But ultimately, if a semistable, semiunstable equilibrium can be achieved, which, while not at a comfortable level, is less painful than the one which threatened, disintegration of the personality has been forestalled.

* * * *

A word should be said, too, about the anxiety feelings which serve as a warning when first the ego's integrity is threatened. Theoretically, the amelioration of stress affected by the selected devices should dispel this pain. Sometimes it does, sometimes it does not. Sometimes the awareness of stress is relieved without a material improvement in the situation. Just as there is much that we do not understand about physical pain⁹—why it persists in some cured lesions, why it is so great in some minor ailments and so slight in some very serious ones—so there is much that we do not understand about its equivalent—anxiety feelings. The conscious awareness of ego hypertension is sometimes the patient's chief preoccupation; in other instances overtaxed egos in the throes of a struggle of equilibrium maintenance seem not to be accompanied by anxiety. Much has been written about it; Freud himself changed his mind about it several times. Much further research and reflection is necessary for any new insights.

Finally, I should like to say a few words about words. I have objected, in the text, to the use of such terms as defenses, defense measures and defense mechanisms, because of the narrowness of their implications. They call to mind partial maneuvers which parry circumscribed threats. I have tried to employ terms which accent the more holistic implications of the ego's defense efforts, that is, its use of a wide range of expedients in the interest of preserving the best possible level of integration in the face of disintegrative pressures. At first, those expedients may be chosen which result in an increased state of tension within the system (first-order devices). Ultimately, however, the organism may be forced to adopt devices which will relieve the painful state of tension. The devices it chooses must be the best available for maintaining organismic integrity with a minimum of loss.

Disease may be seen, then, not simply as *lack* of "ego strength," an *absence* of normality, but as a positive expression of the survival efforts of the organism, inept and costly as they may be.¹⁰ In this paper I have sketched only in broad strokes and rough outline the implications of such a concept of disease. In the development of this idea, the term homeostasis

⁹ Paul Federn (6) contributed a study of ego responses to pain, as has more recently Leo Rangell (26). See also Furer and Hardy (7).

¹⁰ See Romano (29), Romano and Engel (30, 31), Seguin (32), and Engel (5).

was used to signify the efforts of the organism to realize its potentialities and maintain its integrity despite disruptive onslaughts from within and without. Treatment may be viewed in these terms as assistance in the effort to re-establish the optimal level of integration which had to be sacrificed for a more tenable level of homeostasis maintenance.

Summary

The essence of my thesis is that the principle of homeostasis or steady state maintenance can be applied to psychological phenomena and psychoanalytic theory. The functions of the ego in receiving external and internal stimuli and in dealing with them for the best interests of the organism can be viewed as those of a homeostatic effector. The constructive and destructive drives of the organism must be so directed and modified as to permit the maintenance of a level of tension which is both tolerable and conducive to safe, productive and satisfying living and continued growth.

Events constantly occur which tend to disturb the adjustments and reconciliations achieved, and these stresses require the ego to improvise adaptive expedients for maintaining the integrity of the organism. Minor stresses are usually handled by relatively minor, "normal," "healthy" devices. Greater stresses or prolonged stress excite the ego to increasingly energetic and expensive activity in the interests of homeostatic maintenance.

In its effort to control dangerous impulses under such circumstances and thereby prevent or retard the disintegrative process which threatens, the ego initiates emergency regulatory devices which fall into five hierarchically arranged and specifically characterized groups, representing increasingly greater degrees of failure in integration.

I believe that this conceptualization of the ego's regulatory function provides us with a broader frame of reference for understanding mental illness and will enable us to discard some of our vague, many-faceted, traditional terms in exchange for more definite and precise designations of process and stage. It also helps us to align our psychoanalytic concepts with general organismic-biologic theory.

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The Role of Motivation in Psychological Stress

WILLIAM VOGEL, ROBERT W. BAKER, AND RICHARD S. LAZARUS

Lazarus and Baker (5) recently have presented a theoretical and methodological framework for the study of behavior under stress. Their conception is that the motivational state of the individual in relation to the stressor conditions imposed upon him determines whether or not a state of stress occurs. Experimentation within this framework thus involves the systematic use of motivation as an independent variable. The purpose of this paper is to present some evidence concerning the role of motivation in determining response to stressor conditions.

In our experimental studies we distinguish between *induced* and *intrinsic* motivation. By induced motivation we mean those transitory organismic states which we expect to arouse or instil through the use of ego-involving instructions or through the manipulation of incentives. Intrinsic motivation, on the other hand, refers to motive states that are presumed to be relatively enduring characteristics of individuals. These are typically inferred from apposite behavioral samples, including fantasy productions (cf. McClelland, 7).

A further distinction may be made between kinds of behavior samples from which intrinsic motivational states are inferred. On the one hand, "long run, everyday" behavioral characteristics of individuals may be used, as when achievement motivation is inferred from the number of hours that a student studies per week. On the other hand, imaginational production or fantasy may be employed, as McClelland and his associates have done in the case of achievement (7), affiliation (1, 10), and power motivation (13). The assumption is often made that the incidence of need related imagery in the stories a person tells to picture stimuli (especially in the

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absence of external achievement cues) reflects a relatively stable and persistent motivational characteristic.

All these means of studying motivation are relevant to the three theoretical issues to which the present experiment is addressed. The first of these issues involves the relationship between a stressor condition³ and motivational characteristics of individuals. If there is no relevant motive state to be thwarted, then according to our theoretical position there is no stress; if there is a strong motive state, but it is not engaged by the stressor condition, then there is likewise no stress; if there is a motive state, and it is engaged by the stressor condition, the resultant stress state and its consequences vary as a function of the intensity of the motive state. In this study, we focus upon the last of these alternatives and investigate behavioral output and affective arousal as a function of induced motive states varying in intensity. If differential achievement motivation is induced in two groups of subjects, we would expect that failure-information (the stressor condition) should be more thwarting to the more highly motivated subjects, resulting in greater affective arousal (i.e., heightened physiological reactivity) and a greater increase in effort on the task.

The second problem addressed by our experiment is the generality of motive states, i.e., the extent to which a motivational characteristic inferred from one behavioral context is also operative in another. By definition, this problem refers to intrinsic rather than induced motivation. The study seeks to determine whether degree of motivation inferred from level of academic effort and accomplishment in college is associated with behavioral output on a performance task and accompanying physiological reactivity under various experimental conditions, including a stressor. The experimental design also permits the effect of intrinsic motivation on behavioral output and physiological reactivity to be compared with those of induced motivation.

The third issue to be considered concerns the relationship between the expression of a motive in imaginal productions or fantasy and its actualization in behavior. Fantasy has been used as a means of measuring intrinsic motivation on the assumption that this relationship is always direct and positive (7), but evidence has recently been presented that this assumption is not entirely warranted (6). The present experiment investigates the relation of a fantasy measure of need for achievement (7) to behavioral output and physiological reactivity under various experimental conditions, and also compares this measure with indices derived from other behavioral sources.

³By stressor conditions we mean those experimental conditions which are intended by the investigator to be stressful, but which are not necessarily responded to as such by the S. The term "stress" we use to refer to a state of the organism, not to a class of conditions.

Method

Subjects and Procedure

Forty male undergraduate college students (mostly freshmen) who volunteered for the study were selectively assigned to two groups of 20 each in such a manner that the two groups represented similar distributions of scores on two measures of intrinsic motivation, McClelland's need Achievement score and a measure relating academic accomplishment to intellectual ability. One group was told that they were going to perform a task that would allow the experimenter to evaluate the effect of work on physiological activity. This information was intended to be relatively less motivating or ego-involving than the treatment given the second group, which was informed that their performance on the task would provide the experimenter with a means of assessing their potential for high level academic and vocational functioning. All of the *Ss* in the experiment were tested individually.

Before the differentially motivating instructions were given, the two groups were given a "practice" session on the experimental task, ostensibly in order to become familiar with it. Actually, this session ensured the comparability of the two groups regarding physiological reactivity, as well as affording a baseline for gauging the effects of conditions. The practice condition lasted approximately four minutes during which all *Ss* performed an equal number of task items.

The experimental task was the McKinney Reporting Test (8), which presents a long series of circles containing three symbols in various quantities. The *S's* task is to count as quickly and accurately as possible the number of symbols of each kind which each circle contains.

Following the practice period, the differentially motivating instructions were given and a 12-minute "work" condition ensued. At the end of this period, *Ss* were informed that their performance was inadequate and that they would be given an opportunity to do better. During a second ensuing 12-minute period of performance (the failure-stressor condition) both groups of *Ss* were given false, unattainable norms every minute to induce a sense of failure.

Following the failure-stressor condition, *Ss* were administered cards 6BM and 7BM of the Thematic Apperception Test and the machinshop picture of the McClelland series (7), which they had taken under neutral conditions on an earlier day. If a different set had been used the second time following McClelland's procedure, it would not have been clear whether obtained differences in imagery were a function of conditions or of differential achievement cues of the cards. McClelland's attempt to equate the cue value of pictures is of questionable value in studies of individual differences, because the cue value of a picture may vary for different individuals and *S* populations.

At the same earlier session, the Taylor Anxiety scale (12) was also administered, and *Ss* were asked to indicate on a chart their activities for the previous week hour by hour to provide reliable information about their study habits.

Physiological Measures

Measures of physiological reactivity were taken as follows. In the practice

condition, galvanic skin response (GSR) readings were made during the first and third minutes, pulse was recorded at two minutes, and diastolic and systolic blood pressure at four minutes. The same procedure was followed in the two subsequent conditions, being repeated three times during each 12-minute period.

* * * *

Summary and Conclusions

This paper reports an experiment designed to investigate motivational characteristics of individuals as a source of individual differences in response to stressor conditions. Motive states were manipulated in two essential ways: (a) through induction or arousal by use of ego-involving instructions (induced motivation) and (b) through inference from fantasy productions and academic accomplishment as well as study habits (intrinsic motivation). Effects of such motive states were sought in two kinds of behavior under varied experimental conditions, including a failure-stressor. The two kinds of behavior examined were performance output on a perceptual-motor task (the McKinney Reporting Test) and accompanying physiological reactivity.

The study is addressed to three theoretical issues. The first of these refers to the relationship between a stressor condition and induced motive states which vary in intensity. Our expectation that there would be a simple relationship between strength of induced motive state and behavior under a stressor condition was not borne out. However, different motive states are found to be associated with differential response to a stressor *when motivation is examined in interaction with level of physiological reactivity*. An attempt was made to account for the specific interactive effects in terms of degree of appropriateness of the reaction of the subject to the conditions.

The second theoretical issue involves the generality of an intrinsic motivational state inferred from the relation between academic accomplishment and intellectual capacity. Our results indicate that strength of this motive state is inversely related to performance output and physiological reactivity in the experimental situation. We attempt to account for this seeming paradox by suggesting that a motivational characteristic inferred from one behavioral context (i.e., the academic situation) is not necessarily operative in a different context (i.e., the McKinney Reporting Test).

The third theoretical issue of relevance in this experiment pertains to the relationship between the expression of a motive in imaginational productions or fantasy and its actualization in behavior. A positive and direct relationship is often assumed. That the relationship is not always positive and direct is shown by our findings, where amount of achievement-related imagery is inversely related to motivated behavior. We suggest

that whether a need is expressed in fantasy, in behavior, or both will be a function of regulative processes in the personality.

The findings of this experiment indicate the complexity of the role of motivation in determining response to stressor conditions and highlight the methodological difficulties involved in the systematic investigation of motivational variables. At the same time, the results indicate the importance of investigating motivational variables in stress experimentation.

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CHAPTER 7 • *Social Maladaption*

“Mom”

ERIK H. ERIKSON

In recent years the observations and warnings of the psychiatric workers of this country have more and more converged on two concepts: the “schizoid personality” and “maternal rejection.” Essentially this means not only that many people fall by the wayside as a result of psychotic disengagements from reality, but also that all too many people, while not overtly sick, nevertheless seem to lack a certain ego tonus and a certain mutuality in social intercourse. One may laugh at this suggestion and point to the spirit of individualism and to the gestures of animation and of jovial friendliness characterizing much of the social life in this country; but the psychiatrists (especially after the shocking experience during the last war, of being forced to reject or to send home hundreds of thousands of “psycho-neurotics”) see it differently. The streamlined smile within the perfectly tuned countenance and within the standardized ways of exhibiting self-control does not always harbor that true spontaneity which alone would keep the personality intact and flexible enough to make it a going concern.

For this the psychiatrists tend to blame “Mom.” Case history after case history states that the patient had a cold mother, a dominant mother, a rejecting mother—or a hyperpossessive, overprotective one. They imply that the patient, as a baby, was not made to feel at home in this world

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except under the condition that he behave himself in certain definite ways, which were inconsistent with the timetable of an infant's needs and potentialities, and contradictory in themselves. They imply that the mother dominated the father, and that while the father offered more tenderness and understanding to the children than the mother did, he disappointed his children in the end because of what he "took" from the mother. Gradually what had begun as a spontaneous movement in thousands of clinical files has become a manifest literary sport in books decrying the mothers of this country as "Moms" and as a "generation of vipers."

Who is this "Mom"? How did she lose her good, her simple name? How could she become an excuse for all that is rotten in the state of the nation and a subject of literary temper tantrums? *Is Mom really to blame?*

In a clinical sense, of course, to blame may mean just to point to what the informed worker sincerely considers the primary cause of the calamity. But there is in much of our psychiatric work an undertone of revengeful triumph, as if a villain had been spotted and cornered. The blame attached to the mothers in this country (namely, that they are frigid sexually, rejective of their children, and unduly dominant in their homes) has in itself a specific moralistic punitiveness. No doubt both patients and psychiatric workers were blamed too much when they were children; now they blame all mothers, because all causality has become linked with blame.

It was, of course, a vindictive injustice to give the name of "Mom" to a certain dangerous type of mother, a type apparently characterized by a number of fatal contradictions in her motherhood. Such injustice can only be explained and justified by the journalistic habit of sensational contraposition—a part of the publicist folkways of our day. It is true that where the "psychoneurotic" American soldier felt inadequately prepared for life, he often implicitly and more often unconsciously blamed his mother; and that the expert felt compelled to agree with him. But it is also true that the road from Main Street to the foxhole was longer—geographically, culturally, and psychologically—than was the road to the front lines from the home towns of nations which were open to attack and had been attacked, or which had prepared themselves to attack other people's homelands and now feared for their own. It seems senseless to blame the American family for the failures, but to deny it credit for the gigantic human achievement of overcoming that distance.

"Mom," then, like similar prototypes in other countries . . . is a composite image of traits, none of which could be present all at once in one single living woman. No woman consciously aspires to be such a "Mom," and yet she may find that her experience converges on this Gestalt, as if she were forced to assume a role. To the clinical worker, "Mom" is something comparable to a "classical" psychiatric syndrome which you come to use as a yardstick although you have never seen it in pure form. In cartoons

she becomes a caricature, immediately convincing to all. Before analyzing "Mom," then, as a historical phenomenon, let us focus on her from the point of view of the pathogenic demands which she makes on her children and by which we recognize her presence in our clinical work:

1. "Mom" is the unquestioned authority in matters of mores and morals in her home, and (through clubs) in the community; yet she permits herself to remain, in her own way, vain in her appearance, egotistical in her demands, and infantile in her emotions.

2. In any situation in which this discrepancy clashes with the respect which she demands from her children, she blames her children; she never blames herself.

3. She thus artificially maintains what Ruth Benedict would call the discontinuity between the child's and the adult's status without endowing this differentiation with the higher meaning emanating from superior example.

4. She shows a determined hostility to any free expression of the most naïve forms of sensual and sexual pleasure on the part of her children, and she makes it clear enough that the father, when sexually demanding, is a bore. Yet as she grows older she seems unwilling to sacrifice such external signs of sexual competition as too youthful dresses, frills of exhibitionism, and "make-up." In addition, she is avidly addicted to sexual display in books, movies and gossip.

5. She teaches self-restraint and self-control, but she is unable to restrict her intake of calories in order to remain within the bounds of the dresses she prefers.

6. She expects her children to be hard on themselves, but she is hypochondriacally concerned with her own well-being.

7. She stands for the superior values of tradition, yet she herself does not want to become "old". In fact, she is mortally afraid of that status which in the past was the fruit of a rich life, namely the status of the grandmother.

This will be sufficient to indicate that "Mom" is a woman in whose life cycle remnants of infantility join advanced senility to crowd out the middle range of mature womanhood, which thus becomes self-absorbed and stagnant. In fact, she mistrusts her own feelings as a woman and mother. Even her overconcern does not provide trust, but lasting mistrust. But let it be said that this "Mom"—or better: any woman who reminds herself and others of the stereotype Mom—is not happy; she does not like herself; she is ridden by the anxiety that her life was a waste. She knows that her children do not genuinely love her, despite Mother's Day offerings. "Mom" is a victim, not a victor.

Assuming, then, that this is a "type," a composite image of sufficient

relevance for the epidemiology of neurotic conflict in this country: to explain it would obviously call for the collaboration of historian, sociologist, and psychologist, and for a new kind of history, a kind which at the moment is admittedly in its impressionistic and sensational stages. "Mom," of course, is only a stereotyped caricature of existing contradictions which have emerged from intense, rapid, and as yet unintegrated changes in American history. To find its beginning, one would probably have to retrace this history back to the time when it was up to the American woman to evolve one common tradition, on the basis of many imported traditions, and to base on it the education of her children and the style of her home life; when it was up to her to establish new habits of sedentary life on a continent originally populated by men who in their countries of origin, for one reason or another, had not wanted to be "fenced in." Now, in fear of ever again acquiescing to an outer or inner autocracy, these men insisted on keeping their new cultural identity tentative to a point where women had to become autocratic in their demands for some order.

The American women in frontier communities was the object of intense rivalries on the part of tough and often desperate men. At the same time, she had to become the cultural censor, the religious conscience, the aesthetic arbiter, and the teacher. In that early rough economy hewn out of hard nature it was she who contributed the finer graces of living and that spirituality without which the community falls apart. In her children she saw future men and women who would face contrasts of rigid sedentary and shifting migratory life. They must be prepared for any number of extreme opposites in milieu, and always ready to seek new goals and to fight for them in merciless competition. For, after all, worse than a sinner was a sucker.

We [suggest] that the mothers of the Sioux and of the Yurok were endowed with an instinctive power of adaptation which permitted them to develop child-training methods appropriate for the production of hunters and hunters' wives in a nomadic society, and of fishermen and acorn gatherers in a sedentary valley society. The American mother, I believe, reacted to the historical situation on this continent with similar unconscious adjustment when she further developed Anglo-Saxon patterns of child training which would avoid weakening potential frontiersmen by protective maternalism. In other words, I consider what is now called the American woman's "rejective" attitude a modern fault based on a historical virtue designed for a vast new country, in which the most dominant fact was the frontier, whether you sought it, or avoided it, or tried to live it down.

From the frontier, my historian-sociologist and I would have to turn to puritanism as a decisive force in the creation of American motherhood and its modern caricature, "Mom." This much-maligned puritanism, we should remember, was once a system of values designed to check men and

women of eruptive vitality, of strong appetites, as well as of strong individuality. In connection with primitive cultures we have discussed the fact that a living culture has its own balances which make it durable and bearable to the majority of its members. But changing history endangers the balance. During the short course of American history rapid developments fused with puritanism in such a way that they contributed to the emotional tension of mother and child. Among these were the continued migration of the native population, unchecked immigration, industrialization, urbanization, class stratification, and female emancipation. These are some of the influences which put puritanism on the defensive—and a system is apt to become rigid when it becomes defensive. Puritanism, beyond defining sexual sin for full-blooded and strong-willed people, gradually extended itself to the total sphere of bodily living, compromising all sensuality—including marital relationships—and spreading its frigidity over the tasks of pregnancy, childbirth, nursing, and training. The result was that men were born who failed to learn from their mothers to love the goodness of sensuality before they learned to hate its sinful uses. Instead of hating sin, they learned to mistrust life. Many became puritans without faith or zest.

The frontier, of course, remained the decisive influence which served to establish in the American identity the extreme polarization which characterizes it. The original polarity was the cultivation of the sedentary and migratory poles. For the same families, the same mothers, were forced to prepare men and women who would take root in the community life and the gradual class stratification of the new villages and towns and at the same time to prepare these children for the possible physical hardships of homesteading on the frontiers. Towns, too, developed their sedentary existence and oriented their inward life to work bench and writing desk, fireplace and altar, while through them, on the roads and rails, strangers passed bragging of God knows what greener pastures. You had either to follow—or to stay behind and brag louder. The point is that the call of the frontier, the temptation to move on, forced those who stayed to become defensively sedentary, and defensively proud. In a world which developed the slogan, "If you can see your neighbor's chimney, it is time to move on," mothers had to raise some sons and daughters who would be determined to ignore the call of the frontier—but who would go with equal determination once they were forced or chose to go. When they became too old, however, there was no choosing, and they remained to support the most sectarian, the most standardized adhesiveness. I think that it was the fear of becoming too old to choose which gave old age and death a bad name in this country. (Only recently have old couples found a solution, the national trailer system, which permits them to settle down to perpetual traveling and to die on wheels).

We know how the problems of the immigrant and of the migrant, of the *émigré* and of the refugee, became superimposed on one another, as large areas became settled and began to have a past. To the new American, with a regional tradition of stratification, newcomers increasingly came to be characterized by the fact that they had escaped from something or other, rather than by the common values they sought; and then there were also the masses of ignorant and deceived chattels of the expanding industrial labor market. For and against all of these latter Americans, American mothers had to establish new moral standards and rigid tests of social ascendancy.

As America became the proverbial melting pot, it was the Anglo-Saxon woman's determination which assured that of all the ingredients mixed, puritanism—such as it then was—would be the most pervasive streak. The older, Anglo-Saxon type became ever more rigid, though at the same time decent and kind in its way. But the daughters of immigrants, too, frantically tried to emulate standards of conduct which they had not learned as small children. It is here, I think, that the self-made personality originated as the female counterpart of the self-made man; it is here that we find the origin of the popular American concept of a fashionable and vain "ego" which is its own originator and arbiter. In fact, the psychoanalysis of the children of immigrants clearly reveals to what extent they, as the first real Americans in their family, become their parents' cultural parents.

This idea of a self-made ego was in turn reinforced and yet modified by industrialization and by class stratification. Industrialization, for example, brought with it mechanical child training. It was as if this new man-made world of machines, which was to replace the "segments of nature" and the "beasts of prey," offered its mastery only to those who would become like it, as the Sioux "became" buffalo, the Yurok salmon. Thus, a movement in child training began which tended to adjust the human organism from the very start to clocklike punctuality in order to make it a standardized appendix of the industrial world. This movement is by no means at an end either in this country or in countries which for the sake of industrial production want to become like us. In the pursuit of the adjustment to and mastery over the machine, American mothers (especially of the middle class) found themselves standardizing and overadjusting children who later were expected to personify that very virile individuality which in the past had been one of the outstanding characteristics of the American. The resulting danger was that of creating, instead of individualism, a mass-produced mask of individuality.

As if this were not enough, the increasing class differentiation in some not large but influential classes and regions combined with leftovers of European aristocratic models to create the ideal of the lady, the woman who not only does not need to work, but who, in fact, is much too

childlike and too determinedly uninformed to even comprehend what work is all about. This image, in most parts of the country, except the South, was soon challenged by the ideal of the emancipated woman. This new ideal seemed to call for equality of opportunity; but it is well known how it came, instead, to represent often enough a pretense of sameness in equipment, a right to mannish behavior.

In her original attributes, then, the American woman was a fitting and heroic companion to the post-revolutionary man, who was possessed with the idea of freedom from any man's autocracy and haunted by the fear that the nostalgia for some homeland and the surrender to some king could ever make him give in to political slavery. Mother became "Mom" only when Father became "Pop" under the impact of the identical historical discontinuities. For, if you come down to it, Momism is only misplaced paternalism. American mothers stepped into the role of the grandfathers as the fathers abdicated their dominant place in the family, in the field of education, and in cultural life. The post-revolutionary descendants of the Founding Fathers forced their women to be mothers *and* fathers, while they continued to cultivate the role of freeborn sons.

I cannot try to appraise the quantity of emotional disturbance in this country. Mere statistics on severe mental disorders do not help. Our improved methods of detection and our missionary zeal expand together as we become aware of the problem, so that it would be hard to say whether today this country has bigger and better neuroses, or bigger and better ways of spotlighting them—or both. But I would, from my clinical experience, dare to formulate a specific *quality* in those who are disturbed. I would say that underneath his proud sense of autonomy and his exuberant sense of initiative the troubled American (who often looks the least troubled) blames his mother for having let him down. His father, so he claims, had not much to do with it—except in those rare cases where the father was an extraordinarily stern man on the surface, an old-fashioned individualist, a foreign paternalist, or a native "boss." In the psychoanalysis of an American man it usually takes considerable time to break through to the insight that there was a period early in life when the father did seem bigger and threatening. Even then, there is at first little sense of that specific rivalry for the mother as stereotyped in the oedipus complex. It is as if the mother had ceased to be an object of nostalgia and sensual attachment before the general development of initiative led to a rivalry with the "old man." Behind a fragmentary "oedipus complex," then, appears that deep-seated sense of having been abandoned and let down by the mother, which is the silent complaint behind schizoid withdrawal. The small child felt, it seems, that there was no use regressing, because there was nobody to regress to, no use investing feelings because the response was so uncertain. What remained was action and motion right

up to the breaking point. Where action, too, failed, there was only withdrawal and the standardized smile, and later, psychosomatic disturbance. But wherever our methods permit us to look deeper, we find at the bottom of it all the conviction, the mortal self-accusation, that it was *the child who abandoned the mother*, because he had been in such a hurry to become independent.

American folklore highlights this complex in its original power, in the saga of the birth of John Henry, a colored spiker, who, according to the widely known ballad, later died in an attempt to show that a he-man is the equal of any machine. The saga, not equally well known, goes as follows:¹

Now John Henry was a man, but he's long dead.

The night John Henry was born the moon was copper-colored and the sky was black. The stars wouldn't shine and the rain fell hard. Forked lightning cleaved the air and the earth trembled like a leaf. The panthers squalled in the brake like a baby and the Mississippi River ran upstream a thousand miles. John Henry weighed forty-four pounds.

They didn't know what to make of John Henry when he was born. They looked at him and then went and looked at the river.

"He got a bass voice like a preacher," his mamma said.

"He got shoulders like a cotton-rollin' rouserbout," his papa said.

"He got blue gums like a conjure man," the nurse woman said.

"I might preach some," said John Henry, "but I ain't gonter be no preacher. I might roll cotton on de boats, but I ain't gonter be no cotton-rollin' rouserbout. I might got blue gums like a conjure man, but I ain't gonter git familiar wid de spirits. 'Cause my name is John Henry, and when folks call me by my name, dey'll know I'm a natchal man."

"His name is John Henry," said his mamma. "Hit's a fack."

"And when you calls him by his name," said his papa, "he's a natchal man."

So about that time John Henry raised up and stretched. "Well," he said, "ain't hit about supper-time?"

"Sho hit's about supper-time," said his mamma.

"And after," said his papa.

"And long after," said the nurse woman.

"Well," said John Henry, "did de dogs had they supper?"

"They did," said his mamma.

"All de dogs," said his papa.

"Long since," said the nurse woman.

"Well, den," said John Henry, "ain't I as good as de dogs?"

And when John Henry said that he got mad. He reared back in his bed and broke out the slats. He opened his mouth and yowled, and it put out the lamp. He cleaved his tongue and spat, and it put out the fire. "Don't make me mad!"

¹ Roark Bradford, *John Henry*, Harper Bros., New York, 1931.

said John Henry, and the thunder rumbled and rolled. "Don't let me git mad on de day I'm bawn, 'cause I'm skeered of my ownse'f when I gits mad."

And John Henry stood up in the middle of the floor and he told them what he wanted to eat. "Bring me four ham bones and a pot full of cabbages," he said. "Bring me a bait of turnip greens tree-top tall, and season hit down wid a side er middlin'. Bring me a pone er cold cawn bread and some hot potlicker to wash hit down. Bring me two hog jowls and a kittleful er whippowill peas. Bring me a skilletful er red-hot biscuits and a big jugful er cane molasses. 'Cause my name is John Henry, and I'll see you soon."

So John Henry walked out of the house and away from the Black River Country where all good rousterbouts are born.

There are, of course, analogous stories in other countries, from Hercules to Buslaev. Yet there are specific points in this story which I feel are thoroughly American. To characterize the kind of humor employed here would demand an objective approach beyond my present means. But what we must keep in mind, for further reference, is the fact that John Henry begins with a gigantic gripe: he is thwarted in his enormous appetite; he begs, "don't let me git mad on de day I'm bawn"; he solves the dilemma by jumping on his own feet and by boasting of the capacity of his gut; he will not commit himself to any identity as predetermined by the stigmata of birth; and he leaves to become a man who is nothing but a man before any attempt is made to provide him with what he has demanded.

The Juvenile Era

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN, M.D.

I now want to give a hurried sketch of the exceedingly important juvenile era. Much of what I will be talking about is actually accessible to all of us—namely, a good many of the factors which contributed to the growth and direction of personality in the years between entrance in school and the time when one actually finds a chum—the last landmark which ends the juvenile era, if it ever does end. In the succeeding phase of preadolescence, in the company of one's chum, one finds oneself more and more able to talk about things which one had learned, during the juvenile era, not to talk about. This relatively brief phase of preadolescence, if it is experienced, is probably rather fantastically valuable in salvaging one from the effects of unfortunate accidents up to then.

But the importance of the juvenile era can scarcely be exaggerated, since it is the actual time for becoming social. People who bog down in the juvenile era have very conspicuous disqualifications for a comfortable life among their fellows. A vast number of important things happen in the juvenile era. This is the first developmental stage in which the limitations and peculiarities of the home as a socializing influence begin to be open to remedy. The juvenile era has to remedy a good many of the cultural idiosyncrasies, eccentricities of value, and so on, that have been picked up in the childhood socialization; if it does not, they are apt to survive and color, or warp, the course of development through subsequent periods.

It is in general true that, as one passes over one of these more-or-less determinable thresholds of a developmental era, everything that has gone before becomes reasonably open to influence; this is true even in the organization of the self-system, which, as I suppose I cannot stress too much, is remarkably inclined to maintain its direction. The changes which

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take place at the thresholds of the developmental eras, as outlined here, are far-reaching; they touch upon much of what has already been acquired as personality, often making it somewhat acutely inadequate, or at any rate not fully relevant for the sudden new expanding of the personal horizon. Thus the beginning phase of a developmental era may considerably affect those inappropriate aspects of personality which emerge from what the person has undergone up to then. People going into the juvenile era are all too frequently very badly handicapped for acquiring social skill. Take, for example, the child who has been taught to expect everything, who has been taught that his least wish will be of importance to the parents, and that any obscurities in expressing what he is after will keep them awake nights trying to anticipate and satisfy his alleged needs. Now picture what happens to that child when he goes to school. Or take the petty tyrant who rules his parents with complete neglect of their feelings. Take the child, on the other hand, who has been taught to be completely self-effacing and docilely obedient. These are just a few of the many greatly handicapping patterns of dealing with authority which the home permits or imposes on the child. All these children, if they did not undergo very striking change in the juvenile era, would be almost intolerable ingredients, as they grew up, in a group of any particular magnitude.

In this culture, where education is compulsory, it is the school society that rectifies or modifies in the juvenile era a great deal of the unfortunate direction of personality evolution conferred upon the young by their parents and others constituting the family group. There are two contributions to growth in the juvenile era, the experience of social subordination, and the experience of social accommodation.

In considering *social subordination*, it should be noted that in the juvenile era there is a great change in the type of authority, and in the kind of subordination to authority. The social order, by requiring formal education, provides a succession of new authority figures who are often fortunate in their impersonality. Thus the child is exposed to such variegated authority-carrying figures as the schoolteachers, the recreational directors, the crossing policemen, and so on. Some of these new authority figures have pretty highly stereotyped limitations on the authority they may exercise; in every case, they are almost certainly quite different from the figures in the home, in their exercise of authority and their regard for and interest in the young juvenile. In his relations with his teacher and the various other adult authority figures who now appear, the juvenile is expected—as the child had begun to be by his parents—to do things on demand; and he is given rewards, punishments, and so on, with respect to compliance, noncompliance, rebellion, and what not. But there are more-or-less formally enforced limits to each of these new authorities. At the same time, there is the possibility for

the juvenile to see the interrelation of the behavior of his compeers to success or failure with the new authority figures. And in addition to the adult authorities, there are in almost every school situation malevolent juveniles—bullies. Part of the incredible gain in ability to live comes from one's finding a way of getting by under the episodic and destructive exercises of authority by such compeers.

Occasionally some figure in the home is of such great social importance that the new authority figures are intimidated and treat the child as exceptional. For example, the psychiatrist may see an adult in treatment who is the son of an important politician, and may discover that the potency of this politician-father had so altered the freedom with which corrective authority could be imposed on his son that to an extraordinary extent the person as an adult continues to suffer from warp acquired at home as a child. But even under extraordinary circumstances of birth and rank, there occurs some correcting of the more eccentric aspects of adjustment to authority as soon as the child leaves the home.

In almost all cases, however, the more emphatically effective contribution of the juvenile era is that of *social accommodation*—that is, a simply astounding broadening of the grasp of how many slight differences in living there are; how many of these differences seem to be all right, even if pretty new; and how many of them don't seem to be right, but nonetheless how unwise one is to attempt to correct them. This arises from the contact with, and necessity for a certain amount of accommodation to, people of about the same age with a great variety of personal peculiarities. Some of these juveniles are treated with the utmost crudeness by other juveniles. At this stage—if only because the juvenile has just come from the home situation and his previous experience has been with older and younger siblings, or with really imaginary playmates—there is a truly rather shocking insensitivity to feelings of personal worth in others. Thus the school years are a time when a degree of crudeness in interpersonal relations, very rarely paralleled in later life, is the rule. But, in spite of this, the opportunity which is laid before the young juvenile for catching on to how other people are looked upon by authority figures and by each other is an exceedingly important part of the educative process, even though it is one to which no particular attention is conventionally given. A great deal of this educative experience, which tends to correct idiosyncrasies of past socialization, is never discussed as such. Ten, fifteen, or twenty years after one has left the juvenile era, the experience is extraordinarily inaccessible to ready recall, if, for instance, one is undergoing an intensive study of personality.

The rate of growth of personality through all these earlier phases is truly amazing. We realize this more and more as we begin to analyze the enormous number of rather exquisite judgments which one uses in directing one's life in an incoherent culture among people with many specific

limitations and individual abilities and liabilities. And the amount of education for life that comes from the juvenile era is immensely important. The juvenile can see what other juveniles are doing—either getting away with, or being reprovved for—and can notice differences between people which he had never conceived of, because previously he had had nothing whatever on which to base an idea of something different from his own experience.

Authority Figures as People

Perhaps the most startling aspect of the juvenile acculturation, and the last of the enormous accessions to personality in the juvenile era, is the beginning differentiation of the childhood authority figures—parents and their homologues—as simply people. Failure in this very discrimination of parents as people is often strikingly reflected much later in life. This discrimination is, to a considerable extent, first gained by discovering merits in particular teachers and then discovering demerits in certain other teachers, with or without communication of these experiences to the authority figures at home. But if there has been anything like a healthy development up to this time, these observations *are* discussed in the home. As a result of all this, if it works right, the juvenile gradually has an opportunity to pare the parents down from godlike figures to people. Another great tributary to this type of learning, which appears in most juveniles probably when they are well on in the second grade, is that they learn from other juveniles about their parents. The story most often heard of these earlier school years is, “My father can lick your father”; but it is more important to note that there is simply an amazing amount of checking on the relative virtues and weaknesses of one’s parents, especially if there has been no major disaster to development this far. There is no reason in the world why a juvenile should not come out of this period convinced that few people have parents as good as his—that can happen. But if he comes out of the juvenile era with no freedom to compare his parents with other parents, with teachers, and so on—if they still have to be sacrosanct, the most perfect people on earth—then one of the most striking and important of the juvenile contributions to socialization has sadly miscarried.

Competition and Compromise

Now, it is traditional to say—and the tradition is well justified by our observations on inadequate and inappropriate living in chronological adults—that there are two genera of learning which are practically the special province of the early school situation—competition and compromise. They are sufficiently important that certain provisions for them are made in the primary education of all cultures that value these things at all. Unfortunately, competition is the one that gets far more encouragement,

although it is perhaps the one that is beginning to sink in importance. The juvenile society itself encourages competitive efforts of all kinds, and in the juvenile himself, I should say, such competition is natural. In addition, the authority figures encourage competition—that is, they do in any culture that values competition. There are some cultures that do not value competition; in those cultures, the tendencies of juveniles to compete appear, but are subjected to inhibitory influence by the authority figures. In our culture, these tendencies are rather vigorously encouraged, so much so, in fact, that if one is physically handicapped or, for some other reason, very bad at competitive performances that are *de rigueur*, then one is practically taught that one is not really fit to be around—that there is something rather profoundly wrong with one.

The other of this pair of elements, compromise, is also invariably enforced by the juvenile society itself, and to a certain extent is encouraged by the school authorities or the juvenile authority figures. Both competition and compromise, while very necessary additions to one's equipment for living with one's fellows, are capable of being developed into outstandingly troublesome traits of the personality. In what I call chronically juvenile people one sees a competitive way of life in which nearly everything that has real importance is part of a process of getting ahead of the other fellow. And if there is also a malevolent transformation of personality, getting the other fellow down becomes the outstanding pattern in the integration of interpersonal relations. This is another of these instances of arrest of development, which is not to say that a chronic juvenile continues in a great many ways to be strikingly like a person, let us say, in the fifth grade of grammar school; it merely means that there are warps in the freedom for interpersonal relations which relate back to the juvenile developmental phase and to particularly unfortunate experiences there. Now under some circumstances compromise also becomes a vice, so that we find people going on from the juvenile era who are perfectly willing to yield almost anything, as long as they have peace and quiet, as they are apt to put it. And that is another unfortunate outcome of juvenile socialization.

Control of Focal Awareness

Thus the juvenile era is the time when the world begins to be really complicated by the presence of other people. The full educational effort, insofar as that effort is formalized by the school curriculum, by the teaching, and so on, is addressed to the extinction of the autistic from the expressed thought and other behavior of the juvenile. And this learning of successful ways of expression and successful types of performance covers so much ground and receives so much encouragement from all sorts of educative influences—all the way from anxiety to carefully awarded prestige with one's fellows—that by the end of the sixth, seventh, or eighth

grade, a person of normal endowment has given up a great many of the ideas and operations which, in childhood, and in the home, were all right. This, I believe, is the principal factor entering into the so-called latency period, which was one of the important early psychoanalytic concepts. The effect of the juvenile era is, literally, to make it hard to recall what went on in childhood unless it turns out to be perfectly appropriate and easily modified to meet the strenuous attempt by the society to teach the young to talk, to read, and to "act right."

This giving up of the ideas and operations of childhood comes about through the increasing power of the self-system to control focal awareness. And this in turn comes about because of the very direct, crude, critical reaction of other juveniles, and because of the relatively formulable and predictable manifestations of adult authority. In other words, the juvenile has extraordinary opportunity to learn a great deal about security operations, to learn ways of being free from anxiety, in terms of comparatively understandable sanctions and their violations. This is quite different from anything we have discussed up to now. And insofar as the sanctions and the operations which will avoid anxiety make sense, can be consensually validated, the self-system effectively controls focal awareness so that what does not make sense tends to get no particular attention. That is, effective manifestations of awareness are sternly shepherded by anxiety to be more or less in the syntactic mode—the mode of experience which offers some possibility of predicting the novel, and some possibility of real interpersonal communication.

This control of focal awareness results in a combination of the fortunate and the unfortunate uses of selective inattention. The sensible use is that there is no need of bothering about things that don't matter, things that will go all right anyway. But, in many cases, there is an unfortunate use of selective inattention, in which one ignores things that do matter; since one has found no way of being secure about them, one excludes them from awareness as long as possible. In any case, the self-system controls, from well on in the juvenile era, the content of consciousness, as we ordinarily call it—that is, what we know we're thinking about—to a very striking extent.

Sublimatory Reformulations

A part of the educational effort, of course, pertains to the acquiring of rote data and information which is not in any particular sense personal; thus juveniles are taught a great many things that seem to have nothing to do with them, but which they have to know in order to get by the teachers. But I am concerned here with the juvenile educative process which is tributary to success in living. Insofar as it is tributary, it is very largely a manifestation, not of rational analysis and valid formulation, but of the sublimatory reformulation of patterns of behavior and covert process. As

I have said before, this reformulation occurs when a way of behavior that is socially approved is unwittingly substituted for a part of the motivational pattern that is not acceptable to the authority figures and is not tolerated or regarded with esteem by one's fellows; and when this happens there is some remainder of unsatisfied need which is worked off in private reverie process, especially during sleep.

A very great deal of one's education for living, unfortunately, has to be this sort of sublimatory, strikingly unwitting 'catching-on to' how to get a good deal of satisfaction, although not complete satisfaction. Since it is unwitting, it is not particularly represented in useful understanding of one's behavior. But insofar as it is not overloaded, this process gives one great surety in what one is doing; and one's certainty is not even disturbed by the fact that somebody else may reason better to a different end. Thus when a juvenile acquires a pattern of relating himself to someone else which works and is approved, he simply *knows* that what he is doing is right. And this certainty comes about because there is, in the juvenile era, an increasing power of the self-system to control the contents of awareness, and because the acquisition of the pattern is itself unwitting. Since there is no particular reason for anyone to try to bring into the juvenile's awareness how he arrives at these reformulations of behavior, most of us come into adult life with a great many firmly entrenched ways of dealing with our fellow man which we cannot explain adequately. Even in adult therapy, it is fairly difficult for the psychiatrist to attract enough of the patient's attention to one of these sublimatory reformulations to get him to realize that there's something about it quite beyond explaining. People are not even particularly vulnerable to inquiry in this area, because, by the time anybody is apt to be investigating it, they have a whole variety of devices for heading off awkwardness.

Of the learning which goes on in the juvenile era, a very great amount of it, as I have said before, pertains to competitive and compromising operations to preserve some measure of self-esteem, a feeling of personal worth. As the juvenile era progresses—as one gets into fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth grades—one has to notice, from this standpoint of the competitive and the compromising operations in which the self-system is involved, the other person concerned. And the other person will be in one of the three groups of significant people that make up the world of the juvenile—the family, the nonfamily authorities, and the other juveniles. The nature of our social system is such that the juvenile alternates between immediate contact with the family group—no juvenile is apt to be able to throw off the influence of the family group—and immediate contact with the school, in its double aspect of authority carriers and other juveniles.

Ostracism

But as the juvenile era goes on, one of its enormously forceful social

implements is generally manifest in a segregation into groups within the juvenile society itself—that is, the other pupils in the school—which is a reflection of a good deal of the sickness of the larger society in which juvenility is set. An inevitable outcome of differences in background, differences in abilities, differences in speed of maturations, differences in health, and so on, is the establishment of more-or-less in-groups and out-groups. There are often in-groups with respect to one group of things and in-groups with respect to another; and there are often corresponding out-groups in these various areas. But in most juvenile societies there are a certain number of juveniles who definitely are excluded from very much association with those other juveniles who certainly seem to stand high in the esteem of the school authorities, or in the esteem of the juvenile society in general. The segregating influence which makes some people get along fine together, and apparently rate high with the teachers and with the crossing policemen, or which makes them very important to other juveniles even if they rate very low with the authorities—this segregating influence is sharp, and, to the unfortunate juvenile, quite mysterious. One's experience with these people who are in the right place, who have prestige as a group of juveniles—a very loose group, but still a numerical group at least—is apt to make one feel what can now be perfectly correctly called *ostracism*. Thus juveniles, unless fortunate, can feel ostracized; and if they're quite unfortunate, they get a liberal education in how they are kept ostracized.

In any large group of school children habitually in contact with each other, some of the juveniles will definitely suffer from ostracism by a considerable number of others; but these relatively ostracized out-group youngsters have interpersonal relations one with another. Although these relations to some extent take the curse off the ostracism, they usually do not show enough ingenuity or magical potency to make this unlucky group an in-group. And insofar as these associations with other unfortunate juveniles fail, this experience is not tributary to good self-esteem. In other words, members of out-groups, even if they are fairly successful in maintaining internal competition and compromises, usually show pretty durable evidences of their having been in an inferior position with respect to other compeers whom they were compelled to respect, however painfully and unwillingly, because of their social preferment.

Stereotypes

In the juvenile era, one of the additions to acquaintance with social reality which is almost always encountered is the growth of patterns of others' alleged personalities, which, in a great many cases, amount to actual stereotypes. It is apparant that a great many of us make practical use of stereotypes when we say, "He acts like a farmer." This does not usually mean that we have made a great many observations of farmers and have segregated

from all these observations a nuclear group of durable and important traits which are found only in farmers; more probably we are really referring to a stereotype, which may be completely empty of any validifiable meaning. In the juvenile era, the growth of stereotypes which will later disfigure one's ability, or interfere with one's ability, to make careful discriminations about others goes to really lamentable lengths in some instances. These are the stereotypes of persons never encountered in reality, or—perhaps next most troublesome—stereotypes of large groups of humanity on the basis of a solitary instance or a very few instances. Thus, for example, in my own early years, by a series of irrelevant accidents, I heard things said about Jews, but I didn't know any Jews. Because of an extremely fortunate accident of what seemed to be otherwise a very unpleasant developmental history, I did not have very much interest in these vague rumors that I'd never seen exemplified, and so I did not adopt this stereotype. Therefore I emerged into the adult world with some curiosity about these people, whom I thought of as extraordinary, since my own acquaintance with them resulted almost entirely from perusing Holy Writ. I am glad that I did not fix in my mind some of the alleged attributes of Jews which I might have found lying around in certain juveniles, which in turn they, having no actual experience with them, had taken over from parents and other authority figures. Otherwise, I am quite certain that I would have been richly supplied with stereotypes. And these would have been much harder to correct later than was my curiosity as to what the devil the people who wrote the Old Testament must have been like.

Stereotyping can be a source of very real trouble in later life, especially if one is going into a field of work like psychiatry, where the extremely important thing to do is to observe participantly what goes on with another person. If you have a number of implicit assumptions that have not been questioned by you for twenty or twenty-five years about the alleged resemblance of the person before you to some stereotype that you have in your mind, you may find yourself greatly handicapped, for these stereotypes are often viciously incomplete and meaninglessly erroneous.

A great deal of this stereotyping is stamped in, in the juvenile era. Since there is so much to be done in this era and so much pressure on the juvenile to take over any successful patterns for doing it, in our type of school society at least, one of the conspicuous outcomes is that a great many juveniles arrive at preadolescence with quite rigid stereotypes about all sorts of classes and conditions of mankind. One of these stereotypes is about people of the opposite sex. Unless something fortunate intervenes, juveniles pretty nearly have to adopt gross stereotypes of juveniles of the other sex. If you think back to your experience in, say, the first grade, with a particularly attractive playmate who happened to be of the other sex, you may remember how that relationship changed as you went on in juvenile society. And you

may realize that, in spite of all experience which was contrary to the stereotype, you almost had to adopt, by the time you were on the verge of preadolescence, what might be described as the juvenile stereotype of the "girls" or the "boys"—whichever the other sex was—and govern yourself accordingly—publicly at least.

Sometimes there are stereotypes about teachers which are all too easy to accept because of previous unpleasantness with authority figures. Quite often there are stereotypes of juveniles' relations to teachers; and if one is actually teacher's pet, or simply for some reason the teacher is especially interested in one, one has to act under the aegis of the juvenile stereotype of the teacher's pet, and cannot therefore derive any simple profit from what would otherwise be a fortunate accident. I suppose, if only because of the speed with which the awesome varieties of people and behavior are impressed on the juvenile, it's hard indeed to avoid organizing—accessible to awareness—crude classifications of people, performance, and so on, which really are irrational and which later become troublesome stereotypes.

Supervisory Patterns

Stereotyping, to a striking extent, also characterizes the evolution of the juvenile's own self-system, insofar as the personifications of the self are concerned. An almost inevitable outcome of the most fortunate kind of juvenile experience is the appearance of what I call *supervisory patterns* in the already very complex system of processes and personifications that make up the self-system. These supervisory patterns amount in certain instances to subpersonalities—that is, they are "really" imaginary people who are always with one.

Perhaps I can make my point by mentioning three of these supervisory patterns that every one knows most intimately from very prolonged personal experience. When you have to teach, lecture in public, as I am doing, or do any talking in which it's quite important that the other fellow learns something from you, or thinks that you're wonderful, even if obscure, you have as a supervisory pattern a personality whom I might call your *hearer*. Your hearer is strikingly competent in judging the relevancy of what you are saying. This hearer patiently listens to all your harangues in public and sees that the grammar is stuck together and that things that are too opaque are discussed further. In other words, it is really as if a supplementary, or a subordinate, personality worked like thunder to put your thoughts together into some semblance of the English language. My hearer—my particular supervisory pattern—has a certain rather broad composition, which is built out of a great deal of experience in being an essentially solitary, overprivileged juvenile, surrounded by numerous people who were not free from envy. Thus my supervisory pattern is such that I often adjust my remarks fairly well to the needs of, let us say, fifty percent of my

audience. Some people's hearers seem to have been even more singularly uninformed about other people than mine, and these hearers let pass, as adequate and proper, expressions which communicate to very few indeed of those that hear them. But in any event, it is as if there were two people—one who actually utters statements, and another who attempts to see that what is uttered is fairly well adjusted to its alleged purpose.

All of you, whether or not you have a diligent hearer, have now long had, as a supervisory pattern, the *spectator*. The spectator diligently pays attention to what you show to others, and do with others; he warns you when it isn't quite cricket, or it's too revealing, or one thing and another; and he hurriedly adds fog or camouflage to make up for any careless breach. And if any of you write seriously, or even write detective stories, you have another supervisory pattern of this kind—your *reader*. I have been very much interested in the character of my reader, never quite interested enough to conduct an extended investigation to discover his actual origin; but enough to know that he's a charming pill, practically entirely responsible for the fact that I almost never publish anything. He is bitterly paranoid, a very brilliant thinker, and at the same time an extraordinarily wrongheaded imbecile. Thus when I attempt to use the written language to communicate serious thought, I am unhappily under constant harassment to so hedge the words around that the most bitterly critical person will be unable to grossly misunderstand them, and, at the same time, to make them so clear that this wrongheaded idiot will grasp what I'm driving at. The result is, as I say, that I write almost nothing. I usually give it up in the process of revising it.

These supervisory patterns ordinarily come into being in the juvenile era and persist, with some refinements, from then on. Their presence in the self-system may well be stressed from another standpoint: They are only a small part of this very elaborate organization, which we all come to have, for maintaining our feeling of personal worth, our self-respect, for obtaining the respect of others, and for insuring the protection which positions of prestige and preferment confer in our particular society.

Social Judgments and Social Handicaps

In the course of the juvenile era, particularly toward the close of it, one is invariably exposed to judgments and suspected judgments which can be called one's reputation as a juvenile. And in a good many cases, there are very great discrepancies—often quite worthy of inspection in the course of later study of personality—between one's reputation with nonfamily authorities, with other juveniles, and with the family society. With other juveniles, one's reputation is particularly determined by the in-groups and by those juveniles who are manifesting what is called leadership in its more rudimentary form—another of the phenomena of juvenile society as it gets on.

Now, the sorts of things that make up one's reputation in these three areas

of the social world may be suggested if I run over only a few of the contrasts that are, I suppose, with one through life. A person is popular, is average, or is unpopular. In juvenile society, being average has special qualities; for instance, people who can't be popular are much happier being average than being unpopular. Another one of these contrasts is being a good or a bad sport, particularly for males in this culture. Or again, a person is unquestionably bright, or average, or dull. One is assured, or average, or socially diffident. One is superior, or average, or unfortunately inferior with respect to the progress of one's development in interpersonal relations—that is, as we ordinarily say it, in personality development. One is, in other words, outstanding in one's capacity for understanding and invention of new interpersonal patterns, and so on; or one is below average—that is, literally backward in the evolution of interpersonal relations. There can be very real foundations for a juvenile's being backward in this area, if, for example, ill health comes at critical periods and cuts him out of school recurrently, or if something prevents his participation in games which enjoy great prestige in that particular school group. It can come about because of social handicap; this social handicap may be the reputation of one's father as the neighborhood drunkard—things of that kind, which one was not fortunate enough to discover a way to get around. In the good old days, it might be nothing more fatal than the fact that your mother had divorced and remarried. All these things may literally provide such a handicap that one is pretty slow in developing social accommodation. And some of these social handicaps are very real indeed. One of the things which time and time again has shown itself to have been quite disastrous in the history of patients was the social mobility of the parents, which took the juvenile from one school to another at frequent intervals, so that he was always being introduced as a stranger to another group of juveniles. Other things being equal, if one is getting on at all fortunately in juvenile society, it's a very good thing to stay in that group of juveniles throughout the period, or certainly until near the end of the juvenile era. Otherwise one will actually show considerable inferiority in acquiring the complement of interpersonal aptitudes which the juvenile era, at its best, confers. Of course, if one is in a very unfortunate position in a group of juveniles, it is perhaps fortunate if one can get out of it. But continuous upheaval in schooling—and this is strikingly true with service personnel—is apt to leave a very considerable handicap in this and subsequent phases of development.

The Learning of Disparagement

In addition to all this, there are certain more obscure factors which may make one backward, as it were, in growing up. With respect to one's reputation, and particularly with respect to one's superior profit or inferior profit from the juvenile era, there are rather important influences which may be

exerted by the parental group. The particular one that I shall use as an instance is only one of many unfortunate influences which the parents may exercise, which tend to reduce profit from the juvenile era. This is a parental morbidity of security operations, such that the juvenile is taught to disparage others—a common phenomenon on the American scene. It may be the way, for instance, that the significant figure in the home handles a juvenile “misfortune,” such as being average instead of superior. It may occur because the parental figure has always disparaged all people who made her or him uncomfortable. It may occur because one or both parents feel threatened by the revealing nature of juvenile communication and so disparage teachers and other people with whom they feel compared. This disparaging business is really like the dust of the streets—it settles everywhere. It is perhaps not so disastrous in the juvenile era as it is from then on; but it is very disastrous at any time. If you have to maintain self-esteem by pulling down the standing of others, you are extraordinarily unfortunate in a variety of ways. Since you have to protect your feeling of personal worth by noting how unworthy everybody around you is, you are not provided with any data that are convincing evidence of your having personal worth; so it gradually evolves into “I am not as bad as the other swine.” To be the best of swine, when it would be nice to be a person, is not a particularly good way of furthering anything except security operations. When security is achieved that way, it strikes at the very roots of that which is essentially human—the utterly vital role of interpersonal relations.

In the juvenile era this kind of security operation, literally and very significantly, interferes with adequate analysis of personal worth. In other words, if another boy does well and little Willie reports it to mother, and mother promptly knocks the spots off the other boy and his family, that tends to indicate that little Willie’s impression of how the other fellow was behaving was groundless, or that the rewards which the other fellow’s behavior got from teachers, and so on, were undeserved. In other words, one is encouraged to feel incapable of knowing what is good. Learning from human examples is extremely important, as I have stressed; but if every example that seems to be worth emulating, learning something from, is reduced to no importance or worth, then who are the models going to be? I think that this is probably the most vicious of the inadequate, inappropriate, and ineffectual performances of parents with juveniles—this interference with a sound development of appreciation of personal worth, by universal derogatory and disparaging attitudes toward anybody who seems to stand out at all. It is in this way that parents are apt to very markedly handicap the ‘sane’ development of standards of personal worth in their young. To that extent—barring great good fortune in subsequent eras of personality development—they literally guarantee that their children will be barely better than the other swine.

The Conception of Orientation in Living

By the end of the juvenile era, with any good fortune, one has gotten to the point at which it is quite proper to apply the conception of *orientation in living*, as I use the term. *One is oriented in living to the extent to which one has formulated, or can easily be led to formulate (or has insight into), data of the following types: the integrating tendencies (needs) which customarily characterize one's inter-personal relations; the circumstances appropriate to their satisfaction and relatively anxiety-free discharge; and the more or less remote goals for the approximation of which one will forego intercurrent opportunities for satisfaction or the enhancement of one's prestige.* The degree to which one is *adequately oriented* in living is, I believe, a very much better way of indicating what we often have in mind when we speak about how "well integrated" a person is, or what his "character" is in the sense of good, bad, or indifferent.

The juvenile actually has an opportunity to undergo a great deal of social experience, in contrast to the child, who cannot have any orientation in living in the larger world. To the extent that the juvenile knows, or could easily be led to know, what needs motivate his relations with others, and under what circumstances these needs—whether they be for prestige or for anything else—are appropriate and relatively apt to get by without damage to self-respect, to this extent the person has gotten a great deal out of his first big plunge into socialization. If this comes off successfully, he inevitably has established some things which we can really call his values, from the pursuit of which he will not be deflected by other things that come along and might be obtained; in other words, a striking aspect of good orientation in living is the extent to which foresight governs the handling of intercurrent opportunities.

To the extent that a juvenile has been denied an opportunity for a good orientation in living, he will from henceforth show a trait which is a lamentable nuisance: he will be so anxious for the approval and unthinking immediate regard of others that one might well think he lived merely to be liked, or to amuse. And in some cases, that, I fear, is about true.

So, if one has been fortunate in the juvenile era, his orientation in living among other people is fairly well organized. And if his orientation in living is not well organized, his future contributions to the human race will probably be relatively unimportant or will be troublesome, unless he has very good fortune in the next succeeding phases of personality development.

Traumatic Factors in the Background of 116 Delinquent Boys

JOSEPH LANDER, M.D.

One of the many factors playing a part in the production of delinquency is the existence of emotional traumata very early in the life, traumata which merely lay the foundations for subsequent emotional and social maladjustment. Later incidental factors determine the form of maladjustment, whether it be eccentricity, delinquency, neurosis, etc. It appears to me that insufficient attention has been paid to early emotional factors in the lives of delinquents, factors which on theoretical grounds should be of basic importance. In the course of working with delinquent boys at the Hawthorne—Cedar Knolls School of the Jewish Board of Guardians, I was impressed by the frequency and gravity of parental shortcomings. It was striking to note how frequently serious emotional problems in the home had been present at or before the birth of the child. This paper is an investigation of some of the problems; parental rejection, parental incompatibility, parental emotional instability, or defective parental social adjustment.

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A serious problem in any such discussion is the definition of concepts like "maternal rejection," "parental incompatibility," etc. . . . No case was included in any of the several categories unless the pathology was sufficiently grave and overt as to leave no doubt in the minds of the observers that such inclusion was entirely justified. If there were doubts, the case was not included. Data were obtained mostly from examination of case records which had been compiled before this study was undertaken or planned. This

Joseph Lander, "Traumatic Factors in the Background of 116 Delinquent Boys," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1941), pp. 150-156. Copyright, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc. Reproduced by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

point deserves emphasis because the objectivity of histories taken *after* an investigative project has been formulated may be open to question.

Maternal rejection was considered under several headings. Pre-natal maternal rejection was considered to be present if the mother stated that she had tried to abort when pregnant with the subject, or had wished that he would be born dead, or had indicated when pregnant that conception was unwelcome.

* * * *

In addition to these 20 instances of pre-natal rejection, there were 6 cases in which this attitude began quite clearly before the child was two. Such early postnatal maternal rejection was considered to be present if the mother gave the child up for adoption or placement when such a move was obviously motivated by lack of interest in him rather than by economic necessity, physical illness, or other problems.

* * * *

In the remaining 29 cases of maternal rejection this problem was equally marked but its overt onset was later than the first or second year of the child's life so far as could be definitely established, though it was probably present since the boy's earliest childhood. In some rejection took the shape of prolonged and almost painstaking punishment, in others it was more in the nature of gross long-standing neglect and indifference. The mothers in this group were quick to seek removal of the child from the home, were apparently quite unwilling to condone relatively minor offences, or discriminated overtly against the child in favor of his siblings.

* * * *

Paternal rejection occurred in 40 cases, manifesting itself in attitudes quite similar to those illustrated above. Among the fathers, however, there were relatively more instances of complete indifference, and fewer of serious physical cruelty than was true among the mothers. Not included here were two illegitimate boys who were the results of casual sexual contacts. They were excluded from the group of paternal rejection because it may well have been that their fathers never realized having attained paternity and could therefore hardly be accused of neglecting them. Included in this group were cases like F. M., whose father wrote him on literally innumerable occasions that he would visit at Hawthorne, but actually came only once or twice in the course of more than 3 years, each time sending some feeble excuse. When arrangements were being made to parole F. M. the father agreed, under pressure, to pay for his support in a boy's club, but made it clear that he considered the payment as a form of nuisance value to keep the boy from visiting him. He showed no interest in helping to plan for the boy's future

though in his position as manager of a large movie house he could easily have helped his son obtain a job. This attitude prevailed from the boy's earliest childhood.

TABLE I. NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF BOYS FITTING INTO THE RESPECTIVE CATEGORIES

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Maternal rejection	55	47%
Paternal rejection	40	34
Parental incompatibility	50	44
"Disturbed" mothers	31	27
"Disturbed" fathers	36	31

Parental incompatibility was considered to play a role in a boy's emotional development if there was a history of divorce, separation, desertion or appearances in family courts during the boy's early life; if the marriage had been unwanted by either mate and entered into only because of pregnancy or family pressure; or if there was a history of severe quarreling since the beginning of the marriage. Not included here are, again, the parents of the two illegitimate boys to whom reference has been made. There were 50 such family groups of parental incompatibility in the series of 116 boys. Since there were in this series two pairs of brothers, there were 114 pairs of parents. The stories are replete with grossest mutual abuse and recrimination, divorce, innumerable separations and reconciliations followed by further separations; frank infidelity and physical cruelty. Some women stated frankly that marriage had been merely an effort to attain economic security or escape from an intolerable home situation.

* * * *

We come now to the group of parents who showed severe emotional instability, serious maladjustment to society, or defective ethical standards. Thirty-one mothers showed enough disturbance to warrant inclusion in this group. Some were actually institutionalized as psychotic, in others a formal diagnosis of psychosis or severe psychoneurosis had been made, without institutionalization. In some mothers the behavior over a period of months or years was such as to leave little doubt that a diagnosis of psychopathic personality or psychosis was clearly justified. A number of them were prostitutes or had been institutionalized as sexual delinquents on the basis of more or less formal prostitution. The various types of pathology included obsessional pre-occupation with regulation of the child's life to the minutest detail, alcoholism, drug-addiction, kleptomania, suicide of a woman who had run a gambling house professionally, suicidal attempts, a woman who forced her children to peddle gum and candy on the subways

TABLE II.

<i>Number of described Traumatic factors</i>	<i>Boys</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
1	37	32%
2	25	21
3	25	21
4	9	8
5	3	2

even after they had been arrested and she had been warned against it. There was no economic need for her to supplement the family income in this way.

Thirty-six fathers fell into similar classifications. Police records were much more common among the fathers than among the mothers, as were such problems as alcoholism and gambling to a serious degree. Not included was one man who had served a prison sentence for larceny some years prior to the boy's birth but who, in the next 19 years, had apparently been a sober, hard-working and upright citizen, very unhappy with his wife but quite fond of the boy.

Of the 116 boys in the total series, 99 had suffered from one or more of the traumatic factors listed. Some had been subjected to the influence of as many as five adverse forces, as in the case of H. J. who had to contend with maternal rejection; a semi-psychotic mother; serious parental incompatibility ending in separation; a father who was quite irresponsible toward the family—unfaithful, irritable, and brutal; severe active rejection at the hands of this father. Of the 17 boys *not* listed under the several categories of traumata because the data were not overwhelmingly convincing, there was very suggestive evidence in many.

It should be emphasized again that these boys are not representative delinquents, and that the mere fact of their having been at Hawthorne is indicative of a relatively severe degree of social maladjustment in the vast majority of those included in this study. With this point in mind we may consider the implications of the observed facts.

Granting that family groups such as these can be brought to the attention of appropriate agencies while the children are very young, what can be accomplished prophylactically or therapeutically? Diphtheria and small-pox continued to menace society until attempts at therapy were replaced by widespread prophylaxis; delinquency presents an analogous situation in that treatment measures deal effectively with only a very small percentage of the cases which are being produced by society in such quantity. It appears to

me most unlikely that either casework or psychiatric treatment could have altered these parents to a degree which would permit the children to develop in a normal environment. . . .

On the other hand, I do not believe that many of the foster homes available today meet the problem, nor is institutionalization the solution. Only infrequently do foster homes provide the emotional warmth and security of which these children are in such grave need before they reach the fourth or fifth year. Removal from the home, even when that home is as diseased emotionally as here described, is very often another severe blow to the child. Orphanages with a roster of several hundred or several thousand are even less likely to meet the child's emotional requirements.

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An elaboration of the kindergarten and pre-kindergarten schools could theoretically meet many of the needs of these children. This theoretical possibility could become a reality only under certain sharply defined and rigidly met conditions. Groups would have to be limited to a maximum of 10 or 12. The teachers—they would be far more than teachers—should be chosen with somewhat less regard to the number of college credits or night-school certificates they possess, and with much more emphasis on a careful and exhaustive study of personalities.

Merely presenting the child with a large clean room full of progressive toys will not permit such a class or nursery to compete successfully with unorganized street play as a way of spending time. The classroom must provide what the child cannot find elsewhere; something he needs and seeks, and to which he will in most cases respond very quickly and warmly; security in the affection of an understanding and encouraging adult.

There are several reasons why I believe it very important for children to remain in such classes most of the day, and not merely for 3 or 4 hours. It is not only that the child needs to be protected from the overt and subtle traumata to which he is subjected in such homes as described. Just as important is the need for the child to attach himself to adults whose personality patterns are more adequate than are the ones he found in his own home. The defective character structure of these children, with their remarkable lack of guilt, is not merely due to their reaction to frustration and rejection. At least equally important is the defective adult personality which serves as their model.

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Social Tensions and the Inhibition of Thought

ELSE FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK

Social tensions such as those with which we have been faced for the past few decades originate in the structure of society as a whole. These structures are shaped, in the ultimate analysis, by historical, economic, sociological and political factors. Since in turn all these forces depend on psychological processes for their mediation, it is obvious that psychological dynamics play into the resulting course of events.

The aid of psychology is indispensable in the elucidation of compensatory and distortive social trends such as those prompted by tension and fear. In the face of concrete psychological evidence, which is continually accumulating, it would be extremely difficult to shut one's eyes to the fact that irrationality and the ensuing distortion of perception and projection of hostility as well as of other thwarted tendencies enters, during times of tension, the social and political scene in an incisive fashion. Some of this evidence is to be surveyed later in this paper. Irrationality and all of its manifestations, although more prominent under certain specified historical and socio-economic conditions, cannot be explained within the framework of such conditions alone; it must be viewed, in addition, from a psychological point of view.

Recent events have high-lighted the well-known psychological fact that individuals, when faced with traumatic events of an overwhelming and unintelligible nature, are more prone to give up their mature and realistic ways of coping with difficulties and to resort to more immature patterns of reaction. Such so-called regression is by no means the only way of dealing with complex and anxiety-inducing situations. But since it is a frequent type of reaction, going in the direction of minimum effort, we shall first analyze this pattern of reaction. Later we shall turn to the more positive and con-

Else Frenkel-Brunswick, "Social Tensions and the Inhibition of Thought," Social Problems, Vol. 2, No. 2 (October, 1954), pp. 75-81. Reprinted by permission.

structive and, at the same time, more realistic ways of counteracting threatening situations.

One of the most crucial psychological aspects of international tensions and of the defensive and controlling measures which are apt to accompany any threat to national security is given by the inhibitory effects they may exert upon independent and critical judgment. We must therefore pay special attention to this problem. Experimental and clinical observation of adolescents who either grew up in an atmosphere of tension or were experimentally exposed to frustrations permitted me to study in slow motion the effects of such threats upon thinking. By means such as these we may hope to understand better the analogous processes in the social and political area.

The cognitive syndrome which the adolescents studied were found to display I have proposed to call "intolerance of ambiguity." Ambiguity as referred to here has nothing to do with confusion or inarticulate vagueness. On the contrary, it must be seen as the basis of flexibility, creativeness and imagination. Intolerance of ambiguity, by contrast, is characterized by the presence of a rigid cognitive superstructure in which everything opaque and complex is avoided as much as possible, and which obviously purports to compensate, if in the end unsuccessfully, for the inequities of the fear- and conflict-ridden emotional under-structure. The inharmonious nature of this double layer pattern is revealed in many of the following specific aspects of intolerance of ambiguity which deserve special mention, such as: the tendency toward unqualified, black - white and either - or solutions; other forms of over-simplified dichotomizing, stereotype, perseveration and mechanical repetition of sets and of faulty hypotheses; compartmentalization and piecemeal approach; quest for unqualified certainty as accomplished by pedantic narrowing of meanings, by stress on familiarity, by inaccessibility to new experience or by a segmentary randomness and an absolutizing of those aspects of reality which have been preserved; premature closure and definiteness achieved either by diffuseness and sterile rumination or by restriction to concrete and unessential detail; satisfaction with subjective yet unimaginative, over-concrete or over-generalized solutions. There is the danger that propaganda may take advantage of this syndrome by the use of generalities combined with reference to unessential concrete details.

The subtle but profound distortion of reality which is the result of the elimination of ambiguities is, in the last analysis, precipitated by the fact that stereotypical categorization can never do justice to all the possible aspects of reality. Thus there is reluctance to give up what had seemed certain, a tendency not to see what does not harmonize with an earlier bias; assumptions once made, even though proved faulty and out of keeping with reality, tend to be repeated over and over and not to be corrected in the face of new evidence.

It must be granted that these various forms of rigidity and avoidance of ambiguity might, for a time, reduce anxiety. But whenever differentiation and adaptability to change are required, this adjustment will run the risk of breaking down. The same individuals who tend to display this rigid and perseverative, overly-cautious approach to thinking tend also towards impulsive, chaotic and confused behavior once the task becomes more difficult. Both of these ways of responding represent efforts to avoid uncertainty, one by fixation to, the other by breaking away from, the given realities.

Dramatized, concrete and at the same time global, diffuse and undifferentiated types of thinking are well-known characteristics of early developmental stages as such. However, the atmosphere in the home determines whether such primitive reactions become fixated or whether progress toward higher developmental stages can take place. For this latter course a reduction of fear, greater relaxation, acceptance of spontaneity and autonomy, and tolerance of insecurity and uncertainty are necessary requirements. Realism and creative cognitive penetration presuppose advances of this kind in general psychological maturity.

Anxiety-inducing social and political situations may bring to the fore the irrational elements that lurk behind the feeling of helplessness regardless of how permissive the original family situation might have been. In this manner political and social institutions have a direct bearing upon the emotional and cognitive outlook. The effects upon the thinking and creativity of adults under conditions of social and political over-control are probably quite analogous to those which are apparent in the growing child under the intimidating, punitive and paralyzing influence of an over-disciplined, authoritarian home atmosphere.

There can, however, be no doubt—and we shall come to this point later—that different personality structures do react differently to external pressures. But at the same time we must be aware of the fact that tensions and pressures are not only likely to bring authoritarian personalities to the fore but to reinforce authoritarian trends in individuals who otherwise would remain democratic-minded.

Fearful and frightened individuals have a tendency toward total, seemingly unquestioning surrender to every manner of authority; yet upon probing into the depth layer this surrender invariable proves profoundly ambivalent. The same rigid surface-conformity is exercised towards accepted standards of behavior even though the standards may sometimes be unwritten and those of a small in-group. And this kind of conformity is accompanied by an unrealistic and punitive condemnation of those who deviate from such norms.

The compulsive type of conformity just described, with its all-or-none character, differs in important respects from genuine and constructive conformity. First, it is excessive because it compensates for feelings of

uncertainty and the attendant fear of becoming an outcast, and because it often serves the function of covering up the underlying resentment towards the social system as a whole, unconscious though this resentment may be.

A second characteristic of the compulsive conformist is given by his tendency to distort and simplify the system of norms and commands in the direction of what one may call unidimensional interpretation. Rules are adopted or enforced which are largely nonfunctional caricatures of our social institutions, based as they are on a misunderstanding of the ultimate intent of these institutions. In many ways one may even speak of a defiance of an existing culture by compulsive external conformity to its rules. By virtue of the distortions of the spirit of existing institutions, compulsive conformity in certain ways constitutes a form of subversion.

The absence of a genuine incorporation of the values of society accounts for the rigidity of the conformity; at the same time it accounts for a certain unreliability, a readiness to shift allegiance suddenly and completely to other, sometimes diametrically opposite, authorities or standards. This unreliability is a third characteristic of the compulsive conformist. It is out of anxiety that he adheres to the familiar and the unquestioned; it is out of the same anxiety that he readily turns against the very society the values of which he has never espoused with more than a divided heart. He pays very little attention to the social and political realities involved but follows the lure of a few slogans, especially when these are cast in the dichotomies of which we have spoken above.

Let me now turn to the possible implications of this picture upon the situation created by the continued international tensions of the present. One possible outcome could be a profound transformation of our society through the eventual emergence of what Laswell has called the "garrison police state" in which power is concentrated in a small group and the community is strictly regimented in the name of common defense.

Orwell has given a vivid and uninviting description of such a state in operation. The psychological end-stages of such a development could be intellectual surrender, a craving for unrealistically absolute and definite answers, and a search for leaders whose aura of strength, power and glory seems to afford surcease from feelings of isolation, frustration and helplessness, and whose doctrines seem to provide an all-embracing answer to the conflicts and confusions of life and relief from the burdens of self-determination. Thus just those states would be brought about which we set out to combat in our democratic society.

Examples of apodictic and nonrational systems are given by the economic and social doctrines of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Though the two differ in many particulars, both offer an essentially unscientific metaphysical, all-inclusive "Weltanschauung" which has the appearance of definiteness. The solutions are presented in a dogmatic, absolutistic and

often inarticulate and unintelligible way and are formulated for the explicit purpose of by-passing the processes of reasonable consideration.

It must be noted that under such regimes free inquiry and thought is stifled not only in the touchy domain of the social sciences and psychology. The crippling effects readily extend to such seemingly remote domains as theory construction in physics. We have witnessed this in the official rejection of the system of Einstein on the part of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, a reaction which could not but have an inhibitory effect on the creative imagination of individual scientists as well. The Nazi psychologist Jaensch accused Einstein of dissolving reality, and the Communists accused Einstein of idealism.

Essentially the two accusations are very similar. Both involve the rejection of a shift in the traditional interpretation of a given set of concrete data, that is, they involve an intolerance of cognitive ambiguity. Both accusations ignore the basic truth that all creative thought and all reasoning, being manifestations not of the stimulus, *per se*, but of the responding organism, essentially involve the utilization of psychological ambiguity.

The problem arises as to how long a society can exist in which there is a certain mastery of technology but in which the social, political and human outlook is impoverished to the point of dogmatic or distortive schemes.

Jaensch, who was the Hitler-appointed permanent president of the German Psychological Association, has explicitly espoused rigidity, perseverance and avoidance of differences of opinion as an ideal of discipline. Systematic adoption of rigid environmental controls by totalitarian regimes thus not only serves to inhibit or distort imagination and to prevent the acquisition of the theoretical skills so necessary for the comprehension of reality, but even leads to a glorification of this defect and to its being turned into a propagandistic weapon. The thorough rigidification of a nation which may in the end be achieved by such means must lead to a lack of adaptability and thus finally to self-destruction. Toynbee warned of this danger when he said that nations are rarely murdered and suggested that it may be more appropriate to say that they commit suicide.

Are the dreaded trends just described inevitable? Are increased narrow-mindedness, over-simplification, and exclusion the only possible reactions to existing threats, insecurities and tensions? We do not believe so. On the contrary, there is good psychological evidence that the same forces which bring about regression to immature intellectual devices may also have a very different, indeed an opposite, effect, namely that of promoting maturity and wisdom. As far as individuals are concerned, the emergence of one or the other of the alternative patterns depends on the initial strength and maturity of the personality involved. We may hypothesize that given a certain original distribution of relative dominance of one pattern over the other, this dominance may be made more pronounced in either direction by conflict

and tension. It goes without saying that in order to bring out fully the destructive or the constructive alternative, society must lend its support to the trend in question, or at least some aspect of the social institutions or some authoritative figures must further the respective pattern or personality organization.

Considering now the more constructive alternative just suggested, the history of individuals and of nations shows that objective threats, difficulties and uncertainties frequently have mobilized and strengthened rather than stifled and paralyzed existing internal resources, creativity, and moral stamina. The existence of uncertainty and conflict may, furthermore, heighten instead of reduce the intensity and scope of conscious concentration and of awareness in general, leading to a widening of understanding, broader identification, and intensified sympathy and compassion. Under this pattern, the more confusing and misleading the various manifestations of a complex situation become, the greater will become the stimulus and the power to penetrate to the essence of the matters involved, and the greater will be the striving for a kind of clarity which does not involve sacrificing the existing ambiguities. Reasoned deliberation and a many-sided orientation will thus be sharpened rather than blunted in the face of complexities which call for subtle differentiations if they are to be successfully resolved.

Over-all dichotomies and dramatizations in which individuals are conceived of as either conforming and altogether good or as deviant and altogether bad must therefore be replaced by the differentiation between the kind of individual who enriches his culture by some degree of independence and the kind of individual who in effect shows a global defiance of the democratic institutions and thus is the truly subversive personality. It is the differentiation between constructive and compulsive conformity that allows us to draw the line between realistic protection against actual treason and unrealistic, diffuse expectations of betrayal and generalized suspiciousness.

The rationality that characterizes this kind of independence does by no means imply amorality and freedom from obligation. On the contrary, genuine ethical behavior involves a comprehension of the issues involved, a facing of conflicts and of one's own guilt and a readiness to accept the anguish involved in such an open confrontation.

Furthermore, the avoidance of the absolute quest for certainty does not imply boundless relativism, cynicism, and morbid doubt. On the contrary, we find the so-called need for absolutes often combined with basic disbelief and general distrust.

In surveying present-day writings on the subject we find many authors resigned to the fact that irrational, absolute and dogmatic argumentation will readily incite to action while the rational, many-sided approach frequently seems to prove inherently inhibitory and as leading to a barren and

sterile conception of life. Against this we must hold that the virility of a nation cannot in the end be grounded in blind fanaticism, militant aggressiveness, and short-cuts to action. Our findings on the authoritarian personality pattern show that individuals who are more open to reason and facts are in general at the same time those who have a more differentiated internal life and deeper and more reliable, if often relatively calm, emotions. They are also those who, although less fanatic and less compulsive, show more consistency, conviction and dedication in their principles and ideals.

But the fact remains that extreme or highly obvious positions lend themselves more readily to compact verbal formulation and thus give the false impression of solving some of the perennial perplexities of our society. Such definite and unqualified statements are especially suited for being put into the service of either very concrete or very general assertions. In the task of a positive formulation of the democratic outlook and values, on the other hand, the difficulties intrinsic in the complexities, ambiguities, flexibilities, and less fetching logicalities of social reality must be faced in an explicit manner.

We must assume variations between different cultures with respect to their readiness to tolerate ambiguity. This readiness relates not only to the structure of social and political institutions but is also connected with, and expressed in, the philosophical and psychological outlook. For the United States, a long-range optimism seems justified to this writer. On the one hand it must be granted that there are probable reinforcers of the intolerant personality pattern in our culture. Among them we may list the following as the most important: presence of external threats; cultural emphasis on success and power; the necessity of proving oneself, if by no other means than by establishing social distance to those who are allegedly lower on the social scale; increasing standardization; increasing unintelligibility of political and social forces; presence of a well-developed publicity machinery capable of being used to influence public opinion; increasing difficulties in a genuine identification with society, resulting from the anonymity of big organizations and the ensuing isolation of the individual; some tendency toward a short-cut to action, toward externalization, and toward avoidance of introspection and contemplation.

Fortunately it seems that, in this country at least, these potential reinforcers of tendencies toward rigidity are more than counterbalanced by a long series of powerful reinforcers of tolerance for ambiguity and for liberalism in general. The most outstanding of these are the democratic political tradition with its distribution of power which makes a check-and-balance system possible; the tradition of a pragmatic philosophy which, in contrast to the German philosophical tradition, is undogmatic and anti-metaphysical; the widespread preference for scientific and rational explanations; the relative weakness of the tendencies toward over-systematization and fanati-

cism; the "melting pot" ideal; the protective attitude toward the weak; the emphasis on individualism; the equalitarian relationships between children and parents, and between pupils and teachers; the readiness to criticize governmental as well as parental authorities; the increased choices offered by technological progress; the rising attempts to understand the social and economic processes in their inconsistencies and irrationalities; and the ability and readiness to sustain conflict, suspense and tentativeness.

The two patterns are in opposition to each other not only within our civilization as a whole, but within every single individual. How their struggle will end depends to a large extent on the interplay of political, social and psychological forces in their entirety; but it also depends on the number and initiative of mature and rational individuals in our society.

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PART B

Interpersonal and Intergroup Conflict

1. *Threat, Fear, Frustration*
2. *Hostility*
3. *Aggression*
4. *Social Conflict*
5. *Behavior under Stress*

CHAPTER 1 • Threat, Fear, Frustration

Organized and Unorganized Groups under Fear and Frustration

JOHN R. P. FRENCH

Summary of Results and Interpretations

Sixteen groups composed of college students and of members of a neighborhood house were exposed to experimental conditions of frustration produced by the attempt to solve objectively insoluble problems and to a fear situation produced by suffusing the locked room with smoke in simulation of a fire.

The groups showed large differences in the strength of frustration and great differences in behavior. Among others, the following responses were recorded in the descriptive protocols: (1) various forms of escape from the field, such as leaving the group, playing with substitute problems, temporary withdrawal from the problems, satiation, boredom, fatigue, etc. (2) what might be called expressions of frustration, such as verbalized discouragement, talk of failure, groaning, undirected swearing, strained facial expressions, tics, physical tenseness, etc. (3) aggression against the problems, against minor annoyances (such as the buzzer), and self-aggression. (4) other responses such as cheating, disorganization of the group activity, increased organization and cooperation, increased motiv-

John R. P. French, "Organized and Unorganized Groups under Fear and Frustration," University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, Vol. 20 (1944), pp. 301-303. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

ation, division of the group into factions, the development of scapegoats, increased social freedom and communication among members, etc.

The quantitative comparisons of groups revealed that the greatest variability among groups occurred in variables (*e.g.*, in aggression, friendliness, social restraint, etc.) which depend much on the social character of the situation.

For such social behavior the variability within groups was significantly less than the variability among groups. Thus the observable atmosphere of a group produced similar behavior in its members in respect to aggression, friendliness, and fear.

Comparison of the organized with the unorganized groups revealed that the former showed definitely *more* social freedom, we-feeling, interdependence, equality of participation in the group activity, motivation, frustration, and aggression against other members of the group.

The most important dynamic differences between the two types of groups seem to be: (1) there is higher social restraint among members of the unorganized groups; (2) there is stronger identification of the members with the group in the organized groups; (3) the powerfield of the group is stronger in the organized groups.

The high social restraint in the unorganized groups accounts for the fact that the members showed more unequal participation in the group activity. There is also some evidence which indicates that high social restraint and lack of communication among members reduces the strength of the powerfield of the group.

The greater interdependence of behavior among members of the organized groups can be derived from the stronger powerfield of the group and the greater identification of its members.

The greater motivation of the organized groups can also be derived from the stronger powerfield of the group and the greater identification of the members, for the forces induced by the powerfield of the group will be stronger and these induced forces will be more readily accepted by the members.

Evidence was presented which tends to support the following propositions which are included in the Yale theory of frustration and aggression: (1) the strength of frustration is dependent, in part, on the strength of motivation; (2) frustration frequently produces aggression; (3) aggression against others may be inhibited by an atmosphere of social restraint; (4) aggression against others is directed toward those persons who are perceived as interfering agents; (5) social restraint decreases the ratio of direct to indirect aggression; (6) there is some inconclusive evidence that the occurrence of aggressive behavior has a cathartic effect.

A topological interpretation, involving somewhat different definitions and propositions, seemed to account for some of the experimental facts

more adequately. The strength of frustration (defined as a state of emotional tension) is a function of the strength of the weaker of opposed driving and restraining forces when this weaker force is greater than a certain minimum. Such frustration produces a wild variety of responses depending on the momentary structure of the situation. Aggression results most frequently when the aggressive behavior is either a path to the frustrated goal or a path away from a negative valence. Aggression as a goal response occurs when there is a conflict of hostile powerfields so that one of the opposing forces producing frustration is an induced force.

On the basis of this topological interpretation, a number of revisions in the definitions and propositions of the Yale theory were suggested. Most important, the experimental evidence indicates a need for further qualification of the basic postulate that frustration or conflict always produces an instigation to some form of aggression (although not always actual aggression).

In the fear situation produced by suffusing the locked room with smoke in simulation of a fire, the reactions of the groups varied from skepticism to panic. In most groups there was an overlapping of the two situations—a real fire and a hoax—in an unstable equilibrium which was resolved in one direction or the other. Whether the group showed fear or skepticism was dependent primarily on the social situation which determined to a large extent the degree of differentiation and connectedness of regions in the cognitive structure of the members.

The organized groups showed more fear than the unorganized groups because of less differentiation and connectedness of the cognitive structure. In addition to the strong effect of the group atmosphere, the cognitive structure of the members of these groups was affected by their greater previous frustration, less psychological sophistication, and (in some groups) lower education, intelligence, and age.

The results of this preliminary experiment indicate that the total behavior technique is a fruitful approach for studying experimentally the dynamics of group behavior. Comparisons with other studies indicate that it is possible to study experimentally phenomena that are dynamically similar to complex social phenomena. It is probable that such an approach will greatly increase our understanding of hitherto unapproachable problems in the field of social psychology.

The Effect of Threat upon Interpersonal Bargaining

MORTON DEUTSCH AND ROBERT M. KRAUSS

A bargain is defined in *Webster's Unabridged Dictionary* as "an agreement between parties settling what each shall give and receive in a transaction between them"; it is further specified that a bargain is "an agreement or compact viewed as advantageous or the reverse." When the term "agreement" is broadened to include tacit, informal agreements as well as explicit agreements, it is evident that bargains and the processes involved in arriving at bargains ("bargaining") are pervasive characteristics of social life.

The definition of bargain fits under sociological definitions of the term "social norm." In this light, the experimental study of the bargaining process and of bargaining outcomes provides a means for the laboratory study of the development of certain types of social norms. But unlike many other types of social situations, bargaining situations have certain distinctive features that make it relevant to consider the conditions that determine whether or not a social norm will develop as well as those that determine the nature of the social norm if it develops. Bargaining situations highlight the possibility that, even where cooperation would be mutually advantageous, shared purposes may not develop, agreement may not be reached, and interaction may be regulated antagonistically rather than normatively.

The essential features of a bargaining situation exist when:

1. Both parties perceive that there is the possibility of reaching an agreement in which each party would be better off, or no worse off, than if no agreement were reached.
2. Both parties perceive that there is more than one such agreement that could be reached.

Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, "The Effect of Threat upon Interpersonal Bargaining," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1960), pp. 181-189. Reprinted by permission.

3. Both parties perceive each other to have conflicting preferences or opposed interests with regard to the different agreements that might be reached.

Everyday examples of bargaining include such situations as: the buyer-seller relationship when the price is not fixed, the husband and wife who want to spend an evening out together but have conflicting preferences about where to go, union-management negotiations, drivers who meet at an intersection when there is no clear right of way, disarmament negotiations.

In terms of our prior conceptualization of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949) bargaining is thus a situation in which the participants have mixed motives toward one another: on the one hand, each has interest in cooperating so that they reach an agreement; on the other hand, they have competitive interests concerning the nature of the agreement they reach. In effect, to reach agreement the cooperative interest of the bargainers must be strong enough to overcome their competitive interests. However, agreement is not only contingent upon the *motivational* balances of cooperative to competitive interests but also upon the situational and *cognitive* factors which facilitate or hinder the recognition or invention of a bargaining agreement that reduces the opposition of interest and enhances the mutuality of interest.¹

These considerations lead to the formulation of two general, closely related propositions about the likelihood that a bargaining agreement will be reached.

1. Bargainers are more likely to reach an agreement, the stronger are their cooperative interests in comparison with their competitive interests.
2. Bargainers are more likely to reach an agreement, the more resources they have available for recognizing or inventing potential bargaining agreements and for communicating to one another once a potential agreement has been recognized or invented.

From these two basic propositions and additional hypotheses concerning conditions that determine the strengths of the cooperative and competitive interests and the amount of available resources, we believe it is possible to explain the ease or difficulty of arriving at a bargaining agreement. We shall not present a full statement of these hypotheses here but turn instead to a description of an experiment that relates to Proposition 1.

The experiment was concerned with the effect of the availability of threat upon bargaining in a two-person experimental bargaining game. Threat is defined as the expression of an intention to do something detrimental to

¹Schelling in a series of stimulating papers on bargaining (1957, 1958) has also stressed the "mixed motive" character of bargaining situations and has analyzed some of the cognitive factors which determine agreements.

the interests of another. Our experiment was guided by two assumptions about threat:

1. If there is a conflict of interest and one person is able to threaten the other, he will tend to use the threat in an attempt to force the other person to yield. This tendency should be stronger, the more irreconcilable the conflict is perceived to be.
2. If a person uses threat in an attempt to intimidate another, the threatened person (if he considers himself to be of equal or superior status) would feel hostility toward the threatener and tend to respond with counter-threat and/or increased resistance to yielding. We qualify this assumption by stating that the tendency to resist should be greater, the greater the perceived probability and magnitude of detriment to the other and the less the perceived probability and magnitude of detriment to the potential resister from the anticipated resistance to yielding.

The second assumption is based upon the view that when resistance is not seen to be suicidal or useless, to allow oneself to be intimidated, particularly by someone who does not have the right to expect deferential behavior, is to suffer a loss of social face and, hence, of self-esteem; and that the culturally defined way of maintaining self-esteem in the face of attempted intimidation is to engage in a contest for supremacy vis-à-vis the power to intimidate or, minimally, to resist intimidation. Thus, in effect, the use of threat (and if it is available to be used, there will be a tendency to use it) should strengthen the competitive interests of the bargainers in relationship to one another by introducing or enhancing the competitive struggle for self-esteem. Hence, from Proposition 1, it follows that the availability of a means of threat should make it more difficult for the bargainers to reach agreement (providing that the threatened person has some means of resisting the threat). The preceding statement is relevant to the comparison of both of our experimental conditions of threat, bilateral and unilateral (described below), with our experimental condition of non-threat. We hypothesize that a bargaining agreement is more likely to be achieved when neither party can threaten the other, than when one or both parties can threaten the other.

Consider now the situations of bilateral threat and unilateral threat. For several reasons, a situation of bilateral threat is probably less conducive to agreement than is a condition of unilateral threat. First, the sheer likelihood that a threat will be made is greater when two people rather than one have the means of making the threat. Secondly, once a threat is made in the bilateral case it is likely to evoke counterthreat. Withdrawal of threat in the face of counterthreat probably involves more loss of face (for reasons analogous to those discussed in relation to yielding to intimidation) than does withdrawal of threat in the face of resistance to threat. Finally, in the

unilateral case, although the person without the threat potential can resist and not yield to the threat, his position vis-à-vis the other is not so strong as the position of the threatened person in the bilateral case. In the unilateral case, the threatened person may have a worse outcome than the other whether he resists or yields; while in the bilateral case, the threatened person is sure to have a worse outcome if he yields but he may insure that he does not have a worse outcome if he does not yield.

Method

Procedure. Subjects (Ss) were asked to imagine that they were in charge of a trucking company, carrying merchandise over a road to a destination. For each trip completed they made \$.60, minus their operating expenses. Operating expenses were calculated at the rate of one cent per second. So, for example, if it took 37 seconds to complete a particular trip, the player's profit would be \$.60—\$.37 or a net profit of \$.23 for that particular trip.

Each S was assigned a name, Acme or Bolt. As the "road map" (see Figure 1) indicates, both players start from separate points and go to




Fig. 1. Subject's road map.

separate destinations. At one point their paths cross. This is the section of road labeled "one lane road," which is only one lane wide, so that two trucks, heading in opposite directions, could not pass each other. If one backs up

the other can go forward, or both can back up, or both can sit there head-on without moving.

There is another way for each *S* to reach the destination on the map, labeled the "alternate route." The two players' paths do not cross on this route, but the alternate is 56% longer than the main route. *Ss* were told that they could expect to lose at least \$.10 each time they used the alternate route.

At either end of the one-lane section there is a gate that is under the control of the player to whose starting point it is closest. By closing the gate, one player can prevent the other from traveling over that section of the main route. The use of the gate provides the threat potential in this game. In the bilateral threat potential condition (Two Gates) both players had gates under their control. In a second condition of unilateral threat (One Gate) Acme had control of a gate but Bolt did not. In a third condition (No Gates) neither player controlled a gate.

* * * *

Results

The best single measure of the difficulty experienced by the bargainers in reaching an agreement is the sum of each pair's profits (or losses) on a given trial. The higher the sum of the payoffs to the two players on a given trial, the less time it took them to arrive at a procedure for sharing the one-lane path of the main route. (It was, of course, possible for one or both of the players to decide to take the alternate route so as to avoid a protracted stalemate during the process of bargaining. This, however, always resulted in at least a \$.20 smaller joint payoff if only one player took the alternate route, than an optimally arrived at agreement concerning the use of the one-way path.) . . . These striking results indicate that agreement was least difficult to arrive at in the no threat condition, was more difficult to arrive at in the unilateral threat condition, and exceedingly difficult or impossible to arrive at in the bilateral threat condition . . .

* * * *

Discussion

From our view of bargaining as a situation in which both cooperative and competitive tendencies are present and acting upon the individual, it is relevant to inquire as to the conditions under which a stable agreement of any form develops. However, implicit in most economic models of bargaining (e.g., Stone, 1958; Zeuthen, 1930) is the assumption that the cooperative interests of the bargainers are sufficiently strong to insure that some form of mutually satisfactory agreement will be reached. For this reason, such models have focused upon the form of the agreement

reached by the bargainers. Siegel and Fouraker (1960) report a series of bargaining experiments quite different in structure from ours in which only one of many pairs of Ss were unable to reach agreement. Siegel and Fouraker explain this rather startling result as follows:

Apparently the disruptive forces which lead to the rupture of some negotiations were at least partially controlled in our sessions . . .

Some negotiations collapse when one party becomes incensed at the other, and henceforth strives to maximize his opponent's displeasure rather than his own satisfaction. . . . Since it is difficult to transmit insults by means of quantitative bids, such disequilibrating behavior was not induced in the present studies. If subjects were allowed more latitude in their communications and interactions, the possibility of an affront-offense-punitive behavior sequence might be increased (p. 100). (Quoted by permission of McGraw-Hill)

In our experimental bargaining situation, the availability of threat clearly made it more difficult for bargainers to reach a mutually profitable agreement. These results, we believe, reflect psychological tendencies that are not confined to our bargaining situation: the tendency to use threat (if the means for threatening is available) in an attempt to force the other person to yield, when the other is seen as obstructing one's path; the tendency to respond with counterthreat or increased resistance to attempts at intimidation. How general are these tendencies? What conditions are likely to elicit them? Answers to these questions are necessary before our results can be generalized to other situations.

Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) have cited a variety of evidence to support the view that aggression (i.e., the use of threat) is a common reaction to a person who is seen as the agent of frustration. There seems to be little reason to doubt that the use of threat is a frequent reaction to interpersonal impasses. However, everyday observation indicates that threat does not inevitably occur when there is an interpersonal impasse. We would speculate that it is most likely to occur: when the threatener has no positive interest in the other person's welfare (he is either egocentrically or competitively related to the other); when the threatener believes that the other has no positive interest in his welfare; and when the threatener anticipates either that his threat will be effective or, if ineffective, will not worsen his situation because he expects the worst to happen if he does not use his threat. We suggest that these conditions were operative in our experiment; Ss were either egocentrically or competitively oriented to one another⁷ and they felt that they would not be worse off by the use of threat.

⁷A post-experimental questionnaire indicated that, in all three experimental conditions, the Ss were most strongly motivated to win money, next most strongly motivated to do better than the other player, next most motivated to "have fun," and were very little or not at all motivated to help the other player.

Everyday observation suggests that the tendency to respond with counter-threat or increased resistance to attempts at intimidation is also a common occurrence. We believe that introducing threat into a bargaining situation affects the meaning of yielding. Although we have no data to support this interpretation directly, we will attempt to justify it on the basis of some additional assumptions.

Goffman (1955) has pointed out the pervasive significance of "face" in the maintenance of the social order. In this view, self-esteem is a socially validated system that grows out of the acceptance by others of the claim for deference, prestige, and recognition that a person presents in his behavior toward others. Since the rejection of such a claim would be perceived (by the recipient) as directed against his self-esteem, he must react against it rather than accept it in order to maintain the integrity of his self-esteem system.

One may view the behavior of our Ss as an attempt to make claims upon the other, an attempt to develop a set of shared expectations as to what each was entitled to. Why then did the Ss' reactions differ so markedly as a function of the availability of threat? The explanation lies, we believe, in the cultural interpretation of yielding (to a peer or subordinate) under duress, as compared to giving in without duress. The former, we believe, is perceived as a negatively valued form of behavior, with negative implications for the self-image of the person who so behaves. At least partly, this is so because the locus of causality is perceived to be outside the person's voluntary control. No such evaluation, however, need be placed on the behavior of one who "gives in" in a situation where no threat or duress is a factor. Rather, we should expect the culturally defined evaluation of such a person's behavior to be one of "reasonableness" or "maturity," because the source of the individual's behavior is perceived to lie within his own control.

Our discussion so far has suggested that the psychological factors which operate in our experimental bargaining situation are to be found in many real-life bargaining situations. However, it is well to recognize some unique features of our experimental game. First, the bargainers had no opportunity to communicate verbally with one another. Prior research on the role of communication in trust (Deutsch 1958, 1960; Loomis, 1959) suggests that the opportunity for communication would have made reaching an agreement easier for individualistically-oriented bargainers. This same research (Deutsch, 1960) indicates, however, that communication may not be effective between competitively oriented bargainers. This possibility was expressed spontaneously by a number of our Ss in a post-game interview.

Another characteristic of our bargaining game is that the passage of time, without coming to an agreement, is costly to the players. There are, of

course, bargaining situations in which lack of agreement may simply preserve the *status quo* without any worsening of the bargainers' respective situations. This is the case in the typical bilateral monopoly case, where the buyer and seller are unable to agree upon a price (e.g., see Siegel & Fouraker, 1960). In other sorts of bargaining situations, however, (e.g., labor-management negotiations during a strike, international negotiations during an expensive cold war) the passage of time may play an important role. In our experiment, we received the impression that the meaning of time changed as time passed without the bargainers reaching an agreement. Initially, the passage of time seemed to place the players under pressure to come to an agreement before their costs mounted sufficiently to destroy their profit. With the continued passage of time, however, their mounting losses strengthened their resolution not to yield to the other player. They comment: "I've lost so much, I'll be damned if I give in now. At least I'll have the satisfaction of doing better than she does." The mounting losses and continued deadlock seemed to change the game from a mixed motive into a predominantly competitive situation.

It is, of course, hazardous to generalize from a laboratory experiment to the complex problems of the real world. But our experiment and the theoretical ideas underlying it can perhaps serve to emphasize some notions which, otherwise, have an intrinsic plausibility. In brief, these are that there is more safety in cooperative than in competitive coexistence, that it is dangerous for bargainers to have weapons, and that it is possibly even more dangerous for a bargainer to have the capacity to retaliate in kind than not to have this capacity when the other bargainer has a weapon. This last statement assumes that the one who yields has more of his values preserved by accepting the agreement preferred by the other than by extended conflict. Of course, in some bargaining situations in the real world, the loss incurred by yielding may exceed the losses due to extended conflict.

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CHAPTER 2. *Hostility*

The Primary Nature of Hostility

GEORG SIMMEL

Skeptical moralists speak of natural enmity between men. For them, *homo homini lupus* [man is wolf to man], and “in the misfortune of our best friends there is something which does not wholly displease us.” But even the diametrically opposed moral philosophy, which derives ethical selflessness from the transcendental foundations of our nature, does not thereby move very far from the same pessimism. For after all, it admits that devotion to the Thou cannot be found in the experience and observation of our will. Empirically, rationally, man is pure egoist, and any deflection of this natural fact can occur in us, not through nature, but only through the *deus ex machina* of a metaphysical being. Hence natural hostility as a form or basis of human relations appears at least side by side with their other basis, sympathy. The strange lively interest, for instance, which people usually show in the suffering of others, can only be explained on the basis of a mixture of the two motivations. This deep-lying antipathy is also suggested by the phenomenon, not at all rare, of the “spirit of contradiction” (*Widerspruchsgeist*). It is found not only in those nay-sayers-on-principle who are the despair of their surroundings among friends, in families, in committees, and in the theatre public. Nor does this spirit celebrate its most characteristic triumphs in the realm of politics, in those men of opposition whose classical type Macaulay has described in the person of Robert Ferguson: “His

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hostility was not to Popery or to Protestantism, to monarchical government or to republican government, to the house of Stuarts or to the house of Nassau, but to whatever was at the time established." All these cases which are usually considered to be types of "pure opposition" do not *necessarily* have to be such: ordinarily, the opponents conceive of themselves as defenders of threatened rights, as fighters for what is objectively correct, as knightly protectors of the minority.

It appears to me that much less striking phenomena reveal more clearly an abstract impulse to opposition—especially the quiet, often hardly known, fleeting temptation to contradict an assertion or demand, particularly a categorical one. This instinct of opposition emerges with the inevitability of a reflex movement, even in quite harmonious relationships, in very conciliatory persons. It mixes itself into the over-all situation even though without much effect. One might be tempted to call this a protective instinct—just as certain animals, merely upon being touched, automatically use their protective and aggressive apparatus. But this would precisely prove the primary, basic character of opposition. It would mean that the individual, even where he is not attacked but only finds himself confronted by purely objective manifestations of other individuals, cannot maintain himself except by means of opposition. It would mean that the first instinct with which the individual affirms himself is the negation of the other.

It seems impossible to deny an *a priori* fighting instinct, especially if one keeps in mind the incredibly picayunish, even silly, occasions of the most serious conflicts. An English historian reports that not long ago two Irish parties, whose enmity developed from a quarrel over the color of a cow, fought each other furiously throughout the whole country. Some decades ago, grave rebellions occurred in India as the consequence of a feud between two parties which knew nothing about one another except that they were, respectively, the party of the right hand and the party of the left. And this triviality of the causes of conflicts is paralleled by the childish behavior in which conflicts often end. In India, Mohammedans and Hindus live in a constant latent enmity which they document by the Mohammedans buttoning their outer garments to the right, and the Hindus to the left; by the Mohammedans, at common meals, sitting in a circle, and the Hindus in a row; by the poor Mohammedans using one side of a certain leaf for a plate, and the Hindus the other. In human hostility, cause and effect are often so heterogeneous and disproportionate that it is hard to determine whether the alleged issue really is the cause of the conflict or merely the consequence of long-existing opposition. The impossibility of ascertaining any rational basis of the hostility presents us with this uncertainty in regard to many details of the conflicts between the Roman and Greek circus parties, between the Homoousians and the Homoioussians, and of the Wars of the Roses and of the Guelfs and Ghibellines. The general impression is that human beings

never love one another because of such picayunish trivia as lead them to violent hatred.

The Suggestibility of Hostility

There is finally another phenomenon which seems to me to point to a wholly primary need for hostility. This is the uncanny ease with which hostility can be suggested. It is usually much easier for the average person to inspire another individual with distrust and suspicion toward a third, previously indifferent person than with confidence and sympathy. It is significant that this difference is particularly striking in respect to these favorable or unfavorable moods and prejudices if they are at their beginning or have developed only to a slight degree. For, higher degrees, which lead to practical application, are not decided by such fleeting leanings (which, however, betray the fundamental instinct) but by more conscious considerations. The same fundamental fact is shown in merely another version, as it were, by the circumstance that quite indifferent persons may successfully suggest those slight prejudices which fly over the image of another like shadows, whereas only an authoritative or emotionally close individual succeeds in causing us to have the corresponding *favorable* prejudice.

Without this ease or irresponsibility with which the average person reacts to suggestions of an unfavorable kind, the *aliquid haeret* [social, emotional inertia would perhaps not be so tragically true. The observation of certain antipathies, factions, intrigues, and open fights might indeed lead one to consider hostility among those primary human energies which are not provoked by the external reality of their objects but which create their own objects out of themselves. Thus it has been said that man does not have religion because he believes in God but that he believes in God because he has religion, which is a mood of his soul. In general, it is probably recognized that love, especially in youth, is not a mere reaction evoked by its object (as a color sensation is evoked in our optical apparatus), but that on the contrary, we have a need for loving and ourselves seize upon some object which satisfies this need—sometimes bestowing on it those characteristic which, we alleged, have evoked our love in the first place.

A Further Investigation of Hostility Generalization to Disliked Objects

LEONARD BERKOWITZ AND DOUGLAS S. HOLMES

In an earlier investigation (Berkowitz & Holmes, 1959), the present writers reported that aggressive responses are generalized relatively easily from the hostility instigator to other disliked people. These findings can be used to buttress the scapegoat theory of prejudice. Particular minority groups, such as Negroes or Jews, are the target for displaced hostility, we suggested, not because they have some physical similarity to the hostility instigator, but because they are disliked.² In essence, this hypothesis maintains that the actual frustrator and the minority group are equated, since both arouse unpleasant feelings, so that responses elicited by one can be generalized to the other.

The present study was undertaken to throw further light on this presumed process. For one thing, hostility generalization was assessed in the earlier study by means of questionnaire ratings of a peer, and there is a question whether stronger and more direct aggression would show similar effects. The Ss were told the ratings would partially determine the peer's chances of winning a prize, so that unfavorable evaluations could perhaps be regarded as "doing injury." Nevertheless, more injurious acts may not be openly affected by this generalization process, particularly when S knows they would be perceived by the injured party. Guilt or aggression-anxiety conceivably could seriously inhibit the expression of the more injurious hostility.

²Miller explicitly recognizes that the stimulus generalization dimensions involved in displacement phenomena frequently deal with qualitative (or mediated) similarity rather than physical similarity (Miller, 1948, 1951). Nevertheless, there has been relatively little said about the nature of this qualitative similarity.

Leonard Berkowitz and Douglas S. Holmes, "A Further Investigation of Hostility Generalization to Disliked Objects," *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1960), pp. 427-442. Reprinted by permission of Leonard Berkowitz and the publisher. Notes numbered as in the original.

The present report also seeks to account for the generalization of aggression. As noted above, the writers suggested in the earlier paper that the two frustrators involved in the study, the disliked peer and the insulting *E*, were categorized together, since they produced similar emotional responses in *S*. This acquired equivalence supposedly mediated the generalization of aggression from one to the other. One possibility, for example, is that *S* implicitly applied the same label to both frustrators, placing them in the same negatively evaluated category. Dollard and Miller (1950), in advancing the somewhat similar concept, "acquired equivalence of cues," contended that a previously neutral stimulus will produce the response elicited by a particular category of stimuli after *S* has learned to apply the category name to this stimulus. However, there was no direct independent evidence for this equivalence reaction in the preceding study, and the present experiment attempted to provide this support.

Finally, as a subsidiary purpose, this experiment enabled us to investigate the effects of aggressive actions upon later expressions of hostility. Overt hostility does not necessarily lead to a cathartic reduction of aggression; under some conditions the initial aggressive acts might stimulate increased overt hostility (Berkowitz, 1958, 1960). Furthermore, even if the initial hostility were to be followed by a decrease in open aggression, this reduction could stem from the inhibition of hostility by guilt or aggression-anxiety. According to other research, the likelihood of this aggression-anxiety reaction increases with the strength of the instigation. When he aroused an ordinarily socially disapproved drive (sex) in his college student *Ss*, Clark (1955) found that they tended to exhibit *weaker* manifestations of this drive than a group of control *Ss*. Apparently, individuals possessing a high level of a threatening drive frequently strongly inhibit drive-related behavior, perhaps after becoming aware of the drive intensity and/or the potential dangers in the situation.³ A strongly angered person, therefore, might well respond to his first intense expression of hostility with aggression-anxiety. As a result, his subsequent actions would be much friendlier. On the other hand, this inhibiting anxiety reaction presumably would not take place in another individual who was less severely angered and therefore less threatened.

³This is close to Freud's latest conception of the functioning of anxiety (Freud, 1936). Anxiety, he believed, was a response to imminent potential dangers from within the individual (e.g., through the arousal of a disapproved drive) that served as a stimulus to further defensive reactions such as repression.

Our hypothesis that the intensity of aggression-anxiety resulting from the arousal and expression of hostility is in direct proportion to the intensity of the hostility drive is consistent with Miller's conflict model. Miller has proposed (1951) that increasing the strength of the approach tendency (in this case the instigation to aggression) in a conflict situation would cause the individual to go nearer to the feared goal (i.e., he would be more likely to express strong anger) but at this point stronger fear is elicited. It may well be that this fear or aggression-anxiety is evoked by the aggressive act.

Method

Experimental Procedure

The *Ss*, female students at the University of Wisconsin, were recruited from introductory sociology courses to serve in an experiment on "problem-solving and creativity." The 72 *Ss* were divided evenly among the four conditions in a 2×2 factorial design. Two girls who did not know each other were scheduled for a given session. When both had arrived at the laboratory, *E* described the first problem. After two minutes of work, they would exchange papers in order to judge each other's performance. If the person believed her partner's work was "below the average for the University," she was told to administer one or more electric shocks to the partner (*P*). One shock was to be given if the performance was very good while several signified poor work. Shock electrodes were then strapped on *Ss'* wrists. After the brief first problem, *E* collected the papers and gave each *S* a paper in exchange, supposedly *P's* work, but actually previously prepared to be standard for all conditions. Each *S* believed *P* would go first. She received one or more shocks depending upon the condition, ostensibly from the other girl, but in reality sent by *E*. They were then given a second problem and when the papers were exchanged *S* now went first.

The first experimental manipulation, as in the preceding investigation, was designed to create either initial liking or initial dislike for the *P*. *Ss* in the former condition received only one shock for each problem, while the *Ss* who were to dislike their *P* were given five shocks after the first problem and eight after the second. *S's* responses on the shock button at this time, which were electrically recorded, were utilized as baseline scores. The initial attitude toward the *P* presumably had been established and the shock scores were taken as the primary index of this attitude, although questionnaire ratings of *P* also were obtained at this time.

The *Ss* worked alone on the next two problems without exchanging papers, but this time *E*, rather than the *P*, was the perceived aggression instigator. Half of the *Ss* in the Initial-Liking-for-*P* and half in the Initial-Dislike-for-*P* conditions were criticized and insulted by *E* during these problems by standardized messages transmitted to them via earphones, while the others received friendlier evaluations of their work from *E*. After this, two-thirds of the *Ss* in each of the four resulting conditions filled out a questionnaire on which they evaluated both *E* and the experiment (supposedly while waiting for the *P* to finish his problems). Analyses of the shock response data revealed that there were no systematic effects attributable to whether *Ss* had evaluated *E* or not, and this distinction is ignored in the following report.

Finally, in the last phase of the experiment, *Ss* again were led to believe they were interacting with their *Ps*. After receiving what was supposedly the *P's* work on the fifth problem, *S* was told to go first in administering shocks. Every *S* received one shock in return. Then, on the final problem, *P* supposedly took the lead in giving shocks, and all *Ss* received three shocks. The experiment was concluded after *S* took her final turn in sending shocks to *P*.

Dependent Variables

Frequency of Shocks. The primary dependent variable is the frequency of shocks supposedly administered to the *P* at the two opportunities given *S* following the interaction with *E*, i.e., during Time 2 at which time *S* went first in giving shocks, and during Time 3 in which *S* administered shocks after receiving the three from *P*. The mean number of shocks given by each *S* during the baseline period, prior to the interaction with *E*, was subtracted from her comparable scores in each of the two postinteraction periods to yield a measure of each *S*'s change in overt hostility toward her *P*.⁴

Questionnaire Ratings. The *Ss* completed questionnaires at three different times during the experimental session. They were given a questionnaire for the first time at the conclusion of the baseline period in order to determine whether the intended differences in initial liking for *P* had been created. Three items on this form asked *S* what she thought of her *P*: "3. Do you believe your partner was fair and right in his (her) judgments?," "4. How well do you think your partner did on these problems?," and "6. On the basis of whatever impressions you might have, to what extent would you want to get to know your partner better?"

The two-thirds of the *Ss* in each experimental condition who responded to the second questionnaire were told they were rating the experiment and *E* as part of a survey of student reactions to psychology experiments being conducted by the Chairman of the Psychology Department. One item in this very short form asked, "How much did you enjoy the experiment?," while a second question was, "How favorable was your reaction to the experimenter?" This form was completed after *E* had evaluated *S*'s third and fourth problems, and as mentioned earlier, supposedly while waiting for *P* to finish her work.

For both forms, in order to indicate her response to a question, *S* had to place a checkmark somewhere along a 6½ in. line. The line under each question was anchored at each extreme by an appropriate phrase, e.g., "very much," or "very little," and in all instances the score was the distance, in 1/16 in. units, away from the favorable response end of the scale. Thus, the higher the score, the more unfriendly was *S*'s attitude toward *P*. The attitudes-toward-*P* questionnaire was again administered to *S* at the end of the experiment in order to determine the effects of the intervening experiences upon the level of *S*'s unfriendliness to her *P*.

⁴The investigators had also intended to use the duration of shocks administered to *P* as another index of this hostility. Although one might expect the duration measure to be negatively correlated with shock frequency, essentially the same results were obtained with both types of scores. Nevertheless, the duration scores are not reported in this paper because the *Ss* in the Dislike-for-*P*-Frustrated-by-*E* condition gave significantly longer shocks to *P* during the baseline period than the *Ss* who also were induced to dislike *P* but who were not provoked by *E* following this baseline period. Since this difference may be due to any number of factors, such as the former *Ss* having been trained by *E* (inadvertently) to administer relatively long shocks, the interpretation of the shock duration results is highly equivocal.

Finally, immediately following this form, *Ss* were given a brief version of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). As is typical with this instrument, the *Ss* rated the two stimulus objects (*P* and *E*) on a number of seven-point rating scales, with the adjectives at each end of these scales representing polar opposites. Two items assessed the evaluation dimension, "good-bad" and "cruel-kind," two items the potency dimension, "soft-hard" and "strong-weak," and the activity dimension was represented by four scales, "slow-fast," and "excitable-calm," "cold-hot" and "passive-active." Taking each *S* separately, an object's score on a given connotative meaning dimension was the sum over all scales representing the particular dimension, with the scoring of these scales obviously altered so that a high score always referred to the same end of the dimension. Again, the higher the object's reported score on the evaluation dimension, the more unfavorable the evaluation of the object.

* * * *

Discussion

The present results offer relatively strong evidence, particularly when taken in conjunction with the earlier findings (Berkowitz & Holmes, 1959), that hostility engendered by one frustrator can increase the overt aggression expressed to other frustrators. This process is of direct relevance to a variety of phenomena, but it probably is particularly important in the dynamics of social prejudice. For one thing, it enables us to reconcile the scapegoat theory of prejudice with other explanations of intergroup hostility in this country. These other theories, whether psychoanalytic, sociological, or economic in nature, all provide reasons for disliking, if not hating, a minority group. They may or may not be correct, but as far as the displacement or scapegoating process is concerned, their essential feature is that the minority group is the object of strong negative feelings. According to the present thesis, this enmity results in an increase in hostility toward the group when the person harboring these feelings (*a*) is frustrated by other agencies, and (*b*) then has an opportunity to aggress against the group. If the present findings hold, at least some of the hostility aroused by the frustrating agency will contribute to the aggression directed against the disliked minority group.

Our experimental results do not provide any clearcut evidence as to why this hostility generalization should take place, however. They do seem to rule out the possibility that the *Ss* provoked by both their peer and the experimenter had a higher level of general aggression than any of the other *Ss*, with the relatively strong hostility expressed toward *P* following *E*'s frustration of them being solely a manifestation of this stronger general instigation. As was mentioned earlier, the girls in this condition did not enjoy the experiment less than the others who had been frustrated only

by *E*. This presumably would be the case if they had a stronger generalized anger. Instead, our findings indicate that the *Ss* in the Initial-Dislike-for-*P*—Frustrated-by-*E* condition channeled their aggression toward the particular disliked person available at the moment, with the enmity aroused by the other frustrator contributing to the hostility overtly directed against this disliked individual.

The earlier paper suggested that this hostility generalization took place because of an acquired equivalence reaction. That is, the two frustrators supposedly were categorized together so that the responses aroused by one also could readily be elicited by the other. The results with the semantic differential administered at the end of the experiment are only partially consistent with this hypothesis. In general, *P* and *E* are rated more similarly on the evaluative items when both have either frustrated or not frustrated *S* than when only one of these people provoked hostility. However, contrary to expectation, *P* and *E* also were relatively similar in their evaluative meanings when only *E* had frustrated *S*, although this similarity was not as great as that existing in the conditions in which *P* and *E* had presumably aroused somewhat the same feelings in *S*. Furthermore, . . . the less aggressive *Ss* who were frustrated by *E* but not by *P* did tend to differentiate significantly between the two stimulus people, while this discrimination was not made by the less aggressive *Ss* receiving similar treatment from *E* and *P*.

Nevertheless, these data do not justify too much speculation. Obviously, the relatively similar evaluation scores given to *P* and *E* in the Initial-Dislike-for-*P*—Frustrated-by-*E* condition do not necessarily prove that connotative similarity facilitated hostility generalization from one to the other. There are indications that at least some of *S*'s final evaluations of *P* were affected by the number of shocks *S* had given her *P* earlier. This presumed aggression-anxiety reaction might have influenced the ratings of *P* (and also *E*) on the semantic differential so that the similar evaluations followed instead of produced the high level of overt hostility to *P*.

Summary

In an earlier study (Berkowitz & Holmes, 1959) it was shown that aggressive responses are generalized relatively easily from the hostility instigator to other disliked people. The present investigation was designed (a) to determine whether the same results would be obtained with more injurious acts than the questionnaire ratings employed in that experiment, i.e., with electric shocks, and (b) to test some hypothesized causes of this process. Seventy-two female college students were distributed evenly among the four conditions in a 2×2 factorial design. Half of the *Ss*, working in pairs, were first induced to dislike their partner (*P*), with the others being led to have a higher initial liking for her. Then, while working independently of their

partners, half of the *Ss* in these two conditions were frustrated and insulted by *E* while the others received a friendlier treatment from him. Finally, in the last phase of the experiment, the *Ss* were again put to working with *P* and, as had been done in the first phase, were provided with a socially sanctioned opportunity to administer electric shocks to her. The results essentially were the same as in the earlier study. The greatest increase in the number of shocks given to *P* occurred in the *Ss* who had been frustrated by *E* and then given the opportunity to aggress against the disliked peer.

The evidence for the hypotheses accounting for these results is not too clear cut, however. There are indications that the results with the shock measure probably are not due solely to a stronger and more persistent general anger in the *Ss* in the Initial-Dislike-for-*P*—Frustrated-by-*E* condition. Tentative evidence supports the notion that the two disliked stimulus people, *P* and *E*, had somewhat similar stimulus qualities for *S*, but another study is needed to test the hypothesis that this caused the hostility generalization.

In discussing these findings, it was pointed out that this process, hostility generalization from the frustrator to other disliked people, can reconcile the scapegoat theory of prejudice with other theoretical explanations of intergroup hostility. These other theses can account for the disliking or hatred of particular minority groups. Once these people are disliked, however, hostility is generalized readily to them from other frustrators, i.e., they are more probably victims of scapegoating.

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Hatred and Collective Hatred

A. M. MEERLOO, M.D., F.R.S.M.

III

Where in the individual shall we seek for the roots of hatred? What are the origins of this strong affect, this violent urge to destruction? Hatred, death-wishes, guilt, fear, aggressiveness, and sadism belong together. They are among the most primitive reactions of the individual to painful stimuli. However, one should not consider this affect as being of an entirely negative nature. Hatred is not merely repulsion and rejection, it also wants more, it wants to destroy *and* to devour. It is connected with the primitive drive of uniting with and incorporating what one fears and yet loves. The relationship of love, when broken off, is converted into hatred because the primitive urge to destruction remains. Hatred belongs to the fundamental struggle for life and is connected with fear of isolation. In all probability, there were only friends or enemies in primitive times. A friend, when he is expelled from the group, suddenly becomes a foe. Just as in animal groups the stranger or outsider is picked at or driven away, so the human outsider still will be shunned and expelled from primitive human societies.

One of the deepest roots of hate lies in the ambivalence of the instincts of life. Every instinct, in order to grow up and reach cultural maturity, fluctuates between pleasure and pain. Every over-satisfaction of instinct entails hatred against the object that helped to attain the satisfaction. Through satiety pleasure is turned into displeasure. Let us look at the earliest of all instinctual gratifications. The pleasure-bringing stimulus-object (e.g. food) at first, is incorporated lovingly; but in a later phase, after over-satisfaction, pleasure changes into "hatred", or disgust. Only cultivated pleasure does *not* bring about the immediate transformation into displeasure. The whole of culture arms itself, as it were, against this

A. M. Meerloo, "Hatred and Collective Hatred," *Aftermath of Peace; Psychological Essays* (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1946), pp. 31-57. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

sudden change of positive into negative affects. Present day custom with regard to eating, with its culinary technique and its table rituals, is aimed against the feeling of excessive satisfaction. The same is true for the sexual instincts; love and hate are inherent in the same feeling. It is the task of civilisation to put a brake on instincts and pleasures, and to harmonize them. But at the same time, on a secondary level, there arises a deep hatred toward those cultural restraints. The capacity of cultured man to retard, inhibit, and frustrate instinct, though leading ultimately to a higher, cultivated pleasure and ecstasy, yet makes for instability of his inner life. The instinctive hatred of all restraint can cut through all culture and then in one mighty upheaval, the primitive human "animal" breaks through and falls upon its prey, again to devour it.

In sexual pleasure, above all, the harmony of the affects is very unstable. Basic "libido" has in every cultured society been transformed into a more refined game of love. But sexual love can easily change into hatred, after the erotic tensions have been relieved, particularly if the gap between the cultural level and the level of instinctual gratification is wide. Thus hatred always contains lost love. The hatred against culture and restraint, as well as the hatred of one's own uninhibited action is projected onto the love-object. Aggression and converted love work together to destroy the beloved. All human beings go through the phase in which they enjoy cruelty. The pathological extreme of this situation logically leads to sexual murder. This libidinous, primitive hatred is contained in every kind of hatred, as the urge to destroy the object through which one has satisfied one's uninhibited instinct. There remains in us, especially in the male, a primitive fear of having to perish after the moment of greatest instinctual enjoyment. It is perhaps to be explained as a biological parallel to the death immediately after copulation such as occurs in the insect world.

It is the hatred and urge to destruction that make human erotic relations last, even after love has ceased to exist. Every hatred is connected with the suicidal instinct, that is, with self-hatred. The "enemy" is only a screen onto which we project our feelings. This explains the affective tie that is always present between hater and hated. When the hater has conquered his foe he has vicariously destroyed something inside himself. He becomes depressed, and burdened with feelings of guilt and hatred toward himself. Such hatred is dangerous for the person who is "eaten up" internally; it has become a kind of reflex and continuously consumes a surplus of energy.

Hatred and fear belong together very closely. The insecure individual with a fear of life and of death feels relieved if he can hate and vent his pent-up aggressiveness. Just as primitive man runs amuck, so does cultured man hate; it is the essence of aggression. Hatred breaks the unbearable tension of fear. Cultured man does not even need overt aggressiveness, it is sufficient for him to destroy, mentally, as it were,

through hatred. Hatred gives him a new social status and a feeling of magic power. The hater lives in constant ecstasy. Even a pathological idiot assumes a pseudo-personality when he hates and destroys.

Even a vague suspicion of one's own guilt will result in redoubled hatred of those, who had been the target of one's aggression. Apparently, the unconscious feelings of guilt, particularly if they meet with kindness on the part of the object, will reinforce the hatred. Thus, feeling and thinking revolve in a vicious circle, hatred and guilt keep renewing each other until finally there is an outburst. One's own sense of guilt projects guilt and horror on the enemy. That is why, now that the war is over, the Jews will be hated more than ever, because of their very martyrdom. It is a grave crime, indeed, to have been murdered and persecuted. As a rule, guilt is projected on the victim rather than on the criminal. Ironically enough, just as in primitive society, the Jews of "modern" Germany were slain, as it were, in the obsequies of their masters.

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IV

Nevertheless hatred is more important as a contagious collective phenomenon. Collective hatred and aggressiveness can easily be aroused, whilst the individual will be inclined to resist to his hatred. Man learns to reflect upon his affects, and this reflective analysis breaks hatred. No self-account needs to be given of affects induced by the community. This difference between the individual and the collective affects is intensified by present day education. Man is taught little about his responsibility for his affects. "Thoughts are toll-free" as the saying goes; what smoulders inside does not harm one's fellow-beings. Thus man never learned to resist being carried away by collective affects. Here, then, lies one of the roots of hatred. Paradoxically, it is often associated with the intellectual fear of being carried away by the group, of losing one's individuality. A collectivity may hate on account of no more than the de-personalization of its members. Every individual in the group is forced to identify himself with the collectivity; this evokes the latent hatred in each and collective hatred in all. Therefore the crowd can be roused to all kinds of violence and cruelty, much more readily than the individual. That is what Goebbels manipulated so efficiently as chief of Hitler's propaganda department. He characterized his task as "to organize hatred and suspicion, to get masses of men on the march—all with icy-cold calculation" (*Der Angriff*, Goebbel's own daily, 1929).

Collective hatred is especially easily aroused when the mental horizon of the group is narrow; in that case, they are all the more susceptible to mass suggestion. The feeling of isolation, of impotence, of a hostile

environment, makes a man easily inflammable by hatred. Sexual hatred plays a part here, too. In Northern regions the Jew is looked upon as sexually more lascivious on account of his southern descent. People project the frustration of their own erotic desires upon him. He is blamed for being more exotic in his instincts and needs. The southern type of woman is still regarded as the most desirable love-object by Northern Europeans, able to produce the strongest erotic tensions. Yet these very tensions are unbearable to man frustrated by culture. He revolts against this tension, apparently for ascetic reasons, in fact, however, in rejection of early instinctual drives. Thus his lust and jealousy are transformed into hatred, into a sadistic urge for destruction. He destroys what he does not permit himself to love.

These antagonistic feelings are further complicated by the magic fear of castration. The circumcised Jew is unconsciously identified with the punishing authority who threatens castration. Thus we recognize hatred as a result of an unbalanced sexual and instinctual development.

But there is also the opposite process: primitive man envies and hates cultured man. Basically this is a fear of being absorbed into something bigger and more differentiated, of temporarily losing one's individuality. In the individual this is a symptom of growth, of maturing of the personality. Such hate-reactions due to disproportionate growth of the instincts, as a result of the struggle between self-distinction and identification can be seen in all individuals during puberty. National collectivities also are subject to periods of maturation. This hatred stems from the disappointing insight into one's own limits and desires, it is an instinct taking revenge for its frustration. There lies embodied in every hatred the deep realization of incapacity, of impotence,—hence, the association of hatred with suicidal fantasies. What we hate is something inside ourselves, we really hate our limits; and that self-hatred is projected onto somebody else.

All these irrational elements of hatred are spread over the entire personality, from the lowest instinctive functions to the highest intellectual faculties. When they find expression they are indicative of disharmony or disintegration. But it takes much energy for them to be able to break through the control of ego-defenses. The opportunity to hate, however, given to the individual by the collectivity, can set them free immediately. *Collective hatred, therefore, consists of heterogeneous elements.* The collective enemy is always the stimulus and never the cause; the individuals have different aims, but the collective action gives common satisfaction. We also find violent hate-reactions if the control of the ego has been eliminated, as in cases of mental illness or intoxication. Especially in the former, instincts have been disconnected from central guidance. In psychotic cases we find hatred in its most genuine and undisguised forms.

In practice it remains difficult to uncover instinctive hatred, because the

individual disguises it with theoretical justifications. The collectivity, particularly, is very eager to accept these secondary motivations and, above all, to transform them into a national slogan. In such collective hatred every one finds an opportunity to air personal aggressive impulses. We may speak here of an unlimited capacity for transplantation and suggestion of hatred. The individual, after having responded to this collective suggestion, has less mental work to do to motivate his own feelings. He uses the external hatred in order to give free rein to his (disguised) inner hatred. *Collective hatred saves the individual mental energy.* That is why it is so much easier to preach hatred and abuse than to lead the world by love.

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V

The aim of a group, be it national, racial, or political does not necessarily entail hatred against specific other groups. Hatred is sometimes greatest between politically almost identical groups. The binding forces within the group, above all, determine the affects toward other groups. Biological elements play a part here, inasmuch as they are connected with special needs of the group. Groups with weak internal ties, built perhaps on a one-sided purpose or on an unstable affect (e.g., political indignation or nihilism) easily foster hatred against competing formations. Cohesive ties are a vital condition for the existence of the group. Every criticism or weakening of the vital ties shakes the group, which cannot tolerate opposition. By its hatred it fights for its own existence. The less inner strength and security a group possesses, the more aggressive it will be. *Collective hatred is coupled with internal weakness, it really is the inner fear for the group's collective existence.*

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VI

In group hatred, difference in cohesion and tradition is of greater importance than a biological, racial difference. The inter-human ties get more refined with the age of their culture. Culture is the hereditary spiritual possession of the group. The social group derives its most important strength from cultural ties. Strong, matured cultural ties prevail over those of younger groups. What is culturally inferior, powerful though it may be, frequently is absorbed into what is culturally higher. The group, unlike the individual, does not subserve the satisfaction of biological impulses. It wants more, it wants to create safeguards for instinctual life and, in doing so, to provide the opportunity for cultural development. *The significance of every group formation is the creation of a field for cultural evolution.*

Within the various groups we always observe a struggle on two fronts. The

genetically younger and the genetically older regard each other as hostile. The group as such aims at selfpreservation; mixing with groups on a different level of development always means the breaking of old ties.

Three factors determine the nature of the group: the force of inner coherence—*formative strength*; its cultural evolution—*stage of evolution*; and the sense of being together—*formative purpose*. Undermining of any of these factors will be regarded by the group as a hostile act.

The political opposition is hated for having an antagonistic aim. But this hatred is a *sporting, tolerant* hatred, an activating element, as we find it, for instance, between Labor and Tories in England.

However, the competing group, with parallel aims, is much more dangerous for it threatens to break one's own group's inner strength. A *bitter* hatred arises between such groups, coupled with both, ambition and self-reproach as is the case between Socialists and Communists. But a totally different developmental trend and a different cultural rhythm of another group is also felt as hostile. The mass reaction to this is *confused* hatred. Respect and bitterness, attraction and repulsion, the incapacity and the wish to understand, admiration and abuse—all go into the building of this complicated affect, as can be witnessed in the relations between American Capitalists and Russian Communists.

Every stranger who is not understood arouses hatred. This is even more true for foreign groups. One formation will feel roused by the strange "enclave", another will see in it a reflection of its own cultural difference. This disparity in cultural level is more irritating than is generally taken into account. Close to the adulation of the cultured there exists in all groups a tremendous hatred against intelligence, which yet serves as the stabilizer of a certain cultural level.

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VII

The secondary motivation of hatred is a problem in itself. Whenever existence, in the narrower sense of the word, is threatened, hatred of various kinds flares up. Every allegedly "inferior" trait in the other is construed into a justification of one's own hatred. Actually, hatred projects man's own uncertainty and weakness onto the imaginary enemy. Above all, in insoluble conflicts, hatred chooses a defenseless scapegoat. A small triumph by aggression is sought to mask the big inner defeat. Therefore a minority is accused of all the hideous intents that unconsciously smoulder in the aggressor's own soul. Mass hatred always flares up in times of economic or political pressure out of collective fear.

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VIII

The present flowering of racial hatred and so many other manifestations of mass-hatred proves how severely man's existence is threatened in all its foundations, both economic and spiritual. Neither the individual nor the collectivity feel secure any longer. Culture wavers. Without realizing the deeper meaning of these symbols, the more powerful collectivities create scapegoats: the pacifist, the Jew, the Communist and the like. Nationalism is on the upsurge. In most countries these disintegrative tendencies meet with a wide response. Personal freedom is at bay. The group wants to rule and the individual is denied the right to profess allegiance to the group of his choice.

Is present day culture in some particular way responsible for the emergence of these tendencies toward mass-hatred? Can we attribute such reaction, e. g., to an arrested (rigid) state of cultural development, which is being pierced by a dynamic anti-intellectual and anti-democratic thrust? Only the future can answer this question. Actually, however, many of the motivations offered for collective hatred and race supremacy are associated with anti-intellectual currents. In the Germans a vague feeling of hatred against an over-intellectual culture had become linked with an old collective hatred against a people that imagined itself to be the Chosen One. This attitude used to arouse jealousy and envy, above all in the economic and cultural fields. It is the Germans' double tragedy that they should have transplanted the old religious delusive ideas of the Jews of being "God's own people" to their own race. The cult of their race temporarily served to counteract their feeling of inferiority. This attitude does not, however, preserve culture; no material need is satisfied in this way. Inner despair grows and the group moves toward a crisis which only ushers in a new wave of rebelliousness against culture.

IX

The analysis of feelings of mass-hatred points to the paramount necessity of deflecting fear and hatred into culturally productive channels.

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... Outbursts of mass affect are always senseless; hatred turns against itself in the end. This means that the group as such will commit suicide, that the social structure will disintegrate. Hatred and persecution always have weakened persecutors and persecuted alike.

Only those who imagine themselves lost hate each other. Great men and great nations do not hate.

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CHAPTER 3. *Aggression*

Social Causes of Aggression

JOHN PAUL SCOTT

Study of the psychological and physiological causes of aggression shows that the primary stimulation which leads to fighting comes from the outside. In the highly social surroundings of human beings most of these external stimuli come from other members of society. Even when not actively attacking each other, people are likely to be mutually frustrating. . . . frustration is a common cause of hostility and aggression. However, certain aspects of aggression arise from the circumstances of social organization rather than from simple stimulation by other individuals.

Group Aggression

Sociologists and anthropologists have found that there is an almost universal tendency for human social groups to be more aggressive toward outsiders than they are toward members of their own group. This "in-group" versus "out-group" tendency can be seen everywhere in daily life. . . . This suggests that there may be some basic psychological causes for aggression between groups. Some clues to their nature are found in the study of animal societies.

Psychological Bases of Group Aggression. Group aggression seems to be closely associated with a fundamental type of social behavior which may be termed *allelomimetic* (Greek *allelō*, "mutual" plus *mimetikos*, "mimicry"). This

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type of behavior, which consists of each individual in a group doing what the other individuals do, with some degree of mutual stimulation, is widely found in schools of fishes, flocks of birds and herds of mammals. In most animals it seems to be associated with escape from danger. . . .

Such animals as mountain sheep never gang up to attack one individual. There is a good deal of fighting between males during the breeding season, but these combats are entirely individual. There are, however, a few animal societies in which allelomimetic behavior is combined with fighting and aggression. Murie (57) has described what happens to a lone wolf which approaches a den belonging to a well-organized pack. The stranger is attacked by the whole group, beaten unmercifully, and driven away. The wolves also frequently combine in their hunting activities and thus are able to attack and bring down large game. They are even able to make large predators such as bears uncomfortable enough so that they will not stay long in the vicinity of a wolf den.

The same tendencies are seen in groups of some social primates. Carpenter (12) in his study of rhesus monkeys living in a free situation described occasions in which one band of monkeys attacked and drove away another group which came into its territory.

The consequences of this type of co-ordinated aggression are that the group becomes much more powerful than any one individual and consequently more dangerous. . . .

The psychology of human group aggression has been often described but rarely studied by experiment. We may suppose from our comparison with other primates that there is probably some basic innate tendency to join in group aggression in response to certain kinds of outside stimulation, and that doing this gives a considerable amount of emotional satisfaction. This tendency is often magnified by learning and habit formation. As part of an aggressive group one can pursue and fight an outsider with very little danger and considerable chance of success. Group aggression is more likely to win and thus be more rewarding than individual aggression.

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Culture and Aggression

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Relationship Systems. Murdock (56) has found that the several hundred different kinds of cultures so far studied all have certain features in common. The basic unit of social organization is the "nuclear family," consisting of mother, father, and children, with differentiation of labor on the basis of sex and age. The role which each plays in relationship to the other is clearly defined by a cultural ideal. The idea of relationship is expanded to include most or all of the other members of a tribe or group. In a village of two

thousand people an individual may be related in some way to every other person. Relatives can be acquired in three ways: by birth, by marriage, or by ceremony; and until one determines one's relationship to a stranger there is no telling how one should act toward him. . . .

Among other things the relationship system clearly sets apart persons who can marry each other from those who cannot. Marriageable relatives may include some who are quite different from those permitted by our own society, but the effect is to divide up men and women so that there is less opportunity for the type of frustration which we call sexual jealousy. In short, sexual behavior in all human societies is highly regulated, and it may be suggested that one of the reasons for regulating it is to prevent unnecessary and destructive aggression.

There are rules regulating the kind and amount of aggression permitted in each relationship. In a great many human societies aggression is ceremonially released in initiation ceremonies at the time when the relationship status of an individual is changed. Among the Australian aborigines the men suffered circumcision and subincision of the penis when initiated as adults. Even among the peaceful Hopi there was a ceremonial whipping, sometimes borne by a relative of the initiate, and we are all familiar with the initiation ceremonies in the lodges and fraternities of our own society.

Murdock points out that there is a tendency in human communities to divide up into factions, even where these are not socially recognized. The modern Hopi divided up into two groups, those who were friendly to the whites and those who were hostile. Murdock suggests that such groups provide needed outlets for aggression without wholly disrupting the society, and that our own political parties may serve a similar purpose.

Ideal Behavior vs. Real Behavior. Another general principle which comes out of these studies is that the cultural ideal never exactly coincides with what people actually do. In every human society people are constantly doing less or more than the ideal, and there is usually some system for punishing those who stray too far away from it. . . .

Cultural ideals regarding aggression differ widely. We tend to think of the Indian tribes of North America as being bloodthirsty and aggressive, but among them are the Hopi (47) who call themselves the "peaceful people." In their ideal of living they have attempted to set up a life in which there is no violence except when they are forced to defend themselves against outsiders, as formerly used to happen when they were attacked by their more warlike Navaho neighbors. A Hopi is not even supposed to have angry thoughts toward anyone and is seriously upset if he does.

On the other hand, there were many American Indian tribes such as the Sioux, whose ideal occupation was raiding and fighting. A man's social status was determined by the number of horses he had stolen and the number of enemies he had wounded or killed. Stories are still current regarding the

feats of individual courage which earned a man honor in this tribe.

A similar ideal of violence and aggression was prevalent in the Arabian tribes, and blood feud was a commonly accepted standard of behavior. Our own cultural ancestors, particularly those pictured in the sagas of the Norse and Teutonic tribes, had ideals in which fighting and individual bravery played a strong part. In fact, it is only within a century that the custom of the duel has disappeared. Traces of it still survive in sports such as boxing and fencing and in the individual fights of small boys.

Our present cultural ideals are in a state of transition, and as in most complex societies they are not entirely consistent with each other. A well-brought-up boy in our society is taught that he must be aggressive in order to succeed in life. Whether his adult models are salesmen or statesmen, he learns that *aggressiveness* is a good thing and leads to success. At the same time he is taught that *aggression* is a bad thing and that he must not start fights or pick on other people. His religious training may go even further and state that even the feelings concerned with aggression are a bad thing. The result is a cultural ideal which is often difficult to live up to and creates many special problems. . . .

It is clear that human societies differ a great deal, both in their ideal codes of behavior regarding fighting and in the actual amount which goes on. In some societies fighting may be considered noble, in others normal, and in still others reprehensible. The amount of actual aggression may roughly correspond to these cultural ideals, but never exactly, and no matter how peaceful the ideal, there is always some real aggression.

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Cultural vs. Biological Determinants of Behavior. Again we come to the question of how much the cultural ideal can modify human behavior. Does it really affect our actions, or does it simply justify something which would happen in any case?

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. . . It would appear that no cultural ideal attempts to reverse the obvious physical superiority of men in actual fighting, where such fighting is recognized as an ideal, and that in spite of peaceful ideals men always tend to be on the average a little more quarrelsome than women. On the other hand, culture does seem to have the effect of greatly lowering or raising the amount of overt aggressive behavior in any given society.

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Warfare. As we have just seen, human cultures differ widely with respect to ideal patterns of aggressive behavior. Such ideals are usually closely linked with attitudes and standards of behavior regarding war. Whether

these ideals have a great or small effect upon the actual occurrence of war is a matter which is open to argument, but there can be no doubt that warfare is an important cause of aggression for any member of the human society which happens to be involved.

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When war is considered from a cross-cultural point of view, we find that it has occurred since the earliest historical times and has been found in every part of the world with the possible exception of the lands inhabited by the Australian aborigines and the Eskimos. Both of these peoples lived in extremely unfavorable environments where there was, at least formerly, a very sparse human population. There was occasional violence between individuals, and small groups might sometimes attack a single person. That there was no real warfare may simply reflect the fact that the human societies were too small and too far apart to make warfare possible. This suggests that war is in some way connected with highly organized populous human societies.

Up till now it has been possible to explain group aggression in terms of factors which affect the individuals composing the group. When warfare is brought into the picture it is the group as a whole which is affected, and the individuals themselves react as members of the group, with little or no direct stimulation toward aggression. For example, at the beginning of World War I an Austrian archduke was assassinated in Sarajevo. A few days later soldiers from all over Europe were marching toward each other, not because they were stimulated by the archduke's misfortune, but because they had been trained to obey orders.

One result of the ensuing war was that an Austrian soldier was so disturbed by the defeat of the Central Powers that he devoted his life to getting himself into a position where he could order the German army to try to fight the war over again. This he was able to do, with even more disastrous results to himself and his country. This chain of events gives a much oversimplified picture of World War II, but it does suggest that while the actions of key individuals in a war may be explained in terms of direct stimulation to aggression, vast numbers of other people are involved simply by being part of an organized society.

In this book we are attempting to answer the question of what produces aggression by individuals, and there is no doubt that war is one of the major causes. It is also possible to ask: What causes produce warfare? As Durbin and Bowlby (22) point out in their essay on personal aggressiveness and war, many of the causes are the same as those which produce individual aggression. The factors of frustration and displaced aggression help to explain not only the actions of Hitler and the German leaders but also the support which was given them by a large portion of the German population.

At the same time, the fact that an entire human society may act as a unit makes war a very different phenomenon from the aggressive fighting which takes place between individuals and small groups within a society. Considered objectively, warfare is primarily an attribute of populations rather than of individuals. As such, its possible causes are extremely complex, and even a brief discussion of them would require another book.

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The Economy of Aggression and Anxiety in Group Formations

JOACHIM FLESCHER, M.D.

I believe that group phenomena are essentially determined by two factors: anxiety and aggression.

In writing on the subject of the group process, Freud said: "If the individuals in the group are combined into a unity, there must surely be something to unite them, and this bond might be precisely the thing that is characteristic of a group."¹ We shall see that this binding force will become pivotal to Freud's theory on group psychology. What effect has "group belonging" on the individual? "In a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repression of his unconscious instincts."² Freud proceeds to offer convincing evidence to demonstrate the regressive nature of the influence of the group on the individual. He subsequently drew a parallel between the psychological situation of the member of the group toward the leader and the hypnotic situation. This parallel we have had occasion to question.³

While the individual's subservience to the hypnotist stops short of acts that go against basic moral values of the hypnotized, such limitation is absent in typical situations of uncontrolled mass behavior where the most primitive and repressed impulses are given free vent. We ascribed to the numeric factor in groups a greater role than Freud was willing to concede. After investigating the relationship of the member to the leader, Freud centered on the nature of the "suggestibility" and made the attempt to identify the

¹Freud, S.: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). New York: Liveright, 1951, p. 7.

²*Ibid.*, p. 9.

³Flescher, J.: Political Life and Superego Regression. *Psa. Rev.*, 36: 416, 1949.

Joachim Flescher, "The Economy of Aggression and Anxiety in Group Formations," *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1957), pp. 31-39. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.

dynamics which compel the group member to submit to the leader. He ascribed to the leader the role of an ego ideal in the mind of the group members. On the basis of this common ego ideal a second very important step in Freud's theory on group psychology is taken whereby the individuals identify themselves with one another. He found that it was "the unifying and constructive" function of Eros and its libidinal energies that supply in the group situation the binding force which was sought in vain by other students of the process of group formation.

In essence, according to Freud, the group member operates on the illusion that he is loved by the leader. The two major characteristic group formations, the church and the army, most tangibly illustrate his view. Unfortunately we cannot go into all the elements here that disprove the fact that the conviction of being loved by the leader of the army is basic to the psychological situation of the soldier; and that doubt about this love and the physical or emotional loss of the leader are responsible for the disintegration of the army and for panic phenomena. In fact, in the course of his research Freud himself came to recognize, but left unexplained, that a "negative idea" can also bind individuals into a group, though this would sharply contradict the postulated role of libido in group formation.

The libidinal constellation as outlined by Freud is also denied by the fact that it fits more into the situation of highly organized masses, while the regressive behavior which he found inherent in the group situation is more characteristic of improvised, disorganized, leaderless masses, the prototype of which can be found in mob behavior. In other words, the more organized a group is, the stronger are the member's emotional ties with the leader and other members. Though we could, according to the hypothesis of Freud, expect a greater regression in these groups because of this binding force, yet we find the opposite to be true. The patterns of highly organized groups are much more mature and integrated. We shall see that, by considering only the density of the libido in the process of group formation, the basis for the investigation of mass phenomena has unwarrantably been restricted, and that the core of the group process lies outside the dynamic platform of Freud's collective psychology.

While reading Freud's fundamental work on group psychology we vainly expect the inclusion of three factors: Aggression, anxiety, and self-preservation. Such an expectation is justified because the most catastrophic display of aggression has been made by groups. Human history itself appears as a sequence of an ever-increasing scale of collective aggression. It is also puzzling that anxiety was not included by Freud in his investigation of group psychology, though he maintained that the phenomenon of panic was the result of group disintegration. In his opinion, panic evolves from the loss of the leader and the sudden liberation of libidinal energies deprived

of their object. Observation of theater panics following quite banal occurrences invalidates his assumption that leaders are essential to mass phenomena or, that, as he speculates in regard to a theater-scare, the danger "is really great." He thus contradicted the irrational nature of panic, which he thought to be beyond any doubt. Abstracting from the phenomenon of panic we well know how much belonging or not belonging to a specific group formation engenders anxiety according to the contingent power or weakness of the group.

Ultimately the question arises whether the instinct of self-preservation, a highly controversial issue in psychoanalytic theory, has a bearing on the problem of group psychology. We feel that it is not by chance that Freud had made his bitterest remark against those who opposed psychoanalysis when he was discussing the role of self-preservation in the group situation. And yet we shall see that the group situation is not exactly the most suitable area in which to defend the pre-eminent role of libido in patterning normal and abnormal behavior.

What makes it so difficult to follow Freud's reasoning is his practice of drawing conclusions one time on the basis of irrational group formation, another time on the basis of groups whose rational goals are evident. Rational group formations antecede the existence of the human race. It has its precursors in the group behavior of animals and even in the most primitive organisms of the biological scale. Trotter's parallel between the group and multicellularity is more than a mere comparison.⁴ Whenever individuals had to face a task or external danger presented by nature, be it inanimate or animate including men, a task that exceeded the strength of the individual, the necessity to join forces and resources became impelling. Any quick consideration of the most frequent reasons for such group formations on the evolutionary scale, including those occurring when propagation still took place without sexual differentiation, can lead to only one conclusion: in the process of group formation itself, libidinal aims play a secondary role.

When presenting the conclusions of my research on anxiety, my point of departure was the fact that, whenever the individual faces an external danger, an overwhelming task or any frustration, his first response is aggression.⁵ The difference in the nature of mobilized aggression and that of aggression released in defensive or offensive measures appears as anxiety. Special attention therefore has been given to the economy of aggression. The energies of the latter were derived from the two alloy instincts, the self-preserved and the sexual one. These two basic instincts were considered in full agreement with Freud's dualistic instinct theory, to be alloys on

⁴Trotter, W.: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. London: Fischer Unwin, 1916.

⁵Flescher, J.: *Psicoanalisi della Vita Instintiva*. Rome: Scienza Moderna, 1948.

the strength of their derivation from both primary energetic sources: the libidinal and the destructive. The view has been advanced that the latter, and only the latter, accounted for anxiety, which appears when either the self-preservative or the sexual instinct is traumatically challenged.

To what can we ascribe mankind's greater proclivity to group formation? If anxiety in the face of danger and the quest for the power and resources offered by the group are basic to group formation, as we are assuming, the tendency toward group formation will be more pronounced as the tendency to anxiety increases. The human race is certainly a highly anxious animal species. The dualistic view of anxiety maintains that, in response to a real or imagined danger, the unreleased aggression of all previous threatening and frustrating situations determines the amount of irrational anxiety engendered.

What then may account for man's singular tendency toward aggression? In sharp contrast to animals, the greater endowment of the human race with *sexual* drives leads automatically to more frequent traumatizing, that is, to aggression-provoking situations. The most detrimental—we do not hesitate to say, even fatal—deposit of frustration aggression from this source derives from the as yet unexplained fact of the long dependency of the human child on his parents. In this regard we shall only mention that the child in the first four or five years of his life reaches an emotional (but not physiological) puberty, the objects of which are strictly forbidden (incest taboo). The aggression arising in this simple situation has its bearing not only on the greater inclination of men toward destructiveness but also, in view of our theory, on anxiety. It is only in this indirect way that sexual motives contribute to group formation. The greater the irrational anxiety, the greater is the need for group formation and the greater the inevitability of outward release of the aggression kept in suspension prior to the group formation. As we soon shall see, the grave consequences of this simple dynamic constellation can be easily appraised.

The degree of irrationality of group formation can be measured by the degree of irrational aggression the group is liable to display. What does the group offer to the individual? In the case of rational group formation it provides him with combined power and efficiency of the group. In irrational group formation, it gives him the opportunity to release aggression under the protection of the collective strength of the group.

A curious formation which does not belong to either of these two groupings is the one ingeniously devised by S. R. Slavson for therapeutic purposes: the "activity therapy group" is not rational in the strict sense because it has no external task to perform that cannot be completed by the single individual. It shares with the irrational group formation its regressive influence at least in that phase in which full freedom for expression of impulses is allowed. The stage at which destructive activities directed

against the environment reach a dramatic intensity is considered not only typical but dynamically essential to the treatment. The activity group, on the other hand, has in common with the rational group formation the ultimate maturing influence on the group member, the increase of instinctual control, the capacity to share, etc.

It has been found that children who are not amenable to individual treatment or with whom individual treatment has failed because of overwhelming anxiety are still accessible to therapy in a group situation. Closer observation of these cases has shown that the anxiety we described was a direct consequence of the ego's incapacity to cope on a one-to-one basis with the patient's potential aggression directed against parental figures. Evidently the "activity therapy group" offers the possibility of a protective and nonretaliatory collective release of aggression, thus economically draining the very instinctual source of anxiety. This outlet entails an important and beneficial change in dynamics, which we cannot discuss at this time. We have already mentioned that according to the dualistic theory of anxiety presented here, each situation in which the self-preservation or the sexual drive has been challenged leads to a deposit of aggression. We shall therefore not be surprised to find, in the pattern of release of aggression or in the conflict around it, elements pointing to one or another genetic situation—and sometimes several of them simultaneously—in which aggression has been provoked but not released.

* * * *

... For reasons suggested earlier, the irrational aspects of human group formation prevail by far over the rational. The capacity for the sublimation of libidinal and aggressive energies is limited, and the roles in these respects that art, science and literature play among the masses have been overevaluated. Direct sexual gratification is frequently made impossible not so much by cultural taboos as by the grave repercussions that the frustrating, aggression-provoking infantile *sexual condition* has on man's ability to love. The aggression in suspension within a group, that is the sum of unreleased aggression of its members, leads only to one result: the irrational fears which will amplify the external danger will again be exactly proportionate to the aggression potential of the mass. The projection outward of the group's own aggression is, we had occasion to maintain, the psychotic trend which is inherent in the very nature of the group process.⁶

The same is true of the instinct of self-preservation. To ignore the role which self-preservation plays in group formation is not only to violate

⁶Flescher, J.: Il "Pessimismo" di Freud e l'attuale Psicosi Collettiva. *Riv. Psicoanal.*, 1: 3, 1945.

a biological and historic fact but to commit a scientific error of grave consequences. It overlooks the fact that the disregard for the natural right to exist of a weaker group in our society may intensify its destructiveness with the consequent danger to a stronger one. In other words, the instinct of self-preservation, if severely traumatized, can contribute fatally to an irrational deploy of destructiveness with complete unconcern for the ultimate outcome.^{6a}

The difference between the views presented here and what Freud in his basic work considered as the "uniting force" in group formation becomes apparent. Is it not possible that the libidinal forces play only a secondary role in the group process and assume such a role only after the group has been formed?⁷ Might it not be that what holds a group together when it is formed is as secondary to its coming into being and functioning as is the connective tissue for the evolutionary development and function of a multicellular organ or organism?

* * * *

We remember that [Freud] considered Eros to be the uniting force in group formation. The group member loves his leader as his ego ideal, believes himself to be loved by him, and, following his erotic submission to the leader, learns to love and identify himself with other members of the group by means of an aim-inhibited, yet libidinal investment. This was in 1921. In *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1929), however, we read, "In no other case does Eros so plainly betray the core of his being, his aim of making one out of many; but when he has achieved it in the proverbial way through the love of two human beings, he is not willing to go further"; and a few pages later, "Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through this primary hostility of men towards one another. Their interests in their common work would not hold them together; the passions of instinct are stronger than reasoned interests. Culture has to call up every possible reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of men and hold their manifestations in check

^{6a} Eight months after the American Group Psychotherapy Association Annual Conference, 1956, at which this paper was presented, a worldwide crisis arose which threatened the immediate outbreak of an atomic war. The situation was brought about by the simple fact that a small nation, endangered in its very existence, and two other major powers, exposed to a long-range economic disruption, undertook military action to protect themselves. It is easy to foresee that the factors which made this "limited war" stop quickly may very well be missing at the next crisis. If the "mutual terror" would be effective enough to insure peace, the war would not have been started in the first place. The recent crisis, thus, most dramatically bears out my contention that the instinct of self-preservation, if severely traumatized, may contribute fatally to an irrational deploy of destructiveness with complete unconcern for the ultimate outcome.

⁷ Flescher, *op. cit.*, see footnote 3.

by reaction-formations in men's minds. Hence its system of methods by which mankind is to be driven to identifications and aim-inhibited love-relationships; hence the restrictions on sexual life.⁸

The aim-inhibited love, the very emotional adhesive which Freud thought united the members of a group, appears to him now to be a mere reaction formation against man's primary destructiveness. In other words, we find that the most advanced insight into the dynamic structure of the group is contained not in Freud's basic work on this problem, but in scattered remarks in his later works. This is important because students of group behavior confined their evaluation of analytic contributions to Freud's most representative work on group psychology. It is regrettable, that neither Freud nor any one of his better known followers has undertaken to revise his analytic theory on collective psychology in the light of this new insight. This has discouraged psychoanalytic research on group psychology.

Group psychotherapists who observe in their daily work the operation of the aggressive instinct on a group level can make a decisive contribution in this area. We badly need it. Groups and their aggressive potential have for a long time intensified the dangers and the destructiveness which nature has imposed upon humanity. At present this trend seems to have reached a high peak. The potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the major "groups" of the human race has reached unbelievable dimensions. The psychiatrist who reads the reports of experts on the consequences of the next war has the impression of dealing with the fantasies of world destruction symptomatic of the most severe psychosis, schizophrenia. The question is whether it is merely a superficial analogy or whether the schizophrenic's wish to destroy the world has been translated by the inexorable course of human destiny into an appalling possibility; some even say: inevitability.

A decade ago I had occasion to point out that a race for time is being run by scientists with unlimited means at their disposal for devising new weapons of destruction and those others infinitely less privileged who are studying the reasons that make the human child and adult wish to destroy.⁹ I expressed the hope that reason might prevail and that our progeny will remember the twentieth century as one in which humanity first descended to the lowest level of moral degradation in order to rise determinedly to levels of ethics previously unattainable. If reason should not prevail, we maintained, there will be no progeny at all, or at least none who will be aware of a history of humanity.

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⁸ Freud, S.: *Civilization and Its Discontents*. London: Hogarth Press, 1930, pp. 80, 86.

⁹ Flescher, J.: *Psycho-Sexual Development of the Child in the Light of Psychoanalysis*. Italo-Swiss Congress of Hygiene, Milan, May 17, 1946.

Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World

TALCOTT PARSONS

The Problem of Aggression

The problem of power and its control is not identical with that of aggression.¹ Without any conscious intent on the part of one individual or collectivity to gain at the expense of another, or even any unconscious

¹“Aggression” will here be defined as the disposition on the part of an individual or a collectivity to orient its action to goals which include a conscious or unconscious intention illegitimately to injure the interests of other individuals or collectivities in the same system. The term *illegitimately* deliberately implies that the individual or collectivity in question is integrated, however imperfectly, in a moral order which defines reciprocal rights and obligations. The universality of the existence of a moral order in this sense is a cardinal thesis of modern social science. This is not to say that world society constitutes one integrated moral order in this sense; on the contrary, the diversity of such orders is a primary problem of integration, but it is *not* as such the problem of aggression. Thus friction and hostility arising from lack of mutual understanding or mere thoughtlessness or insensitiveness to the position of the other party are not as such acts of aggression, although aggressive dispositions become attracted to these situations as fields of expression perhaps more readily than any others, because they are easier to rationalize.

The use of the term aggression here is thus narrower than in some psychological, particularly psychoanalytic, discussions. In particular “self-assertion,” the “drive to mastery”—for example, of a technical skill—without meaningful hostility to others, will not be treated as aggression. It will not be an issue in the present analysis to decide as to whether, on deeper psychological levels, aggression, in the sense here meant, and non-aggressive self-assertion, or mastery, are fundamentally different or whether they derive from the same roots. On the level of *social behavior* the difference is fundamental, and that is what matters in the present context.

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disposition to do so, there would still be important sources of instability in the relations of individuals and social groups into which the use of power could and would play. There can, however, be little doubt that the widespread incidence of aggressive tendencies is the most important single factor in the dangerously disruptive potentialities of power relationships; and if these could be notably lessened, the prospects of effective control would be correspondingly enhanced.

Modern sociological and psychological analysis has greatly improved understanding of the factors and situations which produce aggressive dispositions. This understanding in turn carries with it the potentiality of devising and applying measures of deliberate control, although it is naive to suppose that control will follow automatically on knowledge of causes. Indeed the problem of utilizing what knowledge we have for control is so complex that no attempt will be made to deal with it in this brief paper which will be confined to sketching a few of the diagnostic considerations on which any program of control would have to be based. . . .

All social behavior, including the "policies" of the most complex collectivities like nation-states, is ultimately the behavior of human beings, understandable in terms of the motivation of individuals, perhaps millions of them, *in the situations* in which they are placed. Therefore the psychological level of understanding of individual motivation is fundamental to even the most complex of mass phenomena. At the same time, however, the complications and modifications introduced by the facts of the organization of individuals in social systems are equally crucial. If it were possible to arrive at a statistically reliable estimate of the average strength of aggressive tendencies in the population of a nation, it would *by itself* be worthless as a basis of predicting the probability of that nation embarking on an aggressive war. The specific goals and objects to which these aggressive dispositions are attached, the ways in which they are repressed, deflected, projected, or can be directly expressed according to the forces which channel or oppose them, and the structure of situations into which they come—all these are equally important with any aggressive potential in general in determining concrete behavioral outcomes. Indeed they may be far more important to understand, since many of these factors in aggressive behavior may be far more accessible to control than are the ultimate reservoirs of aggressive motivation themselves. The present analysis therefore will be largely concerned with the social structuring of aggression in Western society, rather taking for granted that there is an adequate reservoir to motivate the familiar types of aggressive behavior.

A few elementary facts about the psychology of aggression need, however, to be stated since they will underlie the analysis on the social level. There does not seem to be any very clear understanding of how far

or in what sense aggressive dispositions in the sense here meant are inherited. It is, however, highly probable that there are very wide variations in hereditary constitution in this as in other respects and that the variations within any one ethnic population are far more significant than those between "races" or national groups. But whether on the individual or the group level, it is at least very doubtful how far anything like a human "beast of prey" by heredity exists. Ideas to that effect almost certainly contain far more of projection and fantasy than of solid empirical observation and analysis. Indeed there is much to be said for the hypothesis that aggression grows more out of weakness and handicap than out of biological strength . . .

Far more definite and clear is the relation between aggression on the one hand and insecurity and anxiety on the other. Whatever the hereditary potential, and whatever it may mean, there is an immense accumulation of evidence that in childhood aggressive patterns develop when security in some form, mostly in human relationships, is threatened, and when realistic fears shade over into anxiety of the neurotic type. This is a very complex field and only a few points can be brought out here.

Insecurity, as the term is used in psychology, certainly has a number of dimensions. One of the most important generalizations concerns the extent to which the specific patterning of reactions to insecurity, at least, is a function of the human relationships in which the child is placed rather than of its physical safety and welfare alone. One of the major human dimensions is unquestionably that of love or affection which in most social systems centers on the relationship of mother and child. The absolute level of maternal affection is undoubtedly of fundamental significance, but equally so is its consistency. The withdrawal of love to which the child has become accustomed, or ambivalence, however deeply repressed, may have devastating effects. Similarly, relative distribution of affection between siblings is important. Frustration through withdrawal, if not absolute low-level or absence, undoubtedly is normally reacted to with aggression. A common example is provided by the fantasies of children that they will die or commit suicide so the parents will be sorry for their maltreatment.

Another major dimension of security touches expectations of achievement and of conformity with behavioral standards. Here two contexts seem to be particularly important as sources of anxiety and aggression. The first is the sense of inadequacy, of being expected to do things which one is unable to achieve, and thus incurring punishment or the loss of rewards. The second is the sense of unfairness, of being unjustly punished or denied deserved rewards. In both cases the comparative context is fundamentally important. Inadequacy is highlighted by the superior achievements of others with whom one feels himself to be in competition, and unfairness almost always involves specific examples of what is felt to be unjust favoritism

toward others. Again in both cases the consistency of the standards which are held up to the child and adults in applying them is crucial. In this general content the sense of inadequacy or injustice may generate aggressive impulses, on the one hand toward those who are held to have imposed such unfair standards or applied them unfairly, and on the other hand toward more successful rivals or beneficiaries of unfair favoritism.

Two further facts about these structured patterns of aggression in childhood are particularly important. First, they are rooted in normal reactions to strain and frustration in human relations at the stages of development when the individual is particularly vulnerable, since he has not, as some psychologists say, yet attained a strong ego-development. But unless they are corrected by an adequate strengthening of security, these reactions readily embark on a cumulative vicious circle of "neurotic" fixation. The child who has reacted with anxiety and aggression to inadequate or ambivalent maternal love builds up defenses against re-exposure to such frustrating situations and becomes incapable of responding to genuine love. The child who has felt inadequate in the face of expectations beyond his capacity to fulfill becomes neurotically resistant to stimuli toward even the achievements he is capable of and aggressive toward all attempts to make him conform. Unless re-equilibration takes place in time, these defensive patterns persist and form rigid barriers to integration in a normal system of human relationships. The result is that the individual tends either to react aggressively, without being able to control himself, in situations which do not call for it at all, or to overreact far more violently than the situation calls for.

The second important fact is a result of the conflict of the aggressive impulses, thus generated and fixated, with the moral norms current in the family and society and the sentiments integrated with them. In childhood the persons in relation to whom such affects are developed are primarily the members of the child's own immediate family. But solidarity with them and affection toward them is a primary ethical imperative in the society. Indeed it is more than an ethical imperative, since these attitudes become "introjected" as part of the fundamental attitude system of the child himself. The hostile impulses therefore conflict both with his own standards and sentiments and with the realistic situation, and cannot be overtly expressed, except under strong emotional compulsion, or even tolerated as conscious thoughts. They tend therefore, to be dissociated from the positive, socially approved attitude system and "repressed." This repressed attitude system, however, persists and seeks indirect expression especially in symbolic form. This may be purely in fantasy, but there is one particularly important phenomenon for the present context, namely displacement on a "scape-goat." If the father or mother or sibling cannot be overtly hated, a symbolically appropriate object outside the circle of persons who must be

loved is chosen and gratification of the impulse indirectly secured. Precisely because his aggressive impulses are repressed, the person is unaware of the fact of displacement and by rationalization is convinced that this is a reasonable reaction to what the scapegoat has done or is likely to do if given a chance. There can be no doubt but what an enormously important component of group hostility has this psychological origin and character.

The Kinship System

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In attempting to analyze the genesis and channeling of aggression in modern Western society, four aspects or structural-functional contexts appear to stand out as of paramount importance, and will be discussed in order. They are: First, the kinship system in its context in the larger society, since this is the environment in which the principal patterns in the individual personality become crystallized. Second, the occupational system, since this is the arena of the most important competitive process in which the individual must achieve his status. Third, the fundamental process of dynamic change by which traditional values and sentiments are exposed to a far more drastic and continuing disintegrating influence than in most societies. And fourth, the set of institutional structures through which aggression becomes organized in relation to a small number of structurally significant tensions, rather than diffused and dissipated in an indefinite variety of different channels without threatening the stability of the social system as a whole.³

The dominant feature of the kinship system of modern Western urban and industrial society is the relatively isolated conjugal family which is primarily dependent for its status and income on the occupational status of one member, the husband and father. This role, however, is segregated from the family structure itself, unlike the role of the peasant father. Work is normally done in separate premises, other members of the family do not cooperate in the work process and, above all, status is based on individual qualities and achievements which specifically cannot be shared by other members of the family unit.

³The study which comes closest to the present attempt in approach and analytical method is Clyde Kluckhohn's *Navaho Witchcraft*, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, (1944) 22: no. 2, (see also the author's review, *Amer. J. Sociology* [1946] 51:566-569). Naturally because of the vast extent of Western society, the facts must be determined on a basis of broad general impressions rather than on specific field observation. This does not, however, invalidate the comparability of the two analyses. There is a very important sense in which nationalism in the Western world is the functional equivalent of Navaho witchcraft.

It follows that sons on maturity must be emancipated from their families of orientation and "make their own way in the world" rather than fitting into a going concern organized around kinship. Determination of occupational status by family connection threatens the universalistic standards so important to the system as a whole. Daughters become overwhelmingly dependent on their marriage to the right individual man—not kinship group—for their status and security. In practice their parents cannot greatly help them—marriage becomes primarily a matter of individual responsibility and choice.

This kinship system in its larger setting involves a variety of influences on the child which favor high levels of insecurity structured in relatively definite and uniform ways and correspondingly a good deal of aggression.

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... the typical Western individual—apart from any special constitutional predispositions—has been through an experience, in the process of growing to adulthood, which involved emotional strains of such severity as to produce an adult personality with a large reservoir of aggressive disposition. Secondly, the bulk of aggression generated from this source must in the nature of the case remain repressed. In spite of the disquieting amount of actual disruption of family solidarity, and quarrelling and bickering even where families are not broken up, the social norms enjoining mutual affection among family members, especially respectful affection toward parents and love between spouses, are very powerful. Where such a large reservoir of repressed aggression exists but cannot be directly expressed, it tends to become "free-floating" and to be susceptible of mobilization against various kinds of scapegoats outside the immediate situation of its genesis.

* * * *

The childhood situation of the Western world also provides the prototypes of what appear to be the two primarily significant themes or contexts of meaning in which it is easiest to evoke an aggressive reaction, since these are the contexts in which the people of the Western world have been oversensitized by the traumatic experiences of their childhood.

The first of these is the question of "adequacy," of living up to an acceptable standard of achievement or behavior. There is a tendency to be hypersensitive to any suggestion of inferiority or incapacity to achieve goals which have once been set. This in turn is manifested in two ways of primary significance for present purposes. On the one hand the peoples of Western society are highly susceptible to wishful and distorted beliefs in their own superiority to others, as individuals or

in terms of any collectivity with which they are identified, since this belief, and its recognition by others, tends to allay anxiety about their own adequacy. On the other hand, since such a belief in superiority has compulsive characteristics, those who have to deal with such people find it "hard to take," even when the former have a highly realistic attitude. But it also stimulates a vicious circle of resentment on the part of those who, sharing the same hypersensitivity, are treated as inferior. It is, in other words, inordinately easy for either individual or group relationships in the Western world to become defined as relations of superiority and inferiority and to evoke aggressive responses, if the assumption of superiority is, even justly, questioned, or if, again even justly, there is any imputation of inferiority.

The second major context of meaning is that of loyalty, honesty, integrity, justice of dealing. Both in competition with others and in relation to expectations which he has been allowed to build up, the Western child has usually had the traumatic experience of disillusionment, of being "let down." . . . In general there is an overreadiness to believe that the other fellow will attempt to deceive or injure one. Naturally, since this hypersensitivity is associated with repressed aggression, it is very easy for the aggressive impulse to be projected on the other party to the relation, producing the "paranoid" pattern of overreadiness to impute hostile intentions where they do not exist, or to exaggerate them grossly where they do. In its extreme form the rest of the world is apt to be seen as mainly preoccupied with plotting to destroy one or one's group. The Western tendency is to be "thin-skinned," unable to "take it," when frustrations must be faced and to place the blame on others when most of it belongs at home.

The Occupational System

The other most fundamental institutional structure of modern Western society, the occupational system, can for present purposes be dealt with much more briefly—especially since a good deal has been anticipated in dealing with kinship, the two being so closely interdependent. Its most essential feature is the primacy of functional achievement. This implies the selection of people on the basis of their capacities to perform the tasks, of innate ability and training, not of birth or any other antecedent element of status. It further implies the segregation of the technical role from other aspects of the incumbent's life most of which are, in the nature of the case, governed by other types of standards. This takes the form in the type case of physical segregation and of segregation of personnel and activity, so that it involves a distinct system of relationships. Finally, it implies a peculiar type of discipline in that any type of personal feeling which might come in conflict with these relationships is subordinated

to the requirements of the technical task, which are often highly exacting and often narrowly specialized.

There is an inherently competitive dimension of the occupational system. Even when competitive victory is not as such a major direct goal, but rather is subordinated to functional achievements as such, a selective process, which among other things governs access to opportunity for all the higher achievements, is inherent in the system. A man has to "win" the competition for selection, often repeatedly, in order to have any opportunity to prove his capacity for the higher achievements. The inevitable result of the competitive and selective processes is the distribution of the personnel of the system in a relatively elaborate hierarchy of prestige which is symbolized and expressed in manifold ways.

It is furthermore relevant that in the aggregate particular roles, and still more organizations, undertake functions which are altogether unknown in simpler societies. Men are more frequently subjected to the discipline and strains of more exacting skills. But even more important are two other consequences. One is the involvement of people in systems of social relationships of very great complexity which, because of their newness and rapidly changing character, cannot be adequately governed by established and traditionalized norms. The other is the fact that explicit responsibility, in that great consequences hinge on the decisions and competence of individuals, is a far greater factor than in simpler societies. In view of what we know of the deep-seated tendencies to dependency and the psychological difficulties involved in assuming responsibility, this is a fact of prime importance.

When these features of the occupational system are brought into relation to the personality structure discussed above, two classes of conclusions touching the problem of aggression appear to follow. The first set concerns the relation to the general levels of aggression in the society, the second the channeling of what exists into different actual and potential types and directions of expression.

Though it is difficult to arrive at more than a very rough judgment, it seems clear that the balance is rather heavily on the side of increasing rather than reducing the levels of insecurity and hence of anxiety and aggression—the foundations of which are laid in the process of socialization in the family. It is true that the wide field of competitive activity provides some outlets which are constructive for sublimating aggression by harnessing it to the motivation of constructive achievement, and at the same time "winning." But the other side of the medal is the condemnation of probably a considerably large number to being "losers"—since success in such a system is to a considerable degree inherently relative—and thereby feeding any tendency to feel unduly inadequate or unjustly treated. At the same time, participation in the occupational system means subjection

to a severe discipline. It means continual control of emotions so that repression and dissociation are favored rather than counteracted.⁹ Perhaps most important of all, however, the competitive process is governed by a rather strict code which is very often in conflict with immediate impulses. In particular it is essential to be a "good loser" and take one's misfortunes and disappointments with outward equanimity. This reinforces the need to repress feelings of resentment against unfair treatment, whether the feelings are realistically justified or not, and hence their availability for mobilization in indirect channels of expression.

The above considerations apply primarily to men since they are the primary carriers of the occupational system. Conversely, however, by the segregation of occupational from familial roles, most women are denied a sense of participation with *their men* in a common enterprise. Moreover, it is in the occupational sphere that the "big things" are done, and this drastic exclusion must serve to increase the inferiority feelings of women and hence their resentment at their condemnation by the accident of sex to an inferior role.

In respect to the channeling of aggression as distinguished from its absolute level, two things are of primary importance. First, if there are no reasons to suppose that, on the average, absolute levels are lowered, at the same time few direct outlets are provided for most types of aggressive impulse. Hence the general need for indirect channels of expression, particularly by displacement on scapegoats, is reinforced by experience in this sphere of life.

Secondly, it is above all in the occupational sphere that the primary institutionalization of the basic themes of the above discussion takes place—childhood is an apprenticeship for the final test which the adult world imposes on man. Ability to perform well and hold one's own or excel in competition is the primary realistic test of adult adequacy, but many, probably the considerable majority, are condemned to what, especially if they are oversensitive, they must feel to be an unsatisfactory experience. Many also will inevitably feel they have been unjustly treated, because

⁹This discipline includes adherence to sharply objective standards in the face of the strains growing out of the emotional complexity of the system of social relationships of the work situation, and the additional strains imposed by high levels of responsibility for those who have to assume it. In addition, the mobility which is inherent in such a system has two further significant consequences. Status is inherently insecure, in that it cannot be guaranteed independently of performance—to say nothing of the results of economic fluctuations in causing unemployment and the like. Then technological and organizational change, as well as promotion and job change of the individual, are also inherent and make it difficult to "settle down" to a complete emotional adjustment to any one stable situation: it is necessary to make continual new adjustments with all the attendant emotional difficulty.

there is in fact much injustice, much of which is very deeply rooted in the nature of the society, and because many are disposed to be paranoid and see more injustice than actually exists. To feel unjustly treated is moreover not only a balm to one's sense of resentment, it is an alibi for failure, since how could one succeed if he is not given a chance?

Thus the kinship and the occupational systems constitute from the present point of view a mutually reinforcing system of forces acting on the individual to generate large quantities of aggressive impulse, to repress the greater part of it, and to channel it in the direction of finding agencies which can be symbolically held responsible for failure and for deception and injustice to the individual and to those with whom he is identified.¹⁰ Perhaps the most important mitigation of the general situation which the working of the occupational system brings about is that occupational success may do much to reduce the pressure toward compulsive masculinity. But the difficulty here is that sufficient success to have this effect is attainable only to a minority of the masculine population. Lack of it would seem to have the opposite effect, and this is just as much a consequence of the system as the other.

The Structure of Group Hostility

The occupational system of the Western world is probably the most important institutional "precipitate" of a fundamental dynamic process, which Max Weber has called the "process of rationalization." Through it, as well as other channels, this process has had a fundamental part in structuring attitudes in the Western world which is relevant to the problem of aggression and hence calls for a brief discussion.

The progress of science and related elements of rational thought is the core and fundamental prototype of the process. Science is an inherently dynamic thing. Unless prevented by influences extraneous to it, it will continually evolve. Moreover, unless science is hermetically insulated from the rest of social life, which is manifestly impossible, this dynamic process of change will be extended into neighboring realms of thought, for example, philosophical and religious thought, and in the direction of practical application wherever rational norms play a significant role in the determination of action. Hence through this dynamic factor, a continuing process of change is introduced, both into the primary symbolic systems which help to integrate the life of a society, and into the structure of

¹⁰If anything, probably the kinship system has to absorb more strains originating in the occupational system than vice versa. In any case, the effect of these strains is to accentuate the sources of aggression inherent in the kinship system rather than to mitigate them. This would appear to operate above all through the influence on children of parents who themselves are showing the effects of tension. In so far as a man "takes out" the frustrations of his occupational situation on his wife she may in turn "take it out" on the children.

the situations in which a large part of the population must carry on their activities.

The significance of this arises in the first place from the fact that there is much evidence that security in the sense relevant to this analysis is to a high degree a function of the stability of certain elements of the socio-cultural situation. This is true especially because certain aspects of the situations people face are involved in the actual and, as they feel it, prospective fulfillment of their "legitimate expectations." These expectations are, even apart from any neurotic distortions, apt to be highly concrete so that any change, even if it is not intrinsically unfavorable, is apt to be disturbing and arouse a reaction of anxiety. It should above all be noted that technological change inevitably disrupts the informal human relationships of the members of working groups—relationships which have been shown to be highly important to the stability and working efficiency of the participants.¹¹ On the other hand, the corresponding process of change on the level of ideas and symbols tends to disrupt established symbolic systems which are exceedingly important to the security and stability of the orientation of people.

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... There seems, therefore to be no doubt that the continuing incidence of dynamic change through the process of rationalization is one major source of the generalized insecurity which characterizes our society. As such it should also be a major factor in maintaining the reservoir of aggressive impulses at a high level. ...

It is not, however, the significance of the process of rationalization, as a source of quantitative addition to the reservoir of aggression, which is most important, but rather the way it operates to structure the direction of its actual and potential expression. It is a major factor in the polarization of attitudes in the society, especially as they are distributed between different groups in the population in such a way as to focus anxiety and aggression on a single structured line of tension.

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The reverse side of the exaggerated assertion of ... traditional patterns is the aggressive attack on the symbols which appear to threaten them, science as such, atheism and other antireligious aspects of liberal rationalism, the relaxation of traditional sex morality—especially in the larger urban communities and in "bohemian" circles—political and economic radicalism, and the like. The compulsive adherents of emancipated values on the

¹¹ Cf. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, William J. *Management and the Worker*; Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941.

other hand tend to brand all traditional values as "stupid," reactionary, unenlightened, and thus a vicious circle of mounting antagonism readily gets started. This polarization in fact corresponds roughly to structured differentiations of the society, with latent or more or less actual conflicts of interest as between rural and urban elements, capital and labor, upper and lower class groups, and the like, which feed fuel to the flames.

It is above all important that the values about which the fundamentalist pattern of reaction tends to cluster are those particularly important in the constitution and symbolization of informal group solidarities—those of families, social class, socioreligious groups, ethnic groups, and nations. Many of these solidarities are seriously in conflict with the explicit values of the Western world which largely stem from the rationalistic traditions of the enlightenment.¹³ They are hence particularly difficult to defend against rationalistic attack. Since, however, they are of fundamental emotional importance, the consequence more frequently than not is their "defensive" assertion rather than their abandonment. This very difficulty of rational defense when rational values are in fact accepted favors this context as a field for the mobilization of repressed aggression, since it is in a state of bafflement that people are most likely to react with "unreasonable" aggression.

These circumstances seem to go far toward explaining the striking fact that aggression in the Western world tends to focus so much on antagonisms between solidary groups. . . .

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. . . Group conflict seems to be particularly significant because on the one hand solidarity with an informal group, the appeal of which is to "infra-rational" sentiments, is a peculiarly potent measure for allaying the neurotic types of anxiety which are so common; on the other hand an antagonistic group is a peculiarly appropriate symbolic object on which to displace the emotional reactions which cannot be openly expressed within one's own group lest they threaten its solidarity.

* * * *

Thus the immense reservoir of aggression in Western society is sharply inhibited from direct expression within the smaller groups in which it is primarily generated. The structure of the society in which it is produced contains a strong predisposition for it to be channeled into group antagonisms. The significance of the nation state is, however, such that there is a strong pressure to internal unity within each such unit and therefore

¹³ Cf. Gunnar Myrdal's discussion of "The American Creed" in *An American Dilemma*; N.Y., Harpers, 1944 (2 vols.).

a tendency to focus aggression on the potential conflicts between nation-state units. In addition to the existence of a plurality of such units, each a potential target of the focussed aggression from all the others, the situation is particularly unstable because of the endemic tendency to define their relations in the manner least calculated to build an effectively solidary international order. Each state is, namely, highly ambivalent about the superiority-inferiority question. Each tends to have a deep-seated presumption of its own superiority and a corresponding resentment against any other's corresponding presumption. Each at the same time tends to feel that it has been unfairly treated in the past and is ready on the slightest provocation to assume that the others are ready to plot new outrages in the immediate future. Each tends to be easily convinced of the righteousness of its own policy while at the same time it is over-ready to suspect the motives of all others. In short, the "jungle philosophy"—which corresponds to a larger element in the real sentiments of all of us than can readily be admitted, even to ourselves—tends to be projected onto the relations of nation states at precisely the point where, under the technological and organizational situation of the modern world, it can do the most harm.

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CHAPTER 4 • Social Conflict

Toward a Theory of Social Conflict

RALF DAHRENDORF

The Limits and Goals of a Theory of Social Conflict

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The intent of a sociological theory of conflict is to overcome the predominatingly arbitrary nature of unexplained historical events by deriving these events from social structural elements—in other words, to explain certain processes by prognostic connections. Certainly it is important to describe the conflict between workers and employers purely as such; but it is more important to produce a proof that such a conflict is based on certain social structural arrangements and hence is bound to arise wherever such structural arrangements are given. Thus it is the task of sociology to derive conflicts from specific social structures and not to relegate these conflicts to psychological variables (“aggressiveness”) or to descriptive-historical ones (the influx of Negroes into the United States) or to chance.

In the sense of strict sociological analysis, conflicts can be considered explained if they can be shown to arise from the structure of social positions independently of the orientation of populations and of historical *dei ex machina*. This is necessarily a very abstract formulation . . .

Ralf Dahrendorf, “Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1958), pp. 170–183. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in original.

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The following approaches toward a theory of conflict also relate themselves to conflicts based on structure. So far, we are by no means considering a general theory of social conflict, although I would undertake to defend the assertion that we are dealing here with one of the most important, if not the most important, type of social conflict . . . the sociological theory of conflict would do well to confine itself for the time being to an explanation of the frictions between the rulers and the ruled in given social structural organizations.

II

The explanation of motion requires two separate attacks. We must know the point of departure and the direction of motion or, better yet, the moving force. No theory of social change or of conflict can forego the description of the structural entity which undergoes change or within which conflicts occur. Such a description is offered by the integration theory of society. However, it is erroneous to assume that a description of how the elements of a structure are put together into a stable whole offers, as such, a point of departure for a structural analysis of conflict and change. So far, the claim of the so-called "structural-functional" theory of modern sociology to the status of a general theory of society is demonstrably unjustified.

Toward a Critique of a Structural-Functional Theory

This critique has been led in recent times repeatedly, most effectively by D. Lockwood.⁷ It is based on a relatively simple argument. As long as we orient our analysis toward the question as to how the elements of a society are combined into a co-ordinated functioning whole, then the representation of society as a social system is the last point of reference. We are therefore faced with the task of determining certain associations, institutions, or processes within this balanced whole, that is—in Merton's definition—of determining the intentional or unintentional consequences of these associations for the functioning and the preservation of the system. In this way, we come to contentions such as "the educational system functions as a mechanism of assigning social positions," or "religion functions as an agent of integrating dominant values." The majority of sociological investigations in the last years moves in this area of analysis.

However, such an approach leads to difficulties, if we put a question of

⁷David Lockwood, "Some Notes on 'The Social System,'" *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1956). Although Lockwood's argument leads to the same conclusion, it proceeds somewhat differently (cf. my *Social Classes and the Class Conflict*, pp. 159 ff.).

a different sort. What was the function of the English trade unions in the General Strike of 1926? What was the function of the construction worker in Stalin Allee on June 17, 1953? Without doubt, it can be argued in many cases that militant trade unions or opposition political groups and parties also contribute to the functioning of the existing system.⁸ But even when this is the case—and in the two cases cited it would be difficult to establish this—such a conclusion would say little about the role of the group in question. Moreover, it is clear that the intentional, as well as the unintentional, effects of such oppositional groups are in the contribution toward an abolition or destruction of the existing system. The structural-functional position has a comfortable label for such cases: they are “dysfunctional” organizations, institutions, or processes. But this designation again tells us less than nothing. It not only fails to explain the place of these things in the process but actually hinders such explanation by a terminology which seems to be congruent with the system but which, upon closer examination, reveals itself as a residual category. Whatever does not fit is conjured out of the world by word magic.

In every science, residual categories are a fruitful point of departure for new developments. It seems to me that a careful analysis of problems which the term “dysfunction” hides in the structural-functional theory automatically puts us on the trace of a meaningful sociological theory of conflict. At the same time, it offers a remarkable vantage point associated with an attempt of a scientific analysis of society.

Two Models of Society

If we extrapolate the analytical approaches of the structural-functional theory somewhat beyond their boundaries and investigate their implicit postulates, we can construct a model of society which lies at the base of this theory and determines its perspectives. The essential elements of this societal model are these:

1. Every society is a relatively persisting configuration of elements.⁹

⁸This aspect of social conflict is, in fact, central in the analysis of Lewis Coser (continuing that of Simmel) in his work on the functions of social conflict (cf. n. 3).

⁹There is much controversy over this implication of the structural-functional approach. Most functionalists deny that they make such an assumption. Indeed, assertions to the contrary are found in the works of Parsons, Merton, and others. Nevertheless, it can be shown that these assertions are, from the point of view of structural-functional theory, mere declarations. The notion of equilibrium and the concept of a system would have little sense if they did not make the assumption of stability of societies. However, two limitations are to be observed: (1) we have to do here (also in the implications which follow) not with a metaphysical postulate but rather with an assumption made for the purpose of analysis; and (2) stability does not mean statics in the sense of complete absence of processes within the “system.”

2. Every society is a well-integrated configuration of elements.
3. Every element in a society contributes to its functioning.
4. Every society rests on the consensus of its members.

It should be clear that a theory based on this model does not lend itself to the explanation, not even the description, of the phenomena of social conflict and change. For this purpose, one needs a model which takes the diametrically opposite position on all the four points above:

1. Every society is subjected at every moment to change: social change is ubiquitous.
2. Every society experiences at every moment social conflict: social conflict is ubiquitous.
3. Every element in a society contributes to its change.
4. Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others.

The remarkable nature of our vantage point becomes evident when we examine the two groups of postulates with respect to their truth content, that is, if we ask ourselves which of the two models promises greater utility for cognition of reality. It appears that the juxtaposed pairs of postulates are in no way mutually exclusive with respect to social reality. It is impossible to decide by an empirical investigation which of the two models is more nearly correct; the postulates are not hypotheses. Moreover, it seems meaningful to say that both models are in a certain sense valid and analytically fruitful. Stability and change, integration and conflict, function and "dysfunction," consensus and constraint are, it would seem, two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society. They are dialectically separated and are exhaustive only in combination as a description of the social problems. Possibly a more general theory of society may be thought of which lifts the equivalidity of both models, the coexistence of the uncombinable, onto a higher level of generality. As long as we do not have such a theory, we must content ourselves with the finding that society presents a double aspect to the sociological understanding, each no better, no more valid, than the other. It follows that the criticism of the unapplicability of the structural-functional theory for the analysis of conflict is directed only against a claim of generality of this theory but leaves untouched its competence with respect to the problem of integration. It follows, on the other hand, also that the theory of conflict and change is not a general theory. Comparisons between natural and social sciences always carry the danger of misunderstanding. However, it may be maintained, without attributing to this analogy more than a logical meaning, that the situation of the sociologists is not unlike that of the physicists with respect to the theory of light. Just as the physicists can solve certain problems only by assuming the wave character of light and others, on the contrary, only by assuming a corpuscular or quantum theory, so there are problems of sociology which

can be adequately attacked only with an integration theory and others which require a conflict theory for a meaningful analysis. Both theories can work extensively with the same categories, but they emphasize different aspects. While the integration theory likens a society to an ellipse, a rounded entity which incloses all of its elements, conflict theory sees society rather as a hyperbola which, it is true, has the same foci but is open in many directions and appears as a tension field of the determining forces.

The Tasks of a Theory of Social Conflict

The double aspect of society and the dialectics of the two types of sociological theory are in themselves a most fruitful object of reflection. Nevertheless, another problem seems to be more urgent. The theory of social integration has recently developed to a flourishing state as the structural-functional approach in ethnology and sociology. Our theory of conflict, however, is still in a very rudimentary state. It is an approach based on postulating ubiquitous social change and social conflict, the "dysfunctionality" of all the elements of social structure, and the constraining character of social unity. Our considerations put us in a position to formulate some requirements of such a theory:

1. It should be a scientific theory (as is the theory of social integration), that is, it should be formulated with reference to a plausible and demonstrable explanation of empirical phenomena.
2. The elements of the theory should not contradict the conflict model of society.
3. The categories employed should, whenever possible, agree with those of the integration theory or at least correspond to them.
4. A conflict theory should enable us to derive social conflicts from structural arrangements and thus show these conflicts systematically generated.
5. It should account both for the multiplicity of forms of conflict and for their degrees of intensity.

The last goal of a social theory is the explanation of social change. The integration theory gives us a tool for determining the point of departure of the process. To find the locus of the forces which drive the process and social change is the task of a theory of conflict. It must develop a model which makes understandable the structural origin of social conflict. This seems possible only if we understand conflicts as struggles among social groups, that is, if we make our tasks precise to the extent that it reduces to the structural analysis of conflicting groups. Under this supposition three questions come especially to the forefront, which conflict theory must answer:

1. How do conflicting groups arise from the structure of society?
2. What forms can the struggles among such groups assume?
3. How does the conflict among such groups effect a change in the social structures?

III

Wherever men live together and lay foundations of forms of social organization, there are positions whose occupants have powers of command in certain contexts and over certain positions, and there are other positions whose occupants are subjected to such commands. The distinction between "up" and "down"—or, as the English say, "Them" and "Us"—is one of the fundamental experiences of most men in society,¹⁰ and, moreover, it appears that this distinction is intimately connected with unequal distribution of power. The main thesis of the following attempt to construct a model for the structural analysis of conflict is that we should seek the structural origin of social conflict in the dominance relations which prevail within certain units of social organization. For these units I will use Max Weber's concept of "imperatively co-ordinated group." The thesis is not new; it is found (however often with important modifications) in the formulation of many social scientists before and after Marx. But we shall make no attempt to trace the history of this thesis.

Authority and Authority Structures

The concepts of power and authority are very complex ones. Whoever uses them is likely to be accused of lack of precision and of clarity to the extent that he tries to define them "exhaustively." Is the influence of a father on his children, the influence of an industrial combine on the government, or the influence of a demagogue on his followers an instance of an authority relation? Here, as in most other cases, it is basically not a question of a definition but rather a question of an "operational definition," as it is often called today: a method of determination which allows us to identify as such the state of affairs when we are actually confronted with it. However, for the purpose of analysis and identification, Weber's determination of authority is sufficient: "The likelihood that a command of a certain content will be obeyed by given persons."¹¹ This determination contains the following elements:

1. Authority denotes a relation of supra- and subordination.

¹⁰ Empirical corroborations for these generalizations are found in two significant publications of last year: Heinrich Popitz *et al.*, *Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters* ("The Worker's Image of Society") (Tübingen, 1957); Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (London, 1957).

¹¹ Max Weber, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft," in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, III (3d ed.; Tübingen, 1947), 28.

2. The supra-ordinated side prescribes to the subordinated one certain behavior in the form of a command or a prohibition.
3. The supra-ordinated side has the right to make such prescriptions; authority is a legitimate relation of supra- and subordination; authority is not based on personal or situational chance effects but rather on an expectation associated with social position.
4. The right of authority is limited to certain contents and to specific persons.
5. Failure to obey the prescriptions is sanctioned; a legal system (or a system of quasi-legal customs) guards the effectiveness of authority.

This determination of authority makes possible the identification of a cabinet minister, an employer, and a party secretary as occupants of authority positions—in contrast to an industrial syndicate or a demagogue, neither of which satisfies condition 3 above.¹²

It is not the intention of our “definition” of authority to solve all analytical and empirical problems of this category.¹³ In fact, the very first step of our model leads us deep into these problems: in each imperatively co-ordinated group, two aggregates can be distinguished: those which have only general (“civil”) basic rights and those which have authority rights over the former. In contrast to prestige and income, a continuum of gradual transition cannot be constructed for the distribution of authority. Rather there is a clear dichotomy. Every position in an imperatively co-ordinated group can be recognized as belonging to one who dominates or one who is dominated. Sometimes, in view of the bureaucratic large-scale organization of modern societies—under the influence of the state—this assumption may at first sight seem problematic. However, a sharper analysis leaves no doubt that here also the split into the dominating and dominated is valid, even though in reality a considerable measure

¹²This third condition, that of legitimacy, denotes the distinction between power (as an actual command relationship) and authority (cf. Weber’s “Definitionen” *op. cit.*).

¹³Thus it is clear that the phenomenon of authority is here deliberately treated unilaterally. The double aspect of society may be illustrated in this category, as in practically any other. Integration theory, too, treats of authority. However, this theory emphasizes not the polemical, conflict-generating aspect of this social relation but, on the contrary, the integrative, unifying aspect. Parsons is doubtless right when he says that authority “is the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general ‘public’ commitment has been made, or may be made. It is mobilization, above all, of the action of persons and groups, which is *binding* on them by virtue of their position in society” (“The Distribution of Power in American Society,” *World Politics*, X, No. 1 [October, 1957], 140). However, in a way C. Wright Mills, who is criticized by Parsons, is also right when he emphasizes, as we do, the “presumptive illegitimacy” and “dysfunctionality” of all authority.

of differentiation is discernible among those in the dominating group.¹⁴

The Conflict-Theory Model

The dichotomy of social roles within imperatively co-ordinated groups,¹⁵ the division into positive and negative dominance roles, is a fact of social structure. If and insofar as social conflicts can be referred to this factual situation, they are structurally explained. The model of analysis of social conflict which is developed against a background of an assumption of such a dichotomy involves the following steps:

1. In every imperatively co-ordinated group, the carriers of positive and negative dominance roles determine two quasi-groups with opposite latent interests. We call them "quasi-groups" because we have to do here with mere aggregates, not organized units; we speak of "latent interests," because the opposition of outlook need not be conscious on this level; it may exist only in the form of expectations associated with certain positions. The opposition of interests has here a quite formal meaning, namely, the expectation that an interest in the preservation of the status quo is associated with the positive dominance roles and an interest in the change of the status quo is associated with the negative dominance roles.

2. The bearers of positive and negative dominance roles, that is, the members of the opposing quasi-groups, organize themselves into groups with manifest interests, unless certain empirically variable conditions (the condition of organization) intervene. Interest groups, in contrast to quasi-groups, are organized entities, such as parties, trade unions; the manifest interests are formulated programs and ideologies.

3. Interest groups which originate in this manner are in constant conflict concerned with the preservation or change in the status quo. The form and the intensity of the conflict are determined by empirically variable conditions (the conditions of conflict).

4. The conflict among interest groups in the sense of this model leads to changes in the structure of the social relations in question through changes in the dominance relations. The kind, the speed, and the depth of

¹⁴The position of authority of the bureaucrat was already of concern to Max Weber and to many sociologists since. Here there seems to be indeed a differentiation of authority. However, it is a differentiation of a special kind. In modern bureaucratic administration, the exercise of authority has undergone to a certain degree a division of labor; hence the multiplicity of positions, distinguishable by the number of "assignable persons" and the scope of "specific content" to which authority privileges are attached. In the sense of our analysis, there can be no doubt that the entire bureaucracy belongs (at times!) to the ruling side.

¹⁵In what follows, I shall designate the roles to which the expectation of the exercise of authority is attached as "positive dominance roles" and, conversely, the roles without authority privileges as "negative dominance roles."

this development depend on empirically variable conditions (the conditions of structural change).

The intent of such a model is to delimit a problem area, to identify the factors pertinent to it, to put them into order—that is, to propose fruitful questions—and at the same time to fix precisely their analytical focus. We have delimited our problem area by viewing social conflict as a conflict among groups which emerge from the authority structure of social organizations. We have identified pertinent factors in the conditions of organization, of conflict, and of change. Their order, however, can be expressed on the basis of the model in three functions: interest groups (for example, parties) are a function of conditions of organization if an imperatively co-ordinated group is given; specific forms of conflict (e.g., parliamentary debates) are a function of the conditions of conflict if the interest groups are given; specific forms of change (e.g., revolutions) are a function of the conditions of change if the conflict among interest groups is given. Thus the task of the theory of conflict turns out to be to identify the three sets of conditions and to determine as sharply as possible their respective weight—ideally, by quantitative measure.¹⁶ . . .

Empirical Conditions of Social Conflict

As far as the conditions of organization are concerned, three groups of factors come to mind. First, we have certain effective social conditions: for example, the possibility of communication among the members of the quasi-group and a certain method of recruitment into the quasi-groups. Next there are certain political conditions which must be fulfilled if interest groups are to emerge. Here, above all, a guaranty of freedom of coalition is important. Finally, certain technical conditions must be fulfilled: an organization must have material means, a founder, a leader, and an ideology.

Under conditions of conflict, two kinds are immediately conspicuous: the degree of social mobility of individuals (or of families) and the presence of effective mechanisms for regulating social conflicts. If we imagine a continuum of intensity of social conflict among interest groups, ranging from democratic debate to civil war, we may conjecture that the presence or absence of social mobility and of regulating mechanisms has considerable influence on the position of specific given conflicts on this continuum. Here, as with the other conditions, the determination of the exact weights of the factors is a task of empirical investigation.

Finally, a third group of conditions or variables determines the form

¹⁶By this remark is meant (1) a mathematical formulation of the functions, (2) a development of measurement scales for each of the conditions, and (3) the adjustment of the combined scales to groups of conditions.

and the extent of social structural changes which arise from the conflict of interest groups. Probably a relatively intimate connection exists between the intensity of the conflict and the change, that is, also between the conditions of conflict and of the structural changes. However, additional factors come into play, such as the capacity of the rulers to stay in power and the pressure potential of the dominated interest group. The sociology of revolutions and especially the unwritten sociology of uncompleted revolutions should contribute considerably to making these factors precise.

It need hardly be re-emphasized that these unsystematic observations can, as such, hardly lay a foundation of a theory of conflict. Nevertheless, we put ourselves in a position to ask meaningful questions both on the theoretical level and with respect to empirical problems. Each of the conditions mentioned offers a fruitful object of theoretically oriented investigations. And in the empirical sphere, the systematic associations of factors in such an investigation redirects our questions from a haphazard search for *ad hoc* relations in the world of coincidences to a meaningful study of specific interdependencies, whose locus and meaning are fixed by a general perspective.

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... It was not the intent of this discussion to treat exhaustively some empirical problem. Rather, we wanted to show that conflict theory puts us in a position to formulate more sharply urgent problems of empirical investigation, to bring within our grasp unexplained events, to see what is known from additional points of view, and to transform tentative questions into a systematic search—that is, to do precisely what a scientific theory should accomplish. . . . In spite of all progress, the theory of social conflict is still more a challenge to the sociologist than a result of his researches.

The Analysis of Social Conflict— Toward an Overview and Synthesis

RAYMOND W. MACK AND RICHARD C. SNYDER

I. Introduction

It is clearly evident . . . that a vast literature on social conflict has accumulated. Even allowing for a high degree of selectivity, the list of relevant writings is imposing. Over the years, research suggestions and problem- or policy-oriented proposals have grown in number and sophistication. Action programs designed to reduce or eliminate conflict have been subjected to critical appraisal. Attention has been focused on a wide variety of conflict and conflict situations: intrapersonal, interpersonal, interorganizational, and intergroup. In particular, war and peace, labor and management, personality, interest groups, race, ethnology, and ideology have been central topics of conflict analysis. There is, of course, a differential distribution of research and writing among the major categories of social conflict, but none has been totally neglected.

. . . such a broad area of research and analysis is marked by diverse approaches and purposes and by the usual methodological problems and disagreements. To a certain extent this is both natural and in some sense welcome. On the other hand, it has been remarked (11; 12, chap. i) that a priori postures toward social conflict have delayed, if not prevented, the acquisition of systematic, socially applicable knowledge.

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... Inadequate conceptualization and theorizing have had important consequences. First, generalization across disciplinary or subject-matter lines has been slow to develop and, where it does appear, is often implicit. Second, it has been difficult to link propositions systematically. Third, research has not always been guided by hypotheses of acceptable power and significance. Fourth, no well-rounded body of case materials based on comparative types, unifying concepts, and general hypotheses has developed.

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For the foregoing reasons, we wish to argue the need for further intellectual stocktaking—for a propositional survey and assessment and for more precise conceptualization. We shall only attempt to suggest in simplified form the general lines along which this might be carried out.

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II. Basic Propositions

A reasonably thorough scanning of the literature reveals that the materials for an orderly and general index of propositions on social conflict are available. Coser has reformulated and analyzed sixteen of Simmel's propositions concerning intergroup conflict (12, chaps. ii-ix). Williams has presented one hundred and two propositions dealing with racial, ethnic, and religious conflict (39). Indeed, the latter has provided a model which might well be copied for other areas of conflict. Cooper has reviewed the psychological literature on war (11). Jackson has discussed eight major propositions regarding international mediation (23, pp. 126-70). Chase summarizes the findings and principles from several branches of social science which bear on sixteen levels of conflict—from two persons to the East-West crisis (7). Rose offers twenty-one hypotheses on effective industrial mediation devices (33). Dubin ([17], p. 179) has built his analysis of industrial conflict around five central propositions, together with twenty-five corollaries.

Listing propositions could easily be an empty exercise. Why is a propositional survey useful, and what are the necessary rules for constructing it? To begin with, it is universally recognized that a body of knowledge about anything consists primarily of a set of existential propositions which are in varying degrees verified. A necessary step in stocktaking is, therefore, the pinpointing of major generalizations. Once they are made explicit and rendered in propositional form, critical assessment is possible. A series of questions can and should be put to any set of propositions: What evidence can be mobilized in support or disproof? Which are educated guesses? Which are generally agreed to or disagreed from by qualified experts? Which

need further testing and/or reformulation? Which represent cumulative, consistent observations?

In order to avoid an almost infinite list of propositions based on indiscriminate choice, criteria are required. Williams (39, p. 50) suggests three: (1) those of potential importance for understanding social conflict and for application to policy problems; (2) those which offer the most promise of fruitfully guiding empirical research; and (3) those of most probable validity. These criteria direct initial attention to propositions which are of sufficient generality to provide a framework for more particular propositions (lower order of generality), which highlight the necessary and sufficient causes of social conflict, which provide a basis for linking different kinds of social conflict (e.g., industrial and international), and which can be ordered into a theory having explanatory and predictive power.

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... as soon as the process of ordering and evaluating the propositions began, it would be noticed that no explicit scheme of classification is present beyond the mere reference to the social conflict arena to which each was originally applied, that essential terms are undefined, and that the conditions under which the various propositions are alleged to hold true are not specified. Also the crucial question of relevant, acceptable, and sufficient evidence of proof or disproof is ignored. It is our contention that these problems, together with the application of Williams' criteria, are not susceptible of self-evident solutions.

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III. The Problem of Conceptualization and Choices of Major Variables

Having argued that the classification, ordering, and evaluation of basic propositions require prior intellectual operations, we shall now explore a tentative framework of analysis which might aid in these pursuits.

Definitions and Distinctions

Unless the phenomena denoted by the term "conflict" are limited and differentiated, the concept becomes too inclusive. On the whole, it is easier to begin by specifying what is not considered to be conflict. A review of the literature reveals certain distinctions which are apparently agreed upon or at least commonly made. *Competition* is not regarded as conflict or a form of conflict, though it may be an important source of the latter (12, p. 134; 26, p. 230; 38, p. 263; 44, p. 198). Competition involves striving for scarce objects (a prize or a resource usually "awarded" by a third party) according to established rules which strictly limit what the competitors can do to each other in the course of striving; the chief objective is the scarce object, not

the injury or destruction of an opponent per se. A football game played normally according to the rules is competition *until* one or more players begin to assault one another in manner forbidden by the rules; then it becomes a conflict.

Though closely related to conflict, the following are also considered differentiable: *antagonistic interests* (12, p. 135); *misunderstandings* (2, p. 118); *aggressiveness* (2; 12, p. 58); *hostility or hostile sentiments* (39, pp. 42-43; 12, p. 37); *desire or intention to oppose* (26, p. 233); *social cleavages* (e.g., along class lines) (8, p. 64); *logical irreconcilability of goals or interests* (44, pp. 193-94); *tensions* (44); and *rivalry* (44). The attitudes, behaviors, and states of affairs signified by these terms *may* be among the underlying sources of conflict. Or such factors *may* accompany or intensify conflict. But it seems generally agreed that none of the terms is a proper synonym for conflict, nor are the factors denoted singly or in combination sufficient preconditions of social conflict. However, there is no general agreement as to whether any one or more is a necessary precondition for conflict to arise or continue. On the other hand, the potential relevance of the factors is clear. These problems can be clarified by confronting the nature, sources, and conditions of conflict.

Properties of Conflictful Behaviors and Conflict Relationships

We shall not attempt a formal definition of conflict. Rather, a set of properties will be suggested which *in toto* will constitute a model for identifying and characterizing conflict phenomena and situations. Without claiming to be exhaustive, we shall insist that the essential elements are included and that conflict does not exist if the empirical conditions implied by properties 1-5 are not present. For the moment we shall avoid the awkward problem of the relationship between subjective (i.e., from the standpoint of the actor or actors) and objective (i.e., from the standpoint of an observer) perspectives. The following formulation is not original; we have attempted to synthesize and somewhat formalize the contributions of many sources:

1. *Conflict requires at least two parties or two analytically distinct units or entities* (i.e., actor, organism, group, individual, collectivity, etc.).

- a) Social conflict is, by definition, an interaction relationship between two or more parties.

- b) One-party conflict (intrapersonal or individual conflict) may be viewed as *either* individual-environment or actor-nature conflict (in which case the parties may be human and non-human entities), *or* the individual in conflict with himself (conflict of two or more needs and values).

- c) "Games against nature" as provided in some formulations of game theory can be regarded as social conflict, but other forms of one-party conflict can be regarded as socially significant non-social conflict.

d) A minimum "contact" (not necessarily face-to-face) and "visibility" are implied (39, pp. 42-43).

2. *Conflict arises from "position scarcity" and "resource scarcity"* (2, p. 112).

a) Position scarcity is a condition in which an object cannot occupy two places at the same time, an object cannot simultaneously serve two different functions, a role cannot be simultaneously occupied or performed by two or more actors, and different prescribed behaviors cannot be carried out simultaneously.

b) Resource scarcity is a condition in which the supply of desired objects (or states of affairs) is limited so that parties cannot have *all* they want of anything.

c) Different underlying value judgments may condition the demand or need for scarce resources and positions.

d) Hence mutually exclusive and/or mutually incompatible values and opposed values are inevitable characteristics of conflict.

3. *Conflictful behaviors are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control another party or other parties, and a conflict relationship is one in which the parties can gain (relatively) only at each other's expense* (26, p. 230).

a) The key is the intent of action and the object of action.

b) Gains for one party result either from a net loss to the other party or from one party's having less of what he wants than he would have had in the absence of opposition.

c) Many tactics and techniques may be manifest in conflictful behaviors which are not necessarily always identified with conflict per se.

d) Expressive behaviors, such as anger, hostility, shouting, aggressiveness, may or may not accompany conflictful behavior.

4. *Conflict requires interaction among parties in which actions and counteractions are mutually opposed* (26, 44).

a) Conflict cannot exist without action.

b) The action-reaction-action sequence must embody the pursuit of exclusive or incompatible values.

c) Threats are actions.

5. *Conflict relations always involve attempts to gain control of scarce resources and positions or to influence behavior in certain directions; hence a conflict relationship always involves the attempt to acquire or exercise power or the actual acquisition or exercise of power* (35).

a) Power is defined as control over decisions (i.e., disposition of scarce resources and positions) and as the basis of reciprocal influence between or among parties (i.e., control over behaviors).

b) Conflict reflects power strains (i.e., the need or desire to achieve or change control), and opposed actions are directed to changing or preserving existing power relations (i.e., control over objects and behaviors).

6. *Conflict relations constitute a fundamental social-interaction process having important consequences* (17, p. 183).

a) Conflict is not a breakdown or cessation of social interaction.

b) The conflict process has important functions for the parties and for the larger social system of which it is a part.

c) Conflict has a cost dimension.

7. *A conflict process or relation represents a temporary tendency toward disjunction in the interaction flow between parties* (37, p. 230).

a) Disjunction results from the presence of mutually incompatible tendencies which disrupt the normal or persistent patterns of behavior, norms, and expectations of the parties and their responses to each other.

8. *Conflict relations do not represent a breakdown in regulated conduct but rather a shift in the governing norms and expectations.*

a) Disjunctive tendencies do not continue to the point where the interaction is completely disrupted because the conflict process is subject to its own rules and limits.

If the foregoing provides a basis for at least a crude distinction between conflict and non-conflict, it does not go far enough. Thus far we have indicated that there must be *parties* and a *particular kind of interactional relationship between parties*. But there are kinds and forms of conflict relations; there are sources of conflict; various conditions affect the nature and duration of conflict; conflict has certain functions or consequences; and, finally, conflict always occurs in an environmental context which transcends the conflict relationship itself.

Types of Conflict

We shall mention some major distinctions only briefly. One obvious distinction is...conflict *within* persons (intraparty) and conflict *between* persons or groups. . . .

An important and familiar distinction is between *realistic* and *non-realistic* conflict (12, p. 49; 39, p. 40). Realistic conflict is characterized by opposed means and ends, by incompatibility of values and interests. Non-realistic conflict arises from the need for tension release, from deflected hostility, from historical tradition, and from ignorance or error. The two types differ in origin and in the ultimate motivation behind opposed action. In realistic conflict, wants and needs seem to be, or become, incompatible because of other factors, that is, resource and position scarcity. But non-realistic conflict, for example, would be continued opposed action between nations whose actual conflicting interests had long since been reconciled. . . . Along similar lines Kerr (26, p. 234) draws a distinction between *real* and *induced* conflict, the latter being cases where representatives of conflicting groups have ends to be gained (e.g., their own prestige) apart from the ends

in dispute between groups. This would be the situation if labor-union leaders precipitated a conflict with management in order to strengthen their hold over the union membership. Coser differentiates *basic cleavages*—conflict over the very nature of a consensual framework within which individuals and groups have hitherto operated—and conflicts over means and subordinate ends within a consensual framework (12, p. 73). This parallels Simpson's distinction between *non-communal* and *communal* conflicts, respectively (36, p. 17). . . .

An implicit distinction is usually drawn between *institutionalized* and *non-institutionalized* conflict. The former is characterized by explicit rules, predictable behavior, and continuity, as in the case of collective bargaining. Most racial conflict is, on the other hand, non-institutionalized. *Disorganized* conflict, as in the case of a riot (regardless of organized effort to initiate it), may take place within an institutional framework or not, the former being illustrated by an unauthorized, partially supported strike. Organized conflict, such as a war between armies, is obviously different from a spontaneous border clash between irregular armed units. *Extreme* (35, p. 324), *aggressive* (26, p. 232), and *violent* (12, p. 88) conflict are also differentiated from *non-violent*, "*diplomatic*" conflict—chiefly on the basis of coercive means versus persuasive means and on the assumption that, in the former, destruction or crippling of one of the parties is highly possible.

It appears useful to separate *primary, face-to-face conflicts* from *secondary, mediated conflicts*. . . . Closely related is another set of opposite types: *personal subjective conflict* and *impersonal objective conflict*. A conflict between husband and wife would fit the first category, and a conflict between two lawyers, each representing a client, would fit the second. A difference between *conflicts of right* and *conflicts of interest* may be noted. A conflict of right concerns the application of agreed standards to specified actions; a conflict of interest concerns the changing of old standards or the introduction of new standards—roughly, the distinction is between judicial and legislative conflict. This distinction applies to industrial, international, racial, and ethnic conflict.

Opposed values have been specified as inevitable concomitants of conflict, but any preliminary typology should include mention of types of conflict which are predominantly value conflicts per se. *Ideological conflict* is characterized by a clash of "concepts of the desirable" (28, p. 391) and prescriptive norms and beliefs which do or should govern particular behaviors. For purposes of this analysis, ideologies can be classified as relatively open and relatively closed in terms of the extent to which alien or opposed values and belief can or will be accommodated or absorbed. Ideological conflict can be further classified according to the significance of the clash of absolute values, i.e., no "higher values" exist to mediate "lower values," and thus one set must triumph, or there must be benevolent neutrality.

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Underlying Sources of Conflict

Properties 1-5 set forth above may be viewed as a set of analytic preconditions of conflict, but, as formulated, they say nothing about the empirical content in particular cases. For example, position and resource scarcity is one of the necessary preconditions of conflict; yet we have to look elsewhere for the factors which produce, or account for, a specific pattern of scarcity. Underlying sources are those empirical phenomena which may result in the existence of the five preconditions of conflict. Perhaps the line between sources and preconditions will seem arbitrary and difficult to draw. The distinction seems required, nonetheless, because the presence or persistence of underlying source factors does not necessarily mean that conflict, as defined, will arise. . . .

Most social scientists now accept the principle of multiple causality; hence there is no one basic source of conflict. . . . The central problem is, of course, to determine the particular combination of underlying source factors in a given situation which does result in the analytic preconditions. In general, the catalogues of conflict sources which are available do not, for the most part, provide the observer with more than a list of alternative possibilities which he would want to explore in any single instance. Above all, there is little guidance as to patterns of combination which produce conflict and to the conditions under which they are formed. The latter point suggests that difficulties are further compounded because the combination of sources and the translation of these into the preconditions may be influenced by non-source factors, which is one reason why we shall discuss conditions of conflict in the next section.

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While it is true that the specific sources of, say, industrial conflict and international conflict are quite different, it is also true that generalized sources and types of source may be identified. A generalized source is one which is not peculiar to any one arena or kind of conflict. Insofar as "tensions" are, in fact, a source of conflict, they may be either general personality conditions which can be focused on a range by particular situations, or they can be closely connected with only certain interaction relationships. . . . Two questions arise. First, how deep should the search for underlying factors (this usually involves personality dynamics) be pushed? Second, are there certain basic motive patterns of facts of social life which might serve to account partially for a variety of conflict relations. . . . On the surface at least, there is no common agreement on the first question, namely, Should the search for source factors be pushed to the psychoanalytic level? But the lack of agreement is due partly to the failure to make consistent

distinctions among type of, and parties to, conflict and to link sources explicitly with conditions and contexts. Furthermore, the problem of psychological and sociological levels of explanation should not obscure an integrative question. Under what social conditions do psychological mechanisms operate as sources of conflict?

On the second question, it seems generally agreed that scarcity of desired objects, states of affairs, and resources in nature and culture, the division of labor in organized society, and social differentiation lead inevitably to potentially conflictual cleavages and antagonistic interests. It is (or seems to be) further agreed that these factors, as well as more deeply psychological ones, contribute to a reservoir of "free-floating" aggression, hostility, and tension which, in turn, *may* lead to conflictual behaviors. This is illustrated by the mechanisms of projection and displacement which may be focused on any object or group (industrial, international, ethnic, etc.) in a conflict situation. Hence two general categories of sources emerge: those centering on interactional relationships, . . . and those centering on certain interaction characteristics of parties or intrapersonal (personality dynamics) factors. . .

Concern over the origins of conflict draws attention to potential responses to conflict situations and to the decisions which result in moving from a desire to oppose to acts of opposition. In ascertaining why some situations lead to actual conflict interaction while others do not, it is necessary to identify certain crucial foci of analysis. Responses or decisions may result in the origination of conflict interaction, in withdrawal from a potential conflict situation, in a change from non-violent to violent or extreme conflict, or in accommodation to a stable conflict relationship. These outcomes, more often than not, depend on choices. Therefore, the conditions which affect such choices must be probed, and similar cases which have different outcomes must be compared.

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Conditions of Conflict

The main reason for analyzing the accompanying conditions of conflict separately is that particular sources which result in the analytic preconditions do not account for the origin, form, intensity, duration, reduction, or resolution of conflict. This can be demonstrated by Dahlke's (14, pp. 421-24) analysis of race riots, which, he argues, are highly probable when (a) the period is one of change and mobility; (b) the minority group has an outstanding trait or characteristic which can become a basis for negative assessments; (c) lawful authorities assign the minority group a subordinate status; (d) one or more major associations or organizations direct the attack against the minority; (e) the press and other media have been minority-

baiting; and (f) suitable personnel (students and marginal workers) are available for initiating action.

Clearly, the notion of conditions opens up a wide range of relevant factors. In calling attention to the analytic separation of these factors, we mean only to say that certain elements inherent in the nature of parties to conflict, in the interaction relationships between parties, and in the social context will often account for the origin, form, intensity, duration, limits, and resolution of conflict. Conditions are not, then, a special category of factors but a way of viewing that the impact of the elements to be discussed in succeeding sections.

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In addition, two other conditioning factors are of importance. Our specification of the essential properties of conflict relations stressed the power component. To the extent that conflict is over the nature of the respective roles of the parties in decision-making with respect to mutual interests, the form, intensity, and duration of the conflict will depend on the length of time it takes to test the power relationship conclusively and the means available to each party for exerting control. Intensity will also be affected by the cruciality of the decision-making functions at issue. A long war, a long strike, or a long bargaining period may indicate roughly an equal power equation or the failure to find adequate indexes of power. Another condition of great importance is the amount of information available to, and interpreted correctly by, the parties to conflict. Bernard ([2], p. 111) has graphically portrayed the potential impact of this factor.

The Social Context of Conflict

... it is axiomatic that conflict occurs in, affects, and in turn is affected by, a surrounding environment. Conflict must be re-searched and analyzed against the background of the total social system in which it occurs (39, p. 47). . . .

Social change affects conflict in a number of ways. Changes are constantly shifting the bases of potentially antagonistic interests and the relative power positions of individuals and groups. As the value potentiality of the social environment shifts, new demands, new frustrations, and new incompatibilities arise. Population growth, invention, urbanization, mobility—indeed, all the changes which result in and are resultants of greater social complexity—affect the sources of conflict, the nature and number of parties to conflict, the instrumentalities of conflict, the issues of conflict, modes of settlement, and so on (10; 14; 17, p. 179; 22; 26; 29, pp. 3-22; 30; 35; 39, pp. 43 ff.). The same general point applies to international conflict, which has its own social context:

Proposition 30: *Important alternations in the balance of forces as between societies occurs as a result of profound changes internal to one or more societies* (9, p. 19).

Social organization will determine the number and kinds of parties to conflict within any society. In a complex industrial urban society realistic conflict will tend to be carried on by highly organized groups having diverse memberships and specialized representatives and negotiators. In a less complex communal society, there will tend to be more direct, face-to-face interpersonal conflict. Social differentiation (status, occupational roles, power positions, etc.) will tend to define lines of consensus and cleavage, to lead to the formation of groups and groupings which are foci of consensus and cleavage. In a recent book, *Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World*, Frazier organizes his analysis around the ecological, economic, political, and social organization. The impact of the social context or racial conflict is clearly shown. For example, economic racial conflict does not arise where the division of labor is based on objective standards of competitive success (p. 331). Whyte's study, *Pattern for Industrial Peace*, is concerned with a more immediate context of conflict: the relation between company structure and labor-management relations. Changes in organization are correlated with three stages of development: from disorganized conflict to organized conflict to organized co-operation.

Interinstitutional strain, as in the case of religious and political institutions in the United States, may create intrapersonal conflict (religious versus secular values) and/or intergroup conflict over such issues as public aid to parochial schools (40, pp. 12-20). Coser (12, p. 77) and Williams (40, p. 12) have argued that a "loosely organized society" with many crisscrossing pressures and influences on individuals and groups reduces the possibility of single, rigid, and intense conflicts which divide the whole society or a large segment of it and also provides stability despite extensive conflict. Thus a multiplicity of potential or actual conflict situations, combined with shared values which cut across lines of cleavage, prevents any one conflict situation or kind of conflict (e.g., religious) from dominating the relations of sizable groups and large numbers of individuals. Closely related to this is Simmel's notion of safety-valve institutions which channel hostility and drain off residual conflict responses (12, pp. 41-44).

This suggests another significant aspect of the social context of conflict. Normally, no matter how serious a conflict exists between particular groups and individuals, there will always be *disinterested* or neutral, but nonetheless affected, outsiders (or, indirectly, "third" parties). If conflict completely divides a local, national, or international community, which means in effect that there are no outsiders, solutions become very difficult indeed. This is partly because there are no available neutral conciliators or mediators and partly because no one has a vested interest in the cessation of conflict (25,

p. 297). The pressure for liquidation or control of social conflict from disinterested but affected bystanders is one of the primary limits on its duration, extension, and intensity. Both labor and management in the United States have been compelled to recognize a "public interest," and one of the functions of the United Nations is to mobilize world-wide public pressure on disputants.

The availability and permissibility of the instrumentalities of conflict are obviously dependent on the social environment. Firearms are strictly controlled in most societies as a means for settling interpersonal conflict. In many Latin-American countries military rebellion is a recognized mode of carrying on political conflict. It took many years for the strike to be sanctioned as a proper instrument in industrial conflict. There has been a long history of attempts to establish legitimate and illegitimate uses of war as an instrument of national policy.

One of the major problems of the social order at all levels of society is the control of violent conflict. Hence one of the tasks of public policy, social engineering, and scientific study of human behavior is to determine what kinds of social arrangements are conducive to non-violent conflict (31).

Proposition 31: The more integrated into the society are the parties to conflict, the less likely will conflict be violent (26, p. 243).

But, as important as violent conflict is as a basic form or type, the problem is, in fact, much broader. Order and conflict (all types) are persistent states of any social system. While to an extent they are, or appear to be, opposites, both can and must exist side by side. Furthermore, the relationship between them will determine the degree of social stability. Basically, the stability-instability balance will be a resultant of the success or failure of the normative order in regulating conflicts of interest (30, pp. 139-40). Conflict induces a constant pressure of factual situations on the normative order. In turn, conflict is in some manner controlled by social norms. As already remarked, social change—its rate and direction—is an ultimate source of conflict because, as the factual social order undergoes transition, new incompatibilities and antagonistic interests arise. The relevant regulatory norms either will accommodate (permit) acceptable "solutions" or will be modified (or perhaps consistently violated) to take account of the actual power relations between the parties.

If we are interested in generalizing propositions about social conflict from one area of behavior to another, it is obviously necessary to compare relevant social contexts (23, chap. i; 26, p. 235). To the extent that the social environments of industrial and international conflict differ, *some* propositions will not hold for both. . . .

The Functions of Conflict

Since preoccupation with conflict often centers on its most violent, abhorrent, and socially costly forms, it is likely that the average reader will regard *all* conflict as universally bad. It is noteworthy that most contemporary social scientists lay stress on the constructive consequences of conflict relations (7, 12, 22, 24, 26, 29, 36, 38). Coser (12, chaps. ii, viii) has summarized sociological thinking on this point with particular reference to social groups. Dubin's five central propositions ([17], p. 179) constitute a broader thesis: intergroup conflict is a fundamental institutionalized social process which determines the direction of social change and, in effect, defines social welfare. Though most of his analysis is drawn from experience in industrial relations, the propositions have wider applicability.

It is unnecessary to review the whole range of functions served by social conflict. Several major propositions will suffice:

Proposition 32: *Conflict sets group boundaries by strengthening group cohesiveness and separateness* (12).

Proposition 33: *Conflict reduces tension and permits maintenance of social interaction under stress* (26, p. 232; 12, chap. iii).

Proposition 34: *Conflict clarifies objectives* (29, p. 16).

Proposition 35: *Conflict results in the establishment of group norms* (24, pp. 196-97).

Proposition 36: *Without conflict, accommodative relations would result in subordination rather than agreement* (38, p. 263).

The foregoing is a brief reminder that there are important positive social functions served by conflict. . . . This perspective does not, of course, imply that conflict is not often dysfunctional and very costly. One of the most difficult problems in conflict analysis is to arrive at a method for determining the dividing line between constructive functions and dysfunctions. Clearly, the question of the cost of social conflict involves different relevant criteria. It may seem a macabre joke to emphasize the constructive consequences of conflict in an age of nuclear weapons or in the face of the three-year Kohler strike in Kohler, Wisconsin. On the other hand, no scholar, reformer, critic, or politician has ever denied that conflict is an all-pervasive fact of human life, nor does anyone deny that society persists in spite of violent and costly conflict. As a matter of fact, the functional and dysfunctional aspects of conflict are opposite sides of the same coin.

As a crude first approximation to a meaningful distinction, it might be suggested that conflict is, *on balance*, dysfunctional to the extent that its

positive functions are impaired or neutralized under certain conditions. For example, the normal course of a realistic conflict may under some circumstances generate, instead of relieve, hostility or tension. Indeed, a realistic conflict may be transformed into a non-realistic conflict, which may, in turn, undermine institutionalized modes of resolving realistic conflict, and also raise costs far beyond what is proportionate to any advantages occurring to the parties or affected bystanders. A long strike which results in obscuring objectives, in an almost total breakdown of interaction and mutual dependence, in hostility which becomes unrelated to the goals of the parties, and in confusion of actual power relations is dysfunctional and wasteful. Functional conflict encourages collaboration and a more efficient division of labor between parties because of heightened consciousness of purpose and strengthening of positions taken. It is one of the characteristics of dysfunctional conflict that it is difficult to say, as time goes on, what the conflict is about.

Violence at the international level is often accompanied by a tragic lack of reliable knowledge about the objectives and power potentials of the respective contenders and by inadequacy of machinery through which the positive functions of conflict can be realized. In terms of the whole thesis being developed here, the most abhorrent and costly social conflicts should be viewed not as abrupt breaks in "order" and "co-operation" but as transitions or abrupt shifts from one kind of conflict relationship to another. However, it is quite likely that predominantly dysfunctional conflict will lead to a cessation of interaction at some point.

While socially useful and socially undesirable consequences of conflict can and should be kept separate, it is probably true that they go together. From some vantage points at least, it is difficult to imagine any conflict having only one kind of consequence. Therefore, part of the problem of differentiation of the functional and dysfunctional aspects of conflict is the identification of conditions under which dysfunctional consequences can be minimized. A fundamental research question is, then, How and why do the dysfunctional consequences come to predominate?

Summary

Though the framework for conflict analysis outlined so far has centered on the concept, types, sources, conditions, context, and functions of conflict, it is clear from the brief comment . . . that such aspects cannot be discussed without mentioning the connection between relevant party characteristics and the conflict relationship, the nature of conflict interaction itself, and the problem of conflict resolution and control. We shall therefore develop the framework one step further in the next two sections by considering two major foci of conflict analysis—party characteristics and interaction. Since the problem of conflict resolution and control has already been touched

upon, we shall continue to refer to it where it naturally fits our scheme instead of treating it separately.

IV. The Parties to Conflict: Implications of Nature, Number, and Internal Characteristics

The term "party" here will be taken to include individual actors, culture, coalition, social class, personality, nation, organization, organism, system, or group. Party refers to analytic units, regardless of level of generality, *between* which, or in some cases *within* which, conflict takes place. It is assumed that each of these unit types may be viewed operationally as an abstraction of certain observable tendencies and actions of persons and of certain relationships.

Identification and Establishment

This raises the question of identification, which often is not self-evident or given in the particular situation. At the same time, we have proposed that one of the preconditions of a conflict relationship is visibility of parties to each other. Logically, this implies that if the parties are *not subjectively* identifiable, conflict, as defined, cannot exist, though potentially it may be likely if and when identification does take place. It is one of the notable caprices of social conflict that parties may be misidentified, i.e., an individual or group may be *assumed* to be the opponent in a clash of mutually incompatible goals or values when objectively such is not the case at all. As a matter of fact, one of the major features of a sequence of preconflict-conflict-postconflict actions and reactions may be a process of establishing visibility and/or changing identifications of parties. Matters are further complicated by the social context, which may include, as noted, bystander or neutral elements which are affected but technically involved. The line between party and non-party may be a fine one indeed. Sympathy strikes, for example, would seem to be instances of where unions not parties to a particular conflict become, in effect, by their correlated action parties to another (and new) conflict. And, if the sympathy strike occurs in a highly integrated industry, the sympathy strike may actually add a party to the original conflict.

The problem of the identity of parties to conflict is not just a methodological exercise. An observer's identification and participants' identification may or may not coincide. What may appear to be a realistic conflict between labor and management may, in fact, be what has been called an "induced" conflict, i.e., one between officials on both sides. Thus another of our earlier distinctions is useful and points to phenomena which may not be self-evident. For example, political party conflict is often the induced kind. Once the distinction is made, its base seems obvious, but the implications are

perhaps not so obvious. Not only is diagnosis of the *sources* of such conflicts likely to be in error (or at least incomplete), but the conditions and effective modes of resolution may be quite different. One general hypothesis might be: *Induced conflict is likely to be more intense than realistic conflict because of the coincidence of group and personal values.* A second general hypothesis might be: *Induced conflicts arise more from imbalance or ambiguity of power relations, whereas realistic conflicts arise more from incompatibility of objectives.* A third general hypothesis might be: *Induced conflicts are not readily susceptible to normal mediation procedures.*

In the sphere of international affairs, an observer might argue that, in a given case, governments are the real parties, whereas, subjectively, whole nations may be perceived as parties. Apart from the fact that in the social world it is the latter which really counts, actors in conflict situations attempt to manipulate the nature and number of parties. Diplomats and foreign policy-makers may attempt to *delimit* severely the parties to international conflict by separating the government from the people of a foreign nation: "Our quarrel is not with you but with your leaders." Conversely, governmental leaders may attempt deliberately to *extend* either the number or size of opposing parties by saying to a whole population: "This conflict directly involves your welfare, and you had better restrain your leaders or else." The practice of equating group interests and general welfare represents (among other things) an attempt to enlarge the size or change the constituency of one party. It might be supposed that the enlargement-through-changed-identification tendency, where manifest in a monolithic or highly stratified social context, would cause conflict to spread. The establishment of visible and recognized parties is thus part of the conflict process. The following proposition will illustrate:

Proposition 37: *The early stages of conflict are often carried on with the object of establishing the intergroup nature of conflict* (24, p. 195).

A proportionately large number of strikes at the beginning of the organized labor movement supports the conclusion that one of the primary objectives was recognition of the union as a party in industrial conflict. As one writer has pointed out, conflicts do not necessarily presuppose *established* and *coherent groups* (24). On the other hand, a party to conflict may be created by the search for an "enemy" and by another party—provided, of course, that there is conflictful interaction, once the latter has been found.

Number of Parties

* * * *

Actually, little seems to be known about the effect on social conflict of the sheer number of parties. On a common-sense basis it would seem that the

larger the number of parties to a conflict, the more complex the power relations and the more ambiguous the incompatibility of values. Several tentative hypotheses may be suggested:

1. *The larger the number of parties, the more difficult it will be to discover a common solution, in which all parties can achieve at least some gain over previous power positions.*
2. *The larger the number of parties, the less intense will be the non-realistic components of the conflict relationship.*
3. *There is a persistent tendency to reduce multiple-party conflict to two-party conflict via coalitions and blocs.*

If one of the functions of conflict is the clarification of goals and the exploration of common aims, this will depend on the distribution of reliable information among parties and the potential existence of an area of value compatibility. An increase in the number of parties enhances the chance of communications failure and reduces the range of alternative solutions acceptable to all parties. On the other hand, a large number of parties will tend to diffuse hostility and antagonism because more outlets or objects are provided. The tendency to reduce the number of parties to conflict is obviously due to the need to make power more effective and to arrive at a clear-cut definition of power relations which is somewhat stable. Diffuse power relations are notoriously unstable. The general hypothesis would be: *Social conflict tends toward bipolarization of power relations and to centralize the bases of effective power.* This tendency is clearly reflected in the formation of coalitions.

Internal Characteristics of Parties

The problem here is a dual one: the determination of relevant characteristics and the linking of these to clearly differentiated units of analysis. If we keep in mind what has been said previously, it is possible to suggest a crude check list of characteristics. Naturally, since it is not at all clear a priori what range of internal characteristics is relevant to particular types of conflict situations, any list must be derived in part from the postulated properties of conflict, in part from hypothesized relationships between characteristics of parties and aspects of conflict, and in part from further empirical investigation. The following dimensions might serve as a point of departure: *motives, values, and attitudes; beliefs, perceptual frameworks, and information; degree of internal organization and intraparty relationships; size; strength; and extraparty factors having internal implications.* Each of these kinds of characteristics deserves considerable exposition, but only brief illustration is possible here.

1. It has already been indicated that some observers . . . attribute the source of conflict to motivational, value, and attitudinal factors and that

other observers have linked these same party characteristics to the conditions of conflict . . . To take one arena, there are numerous psychoanalytic hypotheses bearing on international conflict and war (18) . . . In general, these hypotheses involve a causal connection between personality dynamics or psychological mechanisms operating at the individual actor level and some aspect of intergroup conflict. Individual attitudes or general personality characteristics are cited to account for, say, national policies leading to conflict or a war decision. . . .

We have noted earlier that the broad issue of the desirability of pushing intergroup conflict analysis to this depth of motivation is unsettled. There is agreement, implicitly or explicitly, that conflict should be viewed in the context of the needs, beliefs, perceptions, values, and attitudes of individuals and groups. However, there also seems to be agreement (*a*) that hostility, aggression, or particular personality disorders are not necessarily concomitants of conflict and (*b*) that realistic or objective conflict may itself induce prejudice, unfavorable stereotypes, and hostility. The latter point implies that the relationship between party characteristics and conflict interaction is reciprocal, not unilateral. More than this, not all individual responses are destructive; constructive responses can be conflict-inducing. Thus ethnocentricity may be functional in the sense of being a factor in group survival and cooperation, while at the same time it is a potential source of condition of conflict. . . .

There are two important points to be considered in evaluating or verifying propositions of this kind. First, the nature of the analytic unit which is to be denoted as the party to conflict becomes crucial. . . .

. . . is a labor union, as a party to conflict, to be designated as the entire membership or as the union leaders? Kerr's distinction between real and induced conflict implies that the latter is related to characteristics of union and management officials and not to characteristics of union membership and a company viewed as collectivities. Nor would we expect to apply a psychoanalytic hypothesis concerning individual behavior to a complex organization or a system in Boulding's terminology without the significant qualification that in each case we referred to certain individuals whose behavior was the focus of analysis. It is perfectly permissible to speak of organizational or system goals, ideology, information, and so on, as long as the properties of such entities are not confused with those of individual actors considered as total personalities.

Second, motivation, values, and attitudes as party characteristics must be related to a specific situation, to a particular conflict interaction context. As one writer has put it (1, chap. i), we must do more than specify a psychological mechanism which is unrelated to an objective state of affairs; rather, we must seek emotional predispositions which cause individuals to perceive and react to real conflict situations.

A somewhat different perspective on the relationships between individual characteristics and intergroup relations is offered by Guetzkow in his *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization* (6). One of the basic propositions which emerges from this study is:

Proposition 42: *Citizen loyalty to the nation and citizen loyalty to some kind of supra-national organization are not incompatible, provided that the latter is perceived to meet new or independent needs* (6, pp. 39-40).

Behind this proposition is a more general one to the effect that multiple loyalties may or may not produce conflict with the individual, thus leading him to withdraw one set of loyalties in favor of another or to be caught in indecisiveness. In a preliminary test of the proposition, Guetzkow used UNESCO survey data and compared multiplists (those citizens with both national and supranational loyalties), patriots (those citizens with exclusive loyalty to the nation), and the alienated (those whose loyalties were primarily supranational). Results were then correlated with such indexes as education, economic status, age, and attitude toward the future. The larger problem being explored here is, of course, the impact of loyalty to one group or set of values on the relations of groups or sets of values. Does loyalty to one preclude loyalty to others? Does loyalty to one group necessarily enhance the possibility of group conflict because multiple loyalties cannot be held by the individual? Guetzkow's thesis appears to represent the positive side to the cross-pressures thesis noted above: cross-pressures mitigate against exclusive loyalties and hence reduce conflict potential; but, to the extent that multiple loyalties can be accommodated, mutually exclusive loyalties to different groups or values need not induce conflict within the individual and may foster intergroup collaboration.

The role of values in conflict analysis can be highlighted by a reminder that value incompatibility is, by definition, an element in conflict. Hence the examination of the respective values (preferred state of affairs, standards of conduct, criteria of choice among goals and actions, etc.) of opposing parties is inescapable. More specifically, ideological and religious conflict should be mentioned in this connection. Very often opposed values can be compromised or partially accommodated, but often they cannot. Ideological conflict may be marked by the fact that a basic value of one party (e.g., freedom of speech in a free society) requires the absolute denial of a basic value of another party (e.g., an official ideology in a totalitarian society). . . . In general, the more inclusive or broader the claim, the less susceptible is the conflict to some form of resolution. The conditions under which religious and other values tend to become inclusive or the conditions under which incompatible value commitments can be held without inducing conflictful behavior are thus extremely important.

2. Several propositions . . . refer to traits shared by so many individual

members of a group that the behavior of the group as a whole is alleged to reflect them. But none of them states anything about intraparty relations or the nature and degree of organization among individual members or components. Another dimension of party characteristics concerns these factors. These propositions, two of which have been cited previously, will illustrate:

Proposition 43: *Conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is to be understood partly in terms of institutional rivalry* (15, p. 31).

Proposition 1: *Intragroup harmony and solidarity reduce intergroup friction* (24, p. 201).

Proposition 9: *Conflict with outgroups increases internal cohesion* (12, p. 73).

Proposition 44: *Conflict between loosely organized groups (i.e., members are only peripherally involved in group activities or loyalty) is less intense* (12, pp. 68-69).

Proposition 45: *As organizations become more bureaucratic, nonrealistic conflict decreases, induced conflict increases* (26, p. 235).

Proposition 46: *Internal political structures which effectively channel and accommodate discontent are less likely to exhibit external aggressiveness* (32, pp. 196-97).

The range of factors suggested is, of course, extensive, even in this small selected set of propositions. Perhaps the most critical point is obvious enough: there is a basic reciprocal functional relationship between the structure and internal dynamics of any group and intergroup conflict interaction. In analyzing these functional relationships, it is once again necessary to bear in mind that propositions will differ, depending on whether we are discussing unorganized individuals as comprising a group, leader-follower, or citizen-policy-maker relations; a heterogeneous political organization; a complex bureaucracy; a total political or social system; or a particular set of institutions. In the absence of additional research, it is difficult to tell whether there is a limited number of strategic aspects of intraparty organization which yield hypotheses of broad generality. At first glance, the existing literature seems to suggest at least three related aspects; (1) degree of internal cohesion and intimacy; (2) degree of centralization of internal control, including group representatives or a bureaucracy; and (3) degree and exclusiveness of commitment to group or organizational values.

Intraparty organization and relations may or may not contribute to either the inducement of conflict or its resolution and control. Familiar propositions fall roughly into two categories—positive and negative. Positive ones are associated with the general view of conflict as a fundamental

interaction process which serves needed social functions. Negative ones stress the role of intraparty characteristics in the origin, intensification, and enlargement of conflict. Obviously, this reflects the fact that internal cohesion, centralization of control, and exclusiveness of commitment to group values may be empirically either functional or dysfunctional. On the one hand, for example, all three aspects are functional in the sense that clarification of opposed goals and mobilization of power are facilitated. On the other hand, dysfunctional consequences may follow—needless intensification, enhancement of non-realistic factors, and enlargement of conflict beyond the parties whose interests are really at stake.

What is more important, perhaps, is that the three aspects point to the “management of forces” which conflict requires. The quality of leadership and morale become significant in the instigation and maintenance of conflict relations. No analysis of social conflict would be adequate without due attention to leadership as a party characteristic. This is implied at several points in the foregoing scheme, particularly in connection with motivational elements and induced conflict. It is easier to grant the importance of leadership than to specify what an orderly and bounded inquiry would entail. Leadership is too ambiguous a concept. At a minimum, it would be desirable to formulate a set of leadership roles and role functions and to relate these to types, sources, context, conditions, and consequences of conflict.

* * * *

Another relevant internal characteristic of parties to conflict follows naturally from the discussion of management of conflict. Dubin has suggested the need for a typology of organizations and groups in terms of the centrality of conflict in their activities. Clearly, a conspiratorial group (e.g., the Communist party) or an organized interest group (e.g., the National Association of Manufacturers) is much more conflict-oriented than is a company like General Motors. One would expect that the former types would pay much more attention to the “management of forces” and to the relationship between internal organization and conflict interaction. In general, it might be expected that the more central conflict is to the operations of a group or organization, the more highly developed will be the techniques of conflict waging. For groups and organizations whose missions are not primarily conflict-directed, conflict avoidance or quicker resolution might be expected.

3. The size and strength of parties are two further dimensions. Implications of these gross variables may be in some sense obvious, but propositions embodying them are much less numerous. A well-known relationship between party size and conflict has been observed in the case of interethnic and interracial opposition. In general, it is said that, as a minority group increases in size, conflict is intensified or arises in the first instance. Where

the Negro population is small relative to whites in southern communities, conflict over segregation is less intense. High intensity seems to be correlated with a 60-40 or near 50-50 ratio, though the exact numerical proportion has not been ascertained. Religious conflict appears less serious or nonexistent where, say, Protestants are almost completely surrounded by Catholics and vice versa. Rose argues that mediation increases the possibility of resolving conflict when the parties are small (33, p. 194). Coser observes that small parties tend to make themselves rigid and inelastic, to withstand pressure toward dissolution, and also tend to absorb the whole individual person in group commitment (12, p. 98). Hence smaller groups may engage in more intense conflict relations and may be much more intransigent regarding resolution. The content or issues of conflict may be affected by group size: the larger the group, the lower the common denominator of group goals.

Party strength has several ramifications and is related to a fundamental property of conflict interaction already discussed, namely, the power relation. Paradoxically, the need for and accomplishment of a readjustment of power relations is both a source of conflict (21) and a function of conflict (Dubin, p. 191). A further paradox is that in some cases the readjustment of power relations requires, or aims at, the complete destruction or crippling of an opposing party, and, in other cases, the weakening of one of the parties beyond a certain point is a distinct disadvantage to the other. Power is an object of conflict and a conditioner of conflict: relative weaknesses may lead to conflict, and the comparative strength of parties will partially determine the new power relation which emerges from conflict. Previous distinctions will be helpful here, among them the differentiation of institutionalized and non-institutionalized conflict.

In the case of institutionalized conflict where continuity of interaction and regularized rules or expectations are essential, the conflicting parties have a vested interest in each other's strength (24, p. 201). There is considerable evidence that industrial conflict has become much more stabilized as unions have grown stronger. . . . Furthermore, the enforcement of rules of conduct and mutual obligations which result from conflict interaction depend heavily on a minimum self-control (i.e., power to control internal decisions) by the two parties involved. In the case of non-institutionalized conflict, these considerations probably do not apply. Indeed, it may well be that it is precisely the lack of vested interest in continuity and stability which accounts for the instability and inconclusiveness of much non-institutionalized conflict.

Another facet of the party-strength factor relates to sources of conflict. This is epitomized in the following proposition . . .

Proposition 17: Changes in the relative power positions of nations are the source of tension leading to international conflict (9, p. 20).

Although applied to phenomena of international conflict, the proposition would appear to apply to most intergroup conflict, except perhaps where groups are unorganized individuals or where conflict is religious in nature. We should also draw a distinction between the recognized and the unrecognized power of groups, that is, a factual change in the power status of one party which is not accepted as a condition of interaction by an opposing party. As noted earlier, the establishment of recognized parties may be the key factor in the initial phase of conflict. Group weakness, on the other hand, may induce conflict where the capacity for enduring frustration of group wants or needs is low (4, pp. 215-16).

Obviously, one of the primary conditions of conflict interaction is the respective influence that two parties can bring to bear on each other in the attempt to control outcomes or otherwise direct behavior along intended lines. Factors range from the capacity to endure threatened deprivation to the capacity to inflict damage, from bargaining skill to flexibility of requirements. The central underlying problem is the identification and measurement of the bases of effective reciprocal influence in conflict interaction. More scholarly effort has been expended on the analysis of potential power and on the calculation of gross power factors available to conflicting parties than on the determination of why under particular conditions a bargain is closer to the desired optimum result of one party than the other, or why one party yields more control over joint decision-making to the other. Conflict analysis clearly joins another strategic focus of analysis—social power. Conceivably, the overemphasis on the more dramatic forms of conflict resolution, such as force or financial superiority, has tended to obscure this broader connection. This is an added reason for the explicit postulation of the significance of the power relation in social conflict.

4. Finally, we come to extraparty factors which affect the links between intraparty characteristics and conflict interaction. The concept of context is once again relevant. Three propositions, drawn from different areas of social conflict, will indicate the general point:

Proposition 18: *Religious intergroup conflict is most likely to develop and to be intense when there are no cross-pressures at work within the individual* (10, p. 46).

Proposition 47: *To the extent that workers and unions are integrated into the general society, the propensity to strike is decreased* (35, p. 337).

Proposition 48: *The higher the level of prosperity, the less intense the conflict between ethnic and racial majorities and minorities.*

Proposition 18 implies that when individuals are affected by shared values which offset or run counter to religious values which put them into opposition with others, religious conflict will be less likely to develop. For example, the Catholic and Protestant businessmen who share certain goals

and prescribed behaviors are less susceptible to conflict on religious grounds than are Catholics and Protestants who do not share these goals and behaviors. Proposition 47 states, in effect, that when parties to industrial conflict are accorded roughly equal status, privileges, and opportunities, there is a tendency to avoid violent conflict. Proposition 48, a very familiar thesis, calls attention to the fact that psychological mechanisms and opposed interests are unlikely under conditions where the majority group does not regard improvement in the status of a minority group as a direct threat to its access to material goods which are becoming scarcer because of a decline in economic activity.

One basic question concerning conflict at the group, society, and the international levels is: What social arrangements conduce to non-violent or non-aggressive conflict? On the basis of present evidence, the answer is not at all clear. Another basic question concerns the relations of major social conflicts to one another. Williams (41, p. 531) has remarked on the canceling out or non-cumulative incidence of conflict in American society. Coser (12, pp. 68-69) has alerted us to the significance of the degree of individual involvement in a single conflict group. A hypothesis worth examining might be formulated as follows: *The larger the number of conflicts in any particular context, the less likely that any one will become all-inclusive with respect to persons, groups, energies, and resources.* Wright (44, pp. 202, 203) suggests, on the other hand, that there is a tendency for all international conflict to become total and absolute. Under what conditions is either or both true?

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V. Conflict as an Interaction System

Conflict has been characterized as a basic social-interaction process, and the tendency toward some degree of institutionalization has been noted. The conflict relation has been postulated as existing in a social context and as embodying a power component. Hence it is not a long step to viewing conflict as a system in the general sense employed by Boulding. Two elements of any conflict system—parties and issues—have been discussed, and a third—the power relation—has been touched upon at several points. In view of this background, we shall confine ourselves to a limited number of additional elements and to a short commentary on each. Various elements of conflict systems are, of course, related to one another and to factors mentioned earlier.

Modes of Resolution

There is a variety of methods for resolving or controlling conflict—many more than can be mentioned here. Arbitration, mediation (more often than not used synonymously with conciliation), negotiation, inquiry, legislation,

judicial settlement, informal consensus (meeting of minds through discussion), the market, violence or force, authoritative command, and varieties of voting procedures are familiar ones. A range of techniques is implied in the phrase "intergroup therapy": interracial housing, co-operative living experiments, education for tolerance, interfaith movements, and so on. When "bargaining" and "negotiation" are not used in a specific technical sense, as in the case of collective bargaining in industry or diplomatic negotiation, these terms apply to many conflict situations. For each mode there are particular types—compulsory versus voluntary arbitration, conciliation recommendations which are not binding versus those which are, majority vote versus unanimity, and so on. Essentially, modes may be regarded as a set of rules for handling the need for resolution or accommodation. Different rules produce different results in different situations, and the rules themselves are a frequent conflict issue. Furthermore, some modes are appropriate for some conflict systems and not others. Voting between an equal number of representatives of labor and management would nearly always be indecisive, while arbitration is hardly a suitable mode of settlement for conflict among political parties. These trivial examples illustrate an important point, namely, that modes of resolution are fundamentally related to the nature of conflict. Evidence indicates that proposed modes of resolution are often inappropriate. Thus no amount of "better understanding through better communication" by itself is going to resolve a genuine power conflict. Mediation cannot function effectively if conflict is between unorganized groups, because mediation requires representatives who can speak authoritatively enough for each group that agreements become binding. At any rate, conflict systems can and should be characterized according to their predominant mode (or combination of modes) of resolution. Basically, Dahl and Lindblom have analyzed the handling of political and economic conflict in terms of basic social processes in their *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*.

Given the growing significance of interorganizational conflict or conflict between highly organized groups, mediation deserves special attention. This mode probably now dominates or is coming to dominate the area of collective bargaining and is becoming more frequent in the area of international relations. Experience has accumulated to the point where observers are beginning to generalize about it and to hypothesize the conditions under which it is or is not successful.

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... It is agreed on all sides that the personal qualifications and professional skills of the mediator are essential to mediation success. Something might be gained from a comparison of the model qualities of an industrial mediator, which can be found in the literature, with the attributes

and skills of Dr. Ralph Bunche and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, who have functioned effectively as mediators for the United Nations. The progress of mediation at the international level would seem to be heavily dependent on an available group of knowledgeable and trusted mediators. Experience with this problem within societies might be revealing for future developments in international organization. Moreover, Kerr's (26, p. 236) distinction between tactical and strategic mediation may be useful. Rather than being aimed at basic solutions to major issues, Kerr sees tactical mediation as resulting in reduced irrationality, removal of non-rational conflict elements, creation of possible new solutions, and assistance in the graceful retreat of parties from overly rigid positions. Various agencies and processes within the United Nations, many hidden from public view, should be examined as manifestations of tactical mediations. Observations based on industrial mediation (16, pp. 72 ff.) indicate definite phases to the conflict resolution process. The initial phase is likely to be one of strong language and positions of apparent inflexibility—a phase the layman is probably most familiar with and which he either mistakes for the general tenor of the whole process or assumes to be irrelevant. This spectacular phase, unless seen in the light of a sequential set of phases, may be very misleading. In more general terms, the ceremonial aspect of conflict resolution through mediation turns out to be functional, and its abolition, which many equate with the "solution" to conflict, would have serious consequences for the likelihood of eventual agreement. However, if conflict becomes entirely or predominantly ceremonial, complexity and rigidity of rules may be the reason (26, p. 236).

In considering conflict resolution, the distinction between violent (or aggressive) and non-violent modes provides another way of classifying systems. Wars, strikes, riots, armed rebellions, and physical assaults are all violent or aggressive modes. From many points of view the chief problem is to channel conflict resolution into non-violent, non-aggressive modes. Some writers blame the seriousness of human conflict on ultimate weapons available (1), and violent modes have been in some respects overemphasized as the essence of conflict systems. The overemphasis on violent modes has, of course, been a reflection of their cost, overtness, and dramatic impact, but it has had the effect of obscuring the relation between non-violent and violent modes, of inspiring superficial solutions, and of divorcing modes of resolution from the underlying nature of conflict interaction. A general hypothesis can be stated as follows: *The possibility of aggressive conflict or employment of violence tends to set a terminal point to controversy.* A related general hypothesis is: *The more destructive the means available to both parties to a conflict, the less likely is it that the ends for which conflict is waged can be served if such means are used.* At first glance, these tentative propositions may be an affront to the reader who is thinking of frequent wars and strikes and who reads and hears

threats among superpowers possessing nuclear weapons. Obviously, these hypotheses imply important conditions and qualifications. The first implies a common interest in joint survival and some degree of functional inter-relatedness between the parties. The second implies a rough equality of capacity to administer destruction and the absence of values which decree total elimination of one or both parties. Serious though these qualifications are, they help to sharpen the questions to be asked of empirical evidence.

Several familiar reminders are appropriate here. In the evolution from individual or group self-help to the monopoly of the instrumentalities of force in the hands of government, it is essential to note that violent modes of conflict settlement did not disappear but were *institutionalized*, i.e., their employment was subject to restrictive conditions and other modes of resolution were made available. The same thing can be said of strikes: as mediation and other modes of resolution of industrial conflict have grown in significance, the strike was *not* abolished but was related to the other modes in the collective-bargaining system in such a way as to curb its use without removing it as an incentive to agreement. It hardly seems likely that mediation could have developed if strikes had been abolished. Similarly, it may be seriously questioned whether international mediation would develop merely because nuclear weapons were abolished. Many disarmament solutions neglect the central function of violent modes: to make bargaining more conclusive and more effective. Attempts by conflicting parties to control violent modes can be interpreted as a recognition that the utility of aggressive conflict has become severely limited.

The necessity to relate the nature of conflict situations to modes of resolution can be seen in another connection. There is, of course, a substantial literature on bargaining generally and on effective strategies in "social games."² For the most part, attention is focused on descriptions of bargaining and games of strategy and on prescriptions for rational behavior where opposing parties are making choices under conditions of uncertainty. We should say in passing that, although this type of analysis employs formal mathematical or economic models which, as yet, have had relatively little empirical application to a wide range of social conflicts, very useful insights into the nature of conflict have been forthcoming. The title of a new book by H. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, to be published this year by John Wiley and Sons, is "Conflict, Collusion, and Conciliation"—a thorough

²See, e.g., M. Shubik (ed.), *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior* (New York: Doubleday, 1954); J. D. Williams, *The Compleat Strategist* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954); O. Morgenstern, "The Theory of Games," *Scientific American*, CLXXX (1949), 22 ff.; J. Bernard, "The Theory of Games as a Modern Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, LIX (1954), 411-24; N. W. Chamberlain, *A General Theory of Economic Process* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955), chaps. vi-ix.

discussion of what in our language we have called "modes of resolution" (i.e., solutions) for certain kinds of social conflicts or "games." Propositions derived from game theoretical analysis can be used as guides to empirical research. However, the main point here is that, along with other key assumptions, it is assumed that bargaining can and should lead to an intersection of demands by parties to conflict such that both "win" (see Braithwaite, *Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher*), and there are strategies in social games which will yield optimum results (this may involve minimizing losses) to the opponents under given conditions. Psychologists, on the other hand, have been concerned with situations in which there is ambivalence toward alternative states of affairs or outcomes and in which conflict is intensified precisely because plus and minus values either do not cancel out or cannot be "resolved" by the choice of a particular value or combination of values. This suggests that value conflict, in the sense of ideological conflicts mentioned above, requires a different type of mode of resolution from those prescribed in bargaining strategies or game theory. For the latter kind of conflict, some sort of value integration seems required, that is, conflicting goal values are converted into instrumental values serving a superordinate goal value. For example, two independent nations may not be able to reach a mutually satisfactory trade bargain because any alternative point of mutually beneficial agreement may have other negatively valued (including non-economic adverse consequences) aspects. But, by organizing themselves into a single trade unit (economic union), trade relations may subserve a higher value, such as a more advantageous all-round division of labor between them or closer political ties.

We have only sketched some of the implications of modes of resolution for conflict systems. What is needed is a systematic comparison of the consequences of various modes with respect to types, sources, conditions, and functions of conflict. The next step is to test the applicability of resulting propositions across the major areas of social conflict.

Power Relations

In a previous section we discussed party strength as a factor in the general relationship between party characteristics and conflict interaction. Clearly, however, power is a relational concept, and it is the nature and distribution of power among the parties *and* relative to the issues of conflict which are significant. Accommodation to preconflict changes in comparative party strength and clarification of mutual control over decisions have also been established as functions of the conflict relation. Thus the power-relations component of any conflict system consists of the respective bases of effective influence on which the parties can operate *and* the allocation of control over decisions which occur during the interaction. There seems to be no inherent reason why, empirically, the bases of influence and distribu-

tion of control over behavioral choices cannot be identified and measured with some degree of precision whether the parties are unorganized groups or individuals or bureaucracies. As remarked previously, this task is not easy, and such knowledge as we have has not been codified in these terms.

If we can assume for a moment that power relations have been at least crudely defined, two characteristic patterns might serve to differentiate conflict systems: (1) *diffuseness* and *specificity* and (2) *stability* and *instability*. In most situations it is likely that these concepts represent a continuum rather than mutually exclusive polar opposites. Diffuseness-specificity implies a distinction between a system characterized by a broad range of effective bases of influence and ambiguity of control over decisions, as against a system embodying a narrow range of effective bases of influence and definite prescriptions for control over decisions. This dimension appears to be related to other variables—the number of parties and internal organization. . . .

An unstable power relation is one in which no durable resolution of power conflicts or establishment of regular joint decision-making patterns is possible (or has been achieved) and/or in which there is no accepted means of measuring the power balance. The perishable nature of coalitions is probably related to the difficulty of stabilizing power relations under certain conditions.

What are the implications of the power factor for the problem of resolution and control of conflict? For one thing, to the extent that the function of conflict is the clarification and stabilization of power relations, modes of resolution which omit or cannot basically affect these relations are likely to be ineffective (35). It is not only that opposed goals are at stake in conflict situations but that control over the choices governing alternative goals and means is also at stake. "Human relations" approaches which attempt exclusively to create a sense of common goals while by-passing the joint decision-making phase may therefore be wide of the mark in many situations.

The difficulty of estimating power in advance of a concrete test is undoubtedly a major obstacle in preventing conflict or in reducing the likelihood of extreme conflict (12, p. 35). Hence the problem of social conflict resolution may be viewed in a dual aspect: the necessity to devise advance measurements of power outcomes and the substitution of small-scale (i.e., discussion or vote) methods for large-scale (i.e., a strike or war) methods in trials of power. In effect, the parties to conflict need to know beforehand whether a better decision can be reached via one mode of resolution than by another. . . . Misinformation or guesses concerning conflict outcomes tend to result in situations in which all parties lose or in which interaction is completely disrupted and therefore must be painfully re-established. No

one knows how often parties to conflict have allowed themselves to be boxed in and driven to actions they themselves acknowledged to be undesirable.

Despite the universal common-sense recognition of the need for face-saving and graceful retreats when ultimate tests of power are bound to be adverse or inconclusive, we know little about the effective detection and accommodation of this stage in a conflict interaction. In areas of disorganized social conflict typified by diffuse and unstable power relations, the possibility of dysfunctional interaction is much greater, especially in the case of unrealistic conflict.

Nature and Degree of Institutionalization

The foregoing comments lead to another dimension of conflict systems. Institutionalization of conflict generally means continuity of interaction; regularized procedures for handling changes in conditions, goals, and power; interdependence of parties; and the creation of new norms (24). Out of institutionalized conflict come new social policies. As conflict is partially resolved at various stages through time, certain issues disappear, and a common law governing formerly disputed matters is built up. Ways of measuring power relations and correcting imbalances without aggressive conflict or violence are developed. Institutionalization requires the combination of conflict and co-operation, since rules and procedures cannot function in the absence of voluntary obedience or enforcement through sanctions (29, p. 17). . . .

Non-institutionalized conflict or conflict interaction having a low degree of institutionalization is marked by chronic recurrence of unsettled issues, by an absence of agreed procedures for review of relations, and by discontinuity of interaction or drastic shifts in the mode of resolution. This type of system is correlated, if not causally linked, with diffuse and unstable power relations. Hypothetically, a higher degree of institutionalization is similarly linked to more specific and stable power relations. A general hypothesis, which could be tested empirically, is: *The higher the degree of institutionalization, the greater the consistency and balance of strength of the parties to conflict.* The pressures of functional interdependence between parties and the need to preserve predictable conflict relations result in modes of resolution which stop short of the complete destruction or crippling of one of the parties. Indeed, it is no accident that wars, for example, seem to be terminated while there is still an entity for the victor to deal with, some minimal organization to make possible a new formulation of the now altered power relation.

There are noteworthy differences in the nature of institutionalization of conflict. The conflict relation may be autonomous in the sense that the parties voluntarily establish an informal social control of their interactions.

Or a conflict relation may be regulated by legal norms enforced from outside the conflict system. . . .

Another pattern of institutionalization relates to centralization and decentralization of conflict systems. In general, political institutionalization is centralized with respect to some area of jurisdiction (or political unit), while the institutionalization of economic conflict, in free societies at least, is more decentralized. . . .

There is good reason to assume, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, a persistent tendency toward institutionalization of social conflict. From the foregoing, three directions of this tendency can be inferred. First, particular institutionalization for particular kinds of conflict may evolve. Second, institutionalization may be based on the support of existing machinery in the social context outside a given conflict system. Third, these two patterns may be combined. Conflict which is essentially disorganized, unrealistic, characterized by diverse modes of resolution, diffuse and unstable power relations, and, on balance, more dysfunctional than functional, tends to lead to institutionalization through mechanisms operating in the social context—usually a centralized institution. Conflict which manifests the opposite properties tends to lead to autonomous, decentralized, and more particularistic institutionalization. Racial conflict would probably fall into the first category and industrial conflict clearly into the second. The conditions leading to a combination are not immediately clear. Presumably, the general character of the culture and social organization would be controlling, but such a statement is not very specific. A major subject for inquiry is the set of factors which affect the degree and form of institutionalization.

It is difficult to escape the conviction that the resolution and control of social conflict are intimately related to the nature and degree of institutionalization. Superficially, it would appear that conflict relations are functional and stable (i.e., predictable and subject to semiautomatic adjustment to new conditions) to the extent that *appropriate* institutionalization exists. The fact that wars and strikes are institutionalized in an important sense in no way undercuts the argument that it is the institutionalization of other modes and the relationship of various modes within an institutional framework which are crucial.

Direct, Unmediated Systems versus Mediated Representational Systems

Another aspect of conflict systems which can be analytically differentiated is closely bound up with the previous dimension. Again, intuitive observation suggests a sizable difference between much interpersonal and unorganized group conflict, on the one hand, and organized intergroup or interorganizational conflict, on the other. The model for the latter, which would cover a large sector of social conflict, can be indicated briefly:

1. The relationships among two sets of representatives or bargainers and the relationships among each set of bargainers or representatives
 - a) The values and perceptions of the representatives or bargainers
2. The nature of the membership or constituency represented
 - a) The values and perceptions of the memberships
 - b) Degree of unity and kinds of relations among members
3. The relationship between representatives or bargainers and the membership or constituency
 - a) Nature and consequences of authority relationship
 - b) Nature and function of leadership
4. The role of the mediator or mediating agencies (if present)
 - a) Qualities and effectiveness of mediation
 - b) Relationship of mediating function to the social context
5. Interrelation of bargaining or representational system to social context
 - a) Institutional links (e.g., sanctions)
 - b) Non-institutional links (e.g., interested publics)

This model, though highly general and though it includes no basis for deriving links among the five sets of variables, does offer a possibly fruitful method of organizing and classifying propositions which then could be connected in the description and explanation of a conflict system which conformed to the underlying assumptions. Furthermore, direct unmediated systems could be analyzed in terms of the presence or absence of the five components. Nor is there any reason why the other characteristics of conflict systems discussed above could not be incorporated in the model as well as the party characteristics, also discussed above. It should be noted that the model is not restricted to formal mediation as a mode of resolution. If non-institutionalization and institutionalization imply a continuum, then the closer to the non-institutionalization end a particular system is, the less likely is the system to conform to the specifications of the model.

System Limitations and Boundaries

... social conflict behavior is rarely, if ever, random and without limitations.

One of the properties of any system is that it is boundary-maintaining. That is, for the purposes at hand, an observer can usually discover empirical distinctions between the related parts which comprise the system and other phenomena which are either unrelated or, from the observer's standpoint, unimportant. Thus the parties to conflict and the conflict interaction (including its components) can be empirically separated from what was earlier called the "social context." The social context consists of non-system factors which the observer *does* think are important. Apart from system boundaries (or limits) in this sense, the other meaning of limitation on conflict concerns

those factors (inside or outside the system) which tend to affect the intensity, duration, enlargement, and mode of resolution of the conflict interaction process. As presented by Boulding, the proper way to connect system and non-system boundaries and limitations is by a concept of an "open system," i.e., one which is characterized by internal changes in relationships among constituent parts *and* one which is susceptible to influences from outside its boundaries. Implicitly, at least, many propositions on conflict are based on a closed system or on an ever expanding system or on a system which manifests only disequilibrium as its essential property. There is ground for distrusting all three as approaches to the study of conflict.

Major limitations on conflict can be listed briefly. Intrasystem limits are (1) functional interdependence between parties, (2) regulation through institutionalized norms and procedures, (3) the need for continued communication between parties, (4) conflict cost, (5) availability and feasibility of certain modes of resolution, (6) inertia and organizational inefficiency of parties, (7) ignorance or misunderstanding, and (8) avoidance taboos.

* * * *

Limitations arising outside any conflict system can be classified as follows: (1) shared cultural and social values which neutralize or dominate conflicting values; (2) institutional sanctions against certain kinds of power relations and modes of resolution; (3) third parties interested in control or resolution; (4) crisscrossing of other conflict systems which prevents enlargement or bipolarization around any single system; and (5) "cross-pressures" which create ambivalences within parties.

To the extent that there are "natural limits" to conflict, the lesson for the problem of resolution and control would seem to be this: *Social strategies designed to keep conflict functional and to prevent violent or aggressive conflict ought to be based in part on deliberate attempts to capitalize on natural limits.* This may involve giving up notions of "abolishing" conflict, of "final" resolutions, and may direct attention to less obvious control devices. Avoidance taboos, for example, may be easier to inculcate and enforce than centralized political controls. Clarification and invigoration of existing common values may be more feasible than finding formulae for reconciling some conflicting values.

Summary

Counting parties and issues, seven properties of conflict systems have been outlined. Aside from providing categories to locate and relate descriptive and causal propositions, this part of the analytic framework has other potential uses. Given a particular conflict system and given *X* empirical content of categories 1 through 7, an observer might be able to hypothesize about the sources, conditions, functions, context, and type of conflict. Or, for example, if there are multiple parties (category 1), if the issue is one

of political power (category 2), if power relations are diffuse and unstable (category 3), if the conflict is relatively non-institutionalized (category 5), if the conflict is direct and immediate (category 6), and if limitations (internal and external) are either absent or minimal, then an observer might predict a violent mode of resolution (category 4).

VI. Conclusion

When all is said and done, there is no substitute for more reliable and systematic knowledge produced by soundly conceived and executed research. The kind of analysis attempted here can aid in posing significant questions, in exposing areas of ignorance, and in generating testable hypotheses. Furthermore, an explicit framework provides a way of codifying existing unfunded common-sense knowledge and research findings. We also feel that detailed studies will be more cumulative if it is possible to compare meaningfully cases and situations from a wide range of social conflicts. Meanwhile, the search for a limited number of major variables, the formulation of bold hypotheses, cross-field generalizations, and typification have their place in conflict analysis.

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Groups in Harmony and Tension: Some Traditional Approaches

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If each generation of men had to learn the facts and relations of social life through direct experience, scientific study would be a hopeless pursuit. Mankind's supreme advantage in attempts to understand and master the physical environment and, more recently, the social environment, lies in the historical accumulation of knowledge and concepts and their transmission to succeeding generations. This almost limitless continuity of historical products in economic, cultural, and social areas is made possible by man's attainment and transmission of a system of standardized symbols, that is, of language. But this good fortune of mankind is not without its penalties. Some concepts marshaled by one generation as "knowledge" may later prove to be inadequate in dealing with realities of physical and social life then known. Perhaps those who developed such concepts and approaches were laboring in too narrow a sphere; perhaps they were strongly moved to advance "knowledge" in such a way that the interests of their group or their society at the time would be well served.

* * * *

Problems of group relations have naturally been of concern to many groups—small groups and large groups, each with its own goals, aspirations, and special interests. As a consequence, there are many approaches and doctrines which have been promulgated, consciously or unconsciously, in the interests of a particular group. Others may represent sincere attempts to deal with problems of group relations in a scientific fashion which, because of unquestioned background assumptions, have proved inadequate to deal with all the problems and findings of this area. The latter attempts

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usually are related to certain aspects of these problems, and may not be wholly erroneous. But, dealing with only certain aspects of the picture, they are one-sided approaches. If taken as comprehensive approaches to group relations, such one-sided emphasis results in ignoring certain facts or twisting them into the narrow framework provided.

To attain an approach to group relations with promise of comprehensiveness and validity to all aspects of these problems, the task of understanding the limitations of certain historically important concepts and trends and eliminating their negative influence is a necessary preliminary step. . . .

The Racist Approach to Group Relations

Race doctrines assume not only that various human groups are essentially different from each other in physical characteristics and in intellectual, emotional, and cultural characteristics by reasons of differing heredities but that such differences result in a hierarchy of superior and inferior groups. It is assumed that groups of relatively "pure" racial stock (with more or less homogeneous hereditary endowment) exist, that any individual belonging to one or another of these groups by definition possesses the superior or inferior characteristics of his group, and that the hierarchy of inferiority and superiority, being determined by heredity, has always been and will continue as long as "intermixing" among "superior" or "inferior" groups does not occur. Inter-marriage between individuals of inferior and "superior" racial stock, according to race doctrine, can result only in biological and cultural leveling or deterioration of the "superior" stock.

Modern study of genetics, of physical anthropology, and of intellectual, emotional, and social characteristics has unequivocally demonstrated that these major assumptions and conclusions of racist doctrine are not based on sound scientific evidence. Summaries of these findings by Anastasi and Foley (1), Benedict (3), Dunn and Dobzhansky (10), Huxley and Haddon (25), Klineberg (28, 30) and Montagu (39) all point to the weakness of such assertions and need not be duplicated here. In 1950 a body of experts from many countries assembled to formulate a statement on race under the auspices of UNESCO (39).

* * * *

Race doctrines prevalent today are based largely on arguments which are relatively modern in content. Although notions of biological superiority are as old as the Old Testament, attempts were not made to classify men into races until the seventeenth century (Bernier). . . .

. . . However, history gives many examples of arguments for the superiority of one group over another for different reasons. Aristotle, Vitruvius, Ibn-Khaldun, Bodin are but a few of those who recorded for history their belief in the superiority of their own group and the peculiarity and in-

feriority of other peoples. This superiority of their own group was seen not so much in terms of biological differences as due to the influence of various external forces, such as climate or astrological influences. Group superiority was to be based also on acceptance of religious faith—the Christian and the heathen, the Moslem and the infidel. In the name of all these superiorities, men suffered and died, were persecuted and killed.

Some writers point to the almost universal phenomenon of ethnocentrism for an understanding of these superiority doctrines. It is true that there is a powerful tendency in every group to view the appearance and behavior of other peoples in terms of the scale of values prevailing within the group. This tendency might be called “natural” in the sense that when the values of the group are learned by each individual member they become a part of his personal identity—of his self. As long as he is exclusively identified with the group and its values, as long as his sights are not raised beyond the value scale of his group, he will judge other peoples in its terms. But ethnocentrism does not lead *ipso facto* to superiority doctrines, or to the group conflict explicit in such dogmas.

A characteristic that appears to be common to the major group-superiority doctrines of all ages is that they are promulgated in groups seeking to rise above, or to maintain ascendance over, other groups—to subjugate, exploit, or eliminate as rivals certain other groups. As Benedict wrote, it is for this reason that: “The fundamental step . . . in understanding race conflict is to understand conflict. . . . The first lesson of history in this respect is that when any group in power wishes to persecute or expropriate another group it uses as justification reasons which are familiar and easily acceptable at the time” (4, p. 41).

* * * *

. . . Unlike justifications based on environmental forces or on beliefs, race doctrine places groups in relative positions of power and privilege on the basis of characteristics which are presumed to be *unchanging* so long as the groups are kept at some social distance from one another. For these positions are alleged to inhere in differences in the biological make-up of every individual in the respective groups. Ideally, race doctrines envisage a world in which “superior” groups rule forever and “inferior” groups forever maintain their subordinate positions. Even in the more modern and somewhat more tactful versions, this assumption is apparent . . .

Race doctrines have had the further advantage in modern times that they have been supported historically by certain “men of science” or by distortions of scientific data. Such explicit or tacit support in an age in which wonders have been wrought by science has been most useful to promulgators of race doctrines. However, it is quite misleading to suppose that race doctrines have ever been squarely based on biology. . . .

Race is a biological concept. Racial classifications have been many and varied, and will probably continue to be (39). Geneticists and historians alike agree that there are no "pure" races (10, 25). Indeed, no classifications of human groupings have been found which satisfactorily include all human groups, or upon which all scientists agree. Racial classifications are in terms of characteristics which are *superficial* in the biological make-up and the adaptability of the organism. Along any dimension chosen, variability is always found within a population. No criteria for racial classification have been found which do not result in overlapping of the distributions of different groups. The characteristics used, such as skin color, cephalic index, facial characteristics, and the like, are all continuous, that is, present in some degree in all human groupings. They are inherited independently of one another. This fact results in inconsistencies in classification when more than one characteristic is used as a basis. Thus dark-skinned Hindus are classified most frequently in the same general category as white-skinned Europeans. Race is nothing more than an arbitrary statistical category based on certain superficial characteristics. "National, religious, geographic, linguistic, and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups; and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connection with racial traits" (39, p. 13).

"Whatever classifications the anthropologist makes of man, he never includes mental characteristics as part of the classifications" (39, p. 14; emphasis ours). Evidence does not bear our conclusions that "inherited genetic differences are a major factor in producing the differences between the cultures and cultural achievements of different peoples or groups" (p. 14). The genes presumed to differ from one population to another "are always few when compared to the vast number of genes common to all human beings regardless of the population to which they belong" (p. 11).

On the basis of our present knowledge, it would seem that the biological concept of race could have no conceivable utility in the study of intergroup relations. The human geneticist is interested in the classification of superficial characteristics for the possible light they might throw on other more important problems of human heredity. Certainly there is no valid basis for studying group differences in social or psychological respects as though "race" differences were being studied. The problems are kept alive in scientific circles largely because until recently many social scientists and psychologists, and even now a minority, accepted uncritically the racist norms of their own groups. For a period, it was accepted in social science that various groups differed as measured by intelligence tests and the like on a *racial basis*. There followed a period of examination of the populations studied, of the characteristics studied, and of the methods of measurement employed (1).

As Berry (5) pointed out in his recent book on "race relations," the

uncritical acceptance of racist norms and belief in eventual success in measuring race differences or superiority-inferiority in various traits are clearly evident in statements by a number of scientists early in this period. For example, the anthropologist, Hooton, wrote in 1931:

Anthropologists have not yet reached a point of an agreement upon criteria of race which will enable psychologists to isolate with any degree of facility the racial types which are to be studied. Psychologists have not yet been able to develop mental tests which anthropologists are willing to trust as fair gauges of mental measurement.

That such differences exist I have not the slightest doubt; that with our present methods they can be summarized quantitatively so that we are justified in assigning one race a position of superiority as contrasted with another, I deny. [24, p. 597; italics ours].

At the present date, most of the material referred to in the above statements has been reexamined and, in some cases, reanalyzed. A large number of studies, such as those by Klineberg and others, point to the factors responsible for such uncritically obtained differences in test performance of different groups. (It should be noted that the father of modern intelligence tests, Binet, was perfectly aware that such tests could not be used to test inborn differences unless the individuals or groups in question had the same opportunities and backgrounds [30]. The testing for racial differences was done chiefly by users of this and subsequent tests in the United States.) For example, it is known that test responses are affected by differences in language, educational opportunities and facilities, socioeconomic level, general cultural milieu, and many more specific factors, such as the type of test, the person doing the testing, the traditions, customs, and interests characteristic of the group, the motives aroused by the test situation, etc.

Finally, it is now realized in the field of mental testing that "intelligence" (and even "normal" or "neurotic" reactions) must be understood in terms of the culture in which it is found (1). "Cultures differ in the specific activities which they encourage, stimulate, and value. The 'higher mental processes' of one culture may be the relatively useless 'stunts' of another" (1, p. 782).

On the subject of behavioral differences traceable to "race," there is enough evidence for definite statements. On the basis of unusually careful and extensive analysis of the data, Anastasi and Foley conclude:

It is misleading to conclude that to date investigators have merely *failed to prove* race differences in behavior. The present state of our knowledge on this question is not a complete blank; nor is the evidence perfectly balanced, with half of the data favoring a racial hypothesis and half a cultural hypothesis. It is a fact that there are *group differences in behavior* . . . But no study has conclusively demonstrated a necessary association between behavior characteristics and race as such. [1, pp. 782-783]

National Character and Intergroup Relations

Everyone who has been outside of his own immediate environment knows that there are group differences in behavior. And most peoples become aware of their own more or less distinctive features . . .

Historically "national character" has been a topic of urgent concern for individuals and groups with interests and ends of a practical nature. The promulgation of differences in national character based on the Jungian approach with its guilt feelings and sadistic tendencies and the like submerged in a "collective unconscious" is too close for many social scientists to discuss the topic comfortably.

Especially since World War II, the study of national character has become more prominent. In view of the increasing daily contacts and interdependence among the various major national groups, this emergence is not surprising. It has been fostered by a concern on the part of some nations to avoid unnecessary conflict with other groups, and no doubt to facilitate diplomatic and military negotiations with them. As Klineberg notes, many sincere men of science see the study of national character as a means of correcting erroneous national stereotypes and of reducing intergroup misunderstanding and tension (29, pp. 8-9). It is possible that it may serve these purposes; but under the urgency of these problems there is a strong tendency to "deliver the goods." At the least, it is foolhardy in the present state of this area to maintain that social science or psychology has more than fragments to deliver.

At given periods, members of ethnic or national groups do exhibit more or less characteristic tendencies in the way of being more aggressive, more competitive, more coöperative, or of being more religiously, politically, financially, or aesthetically oriented, as the case may be (1, 29). Such characteristic tendencies are products of dominant factors in the mode of living and central values or norms of the group in question. These tendencies are certainly not uniformly present in all subunits of a larger group. They are not immutable. As products of the mode of living and central values or norms of the group, behavioral tendencies are subject to change as these circumstances change. At times they show considerable variation as situationally determined.

The fields of ethnology and differential and social psychology are not in a state of complete ignorance concerning the influence of such group factors. But nations today are social groups of great complexity. If the study of national character is to rise above mere reinforcement of prevailing stereotypes or the advancement of policy by this or that national group, certain pitfalls inhering in most contemporary approaches to the problem must be avoided.

At the outset, the period of observation and the major conditions and

group relations at that period must be carefully studied. As Benedict pointed out, the feared, aggressive Vikings of the ninth century have become the peaceful Scandinavians of today (4). We should expect differences in the behavior of the same group in periods of, say, depression or prosperity or war. If national character is to be seriously studied, there is no obvious scientific reason for assuming that identical behavior tendencies or traits will exist after a change or shift in the social system, although they may persist for sometime thereafter. It is entirely possible that the Englishman and the American today have more in common than either has with his ancestors living under a feudal system.

The study of large and complicated national groupings cannot advance beyond a primitive state until the actual complexities of the social system in question are examined and brought into the picture in a functional way. Ginsberg (18) has suggested a few of the factors to be considered before selecting representatives of national groups for study. He includes type of political organization, degree of social differentiation and type of class structure, degree of cultural homogeneity, age or stage of maturity or growth. To these might be added other related factors, such as economic organization, degree of regional isolation or interdependence, etc. Certainly we know on the basis of concrete study that different class settings within the same country produce significant variations in values and behavior (1, chap. 23). Ginsberg suggests that: "In the more differentiated peoples it is perhaps an open question whether class characteristics are not at least as important as national characters, and it is arguable that in some cases members of the upper classes have more in common with their opposite numbers in other nations than with the lower classes in their own" (18, p. 86).

The neglect of such differentiations as class, religion, ethnic groups, and regional differences has quite accurately been described as the principal shortcoming in studies of national character (1, 16, 18, 29, 43). In countries where there is a wide gap between the rulers and the rest of the population we must, as Pear suggests, seriously consider who is to be taken as representative of the character of that nation—the nobility of the prime ministers and cabinet, or the dominated majority (43, p. 25). Studies are based too frequently "not upon the common features of the national culture, but upon an overgeneralized picture of the particular sub-group with which the investigator was most familiar" (1, p. 787). The resulting errors will become increasingly evident as more comprehensive studies are actually made.

* * * *

Most studies of national character utilize techniques employed by ethnologists in small cultural groups. But even in small cultural groups it is necessary to know how representative the behavior in question is of

the entire group. Very seldom are we informed of the frequency of occurrence of a particular behavior item, even in ethnological studies of small cultural groups (29). There is no immediate method for assessing whether or not conclusions based on such unspecified data are valid. Especially when this approach is extended to larger groups, the opportunity for error becomes tremendous. . . .

It can be argued convincingly that ethnological techniques commonly employed even in many studies of "culture patterns" of relatively small or more homogeneous social groups are at present lacking in precision, and that findings are too seldom specified as to their representativeness or source. When these techniques are applied in an unqualified and unspecified fashion to nations as large and complex as the United States, there is little justification for accepting the results as more than interesting reading. Likewise, we are cautioned against the uncritical use of psychological tests or laboratory situations in such studies. Anastasi and Foley (1) point out that some of these tests, such as the Rorschach, do not yet have established diagnostic interpretations even in our own culture. Further, it is known that the whole meaning of such tests and the types of motivations aroused in the test situation may be changed in different cultures. Obviously this conclusion does not mean that short-cut techniques may not be used for studying group differences, but it points to a different approach in both their use and their interpretation.

Another technique is the study of cultural products to tap the characteristics of a national group. Again we are faced with the problem of representativeness—which cultural products and whose cultural products are to be studied? In some countries there is a sharp delineation between the literature and art forms of the established ruling group and those of the peasants. In others powerful groups deliberately control the products which reach the people. How representative are Hollywood movies of the character of the greater part of the American people? When shown in other countries, does their selection reflect a character of those nations or tendencies of the salesmen or censors of the movies?

In short, as cogently indicated by Klineberg in his survey of these problems, the techniques used in contemporary study of national character "all suffer from the same defect, namely that their validity has never been fully established" (29, p. 90).

But the question of techniques is not divorced from the investigator's orientation to the problem at hand. We cannot expect to have adequate techniques so long as the problems are posed in such a way that the functional relationships among factors producing national differences are not organically brought into the picture: "Little attention has been given to the very important question of the *causes* of these differences" (29, p. 91). This does not mean that the investigators of national differences

have no notion of such causes. It means rather that causes are tacitly assumed.

By far the most frequent assumption as to causation is that differences in national groups can be explained by use of concepts derived from clinical experience with individuals from a rather restricted stratum of modern Western societies. Attempts at explaining differences in national groups often explicitly or implicitly assume that such differences stem to a significant extent from variations in treatment (warmth, austerity, threat, and the like) of individuals in such areas of early childhood experiences as toilet training, weaning, swaddling, discipline, early parental relationships, etc. This theoretical approach as exemplified in psychoanalytic writings has been critically analyzed as applied to individual development by Sears, Ausubel, and others (1, 2, 44). On the basis of surveyed evidence, Anastasi and Foley conclude that: "The available evidence for such claims . . . is extremely meager and of dubious significance" (1, p. 777).

Another manifestation of this orientation is the attempt to place various national cultures into clinical categories based on *individual* behavioral deviations in Western societies. Thus a paranoid trend may be "proved" to exist in German culture. Subsequent studies of German war criminals at Nuremberg failed to reveal definite paranoid trends among most individual Nazi leaders, as would surely be expected if there was indeed a paranoid trend in the society as a whole. We are in complete agreement with Klineberg that "extension to whole nations of the categories found useful in the psychiatric classification of individuals is not justifiable without further evidence" (29, p. 40).

. . . it should be noted that analogies between individual behavior and the behavior of groups cannot advance our understanding for well-established reasons. Behavior in group situations has been shown time and again to be different from the sum total of behaviors of individuals A, B, C, etc., when they are alone. If characteristics prevalent among individuals of a group are products of group relationships and interactions, and not some essence of individual members, then the study of group differences must *begin* with analysis of these group relationships and interactions, and not with individuals in isolation. More specifically, it is difficult to foresee any value to the study of national character unless the implied group differences are related in a functional way to differences in social structure, stratification, degrees of differentiation, mode of life, and central values within the national group, and within its sub-groups.

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Theories of Choice and Conflict in Psychology and Economics

MATHILDA HOLZMAN

In the area of choice theory, psychology and economics offer differing interpretations of similar situations. Professor Kenneth Boulding pointed out (in a personal conversation) that what the economist calls an "equilibrium" the psychologist calls a "conflict." The economist's term implies that conflict has been resolved, an interpretation diametrically opposed to that of the psychologist. The purpose of this paper is to explore this paradox, particularly its implications for a theory of choice in psychology. To this end the theory of conflict developed by Neal Miller (6, 3, 2), on which Professor Boulding's paradox is based, will be compared with the economic theory of choice.

It will be seen that Miller's model and the economic model are special cases which can be subsumed under a more general theory, in terms of which one can make deductions about whether conflict or choice will result in a given situation. The primary concern of the paper is the analysis and extension of Miller's model. The economic model is used heuristically to further the explication of Miller's model. Therefore, the focus of attention and criticism will be directed toward Miller's model.

I. The Approach-Approach Conflict and the Theory of Consumer's Choice

The situation which psychology and economics analyze under the above rubrics can be stated thus: If an individual has to decide between options which are attractive to him, how does he make his choice?

Each discipline has a model, which can be given a geometrical representation, to explain what will happen in this situation.

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The Economist's Model

The theory of consumer's choice explains how the consumer allocates his income among the goods and services available for purchase. Although the theory has been couched algebraically and is general with respect to number of commodities, we shall consider the special case of two commodities. The two-commodity case, which can be dealt with geometrically and hence can be compared to Miller's model, involves the same analytical assumptions as the n commodity case, and the deductions from it with which this paper is concerned hold for the general case.

In Figure 1 the curves *I*, *II*, and *III* are called by economists "indifference curves." Each point on a given curve represents a combination of




Fig. 1

goods having equal utility for the individual. As a family of curves, they constitute the hypothetical preference map of an individual for commodities A and B, amounts of which can be read on the vertical and horizontal axes. Preference maps are constructed on the basis of the following assumptions:

1. That there exists a psychological dimension called "utility," in terms of which all bundles of goods can be ordered.² This is the same kind

²Many economists, in their presentations of the theory of consumer's choice, avoid use of the term "utility," since it cannot be *cardinally* measured. The economic analysis of consumer choice depends on the assumption that utility as an ordinal scale exists for individuals. A good discussion of the current state of the theory is given by Machlup (3).

of assumption as that necessary to the construction of any unidimensional psychological scale.

2. That utility is an increasing function of the amount of goods which a person has, so that indifference curve *III* represents a higher level of utility than *II*, and *II* than *I*.

3. That goods have a decreasing marginal rate of substitution, so that, for example, the more of A a person had, the greater would be the amount of A he would be willing to give up for a unit of B. This assumption accounts for the fact that the indifference curves are convex to the point of origin. These three assumptions account for the fact that indifference curves do not intersect.

4. That a person makes his choices in such a way as to maximize his utility, i.e., that he is keeping potential outcomes in mind as he chooses.

In Figure 1 the straight line is the price-ratio line. If the individual is assumed to spend his entire income on commodity A, he will be able to buy the amount (*a*); if he spends it all on B, he will be able to buy the amount (*b*). The straight line (*a*) (*b*) is the locus of all combinations of A and B which he can purchase with the given income, and its slope is determined by the relative prices of A and B. In Figure 1, A must be twice as expensive as B, since the point (*a*) corresponds to ten units of A and the point (*b*) to twenty units of B.

Given his preference map, his total income, and the relative prices he faces, a person is assumed to choose quantities of goods A and B so as to maximize his utility function. The combination of quantities of A and B which yields maximum utility is that indicated by the tangency of the relative-price line and an indifference curve, the point *E* in the diagram. This is the equilibrium point for the individual because no other combination of A and B which he can buy, given his income, yields as much utility.

From the point of view of this paper the crucial assumptions in the economic model are, first, the assumption of a unidimensional psychological continuum-utility; second, the assumption that the units for goods are small enough that choices in general are not of the either/or variety; and third, the maximization assumption. The role of these assumptions will be considered in detail in the discussion of the psychologists' model.

The Psychological Model of Neal Miller

In the course of this paper all three of Miller's conflict models will be considered. This discussion starts with approach-approach conflict (as do Miller's own discussions), not because it seems the most significant model or because the usefulness of Miller's thinking depends on the empirical

usefulness of it, but because the comparison with the economic model is most direct. However, the conclusions drawn from the discussion of approach-approach conflict are general. They apply both to avoidance-avoidance conflict and to approach-avoidance conflict and should not be dismissed on the grounds that approach-approach conflict is the least interesting conflict and perhaps has little empirical reality.

The model for approach-approach conflict (Fig. 2) implies that an individual at point *C* will be in conflict concerning approach to G_1 and G_2 because at this point the strength of his approach motives to G_1 and G_2 are equal. *C* is a point of unstable equilibrium because there is no tendency for the individual, if displaced from this point, to return to it. An implicit assumption of this model is that some factor interferes with the organism's




Fig. 2

achieving both goals, thereby necessitating a choice. In the economic theory the factor of limited income is explicitly introduced.

The fundamental reason for the differing interpretations by psychologists and economists of the choice situation is that the psychologist, in this model, views goals as unique variables. If the psychologists' model involved the conception of substitute goals,³ the interpretation would be more like that of the economist.

³In one paper (7) Miller discusses the learning of substitute goals as displacement or stimulus generalization phenomenon. He has not, however, utilized this concept in his models of conflict.

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... the conclusion that the person at point *C* in the psychological model is inevitably conflicted is a conclusion from a model whose structure precludes compromise. The economic model is one which depends for its notion of equilibrium on the assumption that human beings are compromisers.

The question which emerges is: Under what circumstances is the psychological view (uniqueness and conflict) more likely accurately to reflect reality than the economic view (compromise and resolution of conflict)? To the extent that an individual sees his goals as unique entities for which there are no part satisfactions and no substitutes, Miller's model is the valid one. This is clearly a special case of human behavior, but a most important one. A second assumption necessary to the economic model is that there exists for each individual a unidimensional psychological continuum—utility—in terms of which all goods can be ordered. If this continuum does not include all goals (goods are a special instance of goals), not all possible conflicts are capable of resolution. Utility acts as a common denominator for goods and goals, making it possible for the individual to compare the value of various options. If this common denominator is non-existent a person confronted with a choice is in the position not of wanting both options equally but of not having a relative preference at all. The economist explicitly assumes, in his choice theory, the existence of the common denominator. Miller's models have not been worked out to the extent that the economic model has been, and Miller has made no explicit statement concerning this assumption. However, it seems a fair inference that the assumption is tacitly made. Since Miller presents his model of approach-approach conflict only for the case where goals are assumed to be equally attractive, i.e., where the strengths of approach motives are equal, and suggests no problem in the analysis of the case where the strengths are unequal, the existence of a common denominator is implied.

As a matter of fact, the geometry of the model itself implies this assumption. That is to say that, since Miller presents a two-dimensional model (see Fig. 2) in which strengths of approach motives to two different goals are compared, approach motives must be commensurate. Although Miller's model of approach-avoidance and avoidance-avoidance conflict have not yet been dealt with in this paper, it should be stated that the assumption of commensurability must hold also for avoidance motives and for approach and avoidance motives.

Finally, the economic model assumes that a person chooses so as to obtain more rather than less utility. If a principle like this does not obtain, i.e., if in making his choices a person does not pay attention to

potential outcomes, choice theory does not provide a dependable rule for predicting behavior and is therefore not useful. The assumption of this principle is implied in Miller's analysis.

To summarize the findings of this section, then, the psychological and economic models are based on similar assumptions that (1) persons choose so as to attain more rather than less satisfaction (utility); and (2) there exists a unidimensional psychological continuum, called "utility" by economists, and implicit in approach and avoidance motives in Miller's model in terms of which goals and goods can be ordered.

The difference between the theories which gives rise to the paradox noted by Boulding is a matter of differing assumptions about the existence of substitute goals and part satisfaction.

II. Avoidance-Avoidance Conflict

Economics seems at first look to have no model corresponding to avoidance-avoidance conflict, despite the fact that economists frequently deal with problems of relative costs and relative disutilities. In each such instance the weighing of disagreeable alternatives occurs in the context of achieving some positive goal. This will be seen to be a special case of double approach-avoidance conflict (to be discussed below), in which the strengths of the approach motives to the two goals are identical, since both goals serve the same positive purpose.

* * * *

I have found it very difficult to find instances of pure avoidance-avoidance conflict. In general, a choice between painful options becomes necessary only if the choice is tied to a positive goal, a case of double approach-avoidance conflict. Hence there is a good deal of question in my mind concerning the applicability, empirically, of the avoidance-avoidance model.

III. Approach-Avoidance Conflict

In his work Miller has addressed himself quite specifically to the problem of analyzing conflict situations. In this paper I am concerned with placing Miller's models in the general context of a theory of choice, in order to be able to isolate variables which determine whether in a given situation there will be conflict or resolution of conflict through choice.

In discussing approach-approach conflict, a first statement of the dependence of Miller's findings of conflict on his assumptions about the character of goals was made. In this section, this theme will be developed and consideration given to typical experiments on conflict as these are influenced by assumptions about the nature of goals and as they restrict the potential findings about conflict and choice. The fact that assumptions are restrictive and findings therefore constrained would not be an issue

if it could be taken for granted that the experimental setups are typical of situations which actually confront organisms. So little is known about conflict and choice that this cannot be assumed. To make clear what I mean about the effect of restrictive assumptions on findings I want to analyze two approach-avoidance situations discussed by Miller.

Barker's Experiment

I am going to start with Barker's experiment . . . This is a case of double approach-avoidance conflict and thus is a somewhat more complicated example than a simple approach-avoidance conflict. However, using it as an example has the advantage of showing that the analysis is general, covering both single and double approach-avoidance conflict. First the economic analysis of the experiment, as Barker set it up, will be given, then the economic analysis of the experiment as an economist would conduct it. The essential difference between the two experiments is the position taken regarding the nature of goals.

As Barker conducted the experiment, the problem for the subject is to weigh the disutility (magnitude of negative effect) to him of drinking the least distasteful drink against the utility of the pay (. . . pay is the same for drinking either drink). If the utility of the pay is greater than the disutility of drinking, he drinks. If the disutility is greater than the utility, he abstains. If the disutilities of the two drinks are equal, the economist would say that one would not know which the subject would drink, but the decision to drink or not depends on the disutility of drink versus the utility of pay. The economist's analysis would lead him to conclude that the conflict would be resolved *unless* the utility of the pay exactly equaled the disutility of drinking. Using Miller's model of double approach-avoidance conflict and setting the two approach gradients equal would yield the same conclusion.

Here . . . the finding of conflict is a function of the conceptualization of the choice situation as an either/or or all-or-none predicament.

An economist doing an experiment like Barker's but guided by his own theory would present the subject with the two glasses of distasteful drinks and a teaspoon. He would have on hand a pocketful of nickels. He would say to the subject, "I will pay you a nickel per teaspoon to drink the liquid from either or both of these glasses until you have drunk the equivalent of one glass." To get comparability with Barker's experiment, the rate of pay per teaspoon would have to be such that drinking the equivalent of one glass would yield the same pay as Barker's subjects received. Limiting the subject to one glass means that total possible intake would be the same as Barker's.

This experiment differs from Barker's, first, in that the experimenter permits the subject to define his own goal. The subject may continue to drink teaspoonsful until he has drunk as much as the glassful Barker asked

and has received full pay, or he may stop at any point when he feels the next nickel will not compensate him for drinking the next teaspoonful. If he stops short of drinking a full glass and therefore does not collect all the pay, he may wish he had the rest of the money, but he will not be in conflict. He has all he wants, given the disutility to him of obtaining it. For human beings, and perhaps other organisms, goals are modified through learning, and conflicts are not inevitable so long as such learning is possible and substitute goals exist. In this experiment, conflict has been made less likely by altering the assumption of *the* goal, fixed and immutable, and substituting a flexible entity decided upon—perhaps discovered—by the subject and not by the experimenter. It is still possible, as the experiment is set up, for the subject to conceive of the situation as Miller has conceptualized it—to think to himself, Is it worth my while to drink all of one of these glasses in order to get the pay?—rather than risk going bit by bit until he finds the equilibrium amounts.

The second difference between this experiment and Barker's is that the economist would permit the subject to drink some of both liquids rather than one or the other. This has the effect again of making conflict less likely because another either/or stricture has been removed. It is analogous to the effect of introducing substitute goals in approach-approach conflict.

Miller's Bashful Swain

The little example that Miller uses in explaining the approach-avoidance model in (3) is that of the "young swain who is hard smitten but very bashful [and] vacillates helplessly at a distance from the object of his affections." In this case there may be psychological possibilities which correspond to the teaspoons and nickels suggested for making a less restrictive model for Barker's experiment. Supposing the bashful swain sees the object of his affections in class three times a week. This may yield sufficient satisfaction to the swain that he is temporarily in a state of equilibrium, but it is perhaps not the state deduced by Miller. Being in the same class with Miss X does not involve Bashful Swain's having to put his self-respect on the block by making direct overtures to her; therefore, the equilibrium is one in which anxiety—the presumed avoidance motive—is reduced to zero.

In Figure 3, according to Miller's hypothesis, the equilibrium point is *M*, a point of conflict defined by the intersection of the approach and avoidance gradients. An alternative hypothesis is that, for situations in which substitute goals exist for the organism, equilibrium will be attained by choosing the most rewarding subgoal consistent with reducing avoidance motives to zero (*H*), a point defined by the intersection of the avoidance gradient and the horizontal axis.

Although Miller has never considered this possibility in connection




Fig. 3

with his models of conflict, he does consider (7) an analogous model explaining response based on displacement. His conclusion is that H will be the equilibrium point. Miller (7) considers this the equilibrium point because here net strength of approach motives is greatest. This can be seen in Figure 3. At no other point is the height of the approach gradient above the avoidance gradient as great as it is at H .

An empirical test to determine which factor actually determines the equilibrium would be necessary to settle the point. In the model the effect of the two factors is confounded because of the use of straight lines to represent the gradients.

Another psychological formulation which posits M as equilibrium point is the psychoanalytic theory. This theory views, for example, dreams and neurotic symptoms as compromise formations, the sources of which are the conflicting motives of the subject. The compromise formation is adopted because it permits tension reduction, but in a disguised manner. It should be noted that this is a theory of *neurotic* conflict. A common observation about neurotics is that they tend to be ambivalent in their attitudes toward goals—to do things which cause them feelings of guilt and/or anxiety in addition to positive feelings. One can perhaps distinguish neurotics as a group composed of those whose adjustments tend to be of the conflict-ridden type indicated by point M in Figure 3 from normals whose adjustments tend to be such that they are not anxiety-provoking, as indicated by point H .

Because no substitute goals are introduced in Miller's model of approach-avoidance conflict or in his experiments, his subjects are presented with an all-or-nothing choice, and the extent to which organisms resolve conflict by compromise is never explored,⁴ and therefore the possibility that H rather than M will be a typical equilibrium selected has not been evaluated.

There is no economic analogue suggesting H as equilibrium because the range of problems with which the economist deals does not cover—what from the economist's point of view is highly improbable—the possibility of “getting something for nothing.” This is, of course, the implication of H as equilibrium point. The psychological cost lies in accepting a goal considerably displaced from the most valued one. Moreover, anxiety seems to be a cost that organisms are peculiarly loath to pay, and it is perhaps an error to lump it with other factors, like disagreeable taste, which give rise to avoidance motives, and to analyze avoidance motives as though they were a class all of whose members behaved in the same way.

IV. Choice without Unidimensionality

It was pointed out in the concluding remarks to Section I that the economic theory of choice and Miller's models of conflict are alike in their assumption of a unidimensional continuum on the basis of which options are ranked and the goal having the highest rank selected.

The assumption is made not only with regard to the commensurability of approach motives but also with regard to approach and avoidance motives; i.e., approach and avoidance motives can be algebraically summed to get a net strength of approach or avoidance with respect to a goal. This assumption implies that the unidimensional continuum extends in a negative as well as a positive direction. This is a stringent assumption. In this section I wish to question the empirical generality of this assumption and indicate the nature of a theory of choice and conflict which is based on a less stringent assumption.

The question of the empirical generality of the unidimensionality assumption can be explored by considering the sources of conflict for human beings from incommensurable options. Such conflict is a function of the numbers of *independent* dimensions in terms of which an organism—human or otherwise—is motivated. For a human being this number depends on his degree of personality integration. Allport (1) characterizes the mature personality as one so well integrated that “all motivation seems to be centered in one master sentiment.” The master sentiment, provides,

⁴In the experiments with rats reported by Miller (6) in which food and shock were opposed, there was no possibility for the animal to relinquish the main goal and settle for a substitute goal. Such an experiment could be conducted with the main goal being a preferred food and the substitute goal a distinctly less acceptable food whose attainment involved no shock.

in our terms, the common denominator which permits the scaling of options which Miller's model and the economic theory assume.

The less-well-integrated the personality, the more likely it is that a person will experience irreconcilable motives. This is to a large extent what we mean by an "unintegrated personality." We may think of the process of personality integration as the development of a fairly consistent system of preferences, a sense of the relative importance of various potential goals. However, the degree of personality integration which will be possible for an individual is limited by the number of independent ends (master sentiments) in his value system. In order to make clear what is meant by a value system with independent ends, consider the opposite case—the monolithic value system in which there is only one end, so that options can be ordered in terms of the extent to which they serve this end. Totalitarian political regimes, for example, seek to impose such value systems on their subjects, making the strength of the state (more accurately, the given regime) the highest goal and common denominator in terms of which other ends can be ranked.⁵ This example clearly does not exhaust the class of monolithic value systems; a consistent hedonism is another value system which, substantively, is very different from that which requires the individual to subordinate his well-being and all his interests to the needs of the state. The two systems are alike in that each provides a single end in terms of which to rank options and therefore avoids the potential conflict from the clash of ends. For the person with the monolithic political value system the discovery that his dearest friend is a political undesirable does not arouse conflict as to the course of action to be followed.

To the extent that an individual's value system is not monolithic, conflict of ends (or values) is always a potentiality. Patriotism and friendship cannot be ordered on any *a priori* basis which will hold for all situations in which they cannot simultaneously be adhered to. The reason is that they are not commensurable. One cannot define an essence which inheres in each and in terms of which they can be scaled—as, for example, the calorie has been defined and foods ranked in terms of caloric content. The lack of such an essence is a source of potential conflict from which there seems no escape for human beings except into some sort of authoritarianism which will prescribe a hierarchy of ends.

To the extent that independent ends are present in a value system,

⁵ It is possible for a monolithic value system to seem to be quite complicated, admitting many contingent ends. Instead of ranking all options in a single dimension, options are ranked in as many dimensions as there are contingent ends. Then the contingent ends are ranked in terms of value to the master end. The dimensions are not independent, since the ends are contingent—serving the master end. It is therefore possible to get an over-all ranking in one dimension, that of the major end. There may be many options tied at the same rank, but this is not the type of conflict we are now considering.

not all options have a common denominator. Those which do not have a common denominator cannot be analyzed by a theory of choice based on comparison of options. Since value systems incorporating independent ends are typical of individuals in our culture, we can expect this source of conflict to be an important one.

How are choices made, then, when options cannot be ranked in terms of a unidimensional scale?⁶ A less stringent assumption is that they constitute a partially ordered set. This means that there will be two possibilities for the chooser. Some choices will be conflict-free. A given option will be seen as always preferable to another given option. Thinking in terms of Miller's models, this would be a situation such that one goal gradient is at every point higher than the other goal gradient, so that they never intersect.

In all conflictful instances, the chooser is in the position not of wanting both options equally (experiencing equal response strengths) but of not having a relative preference at all. For where there is no common denominator, there is no basis for comparing the options and making a choice *between* them. The conflict, in the sense of an arresting of ongoing behavior, may be terminated; but the inference cannot be made that a relative preference has been established which can be expected to prevail in the future when the conflict arises.

For example, suppose a person, Y, caught between patriotism and friendship, finds himself unable to decide whether to turn in a politically unreliable friend. He may think to himself, "I'll ask X [e.g., his minister, physician, professor]; he is a good and wise person." In X's system of values this choice may pose no problem, and he may advise Y on a course of action. Y may adopt X's suggestion, thereby terminating the conflict. Whether it is resolved, i.e., whether in the future when such a conflict arises it will lead Y to the same action as taken this time, depends on the spirit in which it is adopted initially. Following X's advice may be seen as a temporary expedient, leaving the conflict unresolved. Following X's advice may be accompanied by adopting those values of X which determine the advice. In this case the conflict is resolved through a change in Y's system of values.

In summary, then, the theory of choice which abandons the assumption of unidimensionality of choice has been proposed because the assumption of unidimensionality is too stringent in the light of the heterogeneity of values. This model implies that conflict of options is a more likely occurrence than one would expect on the basis of either Miller's models

⁶The notion of choices determined by ranking options does not necessarily imply that the individual choosing can verbalize, or even account for to himself, the value framework in terms of which he chooses. The analysis of choice and conflict in this paper is independent of any assumption as to the extent to which the chooser is aware of his motivations.

or the economic theory of choice, both of which are based on the more stringent assumption. It implies also that conflict may be terminated on either a short-run or long-run basis. *Resolution* of conflict, the long-run phenomenon, implies a reorganization of the individual's value system. This leads to the expectation that conflicts are typically not resolved but rather terminated on a short-run basis, so that the individual lives with a value system involving a certain amount of inconsistency.

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Where Is the Modern Sociology of Conflict?

JESSIE BERNARD

I

Over the last two decades there has been a great burgeoning of cultural sociology in the United States. As an explanatory and analytic tool the concept of culture has become almost as important in sociology as in anthropology itself. On the dynamic side, invention and change have engaged the attention of sociological researchers. On the static side, the structural aspects of community—particularly class and caste—have become a fact. Almost everyone nowadays is studying some phase of class in whatever research he is working on. There can, of course, be no legitimate objection to this work.

On the other hand, the more strictly interactional phases of sociology have suffered relatively because of this preoccupation with the cultural aspects. The theory of conflict and of competition particularly has suffered in the hands of recent American sociologists; since the time of such early pioneers as Small, Park, and Ross, little progress has been made. Where, for example—to limit our discussion to the neglect of a theory of conflict—are the American sociological analyses and scientific measures of sabotage, boring from within, the use of “fronts,” the Trojan horse technique, the manipulation of parliamentary debate, the use of *agents provocateurs*, the war of nerves, espionage, fifth columns, deceit, fraud?¹ We have excellent descriptions and analyses of lynchings, strikes, riots, and war. But the


¹Since this article was written, an interesting analysis of “Some Social Functions of Ignorance,” by Wilbert E. Moore and Melvin M. Tumin, has appeared (*American Sociological Review*, December, 1949, pp. 787–95), which includes some reference to ignorance as a conflict technique. But it is dealt with tangentially rather than as an integral part of a systematic theory of conflict.

most important modern conflicts are not necessarily fought on the level of overt violence. Yet American sociologists in recent years have been content to leave the scientific study of conflict where Simmel left it. Therefore, when the Communists turned their battery of conflict techniques on us, we had no theory to cover modern conflict situations. Did the sociologists have anything creative to offer in the cold war? Psychological warfare is still infantile; sociological warfare, embryonic. Animal sociologists can tell us how to exterminate rats sociologically. Germany, which had developed a strong school of conflict sociologists (perhaps apologists would be more accurate) in addition to the Marxist school, perfected the science of community destruction—genocide. American sociologists, except for the Marxists, who have added little to the original Marxian formulas, have, it seems, conspicuously avoided the whole field of the theory of conflict. No wonder, then, if they have contributed little creative work in the sociology of conflict. We have even made the concept of conflict culturally acceptable as the concept of “tensions,” rendering it thus a subjective rather than an objective phenomenon. It is interesting to note that the one scientific book admittedly dealing with social conflict in the past decade was written by a German psychologist.² What knowledge we now have of conflict is largely in terms of what Cooley used to call “sympathetic introspection,” or what is sometimes called empathy. We “understand” it intuitively or with insight. A great novelist or short-story writer or dramatist can use almost any conflict situation he cares to—revenge, defiance, disobedience, revolt—confident that we will understand it from our own experience. Folk language is replete with expressions for conflict situations for which scientific analysis is still lacking. “Offense is the best defense,” “playing the ends against the middle,” “divide and conquer,” “even up the score,” “he has nothing on me,” “put it over,” “your move,” “seize the offensive,” “get even,” “don’t seem too anxious,” “to have a drop on him,” “the weapon of surprise and secrecy,” etc. We understand all these terms but have little research-supported sociological knowledge about them. We are, as compared with Communists or Nazis, mere babes in the woods with respect to the theory of modern conflict.

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Many sociologists might agree that in the United States the theory of conflict has not kept pace with the theory of culture but disagree on the reasons. One explanation is the cultural: It could be argued that our bypassing of the theory of conflict reflects our cultural disapproval of aggressive conflict and that our ignorance of conflict theory is honorable in the light of our cultural values.

²Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948).



Cultural and interactional sociological explanations operate together in an intricate manner. Because our culture condemns certain kinds of behavior, an objective statement that such and such a group is responsible for the condemned behavior at once looks like blaming or taking sides. Veblen pointed out this interesting fact in another connection many years ago:

It is an unhappy circumstance that all this plain speaking about the country town, its traffic, its animating spirit, and its standards of merit, unavoidably has an air of finding fault. But even slight reflection will show that this appearance is unavoidable even where there is no inclination to disparage. It lies in the nature of the case, unfortunately. No unprejudiced inquiry into the facts can content itself with anything short of plain speech, and in this connection plain speech has an air of disparagement because it has been the unbroken usage to avoid plain speech touching these things, these motives, aims, principles, ways and means and achievements, of these substantial citizens and their business and fortunes.¹⁰

American sociologists have harbored a quite understandable fear—inherited from the nineteenth century—of being identified with socialists. As a matter of fact, the outsiders who associated sociology with socialism were probably as nearly correct as the inside sociologists who repudiated the connection entirely. The Marxian formulation of the theory of conflict, the so-called “materialistic dialectic,” was doubtless narrow, incomplete, dogmatic, metaphysical—in fact, imperfect in all the ways it has been accused of being imperfect. But its emphasis on the importance of conflict in social life has not been demonstrated to be incorrect. One may, conceivably, miss more by repudiating the whole theory of conflict than by accepting an erroneous statement of it.

A third reason perhaps why recent American sociologists have shied away from the scientific study of conflict lies in a widespread fear that, if one studies conflict, he is aggravating or advocating it or that at least he approves of it. We have a—cultural, if you wish—policy of hush-hush with reference to many conflicts. In contrast to the Communist policy we believe in “letting sleeping dogs lie,” in “not making an issue of it,” “not stirring up trouble.” As a result we have swung so far away from the subject of conflict that even to mention certain controversial subjects in textbooks has been taboo. That it should be possible to deal with conflict as an objective process without taking sides or becoming a propagandist

¹⁰“The Country Town,” in *The Portable Veblen*, ed. Max Lerner (New York: Viking Press, 1948), p. 421. Originally published in 1923.

or protagonist seems so unrealistic that this basic field of human behavior has been almost suppressed, or at least greatly minimized, in favor of a more static approach. This, if less realistic, at least has the merit of emphasizing what people have in common rather than what they have in conflict.

More subtle, though closely related to this reason for neglecting the sociology of conflict, is the fact that secrecy-and-surprise tactics are among the potent weapons of conflict. The theory of secrecy and surprise may be viewed as the converse of the theory of prediction, just as the sociology of genocide is the application in reverse of the sociology of normal community life.¹¹ And just as control implies predictability, so protection against control, as in a conflict situation, involves non-predictability. We are thoroughly familiar with this principle in games and in war—the use of the feint, the poker face, the diversion of force. Conversely, to have no secrets among ourselves is an index of absence of conflict. There is nothing to hide among friends, but we suspect the secretive person of being opposed to us. We can scarcely expect powerful fighting organizations to violate these principles of conflict for the sake of co-operating in a science of conflict. Both sides of any major conflict are likely to avoid any investigation, however scientific. If we learn about conflict, we disarm the conflicting parties; they are exposed, vulnerable. Until people knew about Communist tactics, the latter worked effectively; when exposed, they lost much of their potency. The Mohawk Valley Formula was successful until unions publicized it. Powerful conflict organizations do not like to be thus disarmed. It may be that the wielders of power do not want a science of power developed. That is, not in the regular, disinterested, academic channels of research. They might hire men to develop a science of power for their own use, but they would not, perhaps, in that event adhere to the mores of science in publishing results. Politicians, industrialists, and labor leaders would not necessarily be anxious for scientific scrutiny of the techniques of conflict.

A fifth reason for the relative neglect of the sociology of conflict lies in a wish not to have to face the existence of conflict. This fact has been skilfully traced in the case of “managerial sociology” by Harold L. Sheppard.¹² He points out how Elton Mayo and his associates persistently refuse to admit the existence of a conflict of interests between employer and employee and insist that the basic thing necessary for satisfying the demands of labor is “social skills” on the part of management. They

¹¹Jessie Bernard, *American Community Behavior* (New York: Dryden Press, 1949), chap. xxx.

¹²“The Treatment of Unionism in ‘Managerial Sociology,’” *American Sociological Review*, April, 1949, pp. 310-13.

assume an identity of interests occasionally interrupted by breakdowns in communication. Herbert Blumer has also commented on the escapist approach to the problems of industrial sociology.¹³

As a corollary of all this, it is difficult to secure the data necessary for a scientific study of the sociology of conflict. Among the important sources for the study of conflict would rank the files of the FBI; minutes of union meetings, of boards of directors, of lobbying agencies; reports of public relations counsels, of the American Arbitration Association, of the United States Conciliation Service, of the NAACP; secret dossiers in the State Department files. These are not likely to be made accessible to the disinterested outsider, even if he is a scientist.

It will be noted that, even if we admit cultural factors to explain our lack of research interest in the field of conflict, there remain, in addition, many others which need not invoke culture. There are thoroughly rational reasons which explain it also. The direction which research takes cannot of course be determined by individual fiat. The reasons here adduced to explain our lack of research preoccupation with a theory of conflict will doubtless continue to operate. We could well use an Institute of Conflict Analysis which would do for the major conflicts of today what the prewar Institute for Propaganda Analysis did for propaganda. A corps of social scientists whose sole function it would be not to serve as a mere fact-finding body but to analyze conflict situations in all kinds of areas and to create instruments for the measurement of conflict, to work out techniques for determining whether conflict really exists or whether the situation is one of mere understanding,¹⁴ might do more for the social sciences than the repetition of static community studies into which so much research talent and energy is now directed. In addition, it might conceivably give us cues for the most creative handling of conflict situations from the local to the international level.

¹³"Sociological Theory in Industrial Relations," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1947, pp. 271-78.

¹⁴Bernard, *op. cit.*, chap. vi.

Conflict Episode Analysis—A Tool for Education in Social Technology

H. HARRY GILES

History of CEA

In the academic year of 1944-45 the Bureau for Intercultural Education had established the first of what later became more widely spread test programs to see whether, through educational means, tensions and conflict between cultural groups could be ameliorated or even cured through educational measures.

It must be remembered that during this time there was a great deal of national interest in the treatment of intergroup tension and conflict. There were, according to the survey made under the direction of Dr. Charles Johnson for the Julius Rosenwald Fund,* over 1000 agencies concerned in some degree with race relations. It was estimated by the present author that these agencies spent 14 to 18 million dollars a year in their efforts to bring about better intergroup relations. Some had been in the field for a quarter of a century or more. Yet in all that time, and with all the money expended, there was little semblance of scientific procedure. Hypotheses and assumptions were rarely stated, still less rarely tested and evaluated. The evidence of research as to the nature of causal factors was incomplete and little used. Professional training in methods of work was limited to a few specialities like social work. The whole situation was one which cried out for training, research, integration of knowledge and its interpretation and application in a systematic way.

*Johnson, Charles S., *Directory of Agencies in Race Relations, National, State and Local*. 124 pp. Julius Rosenwald Fund. Chicago, Ill., 1945.

H. Harry Giles. "Conflict Episode Analysis—A Tool for Education in Social Technology," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, Vol. 26, No. 9 (1953), pp. 418-433. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

Three studies prepared in this time and published in 1947 indicate the situation: Goodwin Watson's *Action for Unity* (Harper), Robin Williams' classic study *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, Social Science Research Council and the NCARC study of Intercultural Education (mimeographed and privately distributed). The former was the first real attempt to classify types of approach to tension problems in communities, and was based on interviews made during a few months of 1946 with agencies in communities over the country. The second was a study on the one hand of the social sciences to discover the research hypotheses and findings which might be applicable; on the other hand it too was an analysis of the actual programs of action agencies. The findings of the Williams study included: (1) little awareness, still less correlation of inquiry and conclusions in the various disciplines; (2) practically no awareness or use by the action agencies of such findings. The third indicated the recency of experimentation and tested methodology.

It was evident, once again, that the effort of Wheeler and Perkins, of Kurt Lewin and others to develop scientific procedures in the social arena through interpretation and use of field theory as applied in that arena, required as well the development of tool-techniques for use in the training and field work of those who were tackling social tensions.

An outstanding example of the latter was the beginning in 1946 of Group Dynamics at the Bethel Training Laboratory. Another was the development in 1944 and succeeding years of the concept of action-research by Kurt Lewin and his fellow workers at MIT, CCI and elsewhere. Still another was the concept of social conflict analysis with one aspect of which this paper deals.

Against the background of war, tension problems and the beginning of a more scientific and professional approach to them, it was in 1945-46 that Professor Harvey Zorbaugh, Chairman of the Department of Educational Sociology at New York University, invited the author to devise a program for graduate training intercultural education. It was a "natural" to institute such a program. Nowhere in America did there seem to be professionally trained persons for the school-community job of dealing with intercultural tensions.

In the year following, a first course was offered, a "Practicum" in Intercultural Education for graduate students, taught by the author in the department of educational sociology of New York University. It was in this course that the attempt was made to apply something like case analysis to social conflicts. Since 1949 the analyses have been carried on in the "Clinical Seminar" and other courses offered by the Center for Human Relations Studies at New York University.

At first there was no formal requirement set up as to the method of analysis. It was to be an exercise in presenting the nature of a conflict,

the handling of the conflict and any positive and negative critical comments as to that handling and the results.

So far as known, then or now, there were at that time no established patterns for social conflict analysis. It was therefore necessary to achieve some kind of order and give the diverse episodes comparison value by creating at least a tentative pattern. This in turn required clarification of the purposes for which this analysis was to be used. Succinctly stated, those purposes were as follows:

1. Training for professional competence in analyzing conflicts inimical to democracy.
2. Training in acute perception and objective reporting.
3. Integration of knowledge from a variety of disciplines.
4. Development of a theory of human dynamics and its uses.
5. Development of practical principles to govern field activity.
6. The establishment of a reservoir of conflict episode reports which would some day be sufficient to provide the basis for a science—at least for classifications—applicable to social conflicts.

“Training in acute perception” has to do with the objective reporting and the search for causal factors and governing principles which are required by the analysis outline.

“Interdisciplinary knowledge” has to do primarily with the search for causal factors and for tested methodology related to them.

“Development of practical field insight” is, as in clinical analysis of cases in medicine, a result of thorough-going analysis, presentation to a critical audience, and the clarifications and unsolved questions which result.

“Development of theory” has to do with the attempt to identify major and minor dynamic factors and principles which apply to and explain successful and unsuccessful treatment of episodes.

To serve these purposes, the first tentative protocols were established, making a more exact definition of the form which a conflict episode analysis should follow. These were:

1. Initial description of the nature of the conflict.
2. Selection of a *social* conflict—not one internal to the individual.
3. The history of the conflict.
4. The causes of the conflict.
5. Methods of handling the conflict.
6. Results to date.
7. Generalizations and conclusions.

CEA Outline and Protocols

The seventh revision of the CEA Outline, issued in 1952, is printed here as it is now given to seminar students.

[New York University, School of Human Education, Center for Human Relations Studies. Conflict Episode Analysis Outline; 7th Revision, 1952.]

1. Title.
2. Presenting Incident.
Illustrating conflict in an acute phase. The forces and people in conflict.
3. History.
When it began. Where? How? Situational factors.
4. Diagnosis.
 - a) Symptoms noticed.
 - b) Hypothesis as to cause.
 - c) Predictions made.
5. Treatment.
 - a) What was done.
 - b) Other possibilities.
6. Results to date.
7. Conclusions:
 - a) Dynamics
 - b) Principles *re* method
 - c) Unsolved questions

As work developed in the seminar from year to year, it became increasingly evident that strict adherence to the outline was a necessity from at least three points of view: (a) to test the value of the form; (b) to test the thinking of those who used it and (c) to make data and conclusions readily usable in any comparative and classificatory studies.

During the first three years of its use, the outline was simply suggested. This was partly in the hope that by not requiring strict use of the suggestion, departures from it might shed light on how to improve it. Repeatedly, however, it was shown that individuals found themselves floundering when they did not have a firm guide in their attempts to analyze conflict episodes, and in addition, even very brilliant and gracefully written accounts of conflict episodes which did not follow the outline, proved seriously lacking in both training and scientific value.

Today, each member of the clinical seminar adheres strictly to the outline as given here. At the end of each term of use, attention is focussed on the evaluation of the outline. No major change has been suggested in the past two years.

A glance at the outline will show how nearly comparable it is to the order of presentation of a medical case. This in part is the result of independent development, for the form was always substantially as it is; in part it is due to the presence of clinical psychologists and medical social case workers in seminars, their own recognition of its similarities to the medical case method, and their helpful suggestions and those which they obtained from medical persons.

* * * *

Comments on Method and Value in Training Function of CEA

In stressing conflict analysis, in the training of graduate students at the Center for Human Relations Studies, certain important assumptions are made, of which the following three are perhaps the chief.

First, that conflict is of interest to us because of many reasons, but principally because it can be destructive—sometimes fatally so—of human growth. Not all conflict is destructive, however. Indeed, almost any conflict has constructive aspects, and if the conflict can be equated with the encountering of a problem, any follower of Dewey will consider it the central focus of learning activity. In order to know whether a conflict is constructive, can be judged good or healthy for an individual or a social group of any size, we have found it useful to set forth at the beginning of the study of conflict a social purpose which yields the criteria for such judgment.

Second, it is assumed that the social purpose to which we are devoted is that of democracy, its purpose succinctly defined by W. W. Charters as “The maximum growth of all.” In this definition, *all* is a key word, since it implies social control of those persons and of those forms of development which interfere with other persons and other forms in their full development.

Finally, it is assumed that the search for causal factors—so essential to diagnosis—is ultimately a search for human dynamics. The term is used here to describe the impulses or forces which seem to motivate human beings. To attempt a unifying theory of human dynamics is indeed a work for many minds over many years. Without excluding other principles, those which have been chiefly employed in the development of CEA up to this point are to be found in *Human Growth and Education*.*

The total number of students who have taken part in attempts to use and develop the method of CEA is approximately 260, over the 8-year period.

As already stated, it is with the training use of CEA that this paper is chiefly concerned, since that has been the emphasis so far in its development. This use has included one year in which the clinical seminar was led by Professor Theodore Brameld, in 1950–51. Three students have spent as much as two years in this discipline. The evidence from these three seems to be that as experience with it increases, the value of it as a training experience increases. In one case, a group of 20 persons spent three weeks on the presentation and analysis of a single episode, discussing it for four

* Doctoral Dissertation by H. H. Giles. Ohio State University, 1942.

hours each day. It was an intense and cumulatively rewarding experience, to which members of the group still refer four years later. Unexpected therapeutic as well as other values accrued.

It has been found that in preparing a conflict episode for presentation there are the following desirable phases:

1. To begin with one, and preferably with two episodes from the past. These are to be episodes in which the person who presents them has been himself involved at first-hand. Taking past episodes has some of the virtues of studying a dead language: it is finished (at least to a considerable degree) and therefore lends itself to analysis in a more docile way (because unchanging) than an episode now going on. Following the workout on a past episode or two come a severe discipline—the analysis of a current episode, in which the predictions made (under Diagnosis) are subject to the scientific test of what actually occurs.

2. The stipulation of a completed outline of one page (at best) and at most two pages has a number of values. One is that it forces extreme compression and hence selection and the considerations which go into it. (Lady Mary Montagu: "I am sorry to write at such length. I have not time to write more briefly.") Another, that it lends itself to rapid reproduction and handy use as a guide, during the oral presentation.

The finished product, the completed analysis, may run from five to twenty pages or more.

3. Another stipulation—that the first episodes at least must come from first-hand experience—forces the author to attempt an objective description and analysis of a life experience in which he was emotionally involved. This has an obvious observed relation to his capacity for achieving balance and perspective; impossible but desirable to all who seek to replace emotional function with rational function. It has within itself some real therapeutic values. To date it has not seemed to damage the growth of emotional maturity, except in one instance out of the 260.

The use of one's own experience is handy, too, since it makes plain the challenge to remember, record, and analyze living experience of one's own. The knowledge that others will raise questions which will probe very deeply into the facts and their interpretation cannot but heighten awareness of one's own resources and deficiencies.

In the seminars where the intensive analyses have been made, there have been students who hold staff and administrative posts in 28 different occupational fields. It is probably fair to conclude that the analysis of conflict episodes as it has been practiced can be of value in any field where there is need to refine theory (the most practical tool of the person on the job) and to develop the ability to relate practice and treatment to causal factors.

The variety of occupational experience and the maturity of the students who have worked on CEA seems to indicate that here is a prime example of the need for integration of disciplines, in the sense that valid research data and the endless search for fundamental principles is, in this exercise, given full play.

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Organizational Reaction to Conflict

JAMES G. MARCH AND HERBERT A. SIMON

An organization reacts to conflict by four major processes: (1) problem-solving, (2) persuasion, (3) bargaining, and (4) "politics." In problem-solving, it is assumed that objectives are shared and that the decision problem is to identify a solution that satisfies the shared criteria. Thus, in the problem-solving process the importance of assembling information is stressed, search behavior is increased, and considerable emphasis is placed on evoking new alternatives.

In the case of persuasion, it is assumed that individual goals may differ within the organization but that goals need not be taken as fixed. Implicit in the use of persuasion is the belief that *at some level* objectives are shared and that disagreement over subgoals can be mediated by reference to common goals. There is less reliance on information-gathering than in problem-solving and a greater emphasis on testing subgoals for consistency with other objectives. As in the case of problem-solving, however, evoking phenomena are of considerable importance—in this instance evoking relevant criteria (i.e., unconsidered objectives).

Where bargaining is used, disagreement over goals is taken as fixed, and agreement without persuasion is sought. One of the major questions in current bargaining theory is the extent to which bargaining "solutions" represent appeals to shared values of "fairness" or "obviousness" (and thus—in our terms—persuasion) rather than a struggle in terms of persistence, strength, etc. (Schelling, 1957). In either case, we can identify a bargaining process by its paraphernalia of acknowledged conflict of interests, threats, falsification of position, and (in general) gamesmanship.

By "politics" we mean a process in which the basic situation is the same as in bargaining—there is intergroup conflict of interest—but the arena of bargaining is not taken as fixed by the participants. A basic strategy of small powers (whether organizational subunits or nation states) in their relations with large powers is not to allow those relations to be

James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 129-135. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

defined as bilateral but to expand the relevant parties to include potential allies. The tendency for the organizational conflict of collective bargaining to expand to include governmental institutions is well known, as are the less frequent but equally dramatic instances of stockholder disputes. The use of politics within the organization proper is also an important technique for resolving intergroup conflict (Selznick, 1949; Lipset, 1950).

The first two of these processes (problem-solving and persuasion) represent attempts to secure private as well as public agreement to the decisions. Such processes we will call *analytic*. The last two (bargaining and politics), which do not, we will call *bargaining*. Our objective is to specify when the organization will tend to use analytic processes to resolve conflict and when it will resort to bargaining.

The extent of *use of analytic processes to resolve conflict . . . is a function of the type of organizational conflict . . . involved . . .* The more organizational conflict represents individual rather than intergroup conflict, the greater the use of analytic procedures. That is, when the organization cannot reach a decision because the individual participants in the organization cannot do so, we expect the behavior in the organization to parallel our propositions about the reaction to individual conflict. The organization members initiate search for additional information on the alternatives available to them and the consequences attached to those alternatives. Conversely, the more organizational conflict represents intergroup differences, the greater the use of bargaining.

These tendencies to resolve intergroup conflict through bargaining and individual conflict through analysis are not invariable, however. The two major processes have different effects on the organization. In particular, bargaining has some potentially disruptive consequences as a decision-making process. Bargaining almost necessarily places strains on the status and power systems in the organization. If those who are formally more powerful prevail, this results in a more forceful perception of status and power differences in the organization (generally dysfunctional in our culture). If they do not prevail, their position is weakened. Furthermore, bargaining acknowledges and legitimizes heterogeneity of goals in the organization. Such a legitimation removes a possible technique of control available to the organizational hierarchy.

Because of these consequences of bargaining, we predict that the organizational hierarchy will perceive (and react to) all conflict as though it were in fact individual rather than intergroup conflict. More specifically, we predict that almost all disputes in the organization will be defined as problems in analysis, that the initial reaction to conflict will be problem-solving and persuasion, that such reactions will persist even when they appear to be inappropriate, that there will be a greater explicit emphasis on common goals where they do not exist than where they do, and that

bargaining (when it occurs) will frequently be concealed within an analytic framework.

Unfortunately, although each of these predictions appears to be testable, we do not know of explicit evidence testing them.

Interorganizational Conflict

... we shall not deal at length with interorganizational conflict. Many of the phenomena of intergroup conflict within organizations are almost indistinguishable from the phenomena that we might consider under the present heading. The distinction between internal and external relations for an organization is frequently a cloudy one. However, there will generally be more pressure toward use of analytic techniques within the organization than in relations between organizations. Of course, this pressure will operate through broad social institutions and reference groups, but with substantially reduced effect.

For this reason, the literature on interorganizational conflict has been particularly concerned with the resolution of conflict through bargaining processes—with who gets what. Although there have been, particularly in economics, a variety of approaches to problems of interorganizational conflict (Zeuthen, 1930; Hicks, 1932; Harsanyi, 1956), in recent years the theory of bargaining has been of particular interest to game theorists. Attempts have been made to apply game theory to conflict among firms in an oligopolistic industry (Shubik, 1956) among political parties in a democratic nation state (Luce and Rogow, 1956), and among nations (Deutsch, 1954).

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Bargaining outcome. Game theory in its original form was no more satisfactory than traditional economic theory in providing an exact prediction of the outcome of a bargaining situation. What it offered was a specification of a set of feasible outcomes—the “solution” of the game. For example, in the case of a highly specialized executive bargaining with his organization over salary, the salary paid will be somewhere between the value of the best alternative available to the executive elsewhere (i.e., what the executive can guarantee to himself without cooperation) and the cost to the organization of hiring and training a replacement (i.e., what the organization can guarantee to itself without cooperation). Since this range may be quite wide, the theory is not overly helpful.

A number of suggestions have been made for improving the determinateness of a bargaining outcome prediction. These attempts represent possible responses to the following problem: Given a conflict of the sort described above, what would be a “fair” outcome? When the problem is viewed in this way, it is sometimes described as the arbitration problem since it reflects the point of view of the impartial arbiter. Moreover, if we assume that there

are general standards of fairness in the culture to which the parties must (in the long run) conform, it is possible to argue that bargaining is implicit arbitration with the norms of society serving as the enforcing mechanisms for fairness. The better known procedures for arriving at unique outcomes in bargaining situations—those of Nash (1950, 1953), Shapley (Kuhn and Tucker, 1953), and Raiffa (Kuhn and Tucker, 1953)—all satisfy some “reasonable” definition of fairness. Nash’s procedure, which is perhaps the best known, defines the fair outcome as that one which maximizes the product of individual utilities. This outcome depends substantially on the participants’ attitudes toward risk. In general, a participant will achieve a more favorable bargain the more willing he is to take risks. Additional implications of the Nash solution have been derived both for the general case and for some special instances such as the duopoly situation (Mayberry, Nash, and Shubik, 1953).

Game theoretic approaches have been supplemented in recent years by somewhat different conceptions of the bargaining process. Perhaps the most interesting of these recent nongame attacks on the problem is that of Schelling (1957). He argues that the outcome of a bargaining situation depends on some qualities of “obviousness” that commend it to the parties involved. If we imagine that bargaining situations are rarely perceived as unique, we can anticipate that individuals in a culture will build up “normal” responses to such situations. These responses are then evoked in new situations. The relation between “obviousness” and “fairness” is not clear. On the whole, Schelling’s solutions depend less on the participants’ attitudes toward risks—and thus their abilities to use threats—than the solutions proposed by game theorists. One way of reconciling Schelling’s conceptions with game theory is to view Schelling’s theory as determining what set of bargaining alternatives will be considered. A game theory approach (e.g., Nash’s) could then be applied to select a solution from within this newly-defined set.

It is on this note that we will leave the discussion of bargaining. With rare exceptions bargaining theory has operated in an empirical vacuum. The assumptions about human motivations and behavior have usually been made on the basis of introspection, inspection of special cases, and mathematical tractability. In general, we would have more confidence in the future development of the theory if serious empirical research were to match, in terms of energy and competence, the mathematical efforts of the past 10 years. In the absence of such an effort, we are reluctant to pursue in greater detail the possible outcomes of bargaining or to comment in detail on the common allegation that in the “real world” bargaining situations are so complex and unstandardized that nothing approximating a general theory of bargaining can be developed. Our own judgment is that a counsel of despair is premature but that we need a good deal more confrontation of

theory and evidence. It may well turn out that the factors determining which alternatives (i.e., of coalitions and solutions) are considered may be quite different from the factors determining which of the considered alternatives is chosen as solution.

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CHAPTER 5 • Behavior under Stress

Problems of Theory in the Analysis of Stress Behavior

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Patterns of Emotional Behavior

If theoretical analysis is to be oriented toward helping us arrive at hypotheses concerning causal factors in stress behavior, a logical first step in the inquiry would be to raise the question: what are the dominant reactions that need to be accounted for?

Perhaps the most useful way to begin is to classify the clinical varieties of emotional behavior that have been most frequently noted in studies of the way people react when exposed to wartime bombing attacks, large-scale natural disasters, and a variety of personal disasters in which individuals undergo threats of injury, near-miss accidents, or some form of profound personal loss. Tentatively, we can single out at least five different reaction patterns which have been frequently described as typical emotional responses to danger:

1. *Apprehensive avoidance*: This form of reaction is perhaps the most common of all emergency behavior in situations where danger is perceived to be rapidly approaching or actually at hand. The pattern includes the

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usual physiological, motor and subjective symptoms of acute fear accompanied by overt actions that are oriented toward escaping from the apparent locus of the danger. Long after the objective dangers have subsided, however, some persons continue to display intense fear, flight tendencies, or a "jittery" alertness to minor signs of threats that are ordinarily disregarded.

2. *Stunned immobility*: This is usually a reaction of relatively short duration during and immediately following a sudden experience of danger impact. The outstanding features are the relative absence of both motor and mental activity coupled with some degree of disorientation. Usually the acute "freezing" reaction subsides after a few minutes, but sometimes people wander about for hours in a distracted, dazed state that resembles sleep walking.

3. *Apathy and depression*: In the wake of practically every large-scale disaster there seems to be a widespread reaction of lethargy and pessimism, especially among those individuals who experience the traumatic impact of the danger or who are most severely victimized. Outstanding symptoms are depressive mood and lethargy, characterized by abnormally low level of energy output, absence of initiative in performing any kind of work, lack of interest in normal social activities, constriction of attention, and so on. Sometimes the overall reaction corresponds to what psychiatrists describe as a mild reactive depression. Although relatively few suicides occur and suicidal thoughts do not seem to be very prevalent, depressive attitudes are frequently expressed by those who show a marked apathy reaction (e.g., "What's the use of bothering about anything anymore?").

4. *Docile dependency*: Without necessarily being lethargic or depressed, many disaster victims are apt to show an unusual lack of independent action, coupled with a marked tendency to cling to authoritative persons and to become more or less passive followers. These tendencies are particularly noticeable during the period when disaster victims first become aware of their losses and throughout the early phases of community recovery, when the help of every able-bodied person is needed for rescue and relief work. In extreme form, the reaction pattern consists of almost automatic obedience to the demands of persons in leadership roles, coupled with a child-like seeking for attention and direction from others. Essentially the same tendencies seem to be present in milder forms among those who simply wait around until someone tells them what to do. Without direct encouragement from leaders, people in this emotional state carry out assigned tasks in an almost automatic, perfunctory way, without seeking out the information they need to perform the task correctly. Sometimes their emotional docility is such that they will blindly follow a directive that is obviously

inappropriate or mistaken. One of the important social consequences of the docile dependency reaction is that it greatly reduces the chances that administrative errors can be rapidly noted and corrected through employee's suggestions and complaints and other forms of feedback that normally can be counted on when gross errors are made.

5. *Aggressive irritability*: Symptoms of aggression become highly visible among a population that is recovering from a disaster, particularly after the most urgent rescue and relief operations are over. The readiness to give vent to angry resentment, and heated condemnation, particularly of local officials, is perhaps the most widely noted manifestation. More subtle expressions of aggressive irritability may take the form of deliberate non-compliance with official regulations, a high degree of sensitivity to possible slights or inequalities in the distribution of scarce supplies, and a suspicious unfriendly attitude toward "outsiders." The dominant emotional mood often seems to involve a sort of self-protective withdrawal: "I've been through hell and from now on I intend to watch out strictly for number one—for me and mine."

For each of the five reaction patterns, marked individual differences have been observed. Some persons show a predominance of only one type with very little tendency to display any of the others. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that these various reaction patterns are not mutually exclusive; the same persons may show several of the reactions at different stages or time periods during a danger episode. Occasionally the same individual will show all five reactions in a definite sequence, the first during the brief period of maximal threat, the second during the period of danger impact, the third and fourth shortly after the obvious signs of danger have disappeared, and the last during the subsequent post-danger recovery period.

All five patterns have this in common: irrespective of the particular actions that are taken and the subjective feelings that accompany them, there is some degree of loss in mental efficiency. Depending upon how intense the reaction is, a variety of "ego functions" will be impaired to a greater or lesser degree. Each of the reaction patterns can at least temporarily interfere with the person's ability to perceive reality correctly, to appraise the safe and dangerous features of his environment, to plan realistically for the future, to control one's socially unacceptable impulses, to take account of the consequences of alternative courses of action, and so on. From the standpoint of the economic and social welfare of the community, a high incidence of sustained emotional reactions of any one of the five types would constitute a serious problem especially because of the resulting inefficiency in rescue and relief activities and the decline in overall work productivity.

The Analysis of Determinants

Having briefly delineated a number of dominant emotional patterns, we are now able to describe more specifically the kinds of research problems which require theoretical analysis. For the present, one of the main tasks is that of formulating hypotheses about the conditions under which each of the various types of emotional reactions occurs, specifying the determinants which increase (or decrease) the intensity and duration of the reaction.

One set of determinants to be considered involves the particular characteristics of the danger stimuli which are perceived and experienced by the individual. In general, the available evidence shows that the most severe and prolonged emotional reactions occur among those persons who are subjected to the highest degree of personal involvement in danger—for example those who are knocked down by the blast of an explosion or who barely escape being killed in a collapsing building. (3, 5, 9, 13, 15) But we still need to know much more about the specific ways in which various types of near-miss experiences give rise to temporary and prolonged emotional disturbance and create chronic traumatic neuroses. Among the major exposure variables which warrant detailed investigation both through experimental laboratory work and field studies, are the following: 1. Degree of warning and alertness (e.g., time interval between warning signals and exposure to danger; activity in progress at the onset of danger.) 2. Degree of injury inflicted by danger stimuli (e.g., amount of pain, perceived severity of the injury; part of the body incapacitated.) 3. Perceptible routes of escape (e.g., perceived barriers to successful flight from danger stimuli; signs of entrapment.) 4. Availability of rescue and aid (e.g., time interval between onset of injury, entrapment or suffering and the arrival of rescue personnel.)

Direct personal involvement may also take the form of the loss or the threatened loss of emotionally cathected persons or objects; for instance, the death of a parent, injury or illness among members of the family, or total destruction of the home. Obviously, the various forms of victimization will require detailed comparative investigation.

Still another important set of situational determinants has to do with the social context of the danger situation. The intensity of emotional reactions will depend to some extent upon whether or not one is surrounded by one's family or by the members of some other psychologically *protective group*—irrespective of whether the presence of these other people actually does decrease one's own chances of survival. Similarly the mere knowledge that trusted *leaders* are somewhere in the neighborhood or will be in a position to mitigate impending dangers may have a markedly dampening effect upon emotional excitement. The reassuring (or non-reassuring) *official communications* which emanate from authority figures and the *informal communications* from other sources—including *rumors* spread by fellow

disaster victims—can have a strong influence on increasing or decreasing emotional tension.

Thus, on the basis of the existing research literature, we are able to single out a number of important sets of *situational* determinants which are known to have some effect on emotional reactions, but whose causal role is by no means fully understood at present. On the basis, there are also numerous categories of *predispositional* determinants to be taken into account. These would include such factors as: 1) previously established ideologies and attitudes concerning the divine or natural causes of disasters; 2) previously formed expectations concerning the ways in which danger situations can be averted or mitigated; 3) self-conception of one's social role in the emergency situation; 4) degree of identification or affiliation with primary groups that are threatened by the danger; 5) social status with respect to chances of receiving aid, relief, and preferential treatment; 6) amount of prior training in relevant protective strategies and tactics for dealing with the danger situation; 7) personality characteristics, such as strength of dependency needs and chronic level of anxiety with respect to body integrity.

We are already at the stage where detailed hypotheses can be formulated concerning the way that these and other predispositional characteristics may be related to observable individual differences in the form and magnitude of emotional responses among people who are exposed to roughly the same kind of situational stress.

Use of Theoretical Constructs

Research on the influence of situational and predispositional factors can be viewed as providing answers to two main questions. First, at times when people are exposed to threats or to actual danger, what *events or circumstances* make them more likely to react one way rather than another? Second, when circumstances are such that a sizable percentage of exposed individuals do react in a particular way, *who* are the ones that are especially likely to show the reaction? When working on questions of this sort it is sometimes helpful to speculate about what must be going on in a person's mind that would explain why certain circumstances and certain predisposing characteristics make him behave the way he does. As is generally recognized, such speculations can sometimes furnish the main ingredients of an explanatory theory—provided, of course, that the concepts are properly refined by means of logically coherent assumptions and definitions from which unambiguous predictions can be made concerning observable behavioral events. Thus, we may expect that some of the current speculations about the way people perceive, think, imagine, and feel during catastrophes may furnish the substance of theoretical constructs. Such constructs could ultimately form the nuclei for constructing miniature theories concerning

perceptual, cognitive or motivational processes which are assumed to mediate various observable relationships.

Already a number of theoretical advances seem to be in the making which ought to help explain emotional behavior under stress conditions. For instance, some aspects of reactions to external danger signals and to fear-arousing communications seem to be at least partly accounted for by propositions derived from behavior-theory postulates which assume that fear or anxiety operates as a learned drive. Central notions in this theory are that a) the intense emotional state aroused by danger cues will motivate varied escape behavior—including thinking, planning, fantasy and other symbolic reactions as well as overt activity, and b) whatever response terminates or greatly reduces the intensity of the emotional state will be reinforced and hence will tend to become the dominant reaction. These assumptions seem to offer an explanation for certain kinds of adaptive and maladaptive behavior in response to fear stimuli. (Cf. Dollard and Miller [2], pp. 62–168, and Hovland, Janis and Kelley [4], pp. 56–98).

Another recent line of theoretical development derives from psychoanalytic propositions concerning denial, isolation, and related mechanisms of defense. Of particular relevance to disaster behavior are those psychodynamic hypotheses concerning: a) how people defend themselves against anxiety in the face of impending danger through reliance upon group identification and beliefs of personal invulnerability, and b) the way relatively minor events during actual danger episodes produce a disproportionately intense emotional impact by shattering the individual's defensive beliefs. (Cf. Grinker and Spiegel [3], pp. 130ff., Rado [12], Schmideberg [13]).

Perhaps it is not premature to begin searching for some new sources of hypothetical constructs and theoretical assumptions concerning the nature of human stress behavior so as to supplement those already in use. In so doing, however, we are apt to overlook or discard some of the most promising theoretical leads if we always live up to that special kind of ambition which demands that a theoretical analysis should employ only those constructs and postulates which have already been sharply formulated, are already in the process of being vigorously tested, and, in brief, are scientifically quite respectable. When working on relatively unexplored problems of human behavior, we ought to allow ourselves to work with dirty hands for a while provided that we sincerely promise our scientific conscience to try to work out operational definitions and otherwise clean up the mess afterwards if it does turn out that relaxing our standards of purity enables us to get our hands on some real pay dirt.

There are numerous theoretical concepts which, although somewhat vaguely formulated in discussions of phenomena quite remote from disaster behavior, may nevertheless furnish the basis for important theoretical

advances. For instance, concepts such as "reference groups," "internalization of role assignments," and "emotional regression" ought to be carefully examined as potential theoretical leads for explaining the effects of specified determinants and for tying together seemingly unrelated reactions to environmental stress.

In addition to modifying our quality ambitions, we shall also have to curtail our quantity ambitions. . . . we shall probably end up with very little productive theory and research if, in appraising theoretical constructs, we insist upon using as one of our main criteria the total number of different propositions to which the construct could potentially be applicable. Consider, for example, the conflict-theory postulates which psychologists have worked out on *approach-avoidance* and *avoidance-avoidance conflicts*. Although developed mainly on the basis of controlled experiments in which animals and human subjects have been exposed to relatively simple dilemmas, the theory is rapidly being extended to more complicated aspects of human motivational conflicts. Such extensions may prove to be of considerable relevance for explaining the way a person behaves when disaster circumstances suddenly place him in an emotionally disturbing conflict between his anxious desire, as a father, to search for his family and his sense of duty, as a conscientious local official, to begin immediately to carry out his disaster control assignment. Similarly, the way in which a person conforms to neighbors' urgent demands for help as well as to official emergency rules and regulations is often determined by sharp conflicts between fear of personal loss on the one hand and social conformity motives on the other. Thus, conflict theory may prove to be a valuable source of testable propositions concerning various sorts of emotional dilemmas that arise in danger situations, even though it may fail to have any bearing whatsoever on some of the most important general propositions concerning the conditions under which strong reactions of apprehensive avoidance and of stunned immobility occur.

It is certainly to be hoped that someday we shall be in the enviable scientific position of being able to set up extremely catholic standards for constructing theory, so that we shall be warranted in living up to extremely high quality and quantity ambitions. In the meantime, we ought to feel elated with any new theoretical concept and any new piece of evidence that helps us to arrive at a warranted generalization concerning one or more determinants of any given reaction variable. Such generalizations are, of course, essential building blocks of the science of human behavior. They are the stuff that our dreams of theory should be made of.

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Group Behavior under Stress

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Problem

Primary interest was focused on studying the effects of situational stress on the behaviour of individuals interacting in small groups under two levels of motivation. The concern was with the effects stress might have on the interaction of group members as they attempt to work cooperatively on a group task—effects not only on interactions of members with each other, but of members with the task materials. The emphasis was on both social-emotional and problem-solving behavior. In addition we attempted to investigate particular group properties (e.g., morale, cohesiveness) as they were affected by stress; properties which are probably the synthesis of certain interaction patterns but which we find difficult to describe in terms of interactions alone.

It seemed necessary because of the lack of pertinent data to consider the present study an exploratory one, and as such it demanded a rather comprehensive experimental technique. The methodology utilized was patterned directly after that used by Carter *et al.* (6), and can be considered as yielding data at three descriptive levels: (a) group properties (e.g., cohesiveness); (b) interaction patterns (e.g., agreeing, disagreeing behaviors); (c) individual characteristics (e.g., striving for group recognition, leadership). These levels are essentially those Cattell advances (8). He argues that groups can be described at three levels: (a) syntality, or the behavior of the group *per se* (group properties), (b) internal structural arrangements or relationships of parts (patterning of interactions), and (c) characteristics of the average member of the population (averaged individual characteristics).

Method

The basic method used was that employed by Carter *et al.* in their studies of small groups, as reported in a series of papers (3, 4, 6, 7). Groups

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composed of four subjects worked on two types of tasks in a laboratory setting. The subjects were observed by two separated observers who immediately classified their ongoing behavior in terms of a large number of categories, and after each task rated each subject on a number of traits. After completion of the two tasks, both the observers and the subjects rated the group on a series of group characteristics.

The two tasks used, a Reasoning, and a Mechanical Assembly task, are described in detail elsewhere (6, 15). They represent the tasks which had high loadings in a factor analysis of leadership ratings on a series of six tasks, as reported by Carter (3). His results indicate: "... that each individual has certain abilities which, related to a particular task, are unique and enable him to fulfil leadership functions as the group attempts to accomplish the task. While each person may have some amount of 'general leadership ability' it is clear that his leadership ability is to a large extent relative to the task" (3, p. 153).

Since leadership is a variable with which we were concerned, it was thought best to use the two representative tasks.

The Experimental Situations

The two independent variables in this investigation were imposed stress and motivation. Three stress and two motivating conditions were used, i.e., an attempt was made to create three experimental stress atmospheres and two experimental motivating atmospheres for the purpose of inducing in the subjects a perception of varying degrees of stress and motivation. Checks on the adequacy of the experimental atmospheres were afforded by the recording of criteria behaviors (tension indicators and signs of frustration) and by a rating on the motivation of the group by the observers and the subjects. A description of the experimental atmospheres follows:

Stress. An attempt was made to create a non-stressful atmosphere, a mildly stressful atmosphere, and a fairly high stress atmosphere.

The non-stress (NS) situation was comparable to the situations used in previous studies by Carter *et al.* (6). The subjects were brought into the situation and shown the materials for the tasks. They were informed that we were interested in observing how groups interact while performing certain types of task, and then told to proceed. No mention was made of how long we expected the tasks to take or how well they were expected to perform them. The only stresses that would appear to exist in such a situation are those which are inherent in any experimental situation that is unfamiliar and requires face to face contact with comparative strangers.

The mildly stressful (MS) situation was essentially the same as the above with the addition of a time limit for performance of the tasks. To make the time barrier more prominent the time remaining for completion of the task was called off to the subjects every five minutes, until only five minutes

remained. In the last five minutes time remaining was told to the subjects at one minute intervals. Time limitations have served as stressful conditions in assessment work done during World War II (19), and by Lindsley (16) and McKinney (17) in experiments. All found that it served effectively to produce frustrating reactions.

The high stress (HS) situation consisted of the above procedure, time limitations, plus the addition of other barriers. For the reasoning task the additional stress was imposed by:

(a) informing the subjects when a conclusion reached was in error. The informing was done over a loudspeaker, the experimenter being in a separate room. This tended to make the time barrier more prominent since subjects were not allowed to rush through the task, coming to many false conclusions.

(b) the experimenter continually offered comments over the loudspeaker to the effect that the group was rather stupid, that the items were extremely easy and they should be doing much better on them, that "X" minutes had passed and they were not accomplishing much, and that the experimenter was surprised that they were having difficulty since he felt these items to be extremely simple.

For the mechanical assembly task additional stress consisted of the same badgering as in (b) above. In addition:

(a) a barrier was imposed which thwarted completion of the task. The task was assembly of a bridge out of pre-cut and pre-drilled lumber. The subjects were asked to "use your imagination on this task since you are to visualize yourselves as a combat engineering team whose job is to build a bridge across this river (the river was two strips of tape on the floor). The side of the river you are on was originally completely mined but a small area (this area was defined by two lights) has been cleared and you have only that space to work in." When subjects crossed into the mined area two photo tubes and accessory circuits tripped a relay causing a bell to sound rather loudly and they were told harshly by the experimenter, "You are in the mined area, move out of it immediately." Initially, the subjects were informed that "... on the basis of present information from intelligence headquarters the enemy is sufficient distance away to allow you about 20 minutes to build the bridge across the river." After 10 minutes had elapsed, however, they were told that new information showed the enemy to be much closer than was thought, and they would have only 5 more minutes in which to work. The work space to which they were confined was extremely small, being barely larger than the largest pieces of lumber for the task, and manipulating materials and constructing were extremely difficult inside the barriers. Every time a barrier was violated they were harshly reprimanded and made to move back into the work area. In addition, as was mentioned

above, they were continually reminded of the remaining time and badgered as to their stupidity, slowness, and lack of ability.

The addition of time barriers conformed to Rosenzweig's definition (21) of a passive external stress, in that no threat to the organism was produced. The badgering technique, the implications of inadequacy, seems to conform to Rosenzweig's definition of an active external stress in that it is threatening to the group. A further justification for assuming the badgering to be stressful is that the technique was used effectively by Bruner and Postman (20) in creating stress.

Motivation. For the low motivation groups the subjects were paid at an hourly rate. No group or individual prizes for performance were offered, and no mention was made of a desire for good performance. The subjects were simply given the tasks, told that our interest was in group interaction, and asked to begin.

For the high motivation groups the subjects were also paid at an hourly rate, but in addition a twenty dollar prize was offered for the best performing group. Every effort was made on the part of the experimenter to increase the competition between the groups and to motivate them to perform well. They were told, "We are extremely interested in seeing how well groups can perform on certain types of tasks. It is very essential that you try to do your best. To help interest you in doing your best a group prize is being offered based on the performance of the group." Group performance records were posted in terms of the relative ranking of the group. In order to prevent actual performance records becoming a variable, all performing groups for each situation were always placed in a constant-relationship to the other groups, i.e., the particular group being observed was always ranked second among the groups.

Comments by experimental groups indicated that at no time did they become aware of the arbitrary nature of the rankings.

Experimental Design

The subjects were 48 volunteers from the junior class in the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program. Each subject served approximately six hours and was paid at an hourly rate. The 48 subjects were randomly divided into 12 groups of four members each, and these 12 groups were then randomly divided into two classes of six groups each. One of these classes was randomly assigned to the high motivation condition; the other became the low motivation class.

Within each of the motivation classes a modified latin square design was applied. Each of the six groups within a class received the three stress situations in a different order, the six possible orderings being used. The design controlled the order of presentation of the situations, but because

replication of each design was not feasible no test of significance of the effect of ordering was possible.

Instruments

We were interested in a total behavioral approach; one which would enable us to give a detailed description of the actual behavior of group members and to allow definitive statements regarding the activities of one member relative to others. Such an approach is possible through the recording of ongoing behavior in terms of small behavior units. Recent efforts in the application of such techniques are represented by the work of Bales (1), Bales and Gerbrands (2), Guetzkow (13) and others. The technique used in this study has recently been developed by Carter *et al.*, and is described in detail elsewhere (5).

While the subjects were working on the tasks they were observed through one-way vision mirrors by two independent observers, who classified their behavior in terms of a coding system involving 58 categories. At the completion of each task the observers rated each of the subjects, using a seven point rating scale, on 11 characteristics. The ratings included such characteristics as aggressiveness, confidence, etc. The reliability of the ratings and categorizations was generally adequate and has been fully presented in a previous article (6).

In addition, when the group completed both tasks it was rated, using a five point scale, on 11 variables by both the two observers and all members of the group. These variables were mainly concerned with group dimensions, i.e., such as morale, cohesiveness, productivity, etc. Previous studies (14) have shown that such characteristics can be rated with adequate reliability.

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Discussion

The experimental techniques utilized resulted in data collection at three descriptive levels: those of group properties, interaction patterns, and individual characteristics. Not all the independent variables received equal attention on all three descriptive levels. The results for task are mainly based on interaction patterns, while those for motivation are based primarily on changes in group characteristics. Stress, the major independent variable, received considerable attention on all three descriptive levels. The discussion of results will be in terms of the three independent variables whenever feasible. Where there is interaction between task or motivation, and stress, the discussion of these results will be included with those for stress.

Stress

Attention will be directed to two main questions concerned with interpersonal relations and problem-solving behavior respectively, as they are

affected by stress. No attempt will be made to discuss all the nuances of the data. It is felt that the methodology utilized is not sufficiently refined to allow conclusions to be drawn from any isolated correlation or test of significance. Therefore, only data which are supported by results obtained with other instruments, or data which integrate well into the total picture, will be discussed.

Interpersonal Relations Under Stress. Analysis of the interaction indices indicates that the behavior changes under stress could be considered to fall into three classes: (a) changes in behavior which would tend to cause tension, friction, or disequilibrium in the group, (b) changes in behavior which would tend to cause a decrease in tension, and increased integration of the group, and (c) changes in problem-solving behavior. The first two certainly reflect a change in interpersonal relations. It was found that as stress increased there was a decrease in behaviors associated with internal friction in the group; a decrease in the number of disagreements, arguments, aggressions, deflations and other negative social-emotional behaviors, as well as a decrease in self-oriented behaviors. Concomitant with this decrease was an increase in behaviors which would tend to result in decreased friction and better integration of the group; an increase in collaborating, mediating, cooperating behaviors. Apparently, as stress increases, individuals attempt to keep interpersonal tensions at a low level, substituting positive, group-oriented behaviors for negative, individually-oriented behaviors.

These changes in behavior should result in changes in characteristics of the group as perceived by both observers and subjects. The analysis of the ratings of group characteristics indicates that both observers and participants saw the groups as less competitive, more cooperative, and more friendly under increased stress. These changes are almost certainly a reflection of the changes in behavior noted above, and they indicate decreasing friction and tension within the group, and increasing internal harmony.

The data from still another source, the ratings of individual characteristics, lend more support to this finding. Individuals were rated as being more cooperative, less aggressive, less oriented toward individual solution, and less confident under high stress than under non-stress. The first three changes can be interpreted as leading to a decrease in friction and an increase in harmony within the group, while the fourth gives a clue as to why such changes might have occurred.

It can be said then, that under increased stress members of a group show more behavior which tends to reduce interpersonal tension and friction and less behavior which might lead to increased disharmony. They will become less argumentative and aggressive, and more cooperative and friendly. It is conceivable that in the face of the external stress and increasing anxiety the group members perceive the group to be a source of security and thus

attempt to maintain their position in it and prevent rejection by more cooperative and friendly behavior. That the group members do become less confident, and probably more anxious, is supported by the decrease in the self-confidence ratings made by observers.

The majority of the studies on stress have been concerned with the performance of individuals in non-group situations, and in general they find that stress leads to the typical reactions of: (a) aggression, (b) withdrawal or escape behavior, (c) regression, (d) neurotic symptoms, etc. They also find that the strength or degree of the above reactions is positively related to the degree of stress. Therefore, these rather negative emotional behaviors should increase as stress increases. We find the opposite occurring.

Some incidental observations made on the groups may shed some light on this apparent discrepancy. It will be recalled that the order of exposure of a group to high stress was varied systematically, some groups receiving high stress on the first session. It was noted that groups receiving stress at their first session were much more recalcitrant about returning for further sessions than the groups which had worked under non-stress. On the average about 30 per cent more cancellations were received from "high stress on first session" groups. It was also apparent that individuals in these groups were more often late for the next session, and when they arrived were often sullen and irritable with the experimenter. Finally, it may be said that no aggression against the experimenter was recorded for the non-stress sessions, whereas some aggression against the experimenter occurred under the stress conditions, although the frequency was so low that no analysis could be attempted.

All the above can be interpreted as manifestations of aggression, withdrawal, or escape behavior with regard to the experimental situation. This would be in agreement with the literature since in almost all the reported studies the behavior noted, in fact the only behavior possible, was a reflection of the interaction between the subject and the experimental conditions, or the experimenter, *both probably being associated with the imposed stress*.

Wright (24), in a study of the influence of frustration upon the social relations of young children, found essentially similar results. He reports that, "There was a significant increase in the cohesiveness of the groups under the influence of frustration. The amount of time spent in cooperative behavior significantly increased, and time spent in conflict behavior decreased" (24, p. 121). This change in inter-child social emotional behavior was accompanied by a marked change in attitude toward the experimenter. The predominantly friendly attitude in the free play situation changed to one of considerable hostility in the frustrating situation.

Both Wright's and the present study seem to indicate that where the stimuli are perceived to be associated with the imposed stress the subjects

react in a fashion predictable from previous experiments on individuals, but where the stimuli (other individuals) are not associated with the imposed stress and are in fact probably perceived as supports in facing this threat, the behavior is the opposite of what would be predicted.

This increase in integrative behavior is by no means a unique observation. It coincides, more or less, with the layman's observation that disaster sometimes leads to decreased bickering and increased integration of group members, in families, athletic teams, cities, or nations.

Problem-Solving Behavior under Stress. We include in our discussion of problem-solving not only behaviors which are considered to be directly related to solution of the problems, but also those characteristics of the group which are probably interrelated with or resultant from such behaviors.

From the interaction categories it was noted that under increased stress there was a decrease in initiating behaviors, mainly in terms of "diagnoses situation, makes interpretation" kinds of behavior, and an increase in a more "general discussion of the task" kind of behavior. In the light of the recorded increase in equalitarian, group-oriented behaviors, these changes probably reflect a more democratic, less individually-oriented approach to solution rather than a more disorganized, less efficient approach. This would also be supported by the observers' ratings of group and individual characteristics. They rated productivity, efficiency, and morale as being highest under mild stress and about the same under non-stress and high stress conditions, while talkativeness was rated lowest under mild stress. These results would indicate that the problem-solving performance of the groups was best under mild stress and about equal under non-stress and high stress.

The subjects did not perceive the situation in this way. They rated productivity as similar under non-stress and mild stress, and lower under high stress, although their other ratings are inconsistent with this. Activity interest in job completion, motivation, and morale are all perceived to be highest under mild stress and about the same under the other two stress conditions. These characteristics would presumably be highly related to the productivity of the group, and would lead one to believe that perceived productivity would also be highest under mild stress. It is possible that this apparent discrepancy is simply a reflection of a change in ego-involvement and level of aspiration of the group members. If one assumes that level of aspiration increases monotonically as stress increases, then one would expect the above co-variations to occur. Under non-stress, although the group does not see itself as especially active, motivated, interested in job completion, or with very high morale, its low level of aspiration would still lead it to perceive productivity as adequate. Under mild stress even though activity, motivation, etc., are felt to be high, the increased level of

aspiration would result in no increase in perceived productivity, *even if productivity were actually higher*. Then under high stress, with activity, motivation, etc., perceived to be at about the non-stress level, the high aspiration level would result in a much lower rating of productivity. That such a change in ego-involvement and level of aspiration is probably occurring is supported by the participants' ratings of "pride in group" and attitude towards the situation. It would be expected that with increased level of aspiration and concomitant decreased productivity, the "failure" experienced would become more acute, and satisfaction with the situation would decrease. The ratings indicate that the subjects felt less pride in their groups and also had an increasingly less favorable attitude toward the situation as stress increased.

Motivation

Differences between the two classes of motivated groups appeared on only a few of the variables. Observers rated the high motivation groups as slightly more motivated and more concerned with job completion than the low motivation groups. There were no significant differences on any of the other group characteristic variables and no differences on any of the interaction indices.

Task

There were quite striking behavior differences associated with the two tasks. For the mechanical assembly task there were almost twice as many non-productive behaviors, over five times as many equalitarian, group-oriented behaviors, a larger number of both directing and submissive behaviors, and more group discussion regarding the task, than for the reasoning task. The reasoning task showed a greater number of negative-social emotional behaviors, more solidarity-oriented behaviors, and more initiating and insightful behaviors.

These results support the previously reported finding by Carter *et al.* (6), that the reasoning task includes more initiating activity with emphasis on making diagnosis, while the mechanical assembly task involves much less behavior devoted to initiating action, but much more to action by the "followers" or "workers".

It should be pointed out that the above discussion is relevant to a rather limited population, working on rather specific tasks. Whether such results can be generalized to most small groups is a matter for future research to determine. Even with such limited generality the results have some interesting implications. They suggest that the results of previous work on stress were a function of the restricted range of behavior allowable to the subjects. If other individuals, not associated with the imposition of stress, were placed in the field, aggressive behavior, withdrawal, etc., might not

occur. These other individuals might be perceived as a source of security, and might be reacted to in a more positive fashion. The results also suggest that stress may not always be detrimental to performance, that in fact a certain amount of stress may actually facilitate good performance, although those experiencing the stress may not perceive the facilitation.

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The Psychological Pressure upon Modern Africans

LEONARD W. DOOB

Anyone who has seriously visited more than one African country, while acknowledging [great] diversity is, nevertheless, unable to prevent himself from perceiving and detecting striking uniformities. The cheerful porter who carries your bags from customs to a car seems to be the same man whether he is at the airport in Leopoldville or Entebbe. On a less superficial level, the longer you stay in Africa and the more Africans in different societies whom you genuinely comprehend as friends or informants, the stronger grows your conviction that, regardless of the intellectual peril, you must . . . generalize about sub-Saharan Africans. The conviction can then be justified, perhaps, by means of a syllogism whose major premise is: People subjected to similar pressures are likely to develop somewhat similar forms of behavior. The minor premise asserts an empirical fact. Africans south of the Sahara live in the midst of similar pressures.

A thorough evaluation of the major premise would demand a tome in its own right. What, for example, does "somewhat similar" mean? A sudden, unexpected loud noise like the pop of a gun startles all human beings who are not deaf; their responses are not "somewhat" but virtually identical. When faced with severe adversity, people always seek to reduce the pain; the forms of behavior that are adopted vary but are "somewhat similar" since they serve the same psychological function and since their duration and significance depend upon the severity of the trouble. Modal tendencies, in brief, are postulated: exceptions are not denied but must be viewed in perspective. The same courteous treatment must be given the elaboration of the minor premise. The specific argument of the analysis can now be summarized in a single sentence so that the direction of the elaboration can

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be clearly discerned in advance: Under somewhat adverse conditions, modern Africans are being forced to select alternate modes of existence and therefore to undergo changes which produce feelings of uncertainty.

The most conspicuous psychological fact about Africa is the simultaneous and continuous exposure of Africans to traditional and Western forms of culture. Everywhere the traditional society meaningfully survives. The most urbanized African knows that usually not far away is a village of his tribe where many if not most of the old ways are cultivated and practiced. His native language, like that of his children, is an African language, no matter how fluently both of them speak English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Afrikaans, or a lingua franca. At the same time even the remotest area in the interior has experienced some contact with the West. Planes are visible overhead and roads are being built and improved. Someone—often not an African but a family from the Orient or the Middle East—has a shop which sells the trinkets, the foods, the cloth, and the mechanical devices of civilization. The government from the capital and the missionaries from the West are trying conspicuously to induce or compel the mass of Africans to improve their health, to wear respectable clothes, to increase the cultivation of a particular crop, to pay taxes, to support more schools, to abandon many traditional beliefs, and in hundreds of other ways to crawl less slowly into the modern world.

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The external changes which Africans must make when they yield to the pressures of Europeans or their own elite are too numerous to catalogue. The psychological underpinning for these changes, however, can be conceptualized under three headings. First, there must be an extension of knowledge and interests. Originally Africans, like other nonliterate peoples, knew and knew well the details of their own community. Now news from the outside is reaching them through their children who are at school, through their own leaders, and through the mass media of communication. It is relatively rare to find an African village which is without such contacts. Someone who is literate and reads a newspaper, however irregularly, reports to others his version of what he grasps. One battery-powered radio set may be in operation; and local African stations broadcast not only in a European language but usually also in several vernacular languages that are considered quantitatively or politically important. Posters and public announcements are displayed on walls. A government agency, like the one charged with "community development," is likely to dispatch a so-called "mobile cinema" van which displays educational and entertaining pictures accompanied by commentaries in the vernacular. In many parts of Africa the people themselves move about, for example, to markets, and thus widen their contacts. Likewise the introduction of a material change evokes some

curiosity and leads at least a few artisans to learn something about a motor or a tool. Widening the base of information, though usually very slow, can also occur in marked spurts. Thus this writer has found in villages in Northern Nigeria a close relation between alertness and literacy that had been acquired in government-sponsored classes for adults: whether more alert people initially attended the classes, whether attendance at the classes made them subsequently more alert, or whether both sequences produced the relationship is not known or perhaps knowable, but the fact by itself suggests the repercussions which follow one another.

The second alteration required by European culture is difficult to specify without appearing to exaggerate, for it refers to an ability to postpone present rewards for the sake of future gratification or to endure trouble at the moment so that it may be avoided later on. No African, no human being has ever been able to live only in the moment; but here it is contended that the Western or modern ways which Africans now learn place an especially high premium upon renunciation. Most public-health measures, for example, demand that action to ward off disease be taken by healthy people; as medical officers have been saying for decades in Africa, it is easier to persuade a man with a pain to swallow a pill that brings quick relief than it is to get him to dig the latrine that may prevent the recurrence of the pain. Similarly, saving is generally necessary before most of the attractive novelties from the West can be purchased. It may very well be that the greater curbing of momentary impulses is effectively attainable only through the partial replacement of external by internal controls: conscience or superego may have to function more frequently, social sanctions less frequently.

The unproven hypothesis just mentioned relates also to the third psychological change discernible among modern Africans: the pressure to abandon some of the certainties provided by traditional society and to seek out or at least not to resist innovation. Traditional societies in Africa obviously were not elysian since they were troubled by natural catastrophes, plagues, wars, slavery, shortages, and other miseries; but people at least knew roughly what to expect. Each person also had some assurance that the kind of existence which he had followed as a child would last during his life time. Now many Africans have experienced gentle or violent changes in their traditional ways, and they are urged in effect to keep changing.

Faced with such pressures and forced mildly or markedly to learn such changes, modern Africans seem significantly uncertain. Without exaggeration, one hypothesis suggests, the greatest of their uncertainties involves brute survival. Nonliterate peoples who live close to a subsistence level are always vulnerable to natural vagaries. A severe storm or a larger than usual invasion of plant pests can produce starvation and death. Many but certainly not all parts of Africa have an uncertain climate which can swing between the extremes of droughts and floods. Tropical diseases like malaria,

dysentery, leprosy, and bilharziasis, though mitigated by European medical science, still confront people, to which newer horrors—like kwashiorkor, a debilitating disease which results from protein deficiency—are added. Africans who modify or abandon the traditional economy (usually subsistence farming), in order to raise a cash crop or work for modern industry find themselves dependent upon employers or upon the prices of the world market which they themselves can neither comprehend nor control. Intervention by government, especially by stabilization boards, reduces but does not control the fluctuations. Even the African who is still linked intimately to his tribe is not completely safe; unlike his “detrribalized” relative in the city, he is not deserted during an emergency, but his society cannot guarantee that the welfare of all will ever be adequately maintained.

Other uncertainty arises from the dethronement of leaders. Traditional chiefs are increasingly losing their power; the respect in which they are held varies with local conditions, but any change in status is almost certain to be downwards. Modern political leaders, no matter how great their power, must establish their claims to obedience and veneration, and it is usually known that they can lose as well as win the power which they now enjoy. Even the role of Europeans is no longer certain. Clearly, they are not blindly loved or respected as some of the early missionaries and explorers were; nor are they universally detested as imperialistic oppressors or exploiters. In the multiracial societies where settlers and Africans have not yet stabilized the kind of relation to be evolved in the future, the actual, the potential, and the frequently noble contributions of Europeans are likely to be appreciated; but the ensuing gratitude contains elements of reservation and suspicion, even when the need for European assistance is desperately recognized, as in the independent countries. The Fathers are adored and hated.

Africans are also uncertain because they cannot assess the outcome of their critical decisions. The corn may grow taller after an application of a new fertilizer, but in the past without the use of chemicals good years have succeeded bad ones. Some Africans may have a modern house in town or in a company compound, and they may enjoy the comfort which it brings; but who knows whether they might not have been happier if they had continued to live in the village of their extended family? The religion from the West appeals to their senses and to most of their convictions but not to all their beliefs: maybe there are still evil witches about, maybe ancestors intervene to bring help or trouble, maybe magic is important.

The pressures upon modern Africans to remain traditional and to become modern, in brief, are strong and unresolved. They are producing conflict without a foreseeable outcome. They have added to traditional insecurity a host of new insecurities. Here is a bleak state of affairs.

In truth, though, it is not as bleak as the analysis would suggest. For the

consequences of the pressure upon modern Africans are not devastating. One has to see the entire picture, as it were, to be depressed by it. Only the African who has somehow achieved perspective is able to point to these difficulties. A person with such social insight is likely to be part of the elite for whom living undoubtedly is tremendously exciting. He has learned enough of the spirit of the West to be thrilled by this pioneering period of independence and growth. He is pleased by his new power, by the problems to be solved, and even by the toil which is demanded of him.

The vast majority of modern Africans, it is felt, are making day-by-day decisions, the ultimate consequences of which—perhaps happily—they cannot foresee. The pagan who wants a bicycle to travel more quickly to market or a radio to hear the drums does not know that he is probably opening the fateful box of civilization for himself. In a manner certainly not unique, relatively unacculturated Africans seem able to tolerate contradictions without being appreciably disturbed. The kind of situation which produces a conflict in the African elite, which might lead to neurosis in Europeans, or which may cause the reader of this article to sigh with dismay, is not even inhibiting. The best and worst of the traditional and the Western cultures, however badly and inadequately mixed, can be enjoyed; and wonderful joy is still felt and exhibited in Africa. Africans can be friendly and attractive and lovable because, although they clearly recoil from misery and although they like hunger and insecurity no more than anyone else, they have not yet come to comprehend the dense, complex web in which, sadly, they must live.

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PART C

Nation-States Conflict

1. *Threat, Fear, Frustration*
2. *Hostility*
3. *Aggression*
4. *Conflict and Violence*
5. *Communication Problems*

CHAPTER 1 • Threat, Fear, Frustration

A World without Psychic Frustration

FRANZ A. ALEXANDER, M.D.

The emotional experience which we call frustration is an essential part of life. It appears in the consciousness as a state of unfulfilment, discomfort, lack of satisfaction. It stimulates the organism to new attempts at gratifying the need or desire which has been thwarted, to try out new methods and make new experiments. It is theoretically conceivable to eliminate all frustrations from the life of a person by controlling the conditions upon which the gratification of all subjective needs and drives depends—a spoiled child comes nearest to this theoretical assumption; but the most common argument against spoiling a child is that later, when the child grows up, he will be unprepared to face the unavoidable frustrations of life. Under actual conditions everyone—even a spoiled child—is exposed intermittently to frustrations which prompt the organism to undertake groping efforts at their elimination.

As soon as a correct behavior pattern is found suitable for the elimination of a certain type of frustration, it is repeated whenever the same frustrating condition arises. As a result of repetitions, the behavior pattern becomes automatic and is carried out with a minimum expenditure of energy. In this way the organism gradually learns to master a great

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number of frustrating situations, particularly those which occur frequently during everyday life. Since there are always new situations which the organism has not yet encountered and to which, therefore, it is not adjusted, frustration is an ever recurring experience. Situations with which the organism is unable to cope because of their suddenness or unfamiliarity are called "traumata." When exposed to a trauma, the organism makes unsuccessful attempts to get rid of the excessive excitation caused either by an impact of external violent stimuli or by an excess of frustration caused by unsatisfied needs.

The phenomenology of psychic frustration covers a great variety of experiences: Unsuccessful attempts at the satisfaction of hunger or thirst and the avoidance of exposure to cold; the more complex emotional states, such as thwarted longing for love, futile seeking of recognition or self-expression, all forms of unavailing ambition to achievement; the inability to satisfy a desire for revenge, competition or the domination of others—all belong to the same category and may create the sensation of frustration. Thus frustration is shown to be an ever present part of the emotional life. In fact, a wish is a wish only as long as it is unfulfilled.

Biology also seems to justify the thesis that struggle against frustrating conditions is an essential part of life. A great part of the anatomical and physiological equipment of the organism serves to master obstacles which interfere with the satisfaction of basic needs. Biologists define life as "a state of dynamic equilibrium," which means that the life-process consists of expenditure of energy which the organism must replace from the environment if life is to be continued; the expenditure and replacement of energy must be in permanent equilibrium to preserve the continuity of life. The process of life itself creates permanent needs for replacement of energy and substance expended. Since this replacement of energy must be obtained from an environment which virtually always contains obstacles, temporary, recurring frustrations are unavoidable.

Theoretically, however, a life without frustration would appear possible when there have been removed from the environment all those obstacles which have to be overcome for the gratification of those needs which the life-process, in constantly using up energy, itself creates.

These obstacles can be divided into two categories—physical obstacles and human obstacles, the latter a result of the competition among men for the resources of life. As to the physical obstacles, we may grant the possibility that further technical advancement and the exploitation of all sources of energy, including the almost unlimited intra-atomic sources, could eventually lead to conditions in which all the basic needs of the human race would be satisfied smoothly, with a minimum of effort. As to the human obstacles also, we may assume that progress in the field of the social sciences and education may gradually lead to a world from which the competition of

man against man for the gratification of the basic needs will be eliminated and replaced by mutual aid and co-operation. It is certain that, in such a planned world, the size of the global population would have to be controlled, since the existing resources necessary for the maintenance of life, although vast, are not infinite on this planet.

Unquestionably, our present technical civilization has brought the fantasy of Aladdin's lamp nearer than ever to its realization. A large portion of our population visualizes the future as a world in which physical comfort is the supreme value; it is inclined to consider as progress everything which brings us nearer to its ideal of a push-button civilization, a mechanical "*Schlaraffenland*," in which all our wants and needs will be satisfied, with a minimum expenditure of energy, by the help of clever mechanical devices calculated to satisfy all our needs—shelter, hygienic food, and swift, safe, comfortable locomotion. The scientific counterpart of this popular outlook is the materialistic economic theory which considers the problems of social life solved when all the basic needs of man are satisfied with as little effort as possible. True, if the strivings of the human race consisted in nothing else but the satisfaction of these basic biological needs, such a mechanical push-button civilization, ruled by equalitarian justice, would mean the end of development, and a static world order would ensue.

It belongs to one of those dialectical contradictions of history that this great emphasis upon the economic bases of social life has become so paramount in our era—an era in which the technical mastery of the resources of life has reached unparalleled perfection. Economic insecurity, in this era, has become the central theme which animates the masses, influences the internal and external politics of nations, and finds expression in materialistic political theories.

There were periods in our Western civilization, before the great technical advancement took place, in which the maintenance of life was a routine matter; the economic and social functions of everyone were well defined, and the satisfaction of these needs better insured; economic security was taken more for granted than in our industrial era. There are also contemporary, so-called "primitive" societies of similar structure. In such a society man can emancipate himself from the relentless concern and anxiety for the morrow and turn his energies toward the less material aspects of life. Then the creative functions of the mind become activated in the forms of folk art and in those customs and rituals of everyday life which elevate human existence above mere vegetation.

It is not a mere coincidence that there has been scarcely any period of human history in which popular art—creative expression of the masses—has been at a lower ebb than in our contemporary industrial cities. A mathematically conceived standard of living has taken the place of such unscientific concepts as human happiness. Technical advancement has

obviously achieved the opposite of its goal; although it raised the standard of living, it at the same time introduced a far greater amount of that sense of insecurity which drags man down to exclusive concern with the basic needs of existence and absorbs all his energies. The creative aspects of life, of necessity, must recede into the background because they are the expressions of that surplus energy which is liberated from the struggle to maintain vegetative existence. The most grotesque feature of this picture is that the possession of those technical facilities, which should make the vegetative foundations of life easier, has become an all-absorbing goal in itself; for the majority of the population, the essence of life consists in a yearly turning-in of gadgets of lower quality for those of higher quality. The possession of an automobile is no longer subordinated to the purpose of locomotion but becomes a cherished goal in itself. The tourist, rushing blindly from place to place and bringing home nothing but the memory of daily accomplishment measured in miles, bears out the validity of this contention.

All this is not intended as a jeremiad against our technical civilization. I wish only to point out that paradoxical feature of our culture—that the machine, because of our failure to use it in a socially reasonable fashion, instead of minimizing the basic problems of vegetative existence, has increased the sense of insecurity and brought concern for the basic needs into the foreground.

The scientific counterpart of this emotional orientation is the growing emphasis upon the adaptive aspects of life—on the gratification of needs with minimum expenditure of energy, on security and stability—and a neglect of all other aspects of life, such as creativeness, wish for adventure, longing for the challenge of obstacles, all of which are manifestations of surplus energy. This all-pervading sense of insecurity explains the high premium currently set on organization and stability; it explains also the fear of initiative, of chance and frustration.

However, elimination of frustration from human experience can be neither a realistic nor a desirable goal. In fact, frustration and gratification belong together; gratification without some antecedent frustration is hardly conceivable. This principle is instinctively known to every woman who keeps her suitor in suspense; to every mother who playfully teases her baby by now showing, now hiding, the desired object; and to every author who piques his reader's curiosity by withholding the clue to the crime, by making him participate in all the harassing vicissitudes of the hero.

* * * *

... Frustration *with* hope is a constructive factor of life; *without* hope, it is destructive. Continuous frustrating conditions which do not allow any hope for their mastery lead to defeatism and neurotic failure. Not the elimination

of frustration, but the elimination of *hopeless* frustration alone, must be the aim of the social reformer.

There seems to be little doubt that in organic development—both phylogenetic and ontogenetic—frustration is one of the great driving factors. Whenever conditions which the organism has learned to master in the past change, frustration sets in and lasts until the organism learns to master the new situation. Frustration is the sign of a failure in mastery and in the motivation for achieving new mastery.

Where there is change, there is also frustration. Every living organism grows; and the process of growth is nothing but a series of modifications in the structure and size of the organism. Every new phase of the growth process involves frustrations requiring new adjustments. Not only the structure of the organism is altered but also the external conditions. Stable conditions are not an attribute of the physical universe as we know it. Because of organic growth and changing external conditions, frustration is an integral part of life.

The opposite of frustration is adaptation. Whenever an organism is adapted to its external and internal environment, frustration is temporarily absent. However, every adaptation is only temporary, because the organism as well as the environment is constantly changing. Adaptation saves expenditure of energy because adapted behavior tends to become automatic and to require a minimum expenditure of energy.

One of the most fundamental but neglected facts of biology and psychology is that the surplus energy saved by adaptive behavior is expended in growth and play by the young organism, and in reproduction by the mature organism. Eros is the god of both play and love. In play activities the young organism exercises those faculties which later will be utilized for survival. Reproduction on the biological level, social productivity on the social level, are manifestations of surplus in the mature organism.

Both in play and in creation, expenditure of surplus energy becomes an aim in itself. In play, obstacles are sought by the organism for the sole purpose of overcoming them, thus giving opportunity for the victorious feeling of mastery. In all creative activities the organism sets a goal outside its own self—a goal which is not subordinated to anything but is an aim in itself.

The propensity of the living organism to utilize surplus energy in a creative way makes those arguments pointless which warn us that universal social security would terminate human progress. It is true that if our technical mastery of nature were utilized in a socially reasonable manner, it would increase the general security and reduce the expenditure of energy necessary for the maintenance of life. However, there is no need to fear that this would lead to lack of initiative and thus to social stagnation. On the contrary—the energy saved by a socially just utilization of the machine would be used for creative purposes and thus for new progress.

One thing must not be forgotten, however. While biological propagation is an inherited drive, social productivity has to be learned. In a society in which the machine and its comforts are aims in themselves there is no hope for real productivity, and the surplus energies saved by the machine will, through lack of constructive goals, be used for mutual destruction. The raising of the standard of living cannot remain an aim in itself but must be subordinated to the creative use of surplus energies.

If this industrial civilization is to survive, the sound economic under-structure of society must be considered merely a means to an end. It is not further technical discoveries but education in the creative use of the energies which have been saved by technological knowledge that is the pressing need of the coming era.

A Sociological Analysis of International Tensions

GEORGES GURVITCH

At the present time the whole social atmosphere is pervaded by a particularly strong atmosphere of tension. Nevertheless, humanity desires no less powerfully that all new advances in scientific and technical knowledge should be used not for aggression, but for establishing new equilibria at a lower tension level. This aim can only be achieved through a completely realistic approach and this involves the abandonment of the belief that tensions and antinomies can be eliminated from social life. All that can be done is to make tensions act against tensions in order to reach some balance by establishing a system of compensatory tensions which may reduce the likelihood of worse tensions such as violent destruction and wars.

Types of Social Tension

It will help us understand international tensions if we first distinguish them from other types of social strain.

Tensions between Strata of Social Reality. Social reality is characterized by tensions between various levels or strata. These may be divided into:

- (1) Geographic and demographic surface including also means of communication, tools, food products, etc. (human ecology and morphology);
- (2) Organized superstructures (collective, hierarchic, and centralized conduct in accordance with predetermined patterns);
- (3) Patterns of different kinds; standardized images of collective conduct;
- (4) Collective conduct in near conformity with those patterns, or more or less predictable habitual behavior, etc.;

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(5) Unpredicted, unexpected, and spontaneous conduct, clashing with, or even modifying the patterns;

(6) Collective attitudes, stable or unstable, whether expressed in behavior or not;

(7) Social symbols, connected with collective attitudes and behavior, which are both products and producers of social reality as a whole. They reveal by concealing and conceal by revealing. Symbols are not necessarily linked with patterns and are not always standardized;

(8) Creative collective behavior in effervescence which innovates, reforms, or revolutionizes the almost crystallized expressions of social life, and produces new forms of crystallization;

(9) Social ideas and values;

(10) Collective mentality (representations, desires, emotions, aspirations).

All these levels or strata are indissolubly interconnected. They interpenetrate and together form a whole. They are, however, always in conflict, and high tensions are developing between them because of the differing degrees of intensity and emphasis to be found in various types of society concerning the effective role of each level. Despite the disturbances and insoluble antinomies caused by this kind of social tension, it must be considered the most pacific of all social tensions.

In-Group Tensions. The second kind of tension develops within small groups, (family, fraternity, labor union, faculty, local community, etc.). High tensions arise between small clusters within a group. . . .

Since these in-group tensions arise from prolonged mutual experience, knowledge, and understanding, they are particularly difficult to handle or modify. At a certain point the only solution is to split the group (for example, divorce in a family or schism in a labor union). Although this kind of social tension often causes severe and painful suffering, it very rarely leads to violent destruction of human life except in criminal cases. It may therefore be considered pacific.

Out-Group Tensions. A third type of social tension is that between particular groups, more especially between what are known as divisive groups, because of their combative attitude, as contrasted to unifying or conciliatory groups. . . .

Some out-group tensions may be quite mild, for example, the struggle between occupational or age groups, while others may be very severe, for example, struggles between social classes. The results of each type of tension may be loyal competition, compromise, variable equilibria at various levels or open or concealed civil war. The most violent expression of class struggle, however, does not usually lead to actual civil war, since the out-group tensions develop within the same all-inclusive society taking the form of a

nation. This integration of conflicting groups within the same nation usually prevents considerable misunderstanding and retards the growth of crude myths.*

Similarity of language, historical tradition, geographic and ecological situations, national attitude and mentality all create an atmosphere in which out-group tensions, even class struggles, are not normally allowed to degenerate into war or the violent destruction of human life. Civil war is very exceptional. Thus inter-group tensions, the most violent and combative social stresses within an all-inclusive society or nation, do not generally constitute a direct threat of war. It should be added that the most satisfactory solution of extreme inter-group tensions within a nation is the official recognition of a change in hierarchy and in the balance between the conflicting groups. This does not always involve revolution, and revolutions do not necessarily lead to civil wars. The former often avoid the latter.

International Tensions. Finally, there are social tensions between nations; that is, between all-inclusive superfunctional societies.

* * * *

Comparing international tensions with the other types of social tensions which we have analyzed, we reach the following conclusions:

(1) International tensions show a very paradoxical character: they seem to be the least real and for this reason the most artificial of all social tensions. Thus they should be the most easily settled and the least deep-seated. Indeed they are mostly founded on misunderstandings, unscrupulous propaganda, false information, and crude myths. However, (2) they are the most dangerous of all social tensions since they can lead to war, the destruction of millions of human lives and to cultural and social backsliding.

This tragic paradox may also be formulated as follows: the more nearly international tensions become real social tensions the more pacific will they become since they will be absorbed progressively into other types of social tensions.

Factors Making for International Tension

Before undertaking an analysis of the means of reducing contemporary international tensions, let us set forth briefly the factors making for international tensions.

(1) Because of their all-inclusive and suprafunctional character, nations are not very intensive social units. But this does not prevent their members from having very definite, if remote, ideas regarding other nations. These

* Refined myths, of course, do play a role in class ideologies.

other nations are generally believed to be morally "far away" or "much inferior"; they are considered suitable objects on which to exercise *national pride* ("there is no better country than ours"), *national hate* ("our enemy is always the same") or occasionally *national hopes* (e.g., the hopes of the Slav nations with regard to Russia, or those which the French nation placed during the last two wars in the United States). These are all aspects of national egocentrism and egotism. Other nations are thought of only in relation to one's own country. This precludes any possibility of mutual understanding.

(2) National egotism and egocentrism create a very favorable atmosphere for developing emotionally charged and standardized symbols and myths which seriously distort the real face and character of other nations. This traditional abuse of symbolical and mythological images—which may be seen for instance in high school history textbooks and in the international information of almost any national newspaper—has become particularly grave at the present time, when new tensions arise daily from the discussions in the Security Council and in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Compelled to face each other as close neighbors without any real understanding, nations take refuge in the further development of emotional mythology; and more and more distort the truth by oversimplifying very complex problems and situations.

(3) We are now living in an age of rationalized propaganda backed by such powerful technical media as the radio, movies, etc. Men are for the first time consciously manipulating symbols and myths, even elaborating them in a manner calculated to suit their by no means always honorable ends. This is a new and directly observable factor intensifying international tensions. Very high international tensions can be whipped up with astonishing rapidity at the dictate of controlling groups. And with no less rapidity they can be slowed down. Illusions and delusions can be imposed deliberately on large masses on an international scale, often in order to conceal the real social conflicts of greater significance.

(4) Finally, certain factors making for international tension are based on already long-standing conflicting interests between nations. These are the conflicts of geographic, colonial, commercial, and economic interests (unequal distribution of natural wealth or of raw materials for industrial products; e.g., coal and metallic ores); differences in population density; unequal numbers of unemployed; areas of traditional dispute; military castes supporting warmongering parties and interfering in civilian affairs; and also ideological conflicts, whether religious, political or social. All these factors, however, have been more important in the past than they are at the present time where the interdependence between nations has become so close that conflicts of real interests can be more easily settled by discussion and conciliation than by totally destructive war.

Means of Reducing International Tension

Due to the highly artificial character of most international tensions and more especially to their rise and fall at the present time, deliberate intervention is likely to be more successful in this field than in that of any other type of social strain. Nevertheless, at the same time the risks of raising the existing tension and fostering new tensions through inappropriate action are far greater than in any other sphere. International relations are dominated by misunderstandings, misinterpretations, and the inability to view other nations in a non-egocentric manner. Consequently, emotionally charged national symbols and myths often become magnified and intensified through unskilled attacks against them or through inappropriate efforts to compromise with them.

At the same time, it is clear that the means of reducing international tensions will vary according to historical periods, types of society and social structure. It is hardly possible to discuss these means in general terms. We shall therefore concentrate exclusively on those methods applicable in present circumstances:

(1) Nations must be compelled to abandon their ignorance of each other by a better organization of mutual information regarding their real way of life, their ideals, aspirations, and achievements.

(2) All forms of disloyal propaganda directed against any nation by distortions of the truth, false rumors, false representation of national characters, etc. must be eliminated from the radio, movies, press, and textbooks of all nations through the aid of some international action possibly concerted by Unesco.

(3) In order to compel each nation to know how it is viewed by other nations and how these other nations see themselves, large scale cultural exchanges will be necessary. Large numbers of professors and students should be exchanged every year between nations. Permanent international information centers showing the economic, political, intellectual, artistic, and religious life of each nation should be instituted. These centers should be able to utilize on the largest possible scale means of mass communication, such as the radio, television, newsreels, and the press. These instruments, which now mainly serve various propagandist ends, would thus counteract propaganda by true mass information.

(4) The same aim would be served by the organization of a permanent and stable international university. This body would move annually from one national capital to another. Professors and students would be delegated annually by national universities under Unesco control. The social science faculty would specialize in the comparison and analysis of present-day social, economic, and political structures, as well as in the study of the

conditions under which an international society and international institutions might best develop.

(5) Economic agreements and international economic planning could very much help to reduce international tensions. Both could in due time bring about a redistribution of natural wealth, and could help to foster national production and the rational exchange of goods. However, only world-wide economic agreements and world-wide economic planning can have any marked success in reducing international tensions. . . .

However, before international economic planning in the common interests can be brought into effect, fundamental changes in national economic and social structures will be necessary. The reduction of international tension through the institution of a *world-wide International Economic Planning Board*, therefore, belongs more to the future than to the present.

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Tensions Interpersonal and International: A Psychiatrist's View

HARRY STACK SULLIVAN

The Matrix of "Stereotypes"

The psychiatrist, when he seeks to be of use to a person, participates with him in discovering the surviving anxiety-fraught *eidetic* or "imaginary" people—less accurately, the recollectable past interpersonal relations in which the patient suffered anxiety—that continue to be influential in distorting the personification of currently significant people "with whom the patient is dealing." Were so long a quest ever necessary, this retrospective reactivation of participants in anxiety situations would lead back to the personification of the Bad Mother of the developmental stage of infancy—an uncanny being of relatively cosmic if rather nebulous proportions, possessed of the nuclear essence of transcendental evil power, against the manifestations of which the infant's magic tool, the cry, had proved of no avail.

Reactivations of anxiety experiences in early childhood would bring up personifications of other only somewhat less bizarre "powers and principalities" of good and evil, including a nightmarish personification, Not-Me, linked in coincidence with the person's early sojourns in the realm of intolerable anxiety—and ever thenceforth growing along with "the rest of one" across the threshold of nightmare and schizophrenic psychosis; a threshold approach to which one is always warned against by *uncanny emotion*.

Among the denizens of later childhood we would find a much better known shadow attached to the desirable; namely, the personification, Bad-Me, to prevent the unfortunate manifestations of which in interpersonal relations there is already developing what will soon become the greatest of

Harry Stack Sullivan, "Tensions Interpersonal and International: A Psychiatrist's View," *Tensions That Cause Wars*, edited by Hadley Cantril (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950), pp. 108-135. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

all organizations of experience in personality, the dynamism of the self, the *self-system*, solely concerned with "living according to the rules" so that one will be spared any avoidable anxiety and its frustrating and complicating of activities in the pursuit of any and all satisfactions with which it coincides.

From these days onward, recall will show that in all interpersonal situations in which there has been smooth function of the self-system, whatever else may have been the case, the person concerned will have felt a comfortable *self-esteem*, an interpersonal security the very antithesis of anxiety.

Whenever this self-esteem was disturbed there had been at least momentary experience of anxiety *and very frequently*, immediately thereafter whatever had been in progress was complicated or interrupted by self-system processes already mentioned as security operations. These may have been no more obscure than a show of *anger*. They may have been as intricate as a years-long impulsion to degrade the other person concerned in "provoking the anxiety" to circumstances which will have divested him of his apparent power to provoke one's anxiety. In neither case, nor in the case of any other of the numerous kinds of security operations, is the personification of the anxiety-colored other person *apt to be like the personification of him before the anxiety-provoking event*. It will have changed to a closer resemblance to some eidetic personification in the patient's—probably recent—past.

So far as anything of a representational nature that can be recalled to awareness, is concerned, everyone has come along a developmental course that began in the region of personifications that are truly nebulously cosmic in proportions, vested with the most extreme "felt" aspects of comfort and discomfort and essentially without relationships other than temporal coincidence and succession. These figures moved without anything approaching rhyme or reason in the growing framework of a center of awareness of vague but impelling recurrent needs which as it were stood out against a background of *euphoria*, a "state of empty bliss." There was in the cosmic center of events a magic power which evoked itself as needs became painful, and utilized its frequently successful tool, the cry. It gradually appeared that this magic was effective only in the presence of the Good-Mother—who could suddenly be replaced by the Bad-Mother with her aura of anxiety, against whom and which one was wholly powerless. Still later, Bad-Me was differentiated as that of the center which often evoked the Bad-Mother. Still later, techniques for avoiding or minimizing anxiety were evolved, including use of the still magically very powerful voice—ever ultimately often with success in *concealing* the presence of Bad-Me.

From such a beginning, under the influence of the events—and nothing but the events—actually undergone, a gradual refinement in differentiating

experience has progressed up to present. In this lifetime's work, Bad-Me has grown into some of the various personifications of oneself and into many of the personifications of other people who have hurt one or impaired one's self-esteem, or *who are foreseen as if they were threatening such damage*.

If one has been fortunate all along the developmental line, one has reached chronological adulthood with a great complement of referential tools for analyzing interpersonal experience so that its significant differences from, as well as its resemblances to, past experiences are discriminable, and the foresight of the related course of near future events will be adequate and appropriate to maintaining one's security and securing one's satisfactions without useless or ultimately troublesome disturbance of the self-esteem of the other person or persons concerned.

If one has been less fortunate in the developmental course, this state of mature competence will be lacking in some or in many areas of interpersonal relations. The handicap in these areas is apt to manifest itself in the phenomena to which I have referred as *parataxic concomitance*, of which "thinking in stereotypes" is a particular instance in the intergroup and international field. Personifications of the stranger are built around eidetic survivors from earlier experience, and anxiety and its complex derivatives prevent the progressive discrimination of significant differences between given persons and the inadequate, relatively stereotyped, personifications that are utilized in foresight and the observation and analysis of current events. Under these circumstances, the return in satisfactions and self-esteem which are derived from the relationships are inexplicably limited and this is rationalized by mostly disparaging and derogatory conclusions bearing on the personal worth of the alien persons. If the contacts, direct or mediate, cannot be avoided, anxiety-fraught states of being result, and these, because they interfere with repose and sleep, tend gradually to increasingly incompetent thought and action. This comes about because human life under any extant social organizations calls for a good deal of sublimatory activity, the possibility of which in turn requires repose and sleep. Persistent states of considerable tension, whether of needs or of anxiety, make repose and sleep alike very difficult, unless and until the safety devices of *apathy* and somnolent detachment come into play. Neither of these protective transformations of living permits good observation and analysis of current interpersonal events.

Any but the most mature people who are living at a time when, one might say, the general level of interpersonal insecurity is increasing; e.g., at times of heightening international tension; may show quite generally a disintegration of their more recent developmental achievements—to which we refer as "chronic fatigue" and which is rather like the effects of alcoholic intoxication—such that their ability to observe events and draw useful

inferences from them deteriorates progressively, and their "judgment" about the relative importance of alternatives becomes more and more defective, until finally anything that happens to be in the field of attention becomes of simply preoccupying importance. As a corollary to this motivational disintegration, these people establish interpersonal relations only with people similarly "reduced" in their state of being; everyone else is perplexingly troublesome, "unreasonable," if not seemingly ill-motivated.

These chronically tense people, often becoming more and more the victims of accumulating poorly formulated resentments—still another complex tension that contributes specifically to the feeling of overwhelming fatigue—fall readily into the immature types of interpersonal relationship reflected, for example, in being audience to a demagogue, associating with "calamity howlers," throwing oneself into radical-mystical "looking to the other world" for salvation; or turning away from the future to join in bewailing "the good old days."

As the regressive change continues, the actual contents of consciousness become less and less clear reactivations of earlier types of personifications, even these being oversimplified in keeping with the loss of refined grasp on the current situation, until these people become susceptible to entertaining the wildest extravagances, just so that these fictions approximate to the patterns of myths and misapprehensions which they once entertained.

The character of the myths and misapprehensions which come to have widespread currency among the less competent at times of intergroup or international tension are of chief interest to the psychiatrist along two lines: (1) from what particular personification in the developmental years do they derive their anxiety-fraught influence, and (2) by what combinations of overlapping verbalisms, rationalizations, are they given the semblance of group-wide acceptance so that they can be treated as consensually valid fact?

There is a good deal to be learned in the latter connection from study of the role of the *demagogue* in channeling the various insecurities of his audience into these mass security operations which interfere with the pursuit of information and improving foresight of possibilities and probabilities.

There is a good deal to be learned, also, from study of the constructive role of the *opinion leaders*—those whose expressed views in one or another field are adopted by many others as their own views; without any accompanying feeling of subordination, dependency, or requirement that they "give credit"; all this seeming to arise from the opinion leader's demonstrated status of being better informed, more skillful in sorting facts from mere prejudiced opinion possessed of superior foresight and relatively *disinterested*.

No one knows better than I how great a gap there can be between the

opinions one expresses and the motivation that one displays. Even if most people use their opinion leaders chiefly as a source of superior verbalisms, rationalizations, for their more inconsistent and incongruous actions; even if most immature people have an amazing congeries of relatively contradictory roles which they assume at different times with no feeling of discomfort; it still remains a fact that the opinion leader is a useful brake on the progress of social disintegration in the earlier stages of group or international tension.

While these relatively mature members of the community seldom aspire to the exercise of political influence in the governmental sense—perhaps because they appreciate the company with which it would imply their associating—they often act as the governing element in restraining political excess. They can be of great importance in bringing about a realization among parents and teachers—in the broadest sense, including those in youth organizations, labor unions, etc.—of “the extent to which their (these parents’ and teachers’) own attitudes and loyalties—often acquired when they were young and when conditions were different—are no longer adequate to serve as effective guides to action in a changing world.”

Finally, there is a good deal to be learned from study of word-of-mouth transmission of information and misinformation, a field to the exploration of which *The Psychology of Rumor* by Allport and Postman, 1947, provides a valuable outline.

Let me turn now to a brief consideration of some of the more important factors which have to be noted in anyone’s attempts to gain valid information about living in an alien social organization.

Psychiatry Face to Face

While there is some reason to believe that a sufficient degree of novelty will always call out a disjunctive force the felt component of which we know as *fear*, a very great many otherwise illuminating observations of by no means intimidating novelty and difference fail entirely to inform us about the world we live in because of the equilibrating influence of the self-system—the tree that all too frequently reflects the way the twig was bent in the developmental years.

The extension of psychiatric theory beyond the confines of the familiar into the world of “foreigners” whose ways of life are alien to us calls for a sharp discrimination between fear and the various manifestations of anxiety and self-system activity, especially those of irrational *dislikes*, *aversions*, and *revulsions*, and the today so widespread *distrust of others*.

Current theory makes *hate* the characteristic of interpersonal situations in which the people concerned recurrently and frequently “provoke anxiety in each other,” yet “cannot break up the situation” because of some

conjunctive forces which hold them together.* If the conjunctive force acts entirely outside of awareness, uncanny *fascination*, with moments of revulsion or loathing may appear. If the integrating forces are not very strong; if the situation is "not very important," the milder manifestations of "more or less concealed," "actually unjustified," dislike and distrust are shown. The "actually unjustified" means that a consensually valid statement of adequate grounds for the dislike or distrust cannot be formulated. The unpleasant "emotion" arises from something more than what either person could readily come to know about the situation.

It is my thesis, here, that while no one can now be adequately equipped for a greatly significant inquiry into the fundamental "facts of life" of everyone, everywhere, there are many possibilities of greatly constructive efforts in this direction—if and only if instead of plunging into the field recklessly "hoping for the best" one prefaces one's attempt with a careful survey of one's assets and liabilities for participant observation.

Every constructive effort of the psychiatrist, today, is a strategy of inter-personal field operations which (1) seeks to map the areas of disjunctive force that block the efficient collaboration of the patient and others, and (2) seeks to expand the patient's awareness so that this unnecessary blockage can be brought to an end.

For a psychiatry of peoples, we must follow the self-same strategy applied to significant groupings of people—families, communities, political entities, regional organizations, world blocs—and seek to map the interventions of disjunctive force which block the integration of the group with other groups in pursuit of the common welfare; and seek out the characteristics of the groups' culture or subculture and the methods used to impose it on the young which perpetuate the restrictions of freedom for constructive growth.

The master tactics for a psychiatrist's work with a handicapped person consist in (1) elucidating the actual situations in which unfortunate action is currently shown repeatedly, so that the disorder-pattern may become clear; (2) discovering the less obvious ramifications of this inadequate and inappropriate way of life throughout other phases of the present and the

*Quotation marks are used to warn the reader that the thus-inclosed expression from common speech is being used as an expedient in pointing to a meaning which has to be much more precise than usual. This signal can often be interpreted as a warning against *voluntaristic thinking*, based on an implicit assumption that something of more or less transcendental power inheres in an alleged *human will*—an illusion exceedingly troublesome in that it discourages exploring the limits of man's analytic capacities, at the same time, serving to perpetuate archaic myths of the divinity of man, which in turn call for a belief in Divinity; the whole relieving the believer from any urgent interest in "doing the best he can" with the present moment and the neighboring probable future. Leaving it to God and seeking one's reward in the Hereafter seem to me to be among the most awful manifestations of perverted human ingenuity. The realm of Deity, if existent, might well be conceived as more than mere negating of human inconsequentiality.

near future, including the doctor-patient relationship and the patient's expectations about it; and (3) with this now clearly formulated problem of inadequate development before us, utilizing his human abilities to explore its origins in his experience with significant people of the past.

It must be noted that an identical distortion of living common to doctor and patient makes this type of inquiry at the best very difficult. Neither is able to "see" the troublesome patterns, and both are inclined to relate the difficulties to the unhappy peculiarities of the other people concerned in their less fortunate interpersonal relations. Each respects the parallel limitation in the other and their mutual effort is apt to be concentrated on irrelevant or immaterial problems until they both become more discouraged or still more firmly deceived about life.

For a psychiatry of peoples, these tactical requirements of good therapy—which is also good research—have to be expanded into (1) a preliminary discovery of the actual major patterns of tensions and energy transformations which characterize more adequate and appropriate living in that group, as a background for noticing exceptions, the incidents of mental disorder among these folk—uninformed study of which would be misleading; (2) a parallel development of skill at rectifying the effects of limitations in our own developmental background; in order that (3) it may become possible to observe better the factors that actually resist any tendency to extend the integrations of our subject-persons so that they would include representatives of other groups relatively alien to them—a pilot test of which is the integration with oneself—and (4) thus to find real problems in the foresight of intergroup living which can be tracked down to their origins in our subject-people's education for life.

There is good reason to believe that all this is not impossible. These world-psychiatric inquiries are not at bottom particularly different from the already mentioned, all too common, instances where doctor and patient suffer approximately *the same* disorders in living. Let me say a word about the way in which one may proceed to reduce the handicap of such a situation; at the same time pointing to the answer to an oft-heard question: "What can I do to help myself?"

My conception of anxiety is in point here. While we may be unaware, at least temporarily, of milder degrees of any one of the other tensions connected with living, we are never unaware of anxiety at the very time that it occurs. The awareness can be, and very often is, fleeting; especially when an appropriate security operation is called out. The awareness can be most variously characterized from person to person, even from incident to incident; excepting only that it is always unpleasant. At the moment that anxiety occurs, one becomes aware of something unpleasant; but whether this seems to be a mere realization that all is not going so well, or a noticing of some disturbance in the activity or postural tone in one of the zones of

interaction—a change in one's "facial expression" or in one's voice, as examples—a feeling of tightening up in some group of skeletal muscles, a disturbance of the action of one's heart, a discomfort in one's belly, a realization that one has begun to sweat; as I say, whether it be one or another of these or yet some other one of a variety of symptoms, one is always at least momentarily aware that one has become uncomfortable, or more acutely uncomfortable, as the case may be.

No matter what may have followed upon this awareness of diminished feeling of well-being, there was the awareness. It best serves in ordinary interpersonal relations to "pay as little attention to it as one can," and to "forget it." But if one is intent on refining oneself as an instrument of participant observation, it is necessary to pay the greatest attention, at least retrospectively, to these fleeting movements of anxiety. They are the telltales which show increased activity of the self-system in the interpersonal field of the moment concerned.

They mark the point in the course of events at which something disjunctive, something that tends to pull away from the other fellow, has first appeared or has suddenly increased. They signal a change from relatively uncomplicated movement toward a presumptively common goal to a protecting of one's self-esteem, with a definite *complicating* of the interpersonal action.

To the extent that one can retrospectively observe the exact situation in which one's anxiety was called out, one may be able to infer the corresponding pattern of difficulty in dealing with others. As these patterns are usually a matter of past training or its absence, detecting them is seldom an easy matter, but, I repeat, it is by no means impossible—excepting there be an actual *dissociation* in one's personality system, in which case there will be prohibitively great difficulty in recalling anything significant about the actual situation which evoked the anxiety.

Two things more remain to be said about this, shall I say, self-observation of disjunctive process in interpersonal relations.

Anxiety appears not only as awareness of itself but also in the experience of some *complex* "emotions" into which it has been elaborated by specific early training. I cannot say what all these are but I can use names for a few of them which should "open the mind" to their nature: embarrassment, shame, humiliation, guilt, and chagrin. The circumstances under which these unpleasant "emotions" occur are particularly hard to observe accurately and to subject to the retrospective analysis which is apt to be most rewarding.

A group of security operations born of experience which has gone into the development of these complex unpleasant "emotions" is equally hard for one to observe and analyze. These are the movements of thought and the actions by which we, as it were, impute to or seek to provoke in the other

fellow feelings like embarrassment, shame, humiliation, guilt, or chagrin. It is peculiarly difficult to observe retrospectively and to subject to analysis the exact circumstances under which we are moved to act as if the other person "should be ashamed of himself," is "stupid," or guilty of anything from a breach of good taste to a mortal sin. These interpersonal movements which put the other fellow at a disadvantage on the basis of a low relative personal worth are extremely troublesome elements in living and very great handicaps to investigating strange people.

Disparaging and derogatory thought and action that make one feel "better" than the other person concerned, that expand one's self-esteem, as it were, at his cost, are always to be suspected of arising from anxiety. These processes are far removed from a judicious inquiry into one's relative personal skill in living. They do not reflect a good use of observation and analysis but rather indicate a low self-esteem in the person who uses them. The quicker one comes to a low opinion of another, other things being equal, the poorer is one's secret view of one's own worth in the field of the disparagement.

It is rather easy to correct interferences in participant observation of another which arise from one's true superiorities to him. It is quite otherwise with the baleful effects of one's secret doubts and uncertainties. We are apt to be most severely critical of others when they are thought to be showing an instance of something of the presence of which we are secretly ashamed, and hope that we are concealing.

This must suffice as an indication of the more pervasive, of the often unnoticed interferences with participant observation with representatives of somewhat unfamiliar background. I need scarcely discuss the role of linguistic difficulties or that of sheer ignorance of the culture patterns to which remarks make reference. These latter are actually only somewhat more striking instances of similar interferences in getting acquainted with any stranger.

Progress toward a psychiatry of peoples is to be expected from efforts expended along two lines of investigation: (1) improving grasp on the significant patterns—and patterns of patterns—of living around the world; and (2) the uncovering of significant details in the sundry courses of personality development by which the people of each different social organization come to manifest more or less adequate and appropriate behavior in their given social setting.

Each of these lines of investigation is a necessary supplement to the other. The first, which may be taken to pertain more to the interests and techniques of the cultural anthropologist, cannot be pushed very far, very securely, without data from the second. The second can scarcely produce meaningful data except it be informed by the provisional hypotheses of the former. The two provide indispensable checks upon each other, without which

neither can proceed noticeably without running into increasing uncertainty.

The theory of interpersonal relations lays great stress on the method of participant observation, and relegates data obtained by other methods to at most a secondary importance. This in turn implies that skill in the face to face, or person to person, *psychiatric interview* is of fundamental importance.

While the value of interchange by use of the mediate channels of communication—correspondence, publications, radio, speaking films—may be very great, especially in case the people concerned have already become fairly well-acquainted with each other as a result of previous face to face exchange; it must be remembered that communication in the psychiatric interview is by no means solely a matter of exchanging verbal contexts but rather the development of an exquisitely complex pattern of field processes which *imply* important conclusions about the people concerned.

This is scarcely the place for a discussion of current views about what one can learn about the theory and practice of psychiatric interviewing; I wish chiefly to emphasize the *instrumental* character of the interviewing psychiatrist and the critical importance of his being free to observe—and subsequently analyze—as many as possible of his performances as a dynamic center in the field patterns that make up the interview.

Everything that can be said about good psychiatric interviewing is relevant to the directly interpersonal aspects of any work in the direction of a psychiatry of peoples. Every safeguard useful in avoiding erroneous conclusions about “the other fellow” becomes newly important when the barriers of linguistic and other cultural uncertainties are in the way.

Inquiries into the alien ways of educating the young must be oriented with close regard to *biological time* as it is reflected in the serial maturation of capacities; as to *social time* as it is reflected in the series of formulable expectations about what the young will “know how to behave about” from stage to stage of their development; and as to the exact *chronology* of presumptively educative efforts brought to bear on the young.

The spread of variations in each of these three fields is of great importance in understanding the people and their relationships which make up any community. Consider, for example, the effect of delayed puberty on the adequacy and appropriateness of subsequent behavior in many a youth in any of our urban areas. Consider, again, the effects on the living of the outstandingly bright boy from a small town when he enters a great metropolitan university. And, finally, consider the probable effects of early training in venereal prophylaxis in contrast with that of suppression of information in this field.

It is by chief virtue of even better grasp on the significant patterns in these series of events that we help patients to help themselves, at the same time becoming better and better informed about the factors which govern

the possibilities of interpersonal action. To the extent that we have useful approximations to an undertaking of the actual processes of personality development which have ensued in the people with whom we deal, we become able to "make sense" of what seems to be going on. This must be the case whether one is a stranger in Malaya or host to a visiting Malay.

A last, peculiarly difficult, topic remains to be considered. I refer here to the *isolation* factor in interpersonal relations, particularly those which occur in situations intended to give information about unaccustomed ways of living. Something has been said, at least by implication, of the conjunctive forces that manifest complementary needs which "bring people together," and foresight of the recurrence of which needs serve to keep people together in more or less durable relationships of one kind or another. Much has been said of the disjunctive forces of anxiety and its derivatives, as well as fear, which "increase distance" between people, foresight of the recurrence of which disagreeable tensions "keep people apart" in more or less durable attitudes of dislike and distrust or of fear. What I have not discussed is that which one might call the specific absence of interpersonal field forces, the "neutral ground" of *possible* interpersonal forces which in a way sets off any particular pattern of field forces as different from another dynamically identical one; that which is apt to be most significantly different, for example, in the case of being a stranger in Malaya from being host to a visiting Malay.

This factor appears in the partition of living between waking and sleeping. The possible interpersonal relations which are wholly unrealized in the waking life call into being *dream-situations* which occur in the peculiar states called sleep and somnolence, the relations of which to subsequent events in waking life are often very obscure.

Dream processes are a part of living which may or may not be esteemed as important to waking life. The culture establishes this value attitude, and the attitude—the body of educative interpersonal experience which "makes up" this attitude in a given person—in turn affects the degree and character of the isolation of the person awake from his life in sleep.

Everyone on occasion has been "awakened by" a dream, often but by no means necessarily with recollection of some train of dream events marked with great "emotion." The events as recalled may have involved anything from an excellent simulation of a person known "really" in current life—an actual extant significant personification—to a bizarre creature or concatenation of events unknown to the world of science and unrecorded in myth or folklore to which the dreamer has had access.

The transition from deep sleep to full waking awareness may have seemed anything from sudden to so slow as to be almost imperceptible. It may on some occasions have been very troublesome, as when the dream persists in some degree for a time after one has "gone to some trouble to wake up"—

perhaps arisen and walked about. If it cannot be "shaken off," one has passed into the schizophrenic way of living, has become "acutely psychotic" as the Western psychiatrist is apt to put it, or is in a *fugue* or peculiar trance state.

It is from a combined approach to the understanding of events in sleep through the cultural anthropology of dream and trance phenomena and their role in daily living around the world, and the psychiatry of "remembered" dreams and of schizophrenic interpersonal relations as seen in our accustomed social setting, that we have gained our beginning understanding of the panoply of *unknown* referential processes that occur as preliminary steps in formulating an acquaintance with the really novel *but important* in the world of people and their doings with us—even, as witness the tale of Kekule and the "benzine ring," with the non-personalized world.

All that I can say, here, in this connection must pertain to the utilization of more or less—but in every case uncertainly—recollected dreams in developing one's acquaintance with oneself and others in current events. The psychiatrist who accepts his field as that of interpersonal relations works with reported dreams in a way quite different from the Freudian and other dream-analysts. In the first place, he does not encourage any dependence on dreams as a primary channel for communication, if only because of the isolation factor above-suggested. Second, he assumes that the intervention of sleep-processes in the work of participant observation is to be interpreted as *either* an isolation of the patient from expanding contact with the psychiatrist *or* a process for the overcoming of some such specific isolation. The first of these possibilities is well-exemplified when one encourages an actually schizophrenic patient to report his dreams: they grow more and more abundant and detailed as the patient sinks into more and more isolation from effective interpersonal relations, including that with the physician. I dare not take space to illustrate the second case. Third, he deals only with those reported dreams which he can convert into relatively simple statements, of situational characteristics in dynamic relationship, into rather simple *dramatic* statements. There is no search for "latent content" in the dream figures, but instead a search *for the currently important factors in living that are isolated from current interpersonal events* occurring in the waking life of the dreamer. These are assumed to be possible interpersonal relations which are excluded from any approach to waking realization, whether because of dissociation within the personality system and the force of uncanny emotion, or by some other incapacity to foresee their possibility—such as gross ignorance, lack of any hint of their possibility.

For the psychiatrist or social scientist who is exploring alien ways of living, I would recommend respect for any occasional rather succinct and emotionally vivid dream that occurs to him, but I would also recommend that he look to an interpersonal context for any help from it. In other words,

it is but seldom that the dream processes directly overcome the factor of isolation; they much more frequently present obscure data which, reflected as a reformulation in diagrammatic terms of situational characteristics *and* action by another, "open the mind" to the important possibilities that are being overlooked.

The Psychiatry of Sovereignty

...I said in the introduction that interpersonal processes involve personifications which may be relatively stable or remarkably in flux. I did not add that the possible instability of those personifications is a matter of *change within limits*. Personifications are patterns, and patterns, for me, are the envelope of all insignificant differences. When a difference becomes functionally significant in its context of living, it is not within the same pattern but in another. If this seems to be a difficult idea to grasp the trouble may reside partly in the fact that I am discussing *dynamisms* and not concrete, substantial mechanisms.

Gurvitch's insistence that nations are something specifically different from all other sorts of groups seems to me to be excellently in point. Nations are those groups which, in the old way of thinking, require as their necessary environing medium, other nations, and possess unique organization for functional activity in that peculiar environment. In language more suited to my way of thinking, they are dynamic centers in field processes so significantly different from those that can be observed in any other multipersonal fields that we can abstract from international relationships their specifically characterizing peculiarity, the manifestations of *sovereignty*.

Nations are particular dynamisms which are the locus of unnumbered other sub- or intra-national dynamisms, "groups," integrated into the national totality by the processes peculiar to and required for the manifestation of sovereignty. With all respect to the vigor with which Szalai entertains the belief that change in social organization must precede change in "ways of thinking," and, I suppose, that therefore any great change in the international way of living calls for something radical like revolution or war—I must insist that the processes of sovereignty are a manifestation of inherent human potentialities and of their realization through the course of events in historic time. The events were events that, so to say, impinged upon people and in so impinging upon or involving these increasingly numerous people, struck off or ensued in culture patterns that could transmit the past through the present into the future—but dynamically; that is, in flux, however low its speed; not statically. I can go with my Hungarian confrere far enough to say that one of the aspects of nations or of blocs of nations is, for very good reason, homologous with certain self-system manifestations in interpersonal relations of lesser complexity; namely,

a marked resistance to significant change of velocity in its directional sense; a, as it were, social inertia. This does not preclude great change of velocity, and I do not believe that revolution or war are the only ways by which these changes can come about.*

While more complex integrations can certainly manifest functional activities significantly different from the functional activities possible to any of their "parts," there are limits to the possibilities of these unique types of activity that are set by the functional possibilities inherent in the "parts," and the functional activity of the whole does not fail to involve some functional activity—if only changes in equilibration—of all parts.

The limits to constructive manifestation of sovereignty by social organizations seem to me to be all but reached at the present juncture of humanity, and, with Dr. Gurvitch, I hope for a rather prompt cultural revolution to end war which would entail the widespread observation that manifestations of national sovereignty are no longer adequate processes for meeting the situation of continuing human progress, and that the world requires a change to something in the direction of an integration of all the peoples of the world.

* * * *

Can one doubt that the first *tool* of prehistoric man was an abstract idea and its associated name-sound, and not a piece of the physiochemical universe? And is it not exceedingly probable that we can go on indefinitely improving our theory and technology—especially in the realm of the sciences of Man? I know no reason for thinking that Ikhnaton, Confucius, Galileo, Marx, or Freud, or any other of the people of great name in the history of thought, did more or less than expand the horizon of human possibilities in the realm of abstract thought and its related technological affiliations. As I hear of the "new" definition of freedom—freedom to take part in the common effort of people who are in one's own state of exploitation, as a step toward an ultimate freedom to develop the full potentialities of man—besides recalling Remy de Gourmont's comment on *justice* in the "Dissociation of Ideas," I find myself moved to endorse with vigor the view expressed in Dr. Freyre's contribution to the analysis of social-scientific thinking from the standpoint of the sovereignty-integrating factors that now influence it.

*The herein treatment of *sovereignty* has been questioned by one of my greatly esteemed anthropologist colleagues on the basis of reference to certain historically isolated peoples who were a people, despite the absence of competing or threatening other peoples. These really utopian states can scarcely be said to be an important factor in current reality, and I am not here equating *ethnic group* with *sovereign power*. The passing of sovereign power as a superior, all-inclusive, integrating factor of very significant groups seems to me to be a prerequisite for achieving dependable understanding of all the conjunctive, and isolating forces which will still be active in the early stages of one world of all peoples.

I also find myself deeply sympathetic to Naess' interest in seeking out and making explicit the intrusions of sovereignty-integrating factors into the textbooks and other literature that are used in influencing the young. It will not be easy to bring the current unsuitability of old doctrines and practices of national sovereignty to the attention of the thoughtful as long as they have been thoroughly prejudiced against attention to the problem at every stage in their development.

I often hear, these days, "you and your long-range programs; there isn't time, any more; can't you help at all right now?" Here again, I subscribe to views expressed by Gurvitch and Naess about intensive *action research* at major centers of conflict, and the use of international conferences none of the personnel of which are invested with any of the sovereignties primarily concerned. The major centers of conflict might be, at the moment, Palestine and India; on the other hand they might equally as well be, at the moment, high-level conferences which concern themselves with, say, particular aspects of the future of Germany. Our first contributions could scarcely be more than "fact finding"—but perhaps "facts" about intransigent confreres, among others—and approaches to agreements in limited but not necessarily irrelevant or immaterial fields.

This venture toward utilizing psychiatry and the social sciences in direct attack at focal centers of international disagreement would require of the scientists concerned an unusual clarity about *ethical* factors that would otherwise interfere quite seriously. I guess that I am dealing at this point with "the pluralism of morals". . . Many years ago, I found myself defining *evil* as the unwarranted interference with life. This was not much of a definition but it seemed helpful in that it made the problem an operational one, and the process of tracing warranties for interference might be something at which one could ultimately become skillful. When I hear statements like "nothing should be done to interfere with class warfare" or "there is no difference between the Nazi and the Soviet dictatorships—each has spilled the same amount of innocent blood," I have to lower my expectations of immediate highly communicative interchange, but I do not have to despair. When, on the other hand, I hear propositions like "the Marshall plan should be fought because it will delay the liquidation of U.S.A. capitalist monopolism. No basic change in society can be made without basic changes in the system of production," I know that I am in pretty deep water; perhaps, unpreparedly, confronted with communication in my initial class.

There is no psychiatric technique that can be expected to reach behind a delegate and change his instructions. There is no swift moving technique for changing beliefs held with intense feeling of their importance, as by a zealot. These flaming convictions are experienced as indispensably useful; one would be much less of a person if one were to relinquish them or open

them to an assessment of their relative rather than absolute importance. In other words, these never-to-be-yielded convictions on never-to-be-compromised positions—and along with them sundry never-to-be-questioned prejudices—are functioning as *effective protection* against great anxiety; when, as nowadays sometimes is the case, they are not literally statements in a credo, assertion of the governing acceptance of which may be necessary for continuing physical survival and liberty.

So far as they protect one from severe anxiety they are so important a part of the self-system concerned *that they may rarely be attacked directly* with any result more desirable than a violent argument. Argumentation, if it is not of the mildest kind, includes so much that is parataxic that the psychiatrist expects nothing useful to come out of it. This does not apply to calm, succinct, statement of a flatly contradictory view, but, here too, the possibility of usefulness is limited to greatly increasing the alertness of the person contradicted, a result sometimes much to be desired as a preliminary to other interpersonal operations.

Perhaps the most common technique for disposing of “highly emotional” beliefs which stand in the way of exploring an issue in quest for agreements lies in (1) becoming as clear as may be about how the belief can be stated *exactly*, with the assistance of (2) attempts to discover if some other statements are acceptable as being implied in the belief, (3) seeking to explore by the use of these other statements the limiting effect of the belief on the holder’s freedom to participate in intelligent interpersonal inquiry, (4) from this limiting effect—and from hypotheses as to experience possibly anterior to the belief itself—to surmise *what the belief is concealing or disguising* which the believer would be “ashamed or guilty” or “embarrassed” to be judged to be. (5) The fifth step is to explore the surmise as best may be, and when probability seems notable, (6) to inquire if the person, denied the belief, would feel that he were so-and-so,—with something of formal suggestion that, if so, that would be a mistake.

All this is a tedious example of the psychiatric effort required to circumvent self-system function *in sole interest of the person in point*, so that he may become free from a major handicap in relations with others. He has to be led to observe closely, to catch on to the exact functional activity concerned—the “personal use” of the belief to him; then to see that the formula is by no means the best for achieving a useful end; and only then can he go about using his abilities to be “more realistic,” less defensively vulnerable, in the field of collaboration.

My work with a stranger soon becomes a mapping of the areas in interpersonal fields in which he becomes anxious—which can be said to mean that he there tends to “pull away”; to explore many leads as to the historic why and distorted present that accounts for these incidents of anxiety; to elevate what I observe to lucid attention, when and if that can be done

without a defeating degree of anxiety; and only then, by stating the problem as I have surmised it, establish a beginning collaboration for its remedy.

This is a far cry from the blueprint for perfecting and then indefinitely preserving the peace of the world. I hope that it will not fail entirely to suggest some possibilities. Thirty years of work has taught me that, whenever one could be aided to foresee the reasonable probability of a better future, everyone will show a sufficient tendency to collaborate in the achievement of more adequate and appropriate ways of living.

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CHAPTER 2. *Hostility*

The Conception of the Enemy

ARTHUR GLADSTONE

At the present time many people in this country regard Russia as the enemy (or all the Communist countries together or simply all Communists wherever they are). And many people in Russia similarly regard the United States as the enemy (or all the capitalist countries together or simply all capitalists wherever they are). Throughout history there have been countless examples of such hostile pairings. There are some basic patterns which seem to hold for nearly all such antagonisms. Each side believes the other to be bent on aggression and conquest, to be capable of great brutality and evil-doing, to be something less than human and therefore hardly deserving respect or consideration, to be insincere and untrustworthy, etc. To hold this conception of the enemy becomes the moral duty of every citizen, and those who question it are denounced. Each side prepares actively for the anticipated combat, striving to amass the greater military power for the destruction of the enemy. Many actions which are ordinarily considered immoral become highly moral when carried out against the enemy. Often people praise their compatriots for the same actions they condemn in the enemy. The approaching war is seen as due entirely to the hostile intentions of the enemy. The only way to prevent the war is to frighten the enemy by achieving and maintaining military superiority (in fact, by outdoing the enemy in the use of methods for which the enemy is generally condemned).

Arthur Gladstone, "The Conception of the Enemy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1959), pp. 132-137. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.

Eventually the growing hostility and the military preparations do lead to war, each side believing that the war was made necessary by the actions of the other. In the hope of contributing to understanding of this often-repeated pattern of interaction, I propose to discuss an important mechanism contributing to the conception of the enemy.

Perhaps a good way to begin is by pointing out that there are some very definite advantages in having an enemy. For example, among the advantages which many of us in the United States derive from having Russia as an enemy are the following: We have the very considerable stimulation to our economic system provided by the manufacture of armaments and preparations for war in general. (It is true that equivalent economic stimulation could be provided by other measures, such as provisions for human welfare, but there is a great deal of opposition to such measures.) We are provided with a satisfying explanation for many conditions and events that displease us. Politicians are provided with a sure-fire campaign issue and vote-getter. The rest of us are provided with a crusade in which all can participate. Let us not underestimate the great psychological satisfactions provided by a crusade. There is the smug satisfaction arising from the recognition that we are morally superior to the Russians. There is the self-respecting satisfaction arising from the feeling of being needed by the cause, of being able to make a social contribution. And there is the red-blooded satisfaction of being able to hate and to prepare to kill and destroy without feeling qualms of conscience. Similarly, the Russians derive great advantages from having the United States as an enemy, but it is probably not necessary to detail them here.

However, the various advantages of having an enemy do not in themselves account for the belief in the enemy. It is not a general rule that men believe what it is convenient to believe. We need to examine the circumstances under which this can happen. We also need to examine the factors which determine that two particular nations become each other's enemies instead of some other pairing.

Psychoanalysts have been especially concerned with beliefs which are convenient but which embody distorted representations of reality. We may therefore hope to obtain from psychoanalytic investigations and theorizing some help in understanding the belief in an enemy. Psychoanalytic theory provides a classification for the various forms of reality distortion, which are known as defense mechanisms. A defense mechanism serves to protect an individual from becoming aware of things which would cause him an intolerable amount of anxiety. The things kept from awareness are usually facts about the individual himself or about other people important to him. Among the defense mechanisms are: repression (which is basic to all the others), projection, rationalization, isolation, denial, reaction formation, etc.

Projection is the defense mechanism which is most relevant for understanding the conception of the enemy.¹ Projection is the ascription to others of impulses, feelings, and other characteristics which exist in an individual but which he cannot admit to himself. Projection is seen in extreme form in paranoid mental patients with delusions of persecution. These people project to others hostile feelings which they cannot admit having themselves. The operation of projection becomes clearest when such a patient attacks someone who is not bothering him. The patient explains that this attack was made purely in self-defense, that the other person had actually attacked him first, or was just about to attack him, or was part of the plot against him. (Paranoia involves other mechanisms besides projection, particularly reaction formation against homosexual attraction, but we mention it here only as an illustration of projection.)

In milder forms than this the mechanism of projection is quite common, so common that we have all experienced it. For example, when we make a mistake or cause an accident through carelessness, we sometimes project the blame to some inanimate object. "The poor workman blames his tools," says the proverb. When we break something or lose something or when we are late for an appointment or make an embarrassing slip, we often find ourselves looking for some person or circumstance onto which we can project the blame.

What factors determine whether an individual will use the mechanism of projection with respect to a given item of feeling or behavior? One factor is the extent to which the item is unacceptable to the individual. To what extent is it incompatible with his self-conception? Would it be only slightly discomforting to acknowledge this about himself or highly anxiety-arousing? A second factor is the extent to which the individual's past history and personality make it possible for him to project. A third factor is the availability of a suitable object onto which he can project, a suitable scapegoat. Feelings of hostility can more convincingly be projected onto someone who is actually rather hostile than onto someone who is rather friendly.

At this point an objection may be raised. If hostility is ascribed to an individual who is actually rather hostile, why should this be called projection? Is it not simply a realistic understanding of the hostile individual? There are several important characteristics of projection which help to distinguish between projection onto an individual who is an appropriate object

¹A number of writers (e.g., 1, 2, 5, 6, 7) have already pointed out that projection may play a part in the development of international hostility. The purposes of the present paper are to present this important concept clearly to a largely non-psychoanalytic audience and to emphasize its research possibilities somewhat more than previous writers have done.

and the realistic understanding of that individual.² The most important characteristic is that projection involves a denial of some fact about one's self. The individual who projects sexual impulses or hostile impulses onto another person denies that he himself has such impulses toward that person. The denial involved in projection facilitates a black-and-white picture of interpersonal situations, a picture in which the projector is completely innocent and the other party is completely to blame for any difficulty or unpleasantness. Another important characteristic is that the projector generally has little or no evidence for his accusation, and, when he does have evidence, it does not seem to be the basis for his conviction; if his evidence is discredited, he will find or manufacture other evidence. A third characteristic is that the projector's apparent insight into the personality of the other is frequently limited to the particular trait or traits which he denies in himself. Related to this is a fourth characteristic, a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the projected trait, even to see it as the key to the whole personality of the other. A fifth characteristic is the tendency to assume that the trait projected onto the other represents conscious motivation, whereas, if it is actually true of the other, it is quite likely to involve unconscious motivation. A sixth characteristic is the tendency to see the projected trait as having especial reference to one's self. Thus, if the other is seen as hostile, he is likely to be seen as especially hostile to the projector. Finally, the seventh characteristic which distinguishes projection is that the projector's accusation of the other often turns out, very conveniently, to be useful as justification for similar behavior by the projector. A familiar example is the zealous guardian of public morals, who projects his sexual interest and curiosity onto others and then finds it his duty to seek out obscene material in order to protect others from it. The use of projection as a justification is especially important, and especially dangerous, in international conflict. An example is provided by a speech made at a recent American Legion meeting. According to the newspaper account:

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, USA, (Ret.) said last night the Soviet Union, not the United States, will decide when and if World War III starts. . . .

He said: "When the Soviet Union is prepared, when it is ready, when it thinks the time is ripe for success, then the decision will be made to start World War III. And nothing we do is going to affect that decision."

For this reason, Casey told the Legionnaires, the United States should not hesitate to act aggressively in trying to keep world peace (8).

I have already mentioned three factors which affect the occurrence of

²Sapenfield (7) gives a good description of the characteristics and functioning of projection. Among the earliest presentations of the concept of projection are two papers by Freud (3, 4). The account of projection given here has drawn from these sources but also includes aspects which neither of these authors mentions.

projection (unacceptable aspects of the self, past history, and availability of a scapegoat). Now we need to make three additions to the list, which apply particularly to the kind of projection that is relevant for international conflict. One additional factor is the amount of contact between the projector and the object of projection. Projection can occur and be maintained more readily when the object is distant, not easily accessible for verification of characteristics. The distance which facilitates projection can be physical distance and it can also be social distance, which interferes with free interaction and the development of an accurate conception of the other.

The second factor to be added is the climate of opinion. We generally find it easier to share the beliefs of others than to oppose them. Many people believe the earth is round simply because everybody else believes it too. Widely held projections are a special case of this social influence on our beliefs. It is easier to believe that the sexual desires of Negro men are a threat to white womanhood if your friends and neighbors believe it too. Furthermore, if a belief is widely held it is much more likely to be acted on, since there is likely to be social approval for the action. Thus, a projection which is shared by a number of people is likely to have much more serious social consequences than if each of those people developed a different (though equally erroneous) projection.

The third factor to be added relates to the ability to project onto a group of people, such as a political or ethnic group, or a nation. This would seem to require that the group be personified, so that it is thought of somewhat as a single individual, or that the group members be regarded as essentially similar to one another. These ways of thinking about groups seem to be extremely common, so this is probably not very much of a limiting factor.

Thus far I have talked about the derogatory conceptions of one another held by hostile nations and have implied that these conceptions are not completely realistic. I have suggested that the psychoanalytic concept of projection may help us to understand the conception of the enemy, and I have pointed out six factors which affect the operation of projection.³ (By the way, I have *not* meant to suggest that projection is the only mechanism which influences the conception of the enemy nor that the conception of the enemy is the sole cause of war.) It is now time to show how the details of this approach can be filled in and its usefulness tested by research.

If this approach is to be applied to the current international situation, perhaps the first question to be asked is: To what extent do our conceptions of the Russians and their conceptions of us involve projection rather than realistic appraisal? For simplicity, I shall talk in terms of studies to be carried

³These six factors should be taken as hypotheses rather than as well-established principles. There are varying amounts of evidence for them, but the evidence is not conclusive for any of them.

out in this country; it would obviously be desirable to carry out corresponding studies in Russia.

One possibility would be to compare the conceptions which various individuals have of themselves with the conceptions they have of Russians, perhaps using techniques similar to those used in studies of stereotypes. Are the traits which an individual regards as especially reprehensible also the ones which he denies in himself and ascribes to the Russians? Russophobes, Russophiles, and relatively neutral individuals might be compared. It would be desirable to have objective information about the personality of each individual to compare with his conception of himself.

Another possibility would be to have subjects give their reactions to accounts of specific actions by Russia (such as military preparations, offers to negotiate, antagonistic speeches, conciliatory speeches, etc.) and also to accounts of similar actions by the United States. It would be of interest to learn the motivations ascribed to those responsible for a given action, the subject's approval or disapproval of it, and his estimate of its probable consequences. We would expect those who project to interpret similar actions by the United States and by Russia in quite different terms, in accordance with their projections. Later recall of accounts of these actions might also be studied to see whether there are memory distortions which indicate projection.

A third possibility might be the development of a test of an individual's general tendency to use the mechanism of projection. An individual's performance on this test might be compared with his conception of Russians.

If studies along these lines were to show, as I believe they would, that our thinking about the Russians (and their thinking about us) involves a great deal of projection, this would make it important to carry out a number of additional studies to increase our understanding of this problem and to see what can be done about it. I will mention briefly some of the topics to be studied: how the tendency to project develops and the effects of various childhood situations and child-rearing procedures; investigation and further specification of the factors affecting projection which were suggested above; the extent to which men in positions of power, such as political leaders, make use of projection in their thinking about the Russians; the ways in which news and information about Russia are handled in the mass media and the effects of this handling on the audience's conception of the Russians (this could be studied in relation to the personality dynamics and the tendency to project of various communicators and various segments of the audience); the effects of exchange programs, foreign travel, and other forms of contact (again, in relation to the personality dynamics and tendency to project of the participants); the effects of psychotherapy, especially psychoanalysis, on the tendency to project and on the conception of the Russians. It should be possible to develop other methods for promoting

more realistic thinking about the Russians and to do action research on their use and effectiveness.

Before closing, there is a final question to be considered. Suppose that the basic hypothesis of this paper (that projection plays an important role in our conception of the Russians and their conception of us) should turn out to be correct. Suppose, further, that we were to discover and apply methods for eliminating projection from our thinking. Would we be any better off than we are now? How would this affect the fact of two antagonistic power systems with differing ideologies competing for world domination and threatening each other with nuclear weapons? It would, I believe, change our ability to deal with this situation and to control its destructive potentialities. If the danger from the opponent could be seen in realistic terms, instead of being greatly exaggerated as a result of projection, it should be possible to devise reasonable ways of dealing with the danger instead of preparing for a holocaust which will destroy both sides. If the people on each side could recognize the extent to which their own actions serve to provoke and frighten the other side, instead of placing all the blame on the "enemy," it should help tremendously in working out disarmament proposals which will serve to protect both sides instead of being to the advantage of one's own side. And if the people on both sides could recognize the extent to which they have needs and goals which are compatible, and even mutually dependent, this should facilitate the development of co-operative arrangements which are a necessary basis for peaceful relationships.

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CHAPTER 3. Aggression

A Structural Theory of Aggression

JOHAN GALTUNG

1. Introduction

This theoretical essay is concerned with the conditions of aggression. We shall define aggression somewhat vaguely as 'drives towards change, even against the will of others'.¹ The extreme forms of this phenomenon are crimes, including homicide, between individuals; revolutions, including elimination, between groups; and wars, including genocide, between nations. These forms make aggression negative and problematic, a cause of

¹This is different from standard definitions in the field, e.g. the famous definition given by Dollard that aggression is any 'sequence of behavior, the goal-response to which is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed'. This definition is also used in the standard work by Berkowitz, L., *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962). But we agree with Klineberg when he writes (*The Human Dimension of International Relations*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, p. 11) that 'The question of universality of aggression is further complicated by considerable difference in the definition of the term itself. One writer, for example, refers to the original meaning of aggression as a tendency to go forward or approach. This is regarded as instinctive, whereas the inborn or instinctive nature of hostility has never been demonstrated. Another describes it as the will to assert and to test our capacity to deal with external forces, and it is this, rather than hostility, that is a fundamental characteristic of all living beings' (p. 10). But universality or fundamentality still leaves us with the problem of where or for whom aggression in this broad sense is most pronounced, and with the problem of under what conditions aggression expresses itself as hostility. We use aggression somewhat in the sense of 'self-assertion', but only insofar as this self-assertion implies an effort to change social relations, i.e. no longer to comply with existing conditions.

concern and prevention. But one can also turn the coin and look at the other face: aggression as the driving force in history, as the motivational energy that moves mountains. However, we shall be mainly concerned with aggression in its extreme forms where it becomes a drive to hurt and harm others because they stand in the way of one's own self-assertion, and not look at the good causes this may serve in the aggressors' own minds. Aggression in this sense is pervasive, important and catastrophic, with modern technology as a multiplier. It should be studied at its roots, at the very points where it emerges.

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2. The Hypothesis about Rank-Disequilibrium

Imagine that we have a system of elements that are *actors* in the traditional social science sense of having goals and being capable of directing actions towards them, and that they interact with each other. Concretely, we are thinking of three such types of systems: the system of *individuals* found in a group and particularly in a nation; the system of *groups* found in a nation if the groups are so homogenized and organized that they can be seen as actors, and the *nations* in an international system. However, we shall prefer to proceed with the general theory for a while without making references to these three interpretations, and only return to them at length later on.

Even under these very general conditions it seems difficult to find counterexamples to the following: 1) There will be a *division of labor* in the sense that the elements will not carry out the same tasks all the time; 2) The elements will tend to be *ranked* according to a number of criteria evaluating their position in the system; and 3) The relative position of the elements according to these criteria will have a certain *stability*. All we are saying by this is that *stratification* seems to be a universal phenomenon. The distance from 'high' to 'low' can be reduced, the consequences of stratification can be alleviated, but it cannot be declared to be non-existent. If one wants an egalitarian society where everybody has the same rank this must be arrived at by such techniques as making an element that is low in one context high in another context (compensation) or letting individuals who have high ranks in one period have low ranks in the next period (rotation). It cannot be done by abolishing differential ranking as such. For as long as there is interaction there will tend to develop a certain cultural similarity, and as soon as this is the case the element that has more of, or is closer to, or is more in agreement with the values of the system will rise high, and the elements that have little of these values and seem to be far from realizing them—whether it is might and glory, power, intelligence, money, beauty, health—will stay low in the system.

Thus, an interaction system is a multidimensional system of stratification,

where those who have and those who have not, those who have more and those who have less, find, are given, or are forced into their positions. For the sake of simplicity, let us deal with these criteria of rank in terms of two positions only—high and low. We shall refer to them as *topdog* and *underdog* positions (T and U). Thus, an element in a system with five rank criteria, will have a profile, say TUTTU, the interpretation of which depends on what kind of system and what kind of dimensions we are referring to. It may, for instance, stand for 'high on power, low on income, high on occupation, high on education, low on ancestry' (for individuals or groups) or 'high on military power, low on income *per capita*, high on industrialization, high on educational level, low on past glory' (for nations), and one may discuss how likely the configuration is. But two configurations are beyond doubt: the complete topdog, TTTTT, and the complete underdog, UUUUU, are both well-known occurrences in any social system, individual or national. We shall refer to these two as 'equilibrated positions', since the ranks of the elements in these positions are in equilibrium with each other; they are equivalents.

With five dimensions and two positions on each there are 32 possible configurations, or in general 2^n combinations when n dimensions are used in the analysis. The theoretical problem is now: *where in the system, for what social types, is aggression most likely to accumulate and express itself?* For common sense as well as social experience make us doubt that aggression is randomly distributed on the configurations or social positions.

With the conceptual apparatus developed so far there are three possible answers: aggression will mainly come from the elements equilibrated at the top (the complete topdog), mainly from the elements equilibrated at the bottom (the complete underdog), or mainly from the elements in rank-disequilibrium, i.e. the elements with some positions high and some positions low.

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We then turn to our hypothesis which is very simple:

*Aggression is most likely to arise in social positions in rank-disequilibrium. In a system of individuals it may take the form of crime, in a system of groups the form of revolutions, and in a system of nations the form of war. But these extreme forms of aggression are unlikely to occur unless 1) other means of equilibration towards a complete topdog configuration have been tried, and 2) the culture has some practice in violent aggression.*¹³

¹³The condition of rank-disequilibrium is, of course, not a necessary condition for aggression. Aggression may arise for other reasons. And it is hardly a sufficient condition either—perfect relationships between variables are rarely if ever found in the social sciences—but we shall argue later that for high levels of disequilibrium aggression seems to be a very probable consequence.

We shall now present extensive comments on this hypothesis. Thus, to take up one point immediately: in another paper¹⁴ we have discussed this problem from a different angle. In a world consisting mainly of complete topdog and complete underdog positions there will be nobody present to bridge the gap between the two. Hence, a conflict between the TTTT and the UUUU would not be alleviated by the presence of mixed combinations that could serve partly as communication bridges, partly as a reservoir of neutrals who could be brought in as mediators and in general dampen the conflict (the classical theory of 'criss-cross'). A shortcoming of this theory is its neglect of aggressive needs located in the unbalanced combinations. Thus, the theory we are presenting here is in a sense complementary to the other theory: for the classical criss-cross theory, disequilibrated combinations will fulfill an aggression-binding function whereas for the present structural theory of aggression disequilibrium is a reservoir of aggression.

Since the predictions that follow from these two theories are contradictory there is an obvious need for a meta-theory. Just to indicate one possible line of thought: it is possible that the criss-cross theory presupposes 1) a high degree of system integration in order for the communication and mediation effects to be present and 2) good chances for the disequilibrated combinations to become equilibrated in a legitimate way. If the degree of system integration is low, as in the international system, and many mobility channels are blocked, the aggression effect will probably predominate over the criss-cross effect. We suggest this as a fascinating topic of future theoretical and empirical research.

3. The Theory about How Disequilibrium Works

The thesis is very simple and the theory behind it is also simple. It rests on a comparison between the social situation of, say, a TU and a UU, in our terminology. There are three such differences that seem to be decisive in this context.

a. *Disequilibrium Means Differential Treatment.* We have assumed that rank matters in the sense that the elements are treated according to their rank. An element in a TU position will be constantly reminded of his objective state of disequilibrium by the differential treatment he is exposed to. This will force a correspondence between his objective situation and his subjective perception of it—unless he cuts out interaction in one direction or the other. If he does so, he is actually living in a world with only one rank-dimension. But if he does not, disequilibrium will be a part of his phenomenological existence, and the idea of rectification may occur.

¹⁴*Rank and Social Integration* (Oslo: Peace Research Institute, stencil 10-2, 1963), to be published in Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, *Sociological Theories in Progress* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965).

However, we do not have to presuppose, for the sake of the theory, that an ideology of rectification has to be fully developed, or even perceived at all—only that the objective existence of disequilibrium will cause an instability in the life-style of the person or the nation, and cause what is often referred to as an ‘unstable self-image’.

In more sociological terms, the crux of the matter is the high probability that the disequilibrated TU will use TT as his reference group even if UU is his membership group, whereas a complete underdog, UU, may not even dare to think in terms of TT as a reference group; the complete topdog will be beyond his imagination. The absolute deprivation of the UU may be higher, but the TU has relative deprivation built into his position. The destabilizing effect of this discrepancy will produce a mobility pressure, and the thesis is then that if there are no open channels of mobility, rectification of the disequilibrium will be carried out by other means. In this process two other aspects of the disequilibrium situation are of major importance.

b. *Disequilibrium Means Resources.* We have commented on the effects on the TU of having one foot in either camp, for instance, of being white and poor, as nation or as individual. Obviously, the position in the top camp not only creates the motivation towards equilibration, but also some of the resources that will come in handy in the struggle. The *nouveau riche* may be green, but he is nevertheless rich and the stories about him are about his efforts to obtain balance by converting money into culture and prestige. The small, overcrowded but economically developed nation has in its economic potential the possibility for conversion into military power with subsequent territorial expansion. The member of the intellectual proletariat may be low on almost everything, and yet have in his intellectual maturity, knowledge and academic discipline, invaluable tools that can be converted into power, high-ranking occupations and income. And the ‘white’ but ‘poor’ nation may draw on its kinship with white and rich nations to gain influence and recognition, as is the case with many Latin-American nations.

c. *Disequilibrium Means Self-Righteousness.* Our culture seems to be more dominated by themes of balance and adequacy than by the theme of compensation. We have no empirical backing for this, but there seem to be more cases of people and nations saying ‘considering our high rank on X it is right and proper that we should also have a high rank on Y, because that corresponds to what is due to us’ than of people and nations saying ‘considering my low ranks everywhere I think I am entitled to some compensation on at least one dimension’. Claims must be justified not only in the eyes of the others but also in the eyes of the claimants themselves; they must feel they are right to the point of self-righteousness. In the kind of achievement-oriented world in which we live, claims will be based on

achievement rather than on lack of achievement—in the latter case they are usually made explicit by others and the Welfare State is an example of the institutionalization of rank-compensation.

* * * *

To summarize: it is socially guaranteed, by the very structure of the system, that the disequilibrated is never left in peace with his disequilibrium unless he cuts out and closes down some interaction channels. In this unstable situation he has both the resources and the inner justification needed for acts of deviance. Nevertheless, we do not hypothesize aggression unless 1) other means of rectification have been tried and 2) the culture has some practice in aggression.

4. More about Rank-Dimensions and Disequilibria

The time has now come to be more specific about the rank-dimensions. These are concerned with the most crucial things of life, the matters for which people live and die.¹⁶ But they differ tremendously, and should be

¹⁶The following list may be useful as a reference. We have presented two sets of variables for nations, depending on whether the variables are 'analytic' (based on statistical information about individuals) or 'global', i.e. *sui generis*.

<i>Individual Dimensions</i>	<i>Nations, Analytic</i>	<i>Nations, Global</i>
1. Age (adults v. adolescents and children)	} population pyramid	Age as a nation
2. Sex (men v. women)		
3. Family ('good' v. 'bad')		
4. Primogeniture ('first born')		Alliances ('good' v. 'bad')
5. Race (Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid, etc.)	rates of racial composition	Doyen in a group of nations
6. Ethnicity (Gentiles v. Jews, emigrants v. immigrants)	rates of ethnical composition	Dominant culture
7. Ecology (urban v. rural)	rate of urbanization	
8. Geography (center v. periphery)		Central v. peripheral nation
9. Nation (for individuals only—all national variables relevant as context)		
10. Education (degree)	rate of literacy	Educational structure
11. Occupation, split into		Occupational structure
a. sector (tertiary, secondary, primary)	1-rate in primary occupations	
b. position (high v. low)	1-rate of population in low occupations	Social structure
12. Ideology ('right' v. 'wrong')	rates of believers	Dominant ideology
13. Income, property (rich v. poor-'dispossessed'; bourgeoisie v. proletariat)	per capita income = per capita consumption + per capita investment standard of living	Stage of economic growth
14. Power (rulers v. subjects)	rate of popular participation	GNP (development)
		natural resources
		utilization of resources (rate of growth)
		Political structure
		International power

analyzed from at least three angles: 1) is it possible, both in theory and in practice, for one element to change position at all, 2) how does the change of one element affect the position of the other elements, and 3) what kinds of disequilibria are most important?

Where the first problem is concerned the traditional distinction made in sociology between ascribed and achieved dimensions is useful. The ascribed position is known at birth, the achieved position is what the individual himself makes out of his life-situation. However, this conceals the important distinction between dimensions that are *indelible* in the sense that the element cannot escape from it (age, sex, race, primogeniture, family, ethnicity) and perhaps even *visible* (age, sex, race)—and the ‘delible’ dimensions like nationhood or ecological background which the individual can move away from—even though they are known at his birth. Achievement may also be so conditioned by the matrix of ascribed dimensions, as in most societies today (skill is not known at birth, but the possibility or impossibility of demonstrating it if it exists is known), that mobility becomes illusory except for persons with the particular mixture of good and evil that makes for mobility. The most aggression-provoking case is probably the half-open dimension of unfulfilled promises, but the completely closed channel will also serve to accumulate aggression unless *all* channels are closed.

The second problem is more interesting. Imagine a system with two elements and one dimension only: we are interested in how the position of one affects the position of the other. In principle, there are three possibilities. The *units* may be *positively coupled* in the sense that if one rises so does the other, and that they will also follow each other on the way down. Then, again, they may be *negatively coupled*: the rise of one is the fall of the other. And, thirdly, they may not be coupled at all. Different economic systems provide examples of all three. Concretely, the most dramatic example of negative coupling in the case of nations is the dimension of *area*: one nation's gain will have to be the loss of one or more other nations unless the game can be made ‘variable-sum’ through the exploration of outer space (or as it was in the period of the great discoveries). And the

15. <i>Legality</i> (law-abiding v. law-breaking)	<i>rates of criminality</i>	<i>Legality</i>
16. <i>Health</i> (well v. ill)	<i>rates of morbidity etc., life expectancy</i>	<i>Medical structure</i>
17. <i>Knowledge</i> (those who know v. those who do not know)		<i>Cognitive culture</i>
18. <i>Skill</i> (those who can v. those who cannot)		<i>Technical culture</i>
19. <i>Conviction</i> (the ‘true believers’ v. the others)	<i>rates of true believers</i>	<i>Ethical culture</i>
20. <i>Taste</i> (artists v. laymen)		<i>Esthetic culture</i>

same applies to property at any given point of time: one person's loss is somebody else's gain, unless the game is changed through such factors as destruction or creation of property or is stretched out in time.

Correspondingly, the *dimensions* may be coupled positively, negatively, or not at all: the rising of a unit on one dimension may imply its rising on another dimension, or its fall, or it may imply nothing at all. More age means more power—at least the power to influence elections through voting, and so on.

In general it is obvious that dimensions with negative coupling between units are the dangerous ones, and this may lead one to speculate how many they actually are. With the concept of a nation tied to the idea of a territory, usually contiguous, international politics is dangerous precisely because of the simple metric quality of that dimension. Today national identity is linked to territory in a rigid way—but one can think away that condition even though only the Jews and some others have had long experience in territory-free national existence. Thus, one could imagine each nation as consisting of a non-negotiable geographical core surrounded by a periphery that could be exchanged for other goods or even lost with no irreparable damage done to national integrity and identity. Or one could imagine a world where all nations were like the Jewish nation prior to the birth of Israel—with a central authority, but no territory—where the nations mix much like strata in a society.

But even though it may serve the prevention of aggression to reduce the salience of competitive dimensions and increase the importance of the cooperative dimensions an important *caveat* should be inserted here. World economy can probably be structured in such a way that wealth becomes a cooperative dimension so that no unit's loss can be another unit's gain (if in no other way, by the simple method of taxation of such gains). But even if nations rise together on a dimension of prosperity there is one aspect of this dimension that will remain competitive forever: not absolute prosperity, but relative prosperity. One nation's gain of the no. 1 position, regardless of the absolute value, is another nation's loss. And this gives rise to a major question that can only be decided on empirically. What matters most, absolute or relative position? What is most important to a competitive pupil, to improve his grades or his relative position? If he improves his grades but slides back in relative rank, how does he look at the net balance of his achievement? And what about the nation accustomed to a no. 1 position in military power that is bypassed by another nation even if it has also itself increased its military capability?

Probably absolute positions are of paramount importance only in systems with little or no interaction or in extreme cases (e.g. below subsistence level). With a high level of interaction we know of nothing in

social science literature to disprove the idea that concern about relative position on a rank-dimension will increase, and since increase in interaction is a general trend in the world community this should make dimensions more, not less competitive, and conflicts for the reason we are discussing more, not less probable in the future.

Finally, we turn to the problem of distinguishing between disequilibria. To say that disequilibrium matters is not to say that all kinds of disequilibrium matter equally much. A typology of disequilibria is needed, and we shall discuss this from three angles, two of them formal and one of them substantive.

First of all, there is the obvious dimension of degree of disequilibrium. Imagine that we introduce a 'middledog', call him M. We define 'degree' of disequilibrium as internal distance between the ranks, which would make TTM less disequilibrated than TTU. Generally, the experience based on data from persons in disequilibrium tend to show that the effects of disequilibrium do not show up unless there is a considerable amount of disequilibrium present. The consequence is a tendency towards J-shaped relationships: deviation tendencies stay at the base level for equilibrium and low degrees of disequilibrium, and then rise quickly for high degrees of disequilibrium.

Secondly, there is the problem of disequilibrium *profile*. The sum of internal distances in the combinations TTU, UUT and TMU are the same, viz., 4, so we would expect more of an effect than for the combination TTM where the sum is 2. But do we expect the *same* effect with this crude measure of internal distance? *A priori*, one might argue that TTU is more desperate about his low status and UUT more proud about his high status, so that the former is the more aggressive, and then one might argue just the other way round. One might say that TMU is exposed to a particularly deviation-generating mixture, and one may say that his aggression will be neutralized precisely because of the complex social structure in which he finds himself. In other words, one should leave this problem to the data; their richness, provided they are good, will probably by far outdo even a good theoretical imagination.

Thirdly, there is the problem of *which* dimensions. Obviously, not all disequilibria even with the same profile will have the same deviation-generating effect. The effect will depend on the salience of the dimensions and of the disequilibrium. There is also the important suggestion made by Jackson²⁰ that the *achieved v. ascribed* distinction may be used here. Let us compare these two patterns with the same internal distance, based on three dimensions:

²⁰See Jackson (9, pp. 476 ff.)

<i>Dimension:</i>	<i>ascribed</i>	<i>achieved</i>	<i>ascribed</i>
Pattern 1	high	low	high
Pattern 2	low	high	low

Of the three mechanisms we have mentioned in the section on 'how disequilibrium works' this distinction should affect the third mechanism, the norm about justice, in particular. The unit with the second pattern is an overachiever relative to his ascribed case; the unit in the first pattern is an underachiever, and the overachiever more than the underachiever will feel that he deserves a fairer deal, at least in an achievement-oriented culture.

According to Jackson one might predict extrapunitivity for the overachiever and intrapunitivity for the underachiever; the overachiever will blame society for constraining him, the underachiever will blame himself for doing less than society or the system might expect from him. But the overachiever is in the difficult situation that he is low on ascribed dimensions where mobility, by definition, is impossible. Hence, he will have to fight like the educated Negro, not for white status, but for the elimination of race as a rank-dimension. Thus, outward aggression takes a form other than simple fight for mobility and scarce value; it may be a fight about the definition of value.

The underachiever, e.g. the white high-class who is low on education or income, might be more motivated to direct aggression to promote his own mobility. But just as likely is aggression due to a desire to keep what he has—perhaps precisely against the attacks of the overachiever. Thus, the two will be pitted against each other, probably with the strongest aggression potential for any possible pair of combinations. In more concrete terms, the underachiever may possibly be identified as a member of the extreme right and the overachiever as a member of the extreme left; the former will keep his privileges since that is the high basis he has in the system, the latter will deny the system of privileges or change them to his own advantage. Thus, we disagree with Jackson that outwardly directed aggression should necessarily be less probable for the underachiever, only that it *may* come as a reaction to the aggression of the overachiever and be less spontaneous.

It is interesting in this connection to compare the state of the Negroes in the USA and in Brazil. Comparisons are very often to the effect that there is less discrimination or prejudice in Brazil, but statistical data do not appear to demonstrate this. Rather, the impression is that there are more Negroes in higher positions in the USA than in Brazil. We shall only suggest an interpretation in terms of the present theory. If we have a nation where race and position are equilibrated we would predict a very low level of aggression, and hence more of a tendency to express oneself in accordance with the predominant ideology of our time, the ideology of racial equality.

Thus, there will be no laws prescribing segregation and little overt prejudice, for rank-equilibrium is built into the social structure.

On the other hand, imagine a nation where many Negroes are high in social position and many whites are low. In that case we would predict formal and informal barriers to secure segregation, and as a barrier against aggression resulting from the disequilibrium. In fact, the way to obtain 'racial equality' will be through the suppression of race as a dimension at all—and here as elsewhere the role of ideology and perception is probably tremendous. Thus, to the extent that these models are approximations to Brazilian and US reality the USA seems to be much further along the road towards racial equality than Brazil, only she is in a transitional period with tremendous potentials of aggression that Brazil has not yet really entered. The revolt of the Negroes in the USA is like the revolt of the colonies in this age of anti-colonialism: these are both efforts to eliminate dimensions, by making all citizens 'first class', or all nations 'independent'.

5. Methodology

The time has now come to look at the thesis from a methodological point of view. We shall discuss first procedures for testing the hypothesis, secondly some other properties of the theory.

The hypothesis relates two variables that describe elements: degree of rank-disequilibrium on the one hand and degree of aggressiveness on the other. For individuals the former is relatively easily measured. A considerable part of social science ingenuity has been invested in the development of good indicators of basic rank-dimensions. Most authors that have made use of this kind of thinking have trichotomized the dimensions in 'high', 'medium' and 'low', tabulated them against each other and used the distance from the diagonal of agreement as the measure of disequilibrium. One can also use rank-order and perhaps get a more sensitive measure, but it is only meaningful in relatively limited systems with a high interaction pitch.

For nations it should be possible to do the same. Increasingly good statistics are available for most dimensions of interest. Data are actually likely to be too good, not too bad—since only gross discriminations are necessary to test the theory. But the difficulty lies in finding which rank-dimensions to use. Obviously, this will vary with time and place. Christian or not, monarchy or not, socialist or not; such concepts may be meaningful and even clear rank-connnotations in some periods and not in others. One procedure for finding which rank-dimensions to use would be to peruse the writings and speeches of leading statesmen to see what dimensions they make reference to, and more particularly what disequilibria they make explicit reference to. Another procedure for the contemporary world would be to make use of opinion polls where a sample could be introduced to a large variety of rank-criteria and asked to rank the criteria in terms of

salience (for instance by means of paired comparisons or the technique of double alternatives). One could then pay particular attention to answers given by the elite.

As to aggressiveness there is a continuum from the idea of *change* in the structure of the system via the overt expression and propagation of such ideas and actions designed to change the social structure, to real aggression, i.e. efforts to pursue such ideas even against the will of other elements—and even at the expense of other elements. The extremes are, as mentioned, called *crime* in the individual case, *revolution* or *internal war* in the group case, and *external war* in the case of nations.

This means that there is a large variety of indicators. So far the only thing that has been explored systematically in the literature has been the individual case with attitudinal indicators, and the hypothesis has been well confirmed. The logically next step would be to use behavioral indicators. Thus, the theory would predict disproportionately great rank-disequilibrium among radical politicians, among criminals (especially those who are engaged in crimes against property), among leading revolutionaries and leaders of change-oriented groups in general, and among very bellicose nations.

For nations attitudinal indicators could be based on national polls and aggregate measures, or on elite polls, or on what the elite has expressed without being solicited by social scientists, e.g. in articles and speeches. Thus, it should be possible to test the idea that there is a disproportionately great desire for change in disequilibrated nations. And the behavioral indicators should not be too difficult to find with the growing experience social science gains with 'statistics of deadly quarrels'.

A major virtue of the hypothesis is that it should be valid both synchronically and diachronically. It should point out the likely aggressors at any given point in time, as was discussed in the introduction. But given one element, an individual or a nation and its history, the hypothesis should help us locate the periods of aggression in that history: the theory is dynamic. Thus, there is a piece of common folklore about radicalism and youth belonging together which gains in perspective if we apply this theory: the youth may be at the period of institutionalized disequilibrium with education high and most other dimensions low, the period of student riots and demonstrations. This is the age where change seems logical, inevitable and desirable and the attitude is known to taper off somewhat with age. The folklore interpretation is in terms of growing wisdom, 'he who is not a radical in his youth does not have a good heart, but he who is not a conservative when he becomes older does not have a good brain'. Our interpretation is in terms of growing equilibrium more than growing wisdom, and hence decrease in motivation due to decrease in relative deprivation. The condition is that the society permits this equilibration,

that there is structural provision for it—otherwise the result will be a society with pockets of accumulated disequilibrium that may one day burst and yield a revolution.

For diachronical tests of the theory the system could be observed through a period and the period divided into time-chunks of, say, from one to five years. For each time-chunk the elements should be rated according to degree of disequilibrium and degree of aggressiveness displayed. Since the theory does not predict overt aggression as an immediate outcome of disequilibrium (other alternatives are tried out first), the test of the hypothesis should provide for a time lag between disequilibrium and aggression, and more so for the behavioral and extreme forms than for the attitudinal and more tranquil forms. A great deal of experimentation with time cuts and lags will probably be necessary before a pattern can emerge.

In this process 'proof' by illustration should not be accepted. One can always 'prove' by the usual library hunt for ten cases in favor and one against (to show that one is not biased), but we have preferred to postpone the presentation of such data till they can be evaluated against a background provided by data amenable to statistical treatment.

One may ask: why not systematically study all wars during, for instance, the last one hundred and fifty years to find in how many cases the aggressing nation can be said to have been disequilibrated? There are two objections to this primitive procedure. First of all, a percentage of disequilibration among nations that aggress says nothing if it cannot be compared meaningfully with the corresponding percentage for nations that do not aggress. One is not interested in the percentage of belligerent nations that are disequilibrated, but in the percentage of disequilibrated nations that engage in aggressive acts. But apart from the trivial point about rules for percentaging there is another objection: the danger of running into a tautology. Given a war and an aggressor it is only a question of time and research imagination to dig up a rank-disequilibrium, for the number of dimensions along which a nation can be ranked is legion. Thus, the methodology will make the theory nonfalsifiable in practice. Undoubtedly, a test of the theory will require much speculation about relevant disequilibria, but the strength of the theory will depend on the ratio between number of types of disequilibria and number of aggressive acts they can explain. The lower the ratio the more powerful the theory; if each aggressive act should be explained by its own kind of disequilibrium we would still have a disequilibrium theory, but a far less powerful one.

A major advantage of this theory, in addition to its dynamic character, is that the hypothesis is meaningful across different levels of social organization. Individuals as well as groups and nations can be ranked in terms of rank-dimensions and aggression, although there will be problems in connection with the choice of indicators. Thus, the theory is a theory in

general conflictology, not in any of the special fields concerned (social psychology, sociology, international relations, not to mention history).

There are three aspects of this cross-level nature of the theory.

First of all, the theory points to a basic *isomorphism* between different levels of social organization. Disequilibrium is relatively easily identifiable at all levels, and its consequences are spelt out in the hypothesis. The hypothesis is about systems of interacting units and three interpretations are given; to the extent that the hypothesis is verified these three levels of organization will have to be isomorphic.

Secondly, there is the possibility of a *causal connection* between the levels. We shall not explore this, only indicate some possibilities. Disequilibrium at one level can lead to disequilibrium at another level: a highly disequilibrated individual may become the leader of a completely underdog group and lead it into disequilibrium by giving it power, property or education. The group, in turn, may lead the nation into disequilibrium. But we are more interested in the cases where disequilibrium at one level expresses itself as aggression at another level, as perhaps may be argued to be a description of the case of Hitler and Nazi Germany.

Thirdly, there is the problem of *interaction*. Imagine that a disequilibrated person brings a disequilibrated group to power in a disequilibrated nation. Would one not expect the motivational energy stored in these disequilibria to multiply rather than to add up, and to result in a particularly spectacular form of aggression? Again the case of Hitler's Germany comes to mind, but also, perhaps, the case of Castro's Cuba, and in general, new nations high on economy and with a more or less revolutionary leadership.

The methodological implication of this is not only the necessity of independent tests at all levels as pointed out above, but, in addition, the need to explore patterns of causality and interaction.

6. Discussion

Let us now imagine that there is something to this reasoning, at least in the statistical sense that disequilibrium in rank accounts for a major part of the variation in aggressive behavior. We can probably do this with some justification partly because some excursions into data seem to corroborate the theory, and partly because the contrary idea of placing the peak of the probability distribution for aggressiveness *a priori* on the points of equilibrium seems to lack theoretical justification. The question is *what follows from this*, can anything be said in more concrete terms about specific arrangements of systems, specific structures. With no value-implication to the effect that aggressiveness is an absolute evil, it is both theoretically and practically important to know something about conditions that promote or do not promote aggressiveness. We shall try to spell out some implications of this kind, mainly for the international system, since this is our major concern.

a. *The Consequences of Economic Development.* Economic development is a major issue of our times, for most people on earth probably the major issue. The motives for giving technical assistance are interesting. Economic and technical aid are defended (against the attacks from those who want to give less or nothing) on such diverse grounds as: 1) it buys us friends, who (a) will not attack us themselves (the direct insurance argument) and (b) will support us if somebody else attacks us (the indirect insurance argument); 2) it increases our military power by securing bases etc. in return; 3) it increases our political power by securing UN votes etc. in return; 4) it increases our economic power by tuning the market to our products or otherwise; 5) if we do not do it the others will do it and gain 1, 2, 3 and/or 4; 6) for humanitarian reasons, all human beings shall be guaranteed a minimum standard of living; 7) for reasons of justice: there is an equitable distribution of economic goods that should at least be approximated to; 8) because it promotes world peace. We are concerned with the last argument.

Some would say it follows directly from one or more of the first seven arguments, which may be true but is certainly not self-evident. Then it may be said that the transfer of technical economic assistance requires a kind of international cooperation and even superstructure that by itself will be conducive to a safer world community. But the argument is usually interpreted so as to mean something else: statesmen talk about the North-South conflict being of equal or even greater importance than the East-West conflict, alluding to the conflict between rich and poor nations. This may be true in more than one sense, but it does not follow that economic development is the remedy. Of course, it is a tautology to say that in a world where economic value has been evenly distributed (if such a world is imaginable) there will be no conflict because of differences in wealth. That leaves us with the conflicts due to similarities in wealth: the desire to be high in a relative sense, not only an absolute one, and the highly important factor that equally rich nations are often nations in more or less similar stages of economic (and even social) growth and hence will be competing for exactly the same goals, the same values, the same markets, the same friends.

But the argument is rather that economic development will deter the poor from joining together to rob the rich, for when they receive aid they will be deprived of the motive. The argument rarely specifies how this is going to happen in detail, and one reason may be that the idea is probably wrong. . . .

In other words, and to put it bluntly: economic development *per se* will probably create more, not less rank-disequilibrium and hence be conducive to more, not less aggression. It is unnecessary to add that this does not imply that it cannot be justified on other bases, or that economic development and technical assistance in particular cannot have peace-building

functions for other reasons, e.g. by contributing to international super-structure.

b. *The Conditions for Revolutions.* According to the theory presented the recipe for a revolution should be relatively clear. A revolution needs leaders and followers, and traditionally the leaders seem to come from somewhere high up in the tertiary sector of society where as the followers come from somewhere low down in the primary and secondary sectors. Thus, what is needed is first of all a sufficient amount of built-in disequilibrium in these social positions. If the point of departure is a feudal system, for instance a newly independent, formerly colonial territory, then one way of arriving at this would be as follows:

1. *Create universities* and other institutions of higher learning so as to turn out a sizeable number of intellectuals who feel they have a key—their high level of education—not only to their own well-being, but to the welfare of the whole society, e.g. economists, physicians.

2. *Make few positions available* so that the high educational status will not be translated into the kind of instrumentality that gives power. Regardless of the economic situation, this intellectual proletariat is a proletariat in the sense of not having access to the machinery they know (or think they know) how to turn. They are forced into other positions, and these positions will call for subsidiary capacities (accounting, typing, low administration) and the disequilibrium is created.

It should be noticed how easily such an intellectual proletariat is created: in the age of technical assistance and international fellowships it takes little time to turn out university graduates, but it still takes much time to tune an administration to an efficient utilization of their skills. The intellectuals will probably oversell their products precisely because they are underbought and underdemanded, and they will be feared, envied and hated by their rank opposites, the powerful non-intellectuals. Both sides will develop ideologies that make symbiosis less likely, as is so easily observed in most countries in Latin America. Thus, a climate for the emergence of revolutionary leadership is created, unless the rulers are clever enough to co-opt the intellectual proletariat by giving them something that tastes of power, e.g. by paying them for writing recommendations.

The revolutionaries may be able to sway a sufficient number of followers to do the footwork for them, but we are concerned with the structural conditions for automatic supply, not with special conditions. Thus, one simple formula is to copy what is mentioned above lower down, and in the primary or secondary sectors of society:

3. *Institute mass education* with a compulsory base and easy access to educational follow-up institutions of various kinds especially so as to permit

autodidactic leaders to emerge. The factor of self-righteousness will probably work more strongly for the autodidact than for the formally trained person, especially if he is high on what he has learnt himself and low on formal schooling. This contributes to an explanation of the role of typographers in social revolutions: their work brings them close to a source of rank-disequilibrium through studies.

4. *Make no other changes*, which means that the recent rise in education is not accompanied by any corresponding rise in economy or power.

Again, it should be noticed how easily this is done. Mass education, like mass medication, costs little compared to building dams or irrigation schemes or the creation of a sector of heavy industry. Also, like mass medication it can bring quick results and cause disequilibria. The disequilibrium caused by raising the hygienic standard without a corresponding rise in the economic basis is well known—to this can be added the effects of a free education market without a corresponding freedom in the markets of economics (goods) and politics (power).

Let us then add to these four conditions four more, and we should have a relatively good set of predictors:

5. *A pattern of boom followed by depression or repression*. . . .

6. *Contact* between the two (or more) disequilibrated groups, between the tertiary high and the primary or secondary low in disequilibrium. Urbanization provides the medium for such contacts, and is a rapidly increasing resource on the world level.

7. *An ideology* that does not have to explain the past or present nor to predict or prescribe the future, but has to provide a kind of semantic bridge over the social distances within the group urging change. This function of ideology, to provide a revolutionary group with emotive symbols that are easily applied and have the same reference for those who use them, is the more necessary the greater the social distance within the group.

8. *A charismatic leader*. The functions of personification and centralization are not easily satisfied without a leader. To say that he should have charisma is probably a tautology since the proof of his charisma lies in his ability to be a leader and sway people into action. But a personality with appeal across social distances is indispensable.

Any one of these conditions may serve as a spark to ignite the motivational energy stored in the disequilibrium mentioned in points 1–4—and all four together should be more than sufficient. . . .

c. *On the Number of Elements in a System*. All our reasoning so far has been with no reference whatsoever to the number, N , of elements in a system. This simple variable, number, is rarely used for other purposes than data analysis in social science; here we shall try to point out one

theoretical implication of *number*. We choose a simple world: it is ranked according to two dimensions and in a random way so that $\frac{1}{4}$ of the elements are TT, $\frac{1}{4}$ are TU, $\frac{1}{4}$ are UT and $\frac{1}{4}$ are UU. The question is: what difference, if any, does it make if this world has 4, 40, 400, 4,000 or 4 million elements?

We expect the drastic demands for reallocations to come from the TU and UT positions. But there is a long distance between making a demand, a request and open aggression, and the probability of aggression will also depend on the number of alternatives. With increasing N the number of combinations for a given element increases very rapidly. There is no need to enter into the mathematics of the combinations since they reflect nothing of substantive interest except the extreme rapidity with which the number of subsystems that can be formed increases with N.

Some of these subsystems may be belligerent coalitions that increase the probability of aggression. But there is another kind of subsystem which is more important in this context. To discover it one only has to recognize one way in which tensions are alleviated for disequilibrated individuals in intra-national systems: they form subsystems that dissolve the disequilibrium. A group of 100 TUs isolating themselves from the rest of the system will no longer see themselves as TUs; the dimensions are negated in the homogeneity of the groups. Thus, one university professor may feel entitled to more power, to the power that corresponds to his wisdom—together with 99 others he may be more concerned with minute differences in wisdom within the group than gross differences between his position and other positions in the society.

If the idea is simply that people and groups and nations like feeling superior or at least not inferior, then the implications are equally simple. A TU for $N = 4$ will have one other element to associate with (UU), whereas the TU will have 19 others for $N = 40$ (10 UU and the remaining 9 TU). The UT are excluded because their profiles lie over the profile for TU at one point. The gain in sources of gratification is conspicuous and continues: 1, 19, 199, 1,999, . . . On the other hand, as soon as these subsystems are formed they may serve to reduce effectively the number of elements until one has a supersystem of four elements, where the elements are complicated organizations bearing the TT, TU, UT and UU characteristics.

* * * *

If there is stability of the kind under discussion in systems consisting of one element on the one hand and systems consisting of many (hundreds, thousands, millions) on the other hand, then some conclusions can be drawn. Nations owe their stability, if they have any, to 1) a large number of individuals, and 2) a sufficiently complicated social structure in terms of all kinds of rank-dimensions to prevent a simplification to a very low number of groups. Of course, stability is enhanced by obliterating the rank-

dimensions, by making them irrelevant, as during a foreign occupation—but this is a rare occasion and when it does not obtain there is strength in number alone.

Similarly the international community should have its points of stability for the one world state as well as for a world consisting of a large number of nations. With the present trends the world is probably moving into the in-between region; for instance with two federations developing out of the NATO-alliance, (one North-American and one European), of the Warsaw alliance (Soviet and Eastern Europe), Asia (for or against China), Africa (Arab and bloc) and Latin America (Spanish and Portuguese) one is left with a dozen nations and all kinds of rank profiles. Formal political union is not necessary for such effects to be demonstrable: even now European nations play a counterpoint to the US; Eastern European nations (singly more than combined) to the USSR; in Asia a China-non-China division is meaningful; in Africa the Sahara is a dividing region and in Latin America the poor could well be pitted against the rich.

d. *On the Number of Dimensions.* It looks as if one may use the same argument about the stability in one and many, but not in few, for the number of dimensions. Of course, the number of dimensions is a more volatile characteristic of the system than the number of elements. But it is not operationally meaningless, as indicated in the section on methodology. One will have to count the number of criteria of ranking on which there is a degree of consensus above a pre-established level.

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The question is now whether there is a limit to this kind of reasoning set by the number of dimensions. A world with a very high number of salient dimensions would permit more flexibility; the number would serve as a cushioning against the effects of disequilibrium. For each new dimension gives a possibility upwards, and hence a source of gratification, especially if different nations climb on different dimensions. To take an example: sports competitions and 'contests' as to which nation has the highest number of Nobel laureates both define positions that can be highly gratifying and compensating. Our hypothesis, then, is that a U position may loom high in the national conscience if it is surrounded by one or a couple of T positions but not if it is surrounded by very many such positions. Then it may even be turned into a point of pride: look at what we have been able to do in spite of that handicap (the national ethos of the small nations in North-West Europe, Norway for instance, illustrates the case).³² Again, if the U is surrounded by nothing because the system is seen

³²Norwegians love *per capita* statistics, for the simple reason that many indicators when divided by a small population will make Norway rank relatively high.

as one-dimensional, then the hypothesis is that an attitude of acquiescence will be more likely, for there is no disequilibrium present to provoke restlessness.

The consequence of this is a prediction of stability in extremely monolithic and extremely pluralistic cultures—in the former there will be one criterion, in the latter many, for pluralism is precisely a multi-faceted basis for evaluation. Again, it may look as if the world is presently moving towards the in-between region. Communications and international organization make greater areas relevant for each other—but at the same time the richness in total cultural variation is broken down. But what could be called the world consensus is probably richer today than the narrow military-economic basis of evaluation prevalent during the period of colonialism.

Combined with the preceding section this means roughly the following: the world is neither in the simple monolithic world-state, nor in a very pluralistic system of numerous and small nations—say a couple of thousand. The world is in-between and in a situation where there is considerably less than maximum protection to be found in the formation of subsystems. We are then thinking not only of the subsystems where nations that feel similar keep together, but also of cultural subsystems where a nation regards as salient only some dimensions. She may pick the dimensions where she ranks high—and receive gratification. But, undoubtedly, she may also pick precisely the dimensions that present her with a maximum internal disequilibrium—so richness and variety in number of dimensions give a potential for containment of aggression, not a fool-proof recipe.

In general, one may say that this perspective implies a number of connections between change and conflict, between the causes of disequilibria and their aggressive dissolution. Social change is structural; it may, for instance, introduce new and usually disequilibrated rank-combinations. Or it may distribute new resources more evenly, which is another way of saying that some complete or nearly-complete underdogs will rise on one or more dimensions due to mass education, prosperity, universal suffrage or, on the national level, to such factors as freedom from colonialism or economic development. The result is disequilibrium with consequent aggression until more equilibrated combinations of rank-sets are achieved—or a precarious balance between equilibrated and disequilibrated combinations as described by the criss-cross theory. And thus world history unfolds itself, and makes aggression as lasting as rank-disequilibrium, that is, as long as human society exists. But that does not imply, of course, that the forms of aggression will necessarily be as dangerous as is the case today, nor that social change will always cause as much rank-disequilibrium as it does today.

In a sense the whole theory is located somewhere between purely system-oriented theories of aggression (like the theories of Richardson processes) and purely element-oriented theories (attributing aggression to national character). According to the theory it is the rank-balance within a unit that counts, not the rank-balance between units. But this balance within is defined with reference to the balance between and is meaningless except in a system context. In fact, as indicated in the reasoning about the formation of subsystems, the system reference is indispensable if one is to decide whether an element is in equilibrium or not.

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(on rank-disequilibrium)

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Influences Making for Aggression

OTTO KLINEBERG

The literature on aggression in individuals and in societies is so extensive that no attempt can be made here to do justice to more than a small part. For purposes of convenience, the material can be divided into two broad groups. On the one hand there are the attempts to explain aggression by describing the patterns of culture and the social organization which predispose toward aggressive action against a presumed enemy. Stress is then laid on the extent to which aggression is accepted or rejected through the mores or folkways of a community. In this sense aggression, including the form of group aggression known as warfare, is a social institution. It is developed in certain communities more than in others. It is to be explained partly by historical and partly by economic factors, but it exists in a community because it has been accepted by that community as a sanctioned form of behavior. From this view a society can be described as having a greater or lesser "aggressiveness" as indicated by its readiness to embark upon this particular activity. On the variations among societies in this respect, the richest sources of material are cultural anthropology and history.

A second major approach to the problem sees the explanation of aggression in terms of the psychology of the individuals making up a particular society. From this view, the "social influences throughout life" are mainly the actual experiences of individuals, usually in early life, which create a need for, or at least a tendency toward, aggressive behavior. This approach usually leans heavily on psychoanalytic theory and on clinical experience, which throw light on the way in which aggression enters into individual behavior. By a sort of extrapolation such individual aggressiveness and the factors responsible for it are used as an explanation for group aggression as well. The material illustrating this point of view is found mainly in the writings of psychoanalysts and, secondarily, in those of

Otto Klineberg, "Influences Making for Aggression," Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 62: Tensions Affecting International Understanding (1960), pp. 187-212. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted.

psychologists interested in exploring the validity of the psychoanalytic hypotheses.

It is not suggested that these two major approaches have always been carried on in mutual disregard of each other. There are instances in which both a social or cultural and an individual or biographical method have been combined for the purpose of understanding aggression within a community. It must be admitted, however, that such instances are rare, and that the literature contains many more examples of one or the other of these major approaches in isolation than in combination.

The Cultural Approach

Stuart Chase has stated that the most important contribution of social science in recent years is represented by "the culture concept."¹ The enthusiasm for this concept arises primarily from the fact, which is of undoubted importance, that the behavior of groups (e.g., nations) is to be understood not in terms of inborn, biologically-determined tendencies but rather through all the socially-determined and learned activities which are included in the notion of "culture." Anthropologists and sociologists have certainly performed a very useful function, with far-reaching implications, in showing that human groups are capable of tremendous variations in behavior and institutions, and that these variations are to be explained not in terms of genes but of social history.

Their materials have special importance for problems of aggression. The argument that war, for example, is due to instinctively-determined aggressive impulses is completely refuted by the accumulated evidence indicating how societies differ in their aggressive behavior. Many years ago Hobhouse and associates² were able to show that in a number of cultures war was simply nonexistent. The more recent surveys by Quincy Wright³ and George P. Murdock⁴ have similarly concluded that war is by no means an inevitable accompaniment of social life. This much can be said without fear of contradiction. It is not as easy, however, to demonstrate why war should have developed in certain communities and not in others.

Various reasons for wars have been given: They have been explained as caused by economic factors and the desire for gain, by religious motives, by the desire for prestige and glory, and so forth. Such general explanations do not tell us enough. We still do not know why one group goes to war to

¹ *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 50.

² L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, London School of Economics, Series of Studies in Economics and Political Science, Monographs on Sociology No. 3 (1915).

³ *A Study of War* (2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

⁴ *Social Structure* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949).

obtain booty, while another group in a similar economic position makes no use of war as an instrument of material gain. We do not learn from the ethnologists how or why the prestige motive becomes hypertrophied in one community rather than in another; or why, when it does become hypertrophied, war should be used as the means of obtaining glory. The culture concept is of undoubted importance; but for the most part ethnologists furnish us with no explanation of how a particular aspect of culture develops, or of why it varies so greatly in frequency and intensity from one community to another.

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Aggressiveness in the Individual

In their writings many psychoanalysts implicitly or explicitly assume that the aggressive behavior of any particular group is to be explained by a tendency toward aggression in individuals composing that group. There is no marked consensus among the psychoanalysts, however, as to the origins of this aggression. Freud in the later development of his theory spoke of a "death instinct" which manifests itself in aggressive behavior, and which is apparently found in every individual. Its form may vary but its existence, in his view, is inevitable. Other psychoanalysts who have dealt with this problem in some detail have not always accepted this assumption that aggressiveness as such is an innately determined form of behavior. They have sought rather in the early experiences of the individual an explanation of the origins of aggression, which they have frequently seen as caused by certain other factors in the developing personality.

H. S. Lippman,⁸ for example, indicates that aggression may be traced to several causes and may be used as an instrument of a number of impulses. There is, in his view, a close relationship between frustration, anxiety, and aggression; the anxious and frustrated child is aggressive. Aggression may also be due to feelings of guilt. It may also follow from rejection of the child by the parents on the one hand, or from overprotection or exaggerated solicitude on their part on the other.

This opposition between those who regard aggression as instinctive and those who explain it as the result of early experiences, particularly of a frustrating character, may be less important than it would seem at first glance since it is obviously impossible for a child to grow up as a member of any society without some frustration. It might therefore be argued that aggression becomes inevitable in any case. From the viewpoint of therapy, however, the distinction is important. If aggression is innate, there appears to be little that can be done about it, except to determine the form which it will

⁸"The Treatment of Aggression," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 13: 415-418 (1943).

take. If it is the result of frustration and related factors, then the early experiences of the individual can also determine the *fact* and the *amount* of aggressive behavior. From this view, the assumption that aggressive behavior is shaped by social rather than by biological factors gives us reason to be much more hopeful regarding the possibilities of control of such behavior. Those psychoanalysts who have been most aware of the contributions of ethnology to understanding of the variations in individual and social behavior have preferred, on the whole, the view that aggressiveness is to be explained in terms of experience. Here the writings of Abram Kardiner,⁹ Karen Horney,¹⁰ and Erich Fromm may be taken as representative.

This is also, in essence, the view of a group of social scientists at Yale University who have endeavored to approach this problem through experimental methods.¹² The assumption is made that frustration always leads to aggression, and that aggression is always to be explained by frustration. The authors assemble an imposing amount of material which indicates some of the ways in which frustration and aggression are interrelated. The evidence comes from observation, experiment, statistical analysis, ethnology, etc., and the book in which it is presented has aroused much interest and considerable controversy. What is clear from the book is that frustration *frequently* gives rise to aggression, and that aggression *frequently* arises from frustration. It is not easy, of course, to prove that this relationship is invariable since any example to the contrary would invalidate the one-to-one correspondence which the book postulates. In a study by Roger G. Barker, Tamara Dembo, Kurt Lewin, and M. Erik Wright¹³ it was found that frustration, although frequently leading to aggression, by no means invariably did so. In a number of cases it led rather to regression, that is, the children who were frustrated showed a form of behavior considerably more infantile than that characteristic of them before they had been subjected to the frustrating situation.

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The Personality of Hostile Individuals

One of the most interesting and fruitful kinds of investigation in this area concerns the personality characteristics of individuals who can be regarded as prejudiced or bigoted. A number of years ago Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert²² demonstrated, in an extensive study of attitudes held

⁹ *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945).

¹⁰ *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1937).

¹² John Dollard and others, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939).

¹³ "Experimental Studies of Frustration in Young Children," in Newcomb and Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology* [(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947)], pp. 283-290.

²² *Public Opinion and the Individual* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938).

by college students, that anti-Jewish, anti-Negro, and other antiminority or antiforeign prejudices were as a rule found together, although this was not true in every single case. These attitudes also tended to be found predominantly in persons who had conservative or reactionary opinions on domestic and international issues. The inference that there is what might be called a bigoted or prejudiced personality has been the subject of several recent explorations.

One of the most extensive of these, carried out at the University of California by Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, is in process of publication.²³ According to the authors "ethnocentrism" is a very general attitude; ethnocentric individuals are indiscriminately antagonistic toward Jews, Negroes, and foreigners. These individuals tend to be conservative in their social and political views, and usually support the status quo. A detailed study of a number of girls in the bigoted group showed them to be, on the surface, poised, polite, self-confident, optimistic, conventionally moral, kind-hearted, devoted to their parents and friends, untroubled by guilt or anxiety, and apparently making a good social adjustment. Beneath the surface, however, and revealed only by deeper psychological probing, are powerful sadistic impulses, frequently directed at the parents, intense anxiety about social status, and often unsatisfied sexual desires. These individuals are governed by a tyrannical and childish unconscious, which makes them take over their parents' puritanical attitudes. They tend to blame others for what happens to them; they think of things as happening *to* them rather than as caused *by* them. Their repressed hostility toward their parents finds partial expression in exaggerated suspicion and mistrust of others. They admire power and scorn the underdog. They advocate harsh punishment for crime. Their general concern about status results in their denying equal status to others. The inferior position of foreigners and minority groups gives them a sense of security, and tends to keep their personalities integrated. The unprejudiced girls, on the other hand, are relatively unafraid of facing reality both in themselves and in their environment. They have more insight into their own motivations, they show a willingness to discuss their shortcomings, and while apparently fond of their parents, show no hesitation in criticizing them. These individuals tend to identify themselves with the downtrodden instead of with the powerful.

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The study of prejudice by Hartley²⁴ . . . is also important in this connection. He demonstrated that those who showed hostility against some minority and foreign groups were on the whole the same as those who showed hostility

²³ See footnote 32, p. 111, *supra*.

²⁴ *Problems in Prejudice* [(New York: King's Crown Press, 1946)].

against the others; those who expressed hostility against "real" groups also expressed hostility against imaginary ones. It is clear that the explanation of this prejudice is to be found not in the behavior of the "foreign" groups, but in the characteristics of the individuals who expressed the prejudice.

A final interesting and important study which can be only briefly reviewed here is by G. W. Allport and B. M. Kramer.²⁵ The principal method used was administration of a questionnaire to 437 college undergraduates from several different academic institutions. Among the more noteworthy conclusions, the following may be mentioned: Prejudiced people have unpleasant childhood memories (real or invented) of members of groups against whom they are prejudiced. Such memories may reflect the importance of early experiences, but may also be due to a tendency to justify present prejudices by a selective reference to real or imaginary past events. On the whole, those who cling most strongly to parental patterns are most prejudiced. A critical attitude toward these patterns is conducive to freedom from prejudice. (This is in line with the conclusions of the study by Frenkel-Brunswick and others.) Only 8 percent of the college students included in this study recalled having learned scientific facts about race, indicating that any educational campaign along these lines has so far not been very effective. Casual contact with minority groups does not diminish prejudice, but intimate equal-status contact seems to have a definitely desirable effect, as was noted in discussion of techniques of attitude change. Religious training in itself does not lessen prejudice, unless there is special stress on tolerance and friendly attitudes. Prejudice is related to the personality and the personal philosophy of the individual; those who are more prejudiced on the whole tend to have a "jungle" philosophy of life, viewing the world as basically evil and dangerous; they have an authoritarian or disciplinarian outlook, a strong fear of fraud and trickery, and little sympathy for the underdog. These conclusions should be checked by further research; some of them at least are in line with the results obtained by others, with quite different methods.

It is striking that so many suggestive conclusions could emerge from the use of a questionnaire. This does not mean that this method by itself should be relied on in this complex and difficult field of research, but that the questionnaire has definite uses, in spite of the criticisms leveled against it. Its results, of course, should be checked and verified by the application of other techniques whenever possible. The conclusions are important for understanding of prejudice or of "aggressive nationalism," and it is necessary to make sure that these conclusions are based upon adequate evidence and also that they would hold in the case of groups with different backgrounds and different cultural experience.

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²⁵ "Some Roots of Prejudice," *Journal of Psychology*, 22:9-39 (1946).

Relations between Individual and Group Hostility

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There remains the problem whether an understanding of the bases of hostility in the individual can help us in understanding group antagonisms. There have been some attempts to bridge this gap. Clyde Kluckhohn,²⁷ for example, points out that the antagonism between biologically or culturally differentiated groups is based on conflicts of interest which are composed of both realistic and irrational elements. Tensions centering upon realistic conflicts are exceedingly difficult to resolve, and the outcome is usually frustrating to one group or the other. As far as the irrational group processes are concerned, Kluckhohn believes that the basic mechanisms hold for the group in much the same way as for the individual. The forms of expression may vary, as do the symbols evoking the hostility, but the underlying processes are the same. If many people are disappointed and frustrated there is, as a result, a free-floating anxiety waiting to fasten on to something. What it will fasten upon depends on the culture patterns of the society and on the frustrating situation at hand. In other terms, Kluckhohn's thesis appears to be that hostility in the group is much the same thing as hostility in many individuals within the group, and that culture enters mainly in determining the direction or the object of the aggressive behavior.

The position expressed by Kluckhohn seems to the writer to be sound as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. A student of group relations is continually impressed by the fact that the aggressive tendencies of a *nation* are not always identical with the aggressive tendencies of individuals within it. The fact that these two kinds of aggression are interrelated is undeniable; the assumption that they are identical must be questioned. Even the patterns of aggression in a minority group, such as those described by Hortense Powdermaker²⁸ for the Negro, fail to resolve the dilemma we face, although they do show the interplay of cultural and individual factors. Negroes are frustrated; they are resentful as a result of the deprivations imposed upon them by the society in which they live. There are inevitable tendencies toward aggression, which may express itself in fantasy, or in the substitution of a Negro object for the white (against whom aggression is too dangerous), or by flight into religion. None of these varieties of aggression is similar to what we find in war. None is really identifiable with the institutionalized hostility of one large group against another.

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²⁷ "Hostility against Minority Groups," unpublished paper presented at the American Psychiatric Conference, 1948.

²⁸ "The Channeling of Negro Aggression by the Cultural Process," *American Journal of Sociology*, 48:750-758 (1943).

The Problem of Leadership

This brings us back to a question . . . whether aggression in leaders can and does become extended to the individuals who make up the group. The dynamics of leadership is being studied by various methods; particularly interesting research is being carried on at the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan. Work has been done also on the training of leaders and on changing their characteristics so as to make them more democratic or more pleasing to the groups with whom they work. The well-known experimental work of Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt and Ralph K. White³¹ has shown that the amount and nature of aggressive behavior varies with the kind of leadership. When the leader was dictatorial and autocratic, there might be an absence of overt aggressive behavior while he was present in the group, but as soon as he left, these aggressive tendencies became clearly manifest. There was also the frequent manifestation of the "scapegoat mechanism," in which one of the younger and smaller individuals in the group received the brunt of the aggression whenever the leader was out of the room. In this case the pattern of leadership is seen to be important, even more important than the fact that one or another individual assumes the leadership; it must be remembered that the same individual acted as an autocratic leader at certain times and as a democratic leader at others. It was his *role* in the group situation which determined the patterns of aggressive behavior which developed.

It is not easy to transfer the results from these limited situations, in which leadership is restricted to very small groups, to the much more complex situation of leadership of a nation and the influence which some leaders may have. We are in any case too close to the events of the last war to evaluate the effects upon world history of the personal qualities of Mussolini and Hitler and their immediate lieutenants.

The safest position is probably the one which holds that the total economic, historical, and cultural pattern of events in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in Italy played a tremendously important part, but that the personalities of the leaders, particularly the German leaders, made an essential contribution. From this viewpoint it is of the greatest importance to know more about such leaders, their backgrounds and personality characteristics, and how they were able to seize and hold power. This means that in understanding the aggressive behavior of a group, understanding of the leader is a necessary and vital component. Thus considerable interest attaches to the many studies of the Nazi leaders which have already been published. Among others may be mentioned *The Case of Rudolf Hess*,³²

³¹ "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,'" *Journal of Social Psychology*, 10:271-299 (1939).

³² J. R. Rees, ed., *The Case of Rudolf Hess* (London: William Heinemann, 1947).

Nuremberg Diary,³³ and *22 Cells in Nuremberg*.³⁴ Interesting as these studies are, they suffer from one common defect: they deal with leaders who have just been defeated and disgraced, and whose reactions may not always represent adequately the standpoints they held when they were in positions of dominance.

There is need for many more studies of the dynamics of national leadership. The impact on recent world events of individuals like Churchill, Stalin, Gandhi, Hitler, and Roosevelt makes it abundantly clear that the influence of the "great man," for good or evil, must not be underestimated. It is of the greatest importance to know what kinds of individuals become leaders and under what conditions they gain and hold their power. Leaders do not usually lend themselves to careful psychological study during their lifetime, except indirectly. On the other hand, materials are available, in the form of relatively detailed biographical accounts, published speeches and writings of various sorts, impressions of the many people who have come in contact with the leaders, etc., which should all serve as secondary but fruitful sources of information. There is probably no more important problem in this whole field than understanding of the role played by the leader in helping to direct his nation toward peace or war.

³³G. M. Gilbert [*Nuremberg Diary* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, 1947)].

³⁴Douglas Kelley [*22 Cells in Nuremberg* (New York: Greenberg, 1947)].

War and Aggressiveness: A Survey of Social Attitude Studies

H. J. EYSENCK

1. *Introduction.* A complex phenomenon like war has obviously so many facets—sociological, anthropological, ethical, psychological—that there are great difficulties in assessing the relative importance of any particular point of view. Yet it may perhaps be claimed with some degree of justice that ultimately all causative influences must find themselves reflected in the individual attitudes towards war and personal aggressiveness which are built up by social pressure, by teaching and propaganda, by personal precept, by childhood experience, by parental emotional conditioning, and the thousand and one agencies which determine our outlook. Consequently the experimental study of the origin, growth, and structure of these attitudes represents an important contribution of social psychology to the investigation of the complex phenomena of war and peace.

Certain limitations are implied in the method of experimentation used in these studies, and must be fully realized before the conclusions can be adequately judged. In the first place, social attitude measurement deals with *conscious* ideas, opinions, emotions, and sentiments; it does not claim to uncover the secret processes of the 'unconscious mind', or to reveal the remarkable activities of the 'id'.

But the general consensus of opinion in modern psychology deprecates [an] exclusive insistence on unconscious motivation, and maintains firmly a balanced attitude which refuses either to deny the reality of certain Freudian mechanisms, or to extend their province so far as to engulf the whole of normal psychology. While the occurrence of sadistic feelings and other abnormal emotional manifestations during war is acknowledged to occur in a number of neurotic and psychotic persons, modern psychology

H. J. Eysenck, "War and Aggressiveness: A Survey of Social Attitude Studies," *Psychological Factors of Peace and War*, edited by T. H. Pear (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950), pp. 49–81. Reprinted by permission. Footnotes renumbered.

refuses to erect an imposing theoretical edifice regarding the nature and derivation of 'aggression' on the extremely subjective interpretations given by a number of psycho-analysts of the dreams, free associations and other productions of their patients, who cannot by any stretch of the imagination be called a representative sample of the normal adult population.

A second characteristic of the material with which we are dealing in this chapter is that the attitudes measured are *verbally communicated*. There is much room for falsification of a conscious kind here, as well as for misunderstandings, wrong emphases, and carelessness. Yet in actual practice we find that when the ordinary precautions of scientific attitude-testing are followed, there is very considerable agreement between the attitude a person records in his questionnaire, and that which he is known to hold (25). This general finding applies in the main to matters in which neither blame nor praise attaches to the direction of his choice; when social evaluation enters strongly, falsification of responses has been shown to take place. But the conscientious experimenter is fully alive to this possibility, and attempts to avoid the difficulty by anonymous returns, suitable indirect wording of the questions, and various other methods.

A third characteristic of these studies is that they deal with relatively large-scale investigations, carried out inevitably in a somewhat superficial manner. The main reason for this state of affairs is that social psychology at present is at a stage where it is looking for worth-while hypotheses to investigate; large-scale attitude studies are conceived of as providing clues which may then be followed up by more detailed and profound investigations.

2. *Aggressiveness*. Discussions of the contributions which psychology can make to the understanding of war almost invariably centre around the problem of aggressiveness. Writers of the psycho-analytic school, like Hopkins (39), Glover (36), and Durbin and Bowlby (19), take the view that the ultimate origin of the aggression which finds expression in war and other types of social conflict is to be found in childhood experiences of the individual; much play is made with such concepts as the 'unresolved Oedipus conflict'. Followers of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, like Dollard, Miller and Hovland (14), take a somewhat wider view and believe that frustration in any field serves as a source of aggressiveness, a view adumbrated by McDougall and Drever. They also, however, recognize that conflict in the family may have a powerful part to play in the creation of frustration and aggression.

Isolated attempts have been made by Lasswell (50), and by Krout and Stagner (48), to discover if emotional experiences of childhood influence adult attitudes towards a variety of issues. Thus it was shown that attitudes favourable to revolt against established institutions were found more frequently in subjects who had repressed aggression against the father, a

parent-child relation not so frequently found in conservatives. Similarly, radicals¹ were found to show more frequent feelings of rejection by their parents, and more unhappiness in childhood. Other studies also show significant correlations between radicalism and antagonism to the father (66). Respect for law and education were found to be more marked in subjects whose home life had been satisfactory (79).

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We have spoken hitherto as if 'aggressiveness' constituted a general factor, i.e. as if there were a marked tendency for a person who was aggressive in one set of circumstances to be aggressive in others also. This belief is by no means universal. Beginning with William James, psychologists in search of a 'moral equivalent for war' have thought that aggressive impulses might be sublimated through sport, physical exercise, the conquest of disease, etc. Writers of the psycho-analytic school in particular have made much of this concept of sublimation, and have often added the view that persons who express aggressiveness freely in personal relationships have less hostility which can be 'displaced' on to 'out-groups'. This belief, indeed, lies at the basis of some modern therapeutic tendencies of the 'group therapy' kind.

Evidence regarding this important point is furnished by Stagner (98), who showed that students who evinced aggressive attitudes in one direction also tended to show them in other directions, the average intercorrelation being as high as +0.4 for various groups. This work is particularly convincing because extensive questionnaire studies were supplemented by personal interviews and other special observations, such as thematic apperception tests, free association, reaction time and galvanic measures. Stagner also inquired into certain alleged 'sublimating' activities, such as playing football, expressing annoyances openly, and so forth. If the 'sublimation' theory were correct, we should expect that students who had 'sublimated' their aggressive impulses would be less aggressive on the various scales (capital punishment, war, fascism, etc.) than those who had failed to 'sublimate'. In actual fact, exactly the opposite was observed; all instances and expressions of aggressiveness showed positive correlations. While we must recognize that only verbal behavior is involved in these tests, the onus of proof would seem to lie definitely on the proponents of the 'sublimation' theory; the results quoted are plainly incompatible with that theory. The same might be said of correlations reported by Eysenck (24, 25) and by Ferguson (31) in a series of articles, in which a consistent tendency

¹The term 'radical' in psychological literature denotes the person occupying the opposite pole of an attitude continuum to the 'conservative'; it is roughly synonymous with 'progressive', signifying 'advanced' opinions.

was found for persons aggressive in one context to be aggressive in another context.

We may conclude this brief review by saying that it has been established that aggressive attitudes tend to be general, extending over large areas of belief and conduct; that no evidence has been found in favour, and much evidence against, the 'sublimation' type of theory; and that work on the genesis of aggressive attitudes is inconclusive in virtue of being restricted to a single culture-pattern.

3. *Primary Social Attitudes.* In a recent Gallup Poll in this country, the question was asked: "Do you think that another world war is likely during the next twenty-five years?" Forty-eight per cent of the respondents thought it likely, 31 per cent unlikely, with 21 per cent undecided. Great differences were found between the well-to-do, 61 per cent of whom thought war likely, and the poorer classes, only 39 per cent of whom thought so. Conservatives and Liberals were more convinced of the likelihood of war than were Labour voters.

These results show that attitudes towards certain aspects of the problem of war are related to social class, or to political affiliation. The question inevitably arises: Are there certain persistent, all-embracing groupings of attitudes, to which isolated opinion statements such as the above can be related? What light has social psychology to throw on the organization of social attitudes, with particular reference to the place of attitudes towards war and peace in this scheme? Much evidence is available in this connection through the work of Thurstone, Ferguson, Carlson, Eysenck, and others, and it is believed that an understanding of the underlying issues will throw some light on the general problem.

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... different statements dealing with attitudes towards war display a certain amount of functional unity.

When the existence of a definite attitude has been demonstrated, the question arises whether concepts of a higher order may not exist which are based on the intercorrelation of several attitudes. For instance, may not militarism, anti-semitism, nationalism, religionism, and pro-capitalism intercorrelate and define an attitude of 'conservatism'? This type of higher-order concept... may justly be called a 'primary social attitude'.

Large-scale correlational studies, involving widely differing groups of students, middle-class adults, Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Englishmen, Americans, men and women, old and young, Eugenicists, Fabians, and various others, have given us a picture of these Primary Social Attitudes... It will be seen that two orthogonal (uncorrelated) factors are involved, and that a large number of different social issues are shown in their relation to these two primary social attitude factors. The nature of

the factors can easily be determined by inspection of the issues which define them. The first factor is clearly a radicalism-conservatism one, as has been proved independently by showing that the items which define this factor also show large differences in endorsement between Conservative and Socialist groups equated for age, sex, and education (24, 25).

The second factor is perhaps less easy to label; it has been variously called 'practical-theoretical' and 'tough-minded *v.* tender-minded'. That it is more than a statistical artefact, and has a very real existence, has been shown elsewhere (25). These two, the 'R' and 'T' factors, as they have been called, will be seen to influence and determine the attitude to about an equal extent; when correction is made for the unreliability of the scale used for measuring this attitude we find that over 50 per cent of its variance is accounted for in terms of R and T, leaving some 40 per cent to be accounted for in terms of more specific factors.

We can now see that the items in the conservative-tough-minded quadrant are essentially similar to the items which were used by Stagner to define his 'aggressiveness' factor; our analysis shows that this is not a simple factor but a composite one which may be reduced to a combination of the two primary social attitudes. This is an important discovery, because we know a great deal about the distribution and the correlates of these two factors, while our information about 'aggressiveness' is very meagre; thus we can bring a much wider range of knowledge and information to bear on our topic. It is also important because the correlation between 'war-mindedness' and 'conservatism' is apparently not conditioned by the specific American or British culture-pattern, but comes out quite clearly in samples of various kinds drawn from both nations. Again, it would be most desirable to repeat investigations of this kind in culture-patterns even more unlike each other than American capitalism and British social-democracy; it may be predicted that much might be learned regarding the nature and structure of attitudes from comparative studies in Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, India, Mexico, etc.²

4. *Correlates of War-Mindedness.* We may study the correlates of war-mindedness either directly, or by reference to the two primary social attitudes which give rise, in combination, to this quality. In one study of the 'direct' type (95), a questionnaire . . . was used with various adult and college groups in the southern states of America, during the academic year 1937-8. Age was not found to be of great importance, but women tended to give less militaristic replies; this difference, however, was much smaller than might have been expected. Republicans were significantly more militaristic than Democrats, but again the difference was slight. Jews were considerably less militaristic than Protestants or Catholics; there was no significant difference between these two religious groups. Men having had fighting experience, and/or some military training, or who were members of

² Such studies are in progress at the moment.

a veterans' society, scored significantly more militaristic than people without any military training, and members of a labour union.

As regards occupational differences, professional and labour groups were less militaristic than the average, while clericals and business men were more militaristic. Children of business men and of labourers have shown a similar difference, according to a report by Porterfield (73). These results all fit into the radical-pacifist *v.* conservative-militaristic pattern discussed in previous sections.

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... A direct attempt to link up the study of social attitudes with work on the measurement of the main *Dimensions of Personality* (23) was made by Eysenck and Crown (28). Using the Crown Word List (13), an objective word association test which had been shown to measure validly and reliably a person's standing on the 'neuroticism' continuum, i.e. on the line leading from emotional stability to emotional instability, a significant relation was found between 'neuroticism' and 'militarism'. . . . This relation between neuroticism and militarism was somewhat curvilinear; in other words, people who were strongly pro-militarist or strongly anti-militarist tended to be significantly less well-adjusted, stable individuals than were those who tended towards less extreme opinions. A similar tendency for extreme views to be related to lack of emotional adjustment was found in a study of anti-semitic attitudes (28); here also a significantly curvilinear relation with neuroticism was found. While these findings are only preliminary, they suggest that much interesting and valuable material may be unearthed by a study of the correlations between personality traits and social attitudes.

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5. 'War-mindedness' and Stereotypes. A militaristic or aggressive attitude seldom exists *in vacuo*; it is likely to be related closely to some object or class of objects. In thus becoming attached to a nation, or a race, our adient or abient reactions tend to become rationalized into consistent and meaningful systems of ideas regarding the object in question; such systems are called 'stereotypes'.³ They have their origin in feeling, emotions, and 'intuitions' rather than in fact. The individual who holds stereotyped

³ In classifying stereotypes in terms of pleasant (adient) and unpleasant (abient) reactions, the writer wishes to bring the whole concept of 'stereotyped' attitudes into relation with the judgmental theory of affectivity as stated by Carr [9] (1925) and elaborated by Peters [69] (1935). According to this theory, Affection is a meaning; the meaning P (pleasantness) is a function of a normal reaction tendency to approach the object (ad-ire), the meaning U (unpleasantness) of reaction tendency to avoid it (ab-ire). This way of looking at stereotypes is useful because it brings to bear on the discussion a whole mass of experimental and theoretical work done in connection with affective states generally. Summaries of this work, as well as a treatment of the judgmental theory of affectivity, will be found in McGeoch [57] (1942), Rapaport [76] (1942), Beebe-Center [5] (1932), Young [113] (1943), Gardiner et al. [34] (1937), and Hunt [40] (1939).

views is often entirely unaware of the part played in their creation by preferences or aversions, rationalizing and emotional reactions. Such views are evidence of uncritical acceptance of unanalysed circumstances; they may be true in isolated cases, they may apply to a limited number of members of the group to which they are referred, but on the whole they confuse thinking by always introducing the 'class-error',⁴ and by failing to stress the importance of individual differences.

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While the existence of stereotypes is undoubted, the tendency in social psychology to look for unconscious processes and 'rationalizations' in relation to all social thinking is open to criticism. Many people are rational in their views, and know full well how little they are qualified to judge such difficult questions as 'national character'; in a number of cases, no doubt, emotional and unconscious processes obscure this natural attitude, and lead to vehement anti-semitic or anti-negro attitudes (cf. Eysenck and Crown (28) for experimental proof). But such cases may only constitute a small percentage of the total population and it is dangerous to generalize from the exception to the rule. Experimental design will have to be much improved before we can claim to be fully informed on the subject of 'stereotypes'. In the absence of such knowledge, little can be said usefully about the relation of stereotypes to war-minded attitudes; the hypothesis frequently put forward that a positive correlation obtains between war-mindedness and stereotypy of attitude remains to be proved.

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[6.] *Changing War-minded Attitudes*. If attitudes arise through social learning, presumably they can be changed through the provision of novel educational or propaganda influences. The work of Arnett et al. (3), Barry (4), Knower (45), Kulp (49), Marple (58), Moore (63), Sorokin and Boldyreff (91), Wheeler and Jordan (111) . . . go to show that this assumption is in fact true, and that the effects of oral and written argument, of film shows, of expert and majority opinion can be traced experimentally in the changing attitudes of the subjects taking part in these experiments.

Longstreet (53), gave a series of lectures on the facts of war to a class of schoolboys, changing their views (at least temporarily) in the direction of opposition to war. Kirkendall (44), showed that a class of seventy-five students, listening to a talk on "Investigations of War Profits and Munitions Manufacturing", became more strongly pacifist in their views. Charrington and Miller (12), showed the effectiveness on a group of 170 college students

⁴ Class error—judging the individual not in terms of his personal unique characteristic but only as a member of some class or group, i.e. a Jew, a Communist, an old maid, or a Negro.

of a pacifist lecture; not only was their attitude at the time shifted strongly toward the pacifist end of the scale, but on re-testing after six months the group still showed a statistically significant shift from its original position, although a certain amount of regression had occurred. The same investigators showed that precisely similar effects followed reading the Eddy-Page pamphlet: "The Abolition of War". Stagner (96) showed the effect of a series of eighteen lectures on 140 summer session students.

Gardner's (35) results, obtained on some 850 school-children, are perhaps even more impressive. He used as propaganda devices (1) a rational lecture in favour of peace, (2) a persuasive-emotional lecture in favour of peace, (3) a talk dealing with the cost of war in terms of lives and money, (4) two emotional stories glorifying war, (5) the motion picture *The Valiant*, which stresses the emotional appeal of dying for one's country. Differences induced in various sub-groups exposed to various combinations of these stimuli are in the expected direction; the author draws particular attention, however, to the fact that changes are demonstrably cumulative—two or three lectures against militarism change opinions not two or three times as much as one lecture, but five to ten times as much.

7. *Opinions on the Prevention of War.* Attitude studies do not extend only to the measurement of opinion of certain issues, they may also legitimately cover views on the methods which ought to be adopted in order to change existing malpractices, or to prevent contingencies such as war from arising. Much important material has been collected in this sphere by Fletcher (33), Stagner (97), and others.

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In general, this survey shows that experts' opinions on the prevention of war are displaced towards the *radical* end of our R factor, while the man in the street's views are displaced towards the *conservative* end. It is possible that this tendency is peculiar to American capitalist society; other results might be found in this country.⁵ Nevertheless, such lack of agreement between expert and voter is unfortunate and dangerous; it argues that there has been a failure of social communication. It is one of the tasks of the social psychologist to point out the existence of such failures; methods of remedying them cannot be usefully discussed in this context.

The finding that social scientists in general tended to advocate relatively *radical* policies for the preservation of peace seems to indicate that the view of those who advocate an instinctive basis for war is widely rejected nowadays. Certainly few psychologists believe in such a genetic basis of aggressiveness; of several hundred American psychologists polled by Fletcher in 1932 (33), well over 90 per cent rejected the view that human

⁵ See, for instance, a study carried out in this country by Mass Observation (59) on an unstated number of persons in Hammersmith and Shrewsbury who 'looked as if they lived in the area'.

nature made war inevitable. . . . the view that war is inherent in human nature forms part of the conservative—tough-minded group of ‘aggressive’ beliefs and attitudes of which war-mindedness is one. This general view is not in accordance with scientific belief, and policies based on it are, therefore, hardly likely to find favour with social scientists.

What then are the policies which according to expert social psychologists would be likely to make a recurrence of war less likely.⁶ A sample of fifty-two American social psychologists was queried in considerable detail by Stagner (97); these men represented an authoritative cross-section of the whole group. “They were unanimous on the need for both political and economic internationalism. They endorsed a democratically organized League with sovereignty above that of nations on specified issues. They advocated a ‘reasonable’ rather than a ‘vengeful’ peace. They favoured an end to ‘white imperialism’.” “The chief obstacles to durable peace (on the American scene) were perceived as: economic nationalism; absence of loyalty to an international government; and fascist indoctrination of the Axis peoples.” “A long-range programme was based on the assumption that uncontrolled aggression anywhere is a menace to the peace of the world. Some frustrations are socially necessary, but many frustrations of biological needs and of ego-values could be ended by the extension of political and economic democracy. Further, the aggression which results from unavoidable frustration can be handled realistically if we improve our mental hygiene practices, reduce scapegoating, and develop a scientific attitude towards human relationships.”

8. *Retrospect and Prospect.* . . . If the scientist is asked how an atom bomb could be produced he will reply, rightly, that given full financial and political support he may be able after several years of large-scale, intensive research to give an answer to the question. Similarly, the reply of the social psychologist must be that, given full financial and political support, and permitted to investigate the problem empirically, he may be able, after several years of intensive research, to give an answer to the question.

Yet almost invariably the position is such that the psychologist is kept away from the object of his inquiry. How can he answer questions regarding the psychology of war if he is not permitted to conduct research and experiments on those who have been engaged on war itself, victors and victims alike? Here, the writer would suggest, lies the main problem of social psychology. The social psychologist is often accused of carrying out ‘trivial’ experiments; the fault may lie with society for making it impossible for him to study the really serious and important topics by refusing him access to his experimental material.

⁶In addition to the papers here discussed, the reader may wish to consult a symposium, “Psychological Considerations in Making the Peace,” *J. Abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 1947, 38, 131-224.

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CHAPTER 4 • Conflict and Violence

Personality Dynamics and Social Conflict

ROSS STAGNER

The specific application of this thesis which I shall propose in this paper is that man comes to value his nation, or other social group, as an essential part of his environment, and mobilizes energy to protect it. Further, as a part of this process, he distorts the input of information in such a fashion as to protect valued aspects of his social environment, and these distortions contribute in no small degree to the intensity and bitterness of social conflicts. . . .

In this connection it is important, I think, to clarify a source of confusion which sometimes creeps into discussions of homeostasis. Man needs a *predictable environment*, a stable milieu, within which he can function. But this is not to say that he wants to make the same responses over and over. It is not uniformity of behavior, but an environment within which he can anticipate the consequences of behavior, which is essential.

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Ethnocentrism

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I would like to hark back for just a moment to the work of the SPSSI Committee on War and Peace, whose labors were rudely interrupted by

Ross Stagner, "Personality Dynamics and Social Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1961), pp. 28-44. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted.

Pearl Harbor. A major conclusion had early been reached by this committee, on the basis of a careful study of the writings of historians, economists, and political scientists—viz., that the major psychological factor involved in the occurrence of international war was the attitude complex called “nationalism” (Stagner *et al.*, 1942).

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The defining features of nationalism are generally considered to be two in number: an exaggerated glorification of the nation, its virtues, its benefactions, its right to superiority; and an exaggerated denigration of nations perceived as being in opposition, these nations generally being seen as bad, cruel, vicious and untrustworthy.

When we look at this description, we readily observe that a similar pattern appears in other forms of social conflict. During the religious wars in Europe 300 years ago, a comparable glorification of one's in-group and vilification of the out-group were common; and anti-Semitism in this country shows this pattern in less bizarre form. The white supremacists of our southern states, and in extreme the Afrikaners of South Africa, hold similar delusions of racial grandeur and of the inferiority of colored races. Partisans of labor unions and of industrial owners do not show quite the same extremes of grandeur and hostility, but certainly many of them suggest that all virtue is on their side, all stupidity, violence, or greed on the other. It seems, therefore, that this bi-polar attitude of grandeur and evil is a psychological feature of all social conflicts. It is unfortunate that we have no generally accepted term for labeling this pattern. Ethnocentrism is undoubtedly the most appropriate term, but it has become identified with religious and racial prejudice. I shall use ethnocentrism to identify this general trend toward group-centeredness, and nationalism for its specific form in international conflict, on which I shall focus.

The central problem, from the point of view of personality theory, is how the motives and perceptions of individuals influence their decisions on social issues. Psychoanalytic writers on these problems, such as Glover, Hopkins, Durbin and Bowlby, and Alix Strachey, have tended to emphasize the decisive influence of motivation, frequently in the form of a “death instinct.” . . .

Hostility as a Critical Factor in Social Conflicts

Let me first deal with the argument that the decisive consideration in major social conflicts is the level of aggressive drive or hostility.

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A hereditary conception of aggression leads nowhere with regard to social conflict. If man is born with a given potential for aggression, we must

apparently assume that in the course of his life he will act out this potential in some form. But aggression, as even the Freudians agree, may be channeled into face-to-face hostility, into competitive behavior, and even into work, or it may be vented in group competition and conflict of a non-violent nature. Thus the theory cannot logically lead to any kind of prediction about the occurrence of violent social conflict, whether between nations, or classes, or races.

A similar conclusion must be reached with respect to the frustration-aggression hypothesis. This view is somewhat more directly relevant to problems of social interaction because it carries an important, sometimes unstated, assumption that the preferred outlet for aggression will be an attack on the frustrating agent. This would suggest that, if large numbers of individuals find themselves being frustrated by, let us say, communist tactics, they will become hostile to communists. The inadequacy of this approach is suggested by the fact that most of the applications of the theory to social problems make use of displaced aggression, as in the famous study of southern lynchings, in which it appeared that a drop in the price of cotton led to more aggressive outbursts. But opposed to this we have the observation of criminologists that crimes of violence for the entire population increase in times of prosperity, not in times of depression. It thus appears that the crucial question is not, what led to the increase in aggressive acts? The question must be phrased: what variables determine the direction to be taken in expressions of hostility? . . . the crucial consideration becomes this: what are the perceptual factors determining the *direction* of aggression? The level of aggressive tension then becomes a remote rather than an immediate factor—not to be ignored, but not open to practical manipulation if we seek to reduce the probability of organized violence.

In opposition to those views of social conflict which stress drive, therefore, I want to talk about the decisive role of perception. Essentially, what I shall say is that for both theoretical and practical reasons, we should focus on how members of groups perceive other groups, and their goals and their tactics. To quote Kenneth Boulding (1959, p. 120), "the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their 'image' of the situation."

The Decisive Role of Perception

Perception can operate in the service of creating a predictable environment in at least three ways. First, it can magnify certain information inputs, giving them greater weight; and secondly, the obvious corollary, it can diminish the importance of other cues. Finally, actual distortions may occur in quality and magnitude. The phenomena of size constancy, for example, require that the individual differentiate among cues of apparent size, and

weight them in such a fashion as to give the closest approximation to the assumed "real object."

Perception in social affairs shows the same attributes. The real virtues of our nation are magnified; our sins are blocked out. The evils of the enemy are exaggerated, and his virtues ignored. Finally, cues indicative of behavior contrary to our expectations are often distorted to support the rigid percepts already organized. The great British statesman, Edmund Burke, said a long time ago, "We can never walk surely but by being sensible of our blindnesses." We must recognize our tendency to exclude certain information from consciousness.

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I propose this assertion as a starting point for my discussion of social conflict: social conflicts are rational if we grant the accuracy of the way in which the participants perceive the issues. It is easy enough for the detached observer to see the irrationality of both sides, let us say, in the Spanish-American War of 1898, in the 1959 steel strike, or in the religious wars of three hundred years ago. But if we learn to look at the matters in controversy as they were seen by the participants, it becomes clear that perceptual distortion was a fundamental process. Once given these misperceptions, given a distorted reality, the behavior of the participants was reasonable.

I shall propose, in other words, that the behavior of the Communist is rational once we grant his way of perceiving western democracy; the behavior of the white supremacist is rational if we accept his way of perceiving the Negro; the behavior of the steelworkers' union is rational if we grant this way of perceiving the companies' proposals in changes in work rules, and so on.

This view, in effect, says that it is inappropriate for psychologists to label other people as "good" or "bad" even if we do it in fancy terms like authoritarian aggression, autistic hostility, unresolved Oedipus complexes and the like. I suggest that the problem of psychological theory is not to pin labels on those persons who hold attitudes with which we disagree, but to analyze the processes by which certain distorted perceptions become established and to consider ways in which these ways of seeing reality might be modified.

Such an approach does not eliminate any occasion for concern with needs, desires, emotions and conflicts. It does shift the focus of theoretical exploration from the motivational state itself to the effects of motivation on perceiving—recognizing, of course, that any distinction between the two processes is logical, not functional.

We must be concerned not solely with the processes of perceptual distortion and rigidity, but also with content. Many perceptual distortions are strictly interpersonal and have no social implications. Some relate to religious, racial or industrial conflicts, others to national problems. I should

like to illustrate my remarks primarily with reference to questions of international hostility.

Whittlesey (1942) reproduced a propaganda map issued by Nazi Germany early in the campaign against Czechoslovakia. It visualized that small nation as a dagger aimed at the heart of Germany, with bombers readily capable of saturating the German nation. What it ignored was the much greater extent to which Czechoslovakia was at the mercy of Germany, a fact which became apparent in 1938. One need not assume that the German author was aware of this distortion; consider the excitement in the USA today over the situation in Cuba, which is even less capable of mounting an assault on our country. Looked at from the other side, note that Americans approve strongly of the ring of air bases we have built around Russia, many of which are as close to that nation as Cuba is to ours.

The perceptual distortion here arises from the fact that we perceive our nation and its purposes as good and pure, hence our bases are no threat to anyone. Russia, on the other hand, is obviously bad, cruel and untrustworthy, hence Russian bases are a great menace to world peace. Please do not interpret my remarks as implying that a Russian base in Cuba would be innocent and virtuous; what I do want to observe is that objectively similar events look quite different when viewed through nationalistic spectacles.

We should also remember that a policy of secrecy is no monopoly of the Soviet Union. Just after World War II our futile efforts to keep the A-Bomb secret aroused antagonism even among our allies. It was undoubtedly perceived as extremely threatening by the Russians—as, indeed, we find their secrecy so alarming that we risk air flights over their territory to penetrate the curtain. Perhaps such efforts at secrecy are always interpreted as threats because of the phenomenon which Else Frenkel-Brunswik christened “intolerance of ambiguity”—the very common mechanism which treats an unclear situation as potentially dangerous. The individual who is extremely anxious is likely to show this intolerance of ambiguity in extreme form. This, clinicians tell us, leads to both perceptual rigidity and behavioral rigidity. It gives rise to the sharp polarization of good and bad which is so characteristic of nationalism. . . .

The significance of this intolerance of ambiguity as regards foreign policy questions can readily be illustrated by a report by Lane (1955). In the Korean War of 1950–53, clear-cut choices were represented by “get out of Korea entirely” or by “bomb China and Manchuria,” whereas an ambiguous policy was represented by “keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement.” In a national sample, the high authoritarian cases chose either of the clear-cut choices much oftener than the middle choice; the low authoritarian cases avoided the extreme policies.

Perhaps this is a good point at which to say that I consider such findings to be important regardless of one’s emphasis on leaders or on the general

population as determinants of policy. Leaders have personalities too, and there is every reason to believe that they can be impatient, can seek for and push the quick, clear-cut alternative, can shy away from policies which appear weak and vacillating. Similarly, the populace can prod the government in certain directions. Our concern with perceptual dynamics is thus not tied to either alternative view of policy determination.

Rigidity on the part of a dominant group is perceived by others as an arbitrary frustration, and so gives rise to exceptionally strong hostility. The inflexible policy of *Apartheid* in South Africa is arousing violence on the part of the natives. Despite the examples of Algeria, Cyprus, and other former colonies, the Afrikaners cling blindly to their delusion that tyranny can work. Few of us will have doubts as to the tragic violence so elicited.

I have noted above the tendency to personalize the nation, to deal with it as a hero or as a villain. Sometimes the personalization is in terms of a specific individual: Churchill, Stalin, DeGaulle, Eisenhower, sometimes in terms of a mythical personage such as Uncle Sam. While psychologists have often deplored this because of the obvious distortion involved, I think we must accept it as inevitable. After all, our patterns of cognition are derived from experience—unless we wish to accept some Kantian absolutes. Since our experience of active agents has almost exclusively been with people, it is scarcely possible that we would think of nations except in a personalized way. Certainly it is easier to build myths of grandeur and virtue about a nation-hero than about the oddly assorted characters we see on the bus going to work. And it is easier to project vicious, violent attitudes onto a foreign leader than onto the total foreign population which, even the relatively naive citizen realizes, must be much like ourselves. It is also true that the leader of a nation is more dangerous than the average citizen. By the demands of his social role, he must be more defensive of national honor, more suspicious of national enemies, more alert to exaggerate trivial actions into major threats. Should he underestimate a foreign danger he would be derelict in his duty. But by his actions he tends to magnify these delusions of persecution which are so widely held among the citizens.

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Some Principles of Perception

... personification of the nation, while it is a distortion of reality, seems inevitable. In terms of the conceptualization I am offering, the individual's awareness of his nation is qualitatively similar to his perception of another person. This suggests that we may utilize the same principles of perception which have become well-accepted in our observations of physical objects and in face-to-face personal relations.

There are two possible approaches to this problem. One places emphasis

on stimulus generalization or perceptual equivalence. That is, one may simply generalize from perceptions of persons to a percept of the nation as a person. This is known as the *generalization hypothesis*. A second approach stems from psychoanalytic theory and involves the notion that emotions such as hostility may be repressed as regards persons near at hand, but are expressed toward foreign groups or personified nations. Christiansen (1959) has suggested that this be called the *latency hypothesis*, since its distinctive feature is that latent emotions are directed toward out-groups.

The empirical evidence, as collected both in this country and abroad, seems to favor the generalization hypothesis. An excellent study, within the limits of attitude scales and questionnaires, has recently been published in Norway by Christiansen (1959). He finds that persons who report aggressive behavior toward their fellows also endorse aggressive policies toward other nations by Norway. Persons reporting generally cooperative behavior endorse less aggressive policies. Those inclined to be self-critical and intro-punitive are likely to assume that Norway may have committed errors in international dealings, whereas the extrapunitive individual usually assumes that Norway was right and the other nation guilty. I reported somewhat parallel findings on American subjects 20 years ago (Stagner, 1944a), and other researchers, e.g., Harry Grace (1949) have confirmed this.

The latency hypothesis, on the other hand, would predict a negative correlation between manifest behavior toward close associates and preferred behavior toward foreign nations, racial minorities, etc. This follows from the fact that the displaced emotion, either affection or hostility, leaves its opposite to govern behavior and perception. Thus the boy who resolves his Oedipus complex by repressing hostility to his father will presumably show affection and positive attitudes at home, but will project bad, tyrannical characteristics onto the evil rulers of foreign nations.

Limited evidence favoring the latency hypothesis is reported by Christiansen using the Blacky Pictures and the Rosenzweig P-F test as devices for getting at latent emotions. On the whole he confesses to disappointment that the evidence is not clear-cut. Similar, slightly favorable evidence has been reported by Krout and Stagner (1939), by Lasswell (1930) and others. No one has reported strong support for this point of view.

The complexity of the problem is exaggerated by variations in what may be called the range of stimulus generalization. This is important in connection with the role of reference groups in defining "good" and "bad" nations or social groups. The anthropologists tell us that isolated cultures quite commonly hold to the view that "only we are human." The Hebrews' perception of the Gentiles, like the Greek view of the barbarians, illustrates this. Growing up in an ethnocentric culture, we become alert to trivial cues which identify the in-group, but which enable us to label and reject the out-group. Various studies suggest that anti-Semites are more accurate at

detecting Jewish facial characteristics than are their more tolerant peers. Whether this alleged sensitivity can hold up realistically is unimportant. The individual *believes* that he can perceive major differences between his fellows and the out-group; his gradient of generalization, and his responses of friendship and cooperation, are thus limited in scope. There is reason to believe, however, that some individuals are unable to perceive these allegedly differentiating cues, and thus may generalize responses of acceptance to humans beyond the in-group. These persons may manifest the cognitive style which George Klein (1951) has called "levelling"; i.e., they tend to iron out differences and to see *all* humans as basically similar.

A second factor which appears to play a part in the choice of such reference groups is also perceptual-cognitive in character. Helen Peak and her students (Peak *et al.*, 1960) have been working with a cognitive style which they call *opposition*. Each of us, I am sure, knows one or more persons who have a consistent tendency to "see the other side" of any issue. They enjoy playing the devil's advocate; and often enough they are not playing. In contrast to this, of course, we have the response-set of *acquiescence*, which has received so much attention in the aftermath of the "Authoritarian Personality" and F-scale studies. A distribution of cases on a hypothetical continuum from extreme acquiescence to extreme opposition would, of course, reveal a skew toward the acquiescent end. And this confirms everyday experience; most children within a nation grow up to accept the nation's leaders as a reference group. But occasionally we get individuals who insist upon looking at the other side, who are not convinced that the policies of their nation are always just, the leaders necessarily paragons of virtue and wisdom. Such critics may become mere cranks and chronic objectors; they may, indeed, find some foreign reference group which is more acceptable. But another common outcome is that they choose an idealistic reference group, and perhaps contribute to the development of a body of advocates of an internationalist position. Peak cites some evidence to indicate that oppositionists are also "levellers"; they would thus be more likely to perceive all human beings as basically alike.

I assume that I need not expand on the application of this idea to parallel social conflicts. How did the Reformation start? Because some people rejected the leaders of the Catholic Church. How did feudalism begin its decline? When some individuals saw the possibility of rejecting feudal leaders and organizing a different social structure. Men such as Martin Luther, John Calvin, Descartes, and Spinoza were undoubtedly characterized by the tendency to ponder automatically the opposite of statements posed to them. (This does not suggest that such men reacted favorably to questioning of their own dogmas. On the contrary, such persons are often quite intolerant of "opposite thinking" when it is focused on their views.)

Given these facts regarding the ways in which decision-makers may act

on biased information, and the psychological processes which lead to biasing, one must ask: what can we do about it? The physical scientists have already made it possible for all men to *die* together. The task of the social scientists is to seek ways by which we can *live* together.

In this paper, I can only suggest a line of approach.

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... I would stress first the importance of *diluting sovereignty* by building up groups and institutions of a supranational character. As we cede a little bit of sovereignty to the International Postal Union, we get used to the idea that our nation cannot act in a completely unilateral manner, without regard to other nations and their rights. More spectacular and more beneficial, of course, is the UN venture in the Congo. This enables people all over the world to get used to the idea that force might be removed from nationalistic controls and used for the welfare of the entire human race.

We need a much larger staff of persons who are agents of such supranational agencies. Ernst Haas (1958), in his recent book, *The Uniting of Europe*, shows the major contributes of the European Coal and Steel Community to developing an internationalist point of view. He speaks of the "spill-over" process, i.e., that men whose duty it is to run the ECSC organization efficiently find themselves forced to expand international cooperation in areas peripheral to the organization itself. ...

We should keep in mind the rigidity of perceptual constancy, and the effectiveness of perceptual defense. Mere communication without involvement has little effect.

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Unless we take account of the different realities perceived by ourselves and the Russians, increased communication may lead only to increased *misunderstanding*. Let me cite a very simple case. The Yalta agreements provided for "free democratic elections" in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other satellite nations. Ultimately we learned that these were to be "free and democratic" as in Russia, i.e., the voter was free to vote for the Communist slate or not to vote. The Russians were not hypocritical; the words did not convey the same "reality" to them as to us.

I hope I am making my point clear. I am trying to say that perceptual distortions and perceptual rigidities block communication between groups in conflict. Further, man's craving for a stable, predictable environment tends to force ambiguous data into the existing perceptual structure. All of you remember the Irishman who, when told that Ireland was neutral in the last war, said, "Yes, I know we are neutral, but who are we neutral against?" ...

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Intergroup Hostility and Social Cohesion

ROBERT F. MURPHY

Georg Simmel (1955:33-4) noted that warfare is frequently the only mode of social interaction between primitive societies. He saw the social relations of such groups to be characterized by diametric opposition between the norms of behavior applicable to members of the ingroup, on one hand, and toward members of outgroups, on the other. This dichotomy was internally self-consistent to Simmel, and he wrote (*ibid*:34):

For this reason, the same drive to expand and to act, which *within* the group requires unconditional peace for the integration of interests and for unfettered interaction, may appear to the outside world as a tendency toward war.

Intergroup conflict was viewed by Simmel as having positive functions; it provides the basis for group formation and cohesion, and it accentuates and maintains group boundaries. Conflict, then, is not aberrant or dysfunctional. Rather, it structures social relations both within and between societies.

Lewis Coser (1956:95), writing to Simmel's general thesis, points out that social cohesion does not automatically follow from conflict, for "social systems lacking social solidarity are likely to disintegrate in the face of conflict, although some unity may be despotically enforced." The corollary proposition is offered that:

...if the basic social structure is stable, if basic values are not questioned, cohesion is usually strengthened by war through challenge to, and revitalization of, values and goals which have been taken for granted (*ibid*:90).

Coser's view by no means contradicts that of Simmel but is an elaboration of the latter's thesis, as cited above, that intergroup hostility and social

cohesion are only analytically different aspects of the same social process. Conflict and social solidarity are mutually re-enforcing; conflict promotes social integration, and solidarity is necessary if the group is to take effective common action against the outer world.

The present paper will analyze the warfare pattern of a Brazilian Indian group, the Mundurucú, in the light of the propositions given by Simmel and elaborated by Coser. We will go beyond the thesis that warfare contributes to the maintenance of the social structure to consider also how this social structure organized the membership for military activity. Further, the thesis will be advanced that this type of social structure actually generated the bellicose activities and attitudes that functioned to preserve it, and that this circular relationship allowed Mundurucú society to continue through a period during which it was subjected to severe internal and external threats. Finally, we will conclude with a general hypothesis upon the relation between social structure, social cohesion, and conflict.

* * * *

Functions of Mundurucú Warfare

The manifest goals of warfare provide us with an understanding of the incentives that motivated the Mundurucú warrior. The religious and sportive aspects of warfare were found to be considerably more ephemeral than were the economic and prestige goals involved, but even the latter two depended upon the existence of a social organization that allowed and encouraged intensive military activity by its very nature. Moreover, the most important single motivation to hostility was a generalized aggressiveness that recognized no specific aims, and this factor yields the most important single clue to an understanding of Mundurucú warfare. If specific goals do not fully explain the extent and intensity of the pattern, and if the pressure of external circumstances did not force battle, then the main dynamics of warfare must be sought within the structure of the society. We must explain the function of warfare, or the social conditions that caused the Mundurucú to direct enormous hostility against an amorphously inimical outside world.

As a first step toward answering this question, we turn briefly to a re-examination of Mundurucú military organization. Leaving out of consideration for the moment the bellicosity of the Mundurucú, the single factor that contributed most to the success of their arms was the tribal organization of war parties. The recruitment of men from a number of communities aggrandized their expeditions while leaving unimpaired the economic and defensive functions of the villages. Tribalism was also central to the ceremonies that were held at the conclusion of a war. On these occasions the tribal warrior society, or Darekši, gathered to celebrate the prowess of Mundurucú arms, and the widely scattered members of certain clans

assembled to exercise their prerogative of attaching particular decorations to the trophy heads.

Intercommunity cooperation in warfare was facilitated by the peculiar juxtaposition of matrilineal residence and patrilineal descent. The male Mundurucú population was thereby linked by cross-cutting ties of residential affinity and affiliation by descent. For example, any Mundurucú man was a member of his own village, in most cases a native of another village, and in several instances a former resident of the village of a divorced wife; he was also linked by ties of patrilineal descent to all the villages in which members of his clan resided. On the other hand, he was not involved in any cohesive and localized lineage unit. The kinship structure imposed no boundaries upon the local group; the male social world was the tribe.

The manner in which bonds were extended throughout the tribe necessitated certain social adjustments. The residence rule destroyed the residential basis of patrilineality and thereby weakened clanship. Correspondingly, the only enduring group of coresident, consanguineal kinsmen was the extended family of women related in the female line. Such aggregates of females posed a threat to the superordinate position of the men which was resolved through several means, one of the most important of which was residence in the men's house. This unit freed the male from the necessity of becoming integrated into the economy and authority structure of his wife's household in villages in which he had no supporting group of kinsmen. Although he owed respect and some service to his father-in-law, the focus of his social and economic life was the men's house; this provided the framework within which a group of men from diverse villages was welded into a highly unitary working and fighting unit. Their position as a militant and self-conscious social entity, demarcated from and superior to the women, was reinforced by the cult of the sacred musical instruments. Thus male solidarity was promoted on a tribal level through the dispersal of patrilineal kinsmen, and on the village level through the men's house.

The organization of 19th-century Mundurucú society made male solidarity on the village and tribal level not only possible but a functional necessity. Conflict had to be rigorously suppressed, for if men became arrayed in overt violence along lines of residential affinity, it would pit patrilineal kin against each other and destroy the very fabric of the kinship structure. And if the combatants aligned themselves according to kinship affiliations, strife could break out within villages and even within households. The Mundurucú situation is opposite that found in some segmentary societies, in which, following Fortes' (1945:240-4) analysis, strife between kinship-territorial units of similar scope is actually productive of social equilibrium.

The necessity for suppressing overt conflict as the only alternative to serious disruptions of social relations was complemented by the necessity for male

cohesion and unity in villages whose hereditary inhabitants were the women. As a result, Mundurucú ethical values enjoined absolute harmony and cooperation upon all the males of the tribe. No such feeling was expected in interfemale relations. The female ingroup was limited to the membership of one or two extended families; beyond these limits, open jealousy and fighting could and did occur. This dichotomy in ethical values is understandable when one considers how different were the male and female social contexts.

Interpersonal and intergroup grievances will arise in all human societies as a necessary concomitant of social life, and the Mundurucú are no exception to this rule. Despite the surface tranquility of interpersonal relations among the males, numerous causes of latent antagonism existed. One potentially disruptive factor of especial significance to the problem at hand was that patrilineal succession to the chieftaincy was assured by exempting the chief's sons from the matrilineal rule. The extended family of the chief thus became the largest and most cohesive such unit in the village, for it retained sons while gathering sons-in-law. The presence of his own patrilineal kinsmen reinforced the chief's position, but it also resulted in antagonism and resentment on the part of the other men of the village, over whom he exerted no lineage-based authority. Evidence to support this statement can be found in contemporary Mundurucú society in a number of cases of sorcery accusation and punishment. In one village the chief and his son were both slain as suspected witches. In another, the family of the chief wished to execute an accused sorcerer against the will of the other residents, and in a third village the family of the chief protected one of their number against the intention of the other villagers to execute him. No evidence of such tensions would have been manifest to the casual observer in any of the three villages; the disaffected parties usually maintain cordial and cooperative relations with their antagonists both before and after the climax of the train of events, but they generally move from the village as soon as convenient. These conflicts, then, are instrumental in furthering the fragmentation of villages under the current condition of pacification.

Given the potentially centrifugal nature of leadership, descent, and residence, warfare functioned to preserve, or at least prolong, the cohesiveness of Mundurucú society. The chief was able to maintain his leadership over his lineally eclectic group of followers through his position as war leader and his complementary role as mediator between them and Brazilian society. To the Mundurucú these are the essential functions of chieftainship, and contemporary informants commonly ascribe the decline of nucleated village life to the disappearance of such attributes of leadership.

Of even greater importance to the integration of Mundurucú society, warfare activated and intensified male unity and values, both of which functioned to make matrilocality viable. Finally, the only permissible intra-

societal mechanism for the release of aggression was sorcery and the killing of sorcerers, and the previously cited cases indicate that they created as many tensions as they resolved. Actually, the only way in which hostility could be unleashed without damage to the society was against the outside world. Paradoxically for a people who considered all the world as an enemy, the true cause of enmity came from within their own society.

Much of the preceding argument has hinged upon the matrilineal and patrilineal character of Mundurucú society. In a recent article I showed that Mundurucú social structure in the 19th century could only be understood as a result of post-contact change and that the aboriginal society was organized on patrilineal and patrilineal lines (Murphy 1956). The fact that the Mundurucú were vigorous warriors before their shift to matrilocality suggests that warfare acquired new functions subsequent to that change and consequent upon it. These new functions, as they have been outlined in this paper, provide us with an understanding of how Mundurucú society remained cohesive and maintained its boundaries through more than a century of contact with the whites.

We will now broaden our analysis of the function of warfare within Mundurucú society to the closely related problem of its function within the structure of Mundurucú-Brazilian relationships. The two bases of this symbiosis were trade and war. Matrilocality evolved as a result of trade relations with the whites, but it was workable in a patrilineal society only when intrasocietal hostilities were repressed and latent antagonisms channeled into intense warfare. Warfare and the connected ceremonies also helped to perpetuate the system of clanship in this newly-evolved type of society, for they constituted almost the only occasions upon which corporate functions of the fragmented descent groups were exercised. Conversely, matrilocality and patrilineality provided the structure for warfare on a tribal scale and thus enabled the Mundurucú successfully to pursue hostilities against comparatively undisrupted tribes during a period when their own numbers were being reduced through disease and emigration to Brazilian settlements. And by frequently undertaking raids in the service of the whites, the Mundurucú had solidified their peaceful relationship with the technologically and numerically superior society. The Brazilians were willing to respect the autonomy of the Mundurucú as long as it was useful to them. We may conclude that the system of matrilocality and patrilineality and the institution of warfare were mutually reinforcing and served to maintain Mundurucú society during a period that witnessed the disappearance or dissolution of many of their neighbors.

Conclusion

Our analysis of the functions of Mundurucú warfare has concluded that the institution operated to preserve the integration and solidarity of

Mundurucú society. These findings accord closely with Simmel's theory of conflict and are also substantiated by Fernandes' (1952:354) conclusion on the functions of Tupinamba warfare. The means by which this social end was accomplished can be viewed as a variable of the Mundurucú type of society. The latter was of a unique order; it was structured so as to ramify kinship bonds throughout the tribe, but it was extremely vulnerable to any open display of aggression within the group. This, and the ambivalent position of the men, resulted in the suppression of hostility and the emphasis upon solidarity that characterized male social relations. Such solidarity could be maintained only through the release of latent aggression in a socially valued manner upon surrogate objects. Mundurucú warfare thus corresponds to Coser's (1956:48) formulation of the "safety valve" mechanism in society:

Social systems provide for specific institutions which serve to drain off hostile and aggressive sentiments. These safety valve institutions help to maintain the system by preventing otherwise probable conflict or by reducing its disruptive effects. They provide substitute objects upon which to displace hostile sentiments, as well as means of abreaction. Through these safety valves, hostility is prevented from turning against its original object.

The achievement of specific ends or the defeat of a particular enemy were secondary considerations in Mundurucú warfare. They fought any group and they fought for the sake of fighting. The ultimate source of their belligerence was the repressed hostility generated within the society, and the ultimate source of repression was the potential destructiveness of intra-societal aggression.

Safety valve institutions of one kind or another are probably universal in culture. Coser (*ibid*:41) distinguishes two means by which aggressiveness may safely be released by the members of a society. These are:

... *Ventilsitten*, which provide a socially sanctioned framework for carrying out conflict without leading to consequences that disrupt relations within a group, and those safety-valve institutions which serve to divert hostility onto substitute objects or which function as channels for cathartic release.

Mundurucú warfare and sorcery fall into the class of "safety-valve institutions"; the structure of the society is such that *Ventilsitten* would be impossible insofar as the Mundurucú cannot publicly acknowledge the existence of intrasocietal hostilities. The institutionalized public arguments and wrestling matches of the Trumai Indians (Murphy and Quain 1955: 57-59) and the spear throwing bouts between Upper Xingú tribes (Galvão 1950:366) are illustrations of cases in which hostility is allowed to appear in a controlled and sanctioned context and is thereby dissipated. Sides are drawn and the issue is resolved among the Upper Xingú groups; the Mundurucú cannot even afford to take sides openly.

Coser (1956:156-7) has considered the relationship between conflict and the rigidity of the social structure, which he defines as "the degree to which it disallows direct expression of antagonistic claims," and concludes:

Our hypothesis, that the need for safety-valve institutions increases with rigidity of the social system, may be extended to suggest that unrealistic [i.e. cathartic and not oriented toward the frustrating object] conflict may be expected to occur as a consequence of rigidity present in the social structure.

Mundurucú warfare was clearly "unrealistic" and the social structure was rigid in Coser's sense. It is possible to broaden our example to include a larger category of rigid social structures and to consider their functional concomitants. I would propose as a statistically testable hypothesis that matrilocal societies must repress open aggression in order to insure cohesion and continuity. If we take any matrilocal and matrilineal or bilateral society as our model, the system of residence tends to disperse males at least throughout the local community. Thus, any male will have close ties of kinship and economic interdependence with his housemates, his natal household, the households of his maternal uncles, and the households of his brothers. The same is true of patrilocal societies from the viewpoint of the women, but males are the principal political role-players in all human societies. Any conflict involving men therefore becomes a matter of deep community concern. As among the Mundurucú, if the lines of allegiance in a conflict situation are drawn according to kinship in any matrilocal society, bonds of local contiguity will be sundered; if primary loyalty is given to bonds of residence, the ties of kinship will be broken. In short, when the residence and kin groups of the male do not coincide, he acquires multiple commitments that may come into conflict. Also, the individual male will more readily repress his grievances if he cannot rely upon the full support of a solidary group.

Brief reference to the ethnographic literature suggests that the social solidarity of matrilocal groups is not restricted to my model. Writing of the Apinayé, Nimuendajú (1939:129) says:

I have never heard of a case of rape nor witnessed anything of publicly scandalous adultery, larceny, or slander. Only when intoxicated do these natives inflict damage on property and bodily maltreatment on persons or commit manslaughter. Compared with any Šerente settlement the village of Bacaba, at least, is a model of internal peace and harmony, and this would hold for Gato Preto, too, in the absence of alcohol.

The Šerente and the Apinayé are Gê-speaking groups of eastern Brazil and are culturally quite similar. The principal difference between them is that the fractious Šerente are patrilineal and patrilocal, while the harmonious Apinayé are matrilineal and matrilocal. Turning to North America, we have the classical example of the matrilocal and "Apollonian" Puebloans. Ellis (1951:199) has noted of Pueblo warfare:

Beyond protection, warfare served to provide legitimate outlet for the frustrations and aggressions arising from unpermitted competition or suspicions thereof among peoples of the same general culture.

The repression of open conflict among the Pueblos accounts for the latent hostility that many ethnologists have seen seething below surface relations. Under modern conditions this often results in community fission, and the same process can be noted among the contemporary, nonwarring Mundurucú. Lacking adequate safety-valves for the release of aggression, the Mundurucú now tend to withdraw from the frustrating situation.

Not all matrilocal groups repress aggression to the same extent as do the Mundurucú, nor are they as warlike. The greater emphasis of the Mundurucú upon social cohesion and external aggression stems from the persistence of patrilineal clans in a matrilocal society. This factor, combined with intervillage matrilocality, made hostility even more explosive and internal release systems less workable. It oriented the group toward warfare and provided the organization for its effective pursuit. Some deviation from our model is expectable, for there is no fixed and unvarying reservoir of aggression in society; it has its roots in the social structure, as does its expression. Our thesis states only that matrilocal societies must repress the open expression of intrasocietal conflict and that this repressed hostility, variable in intensity, will be released through acceptable and nondisruptive means within the society, or through warfare, or through both. But warfare, it can be concluded, is an especially effective means of promoting social cohesion in that it provides an occasion upon which the members of the society unite and submerge their factional differences in the vigorous pursuit of a common purpose.

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Is War a Social Problem?

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II

War as military action has been variously appraised in American and European thought. To some, violent contest is the highest fulfilment of man; to others, a grim, nasty business; and, to still others, hell. More recently, war has also been dubbed the number-one social problem of the age which, if not resolved, will be the doom of civilization in the West (2, pp. 636-39; 5, p. 44; 7, chap. 18). In this sense, it has become what Bronislaw Malinowski called it—"the deadly issue" (8). But, in spite of the apprehensions manifest in the potential effects of military hostilities on the future of mankind, American sociologists generally have avoided the study of war as a social institution or a complex event originating in custom, of which international conflict is only an incident, however deadly (1, chap. 10; 3). Thus, while war has been called the most pressing social problem of our time, the referent is military action or hostilities and their "causes" and "effects" on the life of the in-group.¹

The belief persists in American and European thought that the ready availability of organized force and violence is a necessary condition for the life of the group. But this belief is jostled by others: a belief that the good life is a non-violent one of non-resistance to evil by force, in social progress, in improvement in human affairs by means of cultural reconstruction, and in enlightenment. There is a dilemma in all this. There is, admittedly, an inherent costliness, inefficiency, waste, and coarsening of

¹Currently, this concern is showing itself in what is called "disaster research." "Undoubtedly, the task of anticipating and evaluating the manifold problems of survival in such a disaster situation [thermonuclear attack] presents to sociology and the other social sciences one of their greatest and most awesome challenges, along both theoretical and practical grounds. It is a challenge that well merits our immediate attention" (10, p. 303).

the moral sentiments present in any form of social discipline which assumes as necessary instruments of social order the policeman's club and the soldier's sword. The use of force and violence, though conceded to be necessary to keep society from falling apart, must be rationalized and kept at a minimum lest the humanizing of the race is impeded.

It will be argued in this paper that war *as a social institution* is compatible with the prevailing theory of social order in the West. War, then, in the institutional sense is not a social problem. There are, however, two social problems inherent in any theory of social order, derived from Christian and humanistic sources, which incorporates the historical state-war culture pattern into its scheme of social discipline. Present in such a theory of order, based as it is on the "reasonable" use of force and violence in human affairs, is the dilemma of the extremes. In the state-war culture pattern these express themselves as militarism, on the one hand, and pacificism² on the other. Pacificism would deprive the European community of the primary instrument for maintaining a world peace order, that is, the military establishment. Militarism, on the other hand, would not deprive the community of its military establishment, but it is a problem because it is a way of life repugnant to a Christian and the wise man of the humanistic tradition. The type of social organization or institutional process (i.e., the war-state system) which words like "militarism" and "pacificism" presuppose is widely accepted as the natural outcome of evolutionary processes and necessary to group survival as well.

III

In affirming the stand that European man does not regard the cultural setting which recurrently gives rise to military hostilities as a functional social problem, there is no intention of saying that the culture of the West is a seamless robe. There are unquestionably minority differences of opinion on the place of the uses of force and violence in the management of men. . . . Neither is it intended to deny, in asking the question whether war is a social problem, that the cultural setting from which military action arises as effect could conceivably be abolished if the desire existed. War is, first, a cultural invention; second, it is also a problematic situation in the sense that what can be invented can be altered into something else or displaced by another invention (9).

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²The word "peace" is not suitable to convey the meaning here intended. "Peace," as William James once remarked, is "war" in preparation. The word "pacificism" refers to a changed way of life and the reorganization of society.

IV

The difficulty of treating war as a social problem or a harmful social event is not methodological. Even the psychologist no longer hesitates to define war as a social institution. Why, then, is war not treated as a social problem in the literature of American sociology? It is here suggested that the answer lies in a confusion in thinking about the beginnings of war as an institution rather than in any serious value conflict over the means of its abolition. European man is not disposed to think of the state-war system as akin to a predatory or robber culture and the professional soldier as the chief benefactor. He persists in describing the in-group as a peace island situated in a sea of aggression, and the soldier as the guardian. One outcome of this way of looking at things has been that the soldier and his techniques of violence have been made allies in the search for social order. For there also persists in the thought of European man the belief that group life is a function of coercion. It is assumed that restraints, of both a symbolic and a physical nature, must be placed upon the human individual if social life is to be at all enduring. The paradox exists that man is by nature a social animal and that he is not. He is both social and malevolent.

This paradox, when combined with the traditions of Greco-Roman humanism and patristic Christianity on the uses of force and violence in society, makes the soldier the pillar of law and order in the community of in-groups called European civilization, just as is the policeman so regarded within the in-group. In these traditions the uses of force and violence in human affairs have been rationalized. Neither the humanist nor the latter-day Christian can approve the conduct of the man of action for action's sake. The uses of force and violence as ends in themselves are disapproved. Force and violence are strictly tools of social conservation. They may be employed in the suppression of wrongdoing, and then only when wielded in the group interest and by constituted authority. The individual, of course, may defend himself in the extremity (perhaps as much because he cannot be prevented from doing so as from any deductions which may be drawn from the principle of self-preservation as a law of nature), but he may not punish. It is the group alone, acting through its human agents as instruments, that can punish.

The outcome of this kind of reasoning about human affairs, coupled with the fact that Europe has always been from early times a community of culture and living, has had the effect of making over what appears to have been a social invention of predatory origin into a system of social discipline. The military way was transformed into a system of judicial violence or police action. The state-war system has come to be construed as springing into existence for the purpose of suppressing wrongdoing within the Christian (European) community of nations. The historical origins

of the state-war system were suppressed with the diffusion of the Christian religion among the barbarians. The syncretism which this process affected made over military action into a form of penology. Aristocratic man or the soldier becomes a guardian. He punishes breaches of freedom or political self-determination, violations of territorial integrity, and encroachments upon vital interests or the right of self-preservation.³

It is all too apparent that this appraisal of the nature of man and the social order obliterates the distinction between war as a social institution and in-group systems of social discipline. As already observed, military action is transformed from an affair of plunder and glory into penology. The nature of the relationships of individuals to each other within the in-group, be it a kinship or a territorial aggregate, is not differentiated from the relationships of the political entities which comprise the European community of nations. The moral law is one for the state and the person. The result of this is that the concept of wrongdoing is made to apply to two dissimilar phenomena. International law comes to be formulated with the same set of assumptions in mind as those which apply to municipal or domestic law. The writer's relationship to the reader, as a moral person, is placed on the same footing as the relationship of the United States to England. Nation-states become moral entities capable of wrongdoing just as a person living in society is capable of wrongdoing.

In the humanistic-Christian way of thinking about the state-war system it is assumed that a simple police action, say, the arrest of a thief, differs from a military action only in the number of law violators who must be put down at the same time. While it is no longer customary to describe enemy soldiers as evildoers (robbers, brigands, and lawless men) bent upon no good, the custom not only persists, but was revived in recent wars, of regarding the heads of enemy states as criminals. The order commanding a body of uniformed and disciplined men to invade a frontier is called a criminal act, and the agents of state issuing such commands are war criminals.³ A soldier is subjected to expressions of social disapproval and liable to punishment when, as the policeman, he becomes brutal and exceeds his authority.

The conclusion which emerges from these considerations is that European man has a common theory of social action which he applies to persons in in-groups and the relationships of out-groups (nation-states) to each other, but he has no sociological theory of war. The confusion of military action

³There is a difference in usage attached to the phrases "war crimes" and "war criminals" which should be noted. Acts committed by soldiers in line of duty in violation of international customary and treaty law and municipal law may properly be called "war crimes." Ironically, a "war criminal" is a head of state who wages unsuccessful war. Upon defeat, he is adjudged guilty of making "aggressive war" and is punished by the victor as a "war criminal." Objectively viewed, such action is based upon a definition of the "just cause" as the victor's; of the "bad cause" as the loser's.

with police action has two consequences. First, it obliterates the conquest origins of the contemporary locality group or state. Second, it obscures the fact that the military way (militarism) is something different in nature from the problem of maintaining social discipline in the in-group or peace group. That these distinctions exist, however, is shown by the archeological and historical records.

The soldier makes his appearance on the historical scene not as a peace officer but as a fighting man. The military way from its inception seems to have been chiefly an affair of plunder and glory. Were the contrary belief not so completely a matter of preconceived opinion, it could be said that conquest exists for the benefit of the conqueror. But, in keeping with the thesis here being developed, it may be presumed that the invader, upon occupying alien territory, superimposed rules of obedience and conformity upon those already prevailing and eradicated any which interfered with his rights as conqueror and overlord. Or that the successful defenders within an attacked community responded to this threat by establishing their own "civil government" to resist the attackers. In either case, the resulting social order was created in violence, or in the face of the threat of violence and conquest, and is not to be confused with the pre-existing forms of social discipline of a customary nature, found in all kinship and primary-group relationships.

Within the humanistic-Christian tradition, the state-war system can never become a social problem. The "soldier" and the "policeman" are always equated and described as guardians. Enduring social order is envisaged as an effect of the reasonable and calculated application of force and violence. Original nature is considered as spontaneously incapable of achieving a condition of ordered social life. Political order is always dealt with as something necessary. While people may come to a decision about the predatory nature of criminal behavior, and dispute among themselves only as to the best methods of ending the depredations of the criminal element, the phenomenon of war cannot be handled in the same way. What seems problematic about war for European man is how to convince himself that the state-war system can be justified in the nature of things. That is done, for example, in contemporary American social science thought by arguing that the territorial state emerges when the kinship group is no longer capable of enforcing discipline. The suppression of the kinship order by one founded on the principle of conquest proprietorship and dominion is explained by the argument from progress. The growing complexity of society accounts for the transition.

Given this account of the origin of the state-war system as a protective-conservative arrangement, the guardian role of the soldier is established and the predator role denied. Therefore, what appears problematic is how to prevent the occurrence of militarism, on the one hand, and pacificism,

on the other. Neither alternative is acceptable. European man will neither be a militarist nor a pacifist. He can embrace neither Mars nor Christ. Fighting and contention for their own sake are repugnant to him. On the other hand, the realities of the situation prevent him from being a lover of peace and a champion of the cause of non-resistance to evil by force and violence. The survival of men in politically organized locality groups of conquest origin denies it. Moreover, of those two opposite tendencies present in European life, pacificism is the more serious threat. The military way is not against what is assumed to be necessary and normal. The soldier's calling, like the policeman's, is, indeed, a potentially evil thing but still necessary to the preservation of an ordered social life within the Christian (European) community of nations or states. Therefore, collective wisdom consists in maintaining a condition of affairs where force is applied neither in deficiency nor in excess. The display and uses of force must not devour the fruits of social progress. It is this which is the social problem, not the abolition of the state-war system and the soldier's calling.

V

The logic of the analysis attempted in this paper denies that war can be a social problem. That analysis also makes it plain that the real issues confronting European man are not those bearing on the abolition of the community-of-nations system within which he lives out his life but how to make that system work in a world of science and the machine. Given the humanistic-Christian theory of social order, on the one hand, the predatory origins of the state, on the other, plus the syncretism which time has affected between the two, the state-war system, so far from representing a lawless condition, is actually the foundation of a world peace order. Moreover, the condition of its perpetuation is the inherent *right* of every state to defend itself by means of force and violence against aggression from without and insurrection from within.

At the level of institutional analysis presented, efforts at conflict resolution pursued within the state order can realistically turn only on the reform of international relations, that is, the reduction of the incidence or frequency of military encounters and their effects on the community at large.

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Organization and Conflict

KENNETH E. BOULDING

This paper concentrates on the problem of the "parties" to conflict. Every conflict involves at least two parties or conflicting organizations. The party may be a biological individual, or it may be an aggregate or an organization of individuals. All individuals are organizations of subordinate parts: all organizations are in some sense "individuals" insofar as they have well-defined patterns of behavior and reaction. Generally, we may wish to reserve the term "competition" for the wide concept which includes interactions among unorganized aggregates (such as biological populations) and to use the word "conflict" for the narrower concept in which the conflicting parties are individuals or organizations, possessing a certain core of unity of behavior and in which each organization is in some sense "aware" of the other and makes this awareness an essential part of its behavior pattern. We think of conflict, then, as a system of interacting systems, each party to the conflict being a system in itself, bound, however, to the other party by a system of communication, information, subjective knowledge, and behavior reactions. The question as to what property of such a system constitutes the "conflictual" as opposed, say, to the co-operative element is surprisingly difficult to answer and will be considered later.

A Model of Organization as System

Let us consider first, then, the nature of the systems which are involved in an organization. What we want here is not the organization in all its richness and completeness but rather the most simple abstract model of an organization which will serve to illuminate the relationships *between* organizations. An organization, we may recall, may include things as complex as an amoeba or as simple as the General Motors Corporation! What we are looking for here is the simplest model which will enable us to study the *interaction* of organizations.

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The first element in the description of an organization is a static structure of parts—its geography or anatomy, its organization chart or balance sheet or molecular structure. There are very interesting elements of scarcity or competition even in these static structures which may sometimes underlie conflicts—in a sense, all conflicts of interest, or “issue conflicts,” arise because two things cannot be in the same place at the same time. Everything cannot be close to everything else; there is an inexorability about geography and topology which necessitates more separation of parts in large structures than in small and which imposes limits on the growth of any particular type of structure.

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... Hence we get the very important principle that if the relative importance of linear, areal, and volumetric properties are to be preserved, the *form* of the structure must change as it increases in size; there must be elaborations of linear networks (nerves and channels of circulation); there must be convolution of areas of surface reaction (lungs, brains, bowels), in order to increase the ratio of linear or areal dimensions to volume and weight. In social organizations (firms, states, universities), communications networks and specialized administration must increase their relative importance as the size of the organization grows.

The next step in the development of an organization model is its description as a “machine,” or energy transformer. Any organization depends on some source of energy for its continued existence—food and light in the case of the biological individual, to which may be added coal, oil, and other sources in the case of manufacturing plants or armed forces. Scarcity of energy sources may be an important source of competition and issue conflict, for what is taken *by* one organization may be taken *from* another. Where the game against nature results in a “victory” and the release of another source of energy, the possibility for the expansion of all organizations together emerges, and the conflict between them is at least temporarily lessened. . . .

Organization Growth and Conflict. The next step in the organization model is to describe it as an “open system” or, more generally, as a “growth system” or dynamic open system. A static open system is a structure which is maintained in the midst of a stream or throughput of its constituent parts. To be an open system, a structure must have the property that a “hole” in the structure produces a large attractive force or valency to pull an appropriate “occupant” from the surrounding environment into the “hole.” Thus a living organism maintains its structure more or less intact in the midst of a constant throughput of atoms of matter. A social organization is a structure of “roles”: and vacancy in the role structure—i.e., any role without an occupant—creates pressure to fill the vacancy with an

appropriately skilled person. It is this property of being an open system which enables organizations to live longer than any of their parts—presidents, deans, and professors come and go, but the university goes on forever.

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Although the processes of growth remain mysterious, we do know something about the factors which limit growth, and this enables us to make some significant propositions in the theory of conflict. An important source of conflict among organizations is the attempt of two or more organizations to expand into the same field. When two firms are expanding into a limited market or two nations into the same territory or two labor unions into the same job jurisdiction, a conflict of interest is likely to arise. This "expansion conflict," to coin a term for it, has both a static and a dynamic aspect. It arises in a static sense if the number of role occupants is limited, so that, as more are drawn into one organization, fewer are available for others—the more Rotarians there are, the fewer Lions and Kiwanians; the Methodist church may grow at the expense of the Baptist; and so on. We think of the whole field of organizations as dividing among them the raw material in the shape of members, much as nations divide up the geographic area of the world, and an expansion of one inevitably means a contraction of others, unless, of course, the field itself is growing. Growth in the field itself has thus an important effect in lessening the intensity of expansion conflicts. Thus in the nineteenth century the fact that so many European countries were able to expand their power and influence in colonial empires outside Europe may have lessened the conflict among them; the closing of the colonial field in the early twentieth century may have been one reason for the two world wars. When the labor movement is expanding and all unions are organizing the unorganized, jurisdictional disputes between them lessen in intensity; when the field is closed and one union can expand only at the expense of another, these disputes increase in intensity. An era of great missionary activity, when the churches, too, are organizing the unorganized throughout the world, also sees the decline of denominational tensions and the rise of the ecumenical movement.

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Information, Knowledge, and Organization Image. Now, if we are to explore further the nature and determinants of expansion pressure, we must go to a fourth level of organization theory. This is the level of control processes involving information inputs and outputs and knowledge structures. The simplest model here is that of a cybernetic or homeostatic process, where we assume that there is a variable or, more generally, a set of variables

which the organization is concerned to maintain at some equilibrium values. These variables must be in the information input of the organization, at least to the extent that the organization "knows" where there is a *divergence* of the value given by the information input from the ideal value which the organization sets out to maintain. This knowledge is reflected in behavior or action of some kind directed toward correcting the perceived divergence between the real and the ideal values of the homeostatic variables. For a system like this to operate successfully, there should also be "relational feedback"—that is, information regarding the divergence between real and ideal and especially regarding the change in this divergence, which is perceived as related to the action taken.

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This view of behavior then raises a number of questions regarding the subordinate processes which are involved even in the simplest behavior. These concern themselves mainly with how the image, in all its complexity, is built up and especially how messages which are received by the organization result in a change in the image, for it is only through a change in the image that there can be a change in behavior. . . .

It is the peculiar glory, and occasionally the shame, of man that his images are built up not only by the receipt of messages from nature (signs) but also by the receipt of symbolic messages, proceeding directly from other persons in face-to-face contact or indirectly through the medium of "transcripts"—books, papers, records, movies, television, and so on. Man is the talking animal, and the complexity of his organizational world depends largely on his ability to communicate in symbols. If I hear a voice behind me, I may interpret this information as indicating the presence of a person, and the character of the voice will give me clues as to the character of the person—whether it is familiar or unfamiliar, foreign or native, male or female, etc. So far, the voice is merely a sign; it does not matter what words are spoken, and the process of building this information into an image is not essentially different from the process by which any other message from nature conveyed by any of the senses is built up into an image of the world around us—a world of rocks, trees, clouds, animals, people, buildings, and so on. The moment, however, that words are spoken which are *understood*, we pass to a "higher" and immensely complex system of symbolic communication which has the property of building up images far removed from the immediate world around us. Symbols remove the human organization from the prison of the immediate here and now, in which all lower forms of life are trapped, and the image of man therefore soars off to the galaxies, to the beginnings and the end of all things, to the realm of the impossible and almost to the inconceivable. It is because of this symbolic nature of the image of man that conflict in the human

world is so much more complex than conflict in the animal kingdom, where images are built up only by signs and hence conflict is always fact to face.

Value Dimensions of the Organization Image. The theory of the image points to another problem underlying any theory of behavior and interaction—the problem of the determinants of the value image or, more accurately, the value dimension of the image. This is vital for a theory of behavior, for, as we have seen, behavior consists of movement into the most highly valued part of the *total* image. A shift in the value ordering, therefore, even without any change in the rest of the image, can produce profound, even revolutionary, changes in behavior. I may be all set to get on a plane for New York when I receive a telegram to say my father has died in San Francisco; the information creates a marked shift in my valuation of my image of space and time: I cancel my reservation to New York and get a plane to San Francisco immediately because this is now the most highly valued part of my image of the world of space and time. Note that the value ordering is not the same as the emotive or pleasure-pain dimension of the image; my engagement in New York may have been perceived as very pleasant, whereas my task in San Francisco may be very painful. The value ordering, however, is capable of overriding all other orderings, and it is the value ordering which dominates behavior. Notice that in this case there is no change in my general image of space and time—I still visualize New York and San Francisco as occupying the same relative positions on my inner globe. In this example we might argue that it was a change in my detailed image of space and time, especially of persons, which caused the change in the value image; thus I now visualize my father as dead, whereas previously I had visualized him as alive. We cannot always assume, however, that it is changes in some other aspect of the image which causes a change in the value image. There may be revolutions in the value image which are quite independent of any change in the rest of the image. I am asked, for instance, do I prefer tea or coffee. I say tea, and then immediately “change my mind” and say coffee. My images of tea and coffee remain the same; only my value ordering has changed.

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In considering the value image and, indeed, the image in general, attention should be drawn to the importance of *stereotypes*, or what might be called *condensed images*. . . . We cannot rest content with propositions of the form “A is better than B in respect to X, but worse than B in respect to Y.” We want to know where A is *altogether* better or worse than B. So we run to grade sheets; cost-of-living indexes; national, racial, and occupational stereotypes, in an attempt to escape from the intolerable multidimensionality of reality. Up to a point this simplification is a necessity—we could not act at all were we not capable of effecting these drastic condensations

of the image. Condensation, however, can easily become pathological and may be an important cause of conflicts which could be resolved if the parties had a greater tolerance of complexity and ambiguity.

The danger to organizations and to the harmony and fruitfulness of their interactions, which comes from condensation of the image, arises from what might be called the principle of linked *homeostasis*. Suppose that there are two variables which must be maintained within the limits of homeostatic tolerance. If the mechanisms by which each is stabilized and too closely linked, the stabilization of one may be achieved only at the cost of the de-stabilization of the other, or they may both be stabilized only with a range outside what is regarded as desirable for both taken separately. Thus suppose we wish to stabilize both the temperature and the humidity of a building. If the apparatus for maintaining these variables is linked, we may find ourselves in the position where an attempt to raise the temperature lowers the humidity, and we find ourselves forced to choose between the warm and dry or the cold and moist, and we cannot achieve the "ideal" of warm and moist. The linkage may occur anywhere in the system, either in the information receptors, in the "image" of the control, or in the effectors (furnaces and humidifiers) by which the variables are changed. One suspects that the main source of linked homeostasis in human systems is in the condensed image. Information about two or more essential variables is condensed in the image into a single variable and can produce only a single behavior reaction in the effectors. Thus the inability to discriminate leads, paradoxically enough, to discrimination in the sociological sense. We lump together in the image things which should be separate, and, because of this, we behave toward a heterogeneous reality as if it were homogeneous and toward a homogeneous reality as if it were heterogeneous. Thus we condense the immensely complex image of personality into a few stereotypes—"Negroes," "Jews," "eggheads," "capitalists"—and classify those we meet immediately into these simple boxes and order our behavior accordingly, oblivious of the fact that our boxes are full of all kinds of different people, requiring different modes of behavior, and that a classification according to appropriate modes of behavior might be quite different.

Up to this point I have not emphasized the distinction between persons and organizations of persons, having simply a model of a "behavior unit" without regard to its composition. There are, however, important differences between the individual person as a system and a social organization, such as a university or a corporation. . . . In the case of the social organization, what gives it a unitary character or "personality" is the existence of widely *shared* images, especially of the organization itself, among the participants. One should perhaps say "integrated" images rather than "shared," as the images of different persons may be very different and yet may fit into a unified whole. . . . The head of a department who cannot see

beyond his own department, the professor who cannot see beyond his own classroom, and any employee who has no vision whatever of the institution beyond his paycheck are all potential sources of internal strife and weakness.

Establishment and Development of the Image. The question as to how common images are established is, therefore, a crucial one from the point of view of the theory of the social organization. The problem involves the dynamics of the change of the image under the stimulus of mainly symbolic messages. I am prepared to suggest as a very plausible hypothesis that common images are formed mainly through "conversation"—that is, through a dynamic process by which messages are sent back and forth among a group of people. The basic unit of conversation is the "remark." A remark always proceeds from the image of the remarker. It is heard by listeners and modifies the image of the listeners, unless there is strong resistance, in the direction of the image of the remarker. In conversation the listeners in turn become remarkers, and the images of the different individuals converge as each modifies the other in the direction of his own. For this to happen, however, I suspect that there must be a certain degree of initial similarity in the images. If the images are too divergent, a remark which is interpreted by the listener as implying a very different image from his own is regarded as a personal threat and is resisted. Under these circumstances, conversation may split up into a number of different groups, each with a convergent image, but there is no tendency for the different images of the subgroups to converge.

This theory stresses the importance of the communication network in the development of common images. The larger an organization becomes, the more difficult is the maintenance of adequate "conversation"—two-way image modifying communications among the component parts. There is a tendency, therefore, for the organization to split up into "non-conversing groups"—each group conversing within itself but not conversing with other groups. Thus management becomes a group with much internal conversation and a converging image, and the labor force becomes another group with a different image. Much industrial conflict is a result of the differing public images of management and labor groups. It may be that one of the most important social functions of the labor movement is that it provides an intermediate group of labor leaders who participate in *both* groups and hence are able to act as intermediaries between them. . . .

Implicit in the successful function of an organization is the notion of *mutual acceptance* of role images. If the participants in an organization do not accept the notion of the role *structure*, the organization is in danger of disintegrating. This does not mean that each individual must be satisfied with his own particular role. Indeed, unless there is some degree of dissatisfaction with the present role, an organization could never promote anyone, and too great satisfaction and harmony may actually lead to stagnation and decay through the failure of the "open-system" aspects of

organizational structure. There is a profound difference, however, between an ambition to aspire to another role and a rejection of the whole role structure as such. Thus union-management relations can be stable and harmonious only if both sides accept the role of the other. A revolutionary union, such as the old IWW, which rejects *in toto* the whole concept of a division of labor between employers and employed, cannot possibly enter into stable relations with the employer but must be in a state of constant conflict. . . .

The Theory of Organization and Conflict

Three-Conflict Situations. Much more might be said on the subject of the theory of organization. In the interest of that conflict of space which besets every writer, however, we must now gather up the many strands of this paper to see whether the theory of organization, which we have presented here in bare outline, has fruitful applications to the theory of conflicts and their resolution. We must realize, of course, that there are many kinds of conflict situations. There is not a single concept of conflict, and therefore there cannot be a single theory of conflict. My own inquiries have led me to distinguish three different situations, each of which go by the name of conflict. We have first what Dr. Bernard calls "issue conflict," which is what I, as an economist, might like to call "economic conflict." This is the situation in which a movement of change in a situation makes at least one party, in its own eyes, worse off and the other party better off. The theory of these situations has been elaborately developed in the theory of welfare economics, and I need not go into it here except to remark that, with two organizations, any given field can be divided into two sets, one which is called the "trading set," where movements are possible which benefit *both* parties, and the other, which is the "conflict set" (Edgeworth's "contract curve"), where a movement will benefit one party at the expense of the other.

Economic Conflict. An important dynamic principle emerges from this static theory, which might be called the "principle of the widening of the agenda." As long as the two parties are not in the conflict set, negotiation of a "trading" nature is possible, whereby both parties become better off. "Trading," however, inevitably moves the parties toward the conflict set and eventually lands them there. Once there, the only possibility is agreement or non-agreement; and if there is non-agreement, various rituals must be performed such as strikes, wars, etc., which will change the willingness to agree of one or both parties so that agreement becomes possible—assuming, that is, that the relationship cannot be avoided. Even if the parties are on the contract set in one field, however, they may get off it by widening the agenda to include variables which were not previously in discussion. Generally speaking, the wider the agenda, the greater the possibility for finding "trades," and the less chance there is of reaching an impasse on

the conflict set. The principle of the widening of the agenda is exemplified in the multiplication of clauses in treaties and in union contracts. It is tempting to interpret the relative success of industrial relations as against the relative failure of international relations in terms of the greater flexibility of the agenda in union-management negotiations as over against the hands-tied diplomat and the still more rigid soldier.

The contribution of organization theory to this part of conflict theory is to point out that it is not the "objective" situation which matters, but the subjective images of the participants, and that, therefore, the theory needs to be extended into the consideration of the dynamics of the formation and change of these images. Insofar as all issue conflicts involve utility, they are capable of resolution by changing value images as well as by a shift in the objective situation. It would be a grave error to think of issue conflicts as if they somehow involved brute facts, whereas psychological conflicts involved illusions. In the dynamics of issue conflicts, especially, it is important to study the images of each party in its own mind and in the mind of the other.

Interaction Conflict. The second and the third type of conflict both fall under Dr. Bernard's class of psychological conflicts, and yet they represent, to my mind, entirely different situations. The second type is what might be called "interaction conflict" as typified in the arms race, in any process of mutually heightening hostility through the reaction of each party to the behavior of the other. The pioneering analysis of these processes by Lewis F. Richardson (4) perhaps merits entitling them "Richardson processes." In the Richardson model we postulate some measure of "hostility-friendliness" (as Richardson himself points out, these models apply just as well to the process of falling in love as they do to the arms races). Then we suppose that the increase in the hostility of each party is a function, first, of some constant term which represents the underlying "grievance," and, second, of the absolute level of hostility of the other party. This gives us two simultaneous differential equations. These may have an equilibrium solution (a "balance of power"), or they may be indefinitely explosive up to some boundary at which the system breaks down in war, strike, or divorce—depending on the nature of the parameters. The less "sensitive" the parties—the less the hostility of one increases at each level of hostility of the other—the more likely is a balance-of-power solution to be found. The model can be extended easily to more complex cases involving, for instance, such variables as "submissiveness."

The Richardson process is a very general phenomenon, observable in international relations. It may be almost unrelated to any "issue conflict," though the process takes account of this possibility through the constant term in its functions. The contribution of the theory of organization to these processes seems to be to point out the importance of the *perception* problem. It is not the "objective" hostility of the parties which is important,

but the *perceived* hostility, that is, the hostility of each as perceived by the other. Consequently, again, the pattern of image formation takes a foremost place in the general theory of these processes. What are the cues, for instance, by which hostility is perceived, and how may these cues be misinterpreted? One may introduce, as an essential element in the process, the *predisposition* to perceive hostility. This is unquestionably related to internal hostility (self-hatred). The greater this predisposition, of course, the more likely are we to find unstable Richardson processes set off. The Freudian theory of displacement and aggression fits nicely into the general picture at this point. The self-hater is more likely to get into Richardson processes of mutually increasing hostility than the well-adjusted self-lover. The wisdom of the great commandment to "love our neighbor *as ourselves*" is amply justified by this impressive body of theory!

Internal Conflict. The third type of conflict situation is that described by Kurt Lewin (2) and Neal Miller (3) and might be described as the "quandary." This is the situation in which the individual (or organization) is incapable of making a decision because it is pulled (or pushed) in two opposite directions at the same time! This is a strictly external conflict; it does not involve two parties but the motivational forces operating on a single party. It falls into quite a different category, therefore, from either issue conflicts or Richardson processes. It is, nevertheless, relevant to the wider concept, in that the internal conflicts may profoundly affect the conduct of external conflicts. Miller makes the extremely interesting suggestion that quandaries which result from opposing *pulls* or attractions are unstable; if the individual veers ever so slightly toward one side or the other, the side toward which he veers exerts a strong pull on him, and he soon goes over to it. Quandaries which result from opposing pushes or repulsions are stable; as we veer to one side, the push becomes stronger and pushes us back into the quandary. Buridan's ass between two bales of hay is unstable. The slightest variation toward one bale reinforces its pull, and he goes toward it—returning then, as someone has observed, to eat the other! Buridan's ass, on the other hand, between two equally repellent skunks would be in a position of agonizing stability. As he moved toward either skunk, its repellent force would increase and would push him back toward the other.

Insofar as internal conflict of this kind produces disorganization and self-hatred, it has an important bearing on two-party conflict, as we have seen. The proposition may be ventured that those who are motivated mainly by hatred (fleeing away from what they do not like rather than toward what they like) are likely to get into quandaries and to be racked with stable internal conflicts destructive to their internal organization. Because of this, they are also likely to get involved in Richardson processes of mutually increasing hostility and are also likely to be unable to adjust their value structures (rendered rigid by their very disorganization) in the resolution of

issue conflicts. Those who are motivated by "love," on the other hand, who move toward that they like rather than away from what they do not like, will be able to resolve quandaries easily, will be unlikely to get into processes of mutually increasing hostility, and can afford to have flexible value images which will help them in getting out of issue conflicts (liking what they get, instead of getting what they like).

Conflict Resolution

I may offer one final word on conflict resolution. Perhaps the most important avenue of conflict resolution is simple *avoidance*. This is much neglected by the psychologists, though it is familiar enough to economists, and is indeed the basis for the economist's prejudice in favor of perfect competition. In a perfectly competitive market there is no conflict at all; if one arises, it is immediately avoided by switching to another buyer or another seller. It is only as markets become imperfect that conflict becomes important, as it becomes increasingly impossible to avoid particular relationships. The conflict between a professor and his dean is frequently resolved by a nice letter from another dean. In family life, divorce or separation represents conflict avoidance; here again the extreme (and inevitable) imperfection of the marriage market makes conflict in this area possibly more intense than in almost any other. In international relations, likewise, the impossibility of avoidance, especially in a world of few great powers, makes this particular solution inadmissible and forces the development of organizational solutions. Also in industrial relations, once labor is organized, avoidance becomes impossible; the individual worker can flee to another shop, but the union has to stay with the employer till death do them part.

If avoidance is impossible, the resolution of conflict depends on two factors: the reduction in the intensity of the conflict, on the one hand, and the development of overriding organizations which include both parties, on the other. The intensity of conflict can be reduced by a change in the value images of the parties toward "love" and away from "hate," by an expansion of the field into which organizations are growing, by a diminution of their expansion pressure, and so on. Overriding organizations can develop either through sheer conquest, in which one party is eliminated (making a desert and calling it peace), or through the development of images in both parties in which there is acceptance of the role of a larger organization. Organization theory is important here in pointing out the limiting factors on the size of organization. These limiting factors may prevent the rise of uniting organizations unless the functions of these organizations are severely limited. It is clear, for instance that world government would prevent "international" war; it is possible, however, that its very size would cause it to fall apart and render it impotent to prevent the re-formation of "non-conversing groups,"

with the consequent danger of civil war. It is perhaps the chief function of organization theory to warn us against simple or formal solutions and to point out the richness and complexity of conflict situations and their roots in the image-forming process.

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Man and Violence

PRYNS HOPKINS

As in the cases of the other of the world's sicknesses, war too is nourished by many roots. These roots are variously economic, genetic, political, psychological, ethnological and theological.

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... Whatever are the *causes* of war—and they may be legion—it is clear that the *fact* of war depends completely upon man's willingness to fight. If, therefore, man were not, in any circumstances whatsoever, willing to fight, war would be impossible.

Here, then, is our problem. Why is man willing to fight? That it is far from simple to answer, for the reasons are, as everyone knows, multitudinous.

Within the space of a very long book they could scarcely be reviewed, let alone examined; and for me it is quite impossible to attempt even a survey. I shall therefore... concentrate upon one or two psychological factors, the importance of which is perpetually overlooked.

I do not wish it to be thought that because I deal *in extenso* with only these few psychological motives that they are in themselves sufficient to explain the phenomenon of war. Nor do I wish to imply that war is entirely a psychological phenomenon. ... I shall not do more here than remind my readers of the fact that the "rational" causes of war do not in themselves present unsurpassable obstacles, but that until the underlying psychological motives are understood and cured, war will never be removed from the world.

... Battle and strife offer an almost unparalleled opportunity for the expression of those sadistic impulses which in peace-time we are able to control often only with difficulty. So much is this the case that I am tempted to use war as the supreme example of the play of the sadistic urge, and I only refrain from this because there is another psychological factor which, in my view, is possibly even more instrumental in preparing those conditions

Pryns Hopkins, "Man and Violence," The Psychology of Social Movements, A Psycho-Analytic View of Society (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1938), Chapter 6, pp. 115-131. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.

in which war becomes inevitable. Before I proceed to discuss it in detail, however, I wish to follow my usual practice and point out in general terms a miscellaneous assortment of lesser psychological motives, all of which play their parts in building-up a war fever.

Consider, first of all, an auto-erotic motive such as narcissism. The narcissist likes to admire his own potency and power. As an individual human being he is limited in these, but his imagination allows him to identify himself with his nation. The weaker he is personally, the more may we expect him to clamour for national aggrandisement. The more timid he is, the more surely will he wish his nation to be aggressive to its neighbours.

Exhibitionism expresses itself in an analogous but slightly different way. Instead of a self-centred pride in belonging to an influential group or in possessing (collectively) a big battleship, there is a liking to parade whatever one is proud of before other persons. The simple private soldier's primitive pleasure in a strutting before girls in a smart uniform, and the vanity of the young aristocrat who lets it be known he has joined a fashionable regiment, are direct expressions of this motive.

Allo-erotism is of a great deal of importance as the force binding a group together. In this connection Freud points out in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*:

We have only to think of the troop of women and girls, all of them in love in an enthusiastic sentimental way, who crowd round a singer or pianist after his performance. It would certainly be easy for each of them to be jealous of the rest; but, in face of their numbers, and the consequent impossibility of their reaching the aim of their love, they renounce it, and instead of pulling out one another's hair, they act as a united group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with their common actions.

Of the allo-erotic factors, homo-sexuality is of particular importance. We find this cruder aspect of this impulse functioning in the pleasure of being in physical contact with large numbers of one's own sex—a motive given by many men as among those responsible for their enlistment for the last war. I should point out that this same impulse, where sublimated, often serves as the basis for pacifism—love of fellow-men extended to embrace all mankind rather than just one's countrymen.

Hetero-sexuality, too, plays an important part in building up war psychology. One of the chief justifications for all recruiting and rearmament is that we must defend our women against enemy soldiery. That the latter are similarly arming and enlisting to defend their women against our rearmament is happily forgotten.

All these factors and many more that I have no space to mention find expression in war; but none of them finds fuller expression than sadism and that extremely misunderstood factor that Freud calls the Oedipus complex.

Before proceeding to show how this last factor enters into war-mindedness, I propose to explain in more detail . . . how it develops and how it manifests itself in ordinary affairs.

The fundamental feature of the Oedipus complex is ambivalence. Ambivalence means liking and disliking a thing at one and the same time. In conscious thinking we estimate the value of any thing or of any proposed course of conduct or of any person in terms of what remains when we have subtracted our negative from our positive feelings for it. But in unconscious mental activity the two incompatible attitudes simply live on side by side, rendering our account, in consequence, contradictory or indecisive.

Ambivalent feelings frequently are directed against our parents. The child resents the fact that they sometimes thwart his wishes, even while he is grateful because they, and more immediately the mother, satisfy his needs, give him shelter, help and love him, and so nourish his own reciprocal love. This is, as a rule, the more pervasive and preponderant feeling. But that must not blind us to the fact that frequent occasions and outbursts of hate occur as well, and leave a strain of hate behind them. And we must in consequence also recognize, as a third and very important feature of the child's psychic life, that the hate and the love must occasionally come into direct collision and lead to a recurring conflict in the child's mind. That these conflicts emerge in later life often with disastrous effects is not readily appreciated.

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Ambivalence towards other members of the family is usually the result of jealousy. The child who imagines that his claims are passed over on account of a favourite is likely to resort to exactly the worst possible tactics to try to remedy this. Feeling that he does not get his share of love, he becomes morbidly sensitive about it, and tries to get attention by pushing in on every possible occasion. This aggressiveness has, of course, the very opposite effect from that intended; it alienates instead of attracting people. But despite the folly of such conduct, it is often persisted in.

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Here in a nutshell are the essentials of the famous Oedipus complex, which comes to a head usually between the sixth month and the end of the third year of a child's life. . . .

First, a special excitability and intensity of feeling (which applies patently with the same force to his love for his mother) as to the boy's hatred of his father, the powerful, privileged, and excluding rival. Secondly, a specially sharp focus of this feeling on the father's bodily privileges with the mother, and, above all, on the most intimate privilege of all. Thirdly, and issuing from this, an incompatibility between this attitude of resentment

and jealousy of the father's own demands and imposed conditions, and the boy's growing desire to live in greater unison with him. And fourthly, by a paradox which is easily made intelligible, an actual enhancement of this very desire for unison.

Owing to the boy's strong wish to remain friends with his father, other male persons are sought for unconsciously as substitutes for the father in order that the hostile feelings may be displaced from him on to them.

What are the origins of this curious tangle of conflicting emotions? That their roots are to be found in early babyhood is evident, and I would remind the reader of what I have already said as to how sensual is an infant's attachment to his mother. The male child (especially) is jealous of anyone who comes between her and himself, even if it be his own father. A child tends to be monopolistically minded whether about his toys or his loves, and in consequence wishes to have his mother all to himself. Doubtless at other times he feels very strong affection for his father, or for brothers and sisters, but this affection arises definitely later than does his initial love for his mother.

Such is the conclusion established by innumerable psycho-analyses, and it has been confirmed by direct observation of very young infants. When the boys are older they sometimes cease to manifest antagonism to father and brothers openly. But analyses and many symbolic actions show that the antagonism has not been eliminated or otherwise satisfactorily dealt with, but has only been repressed by positive feelings of affection towards father or brother, and by feelings of duty towards them which dominate consciousness.

What, then, becomes of the repressed feelings? They remain as operative as before, and indeed combine with the primeval impulse of aggression as also with sadism; but having been repressed, they have to express themselves covertly or in a sublimated form.

The most usual way they do this is by giving exaggerated force to the reaction against some trivial offence. Let us say the father speaks to the boy a little more sharply than an occasion requires; the latter instead of resenting his father's anger for a moment and then forgetting it, broods over the injustice of it for half a day.

A second way is by inhibiting the performance of what was consciously intended to be a friendly act. The boy is asked, we will say, to bring his father a certain object. He expresses ready consent, but is so tardy starting as to exasperate the father; or he starts briskly but stumbles, letting the object fall and break.

A third way is the one which has most importance for us in this chapter. It consists in splitting up the infantile image of the father into a good-father-image and a bad-father-image, and then identifying one or both of these with some other male person. Normally, the good image is kept for the real

father, who is accordingly loved with much less conflict, and the evil image is transferred to some other male member of the family, such as an uncle or to a schoolmaster or other outsider, who then becomes hated. The persistence within the unconscious of this father-hate long after we have suppressed the very memory of such feelings from consciousness is evidenced constantly in psycho-analysis.

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What is more natural than that a child should have this hatred in him? He can only take his parents as he finds them, in relation to his own desires, demands, and feelings. If at times they refuse him gratifications, or force particular ways of behaviour on him, how can they appear to him as other than hateful? He knows nothing about their higher motives (assuming these are always there) or about his own ultimate good, not until he has reached a fairly advanced stage of intellectual development. He just knows that they are behaving to him in a way he resents, and are so far hateful. Afterwards, when he has learnt to love them, he tries to absolve them from his hatred by projecting it on to substitutes. Even children may serve him in this capacity. Indeed, when we are grown up, we are tempted to think of our own children when they thwart our wishes as in childhood we thought of our parents.

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Such complexity of expression is typical of the working of the Oedipus complex. It might, for example, be imagined that to rescue one's father from peril must always be an act of friendship, not of hatred; but Freud has found in his elaborate analyses of a multitude of men's dreams, based on this theme, that such a view is frequently utterly at fault.

It speedily became apparent that the friendliness was far from real in the sense in which it was so if a man rescued his mother and not his father from peril. The emphasis in the dream was always given to the fact that the father was put into a position from which he needed rescuing, in which he needed the help of his son. By making him dependent upon the goodwill and superior powers of the son, the dreamer reverses the roles they respectively occupy in real life.

The strength of the hatred and resentment which is generated in a son sometimes assumes terrifying proportions. Of course, since by the very nature of the complex, this resentment rarely finds direct expression, it is found in a sublimated form—e.g. the would-be parricide becomes an actual hangman, and so satisfies not only the desire to kill, but the conscience which says killers should be punished (hanged). Extreme instances of this factor and of its moulding of the life of the adult are not far to seek.

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Men who live only to kill are rare, but they are of vital importance to an army. I know of a sergeant-major who was decorated for his bravery in holding a machine-gun post during the war under circumstances of particular gallantry. His section had been wiped out to a man, and across a shell-pitted No-Man's Land were advancing masses of grey-clad figures. For twenty minutes he had, although wounded three times, continued firing his gun, never ceasing to pour death and destruction into the oncoming soldiers until his ammunition was exhausted.

The incident is not unusual in the annals of the Great War; what is unusual was his own attitude towards it. He boasted afterwards that no other man single-handed had ever killed so many of his fellows in such a short time, and confessed that the incident had been the supreme moment of joy in his life.

Although I have said that such extreme instances are comparatively rare, they are more numerous than most people suspect. The fact that they occur at all is evidence (since people differ only relatively) that in mankind as a species there exist feelings of this nature, if of less degree. We may conclude that the opportunity to kill is one that is welcomed on occasions by enormous numbers of men. The influence which such an attitude has upon war and recruiting for war I need not stress; what I will stress is the connection between this attitude and the Oedipus complex of childhood.

Still this is only a particular illustration of a general factor. It is not difficult to see how the anger and resentment of a child towards its father during a long process of sublimation becomes successively directed onto such objects as schoolmasters, policemen, and magistrates, nor how much resentment may conduce to the commission of all sorts of crimes of violence. In some cases the sublimation may be carried on and on until at last the hatred becomes directed upon an object that the whole community agrees in disliking. What more likely object is there than "the enemy," who thus fulfils the extremely important function of providing intense expression for the repressed father-hate of childhood? The desire to "punish" the enemy then becomes a consuming passion, and a harmless citizen becomes a fanatical supporter of a ruthless war policy.

Thus the fact we found true of sadism is so again of the Oedipus complex—the greatest opportunity which life offers for its expression is presented in war. Those hatreds which in peace-time smoulder in every human soul, varying only in intensity, become licensed then to vent themselves upon the national enemy. One is allowed—nay, ordered—to march against the symbol of the evil father with gun and bayonet, bomb and flame-thrower. The more one tortures, maims, and kills him, the more is one praised. So let there be a holiday from pity.

So completely are the hostile feelings displaced on to the foe, or on to whomsoever seems to show him the least sympathy, either by trying to

explain his point of view, or questioning the complete righteousness of one's own, that only love remains for friends and allies. This phenomenon of the cessation of all quarrels and union of all parties at home in a general spirit of *bonhomie* when hate is directed against a foreigner, has been remarked on by many observers, exploited by tottering sovereigns, and made the basis of many eulogies of war. As for the enemy, every cruelty may be perpetrated on him because he is the embodiment of all that is vile, criminal, treacherous, and beastly. Our own country and its allies are fighting him, so it is felt, purely from defensive reasons, after intolerable provocation and in a flawless cause.

Our culture contains all merit and theirs none. Our soldiers never commit atrocities, but have a monopoly of all chivalrous qualities. And when they come home on leave food, drink, women, and sometimes even money are theirs for the asking, nay, are forced on them by generous and mutually loving patriots.

Since this phenomenon takes place equally among the belligerent peoples on both sides, it is clear that the dethronement of their reason has been accomplished by the upsurging of most powerful emotions. No other danger of death, not even from a catastrophic cause like an earthquake, unhinges men's reason and leads them to completely insane judgments about each other as does war. If we would understand this, then we must look for some force stronger than the fear of death—something which can drive men to sacrifice their lives.

Psycho-analysis had made it clear such a force is present in the Oedipus complex. Let me finally recapitulate the main points of the argument. To the infant, with his enormous self-esteem, there can seem to be only one explanation of the fact that his mother gives a share of her embraces to anyone but himself; it is that they are forced upon her against her will. The more openly the father and mother make love before him, therefore, the more is built up in the child's imagination the picture of an ogre-father, prototype of all future villains, assaulters, and rapers.

Our native land feeds, clothes, and educates us. She therefore becomes to us our *mother-country* whom we love truly as we love our flesh-and-blood mother. When foreign troops threaten our country, we describe their action as one of invading or assaulting her, thus showing who in our unconscious minds we think they are. All the allies in the Great War, for example, felt *outraged* by the *rape* of Belgium.

Unconscious fear of an assault on our mother, therefore, is largely responsible for the clamour that our country shall be "protected" against potential evil father-figures by the largest army or navy or air-fleet which we can wring out the taxpayers. It is this illusion largely which sees to it that as fast as new gains for humanity are made by technical science, the goods they produce are swallowed up by just so much the larger armaments.

It would not be fair, and it would not be scientific, to close this chapter without pointing out that the Oedipus complex may, in certain limited circumstances, work violently against war and in favour of pacifism. This ideal is less frequently achieved, but amongst so-called (and aptly-called) "militant" pacifists its working is clear.

In their case, the mother-idea has progressed beyond the mere geographical unit of the nation or country and embraces the whole world. Hence all soldiers and all those like armament manufacturers and jingoistic statesmen who aid and encourage soldiers are conceived of as father-villains, and it is against them that the heat and passion of the pacifists' latent father-hates are directed.

Yet these circumstances occur more rarely, for the pacifists are still a minority. If, however, we are willing to learn from psychology—and with the incentive of protection against war to spur us we might be encouraged to do so—then it is clear that one of our first lessons will have to be how to direct and harness the enormous forces latent in the Oedipus complex for the destruction of war, and not, as so unhappily obtains to-day, for the destruction of mankind.

Uses of Violence

H. L. NIEBURG

The threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence (which gives the threat credibility), are essential elements in conflict resolution not only in international, but also in national communities.¹

... Violence and the threat of violence, far from being meaningful only in international politics, is an underlying, tacit, recognized, and omnipresent fact of domestic life, of which democratic politics is sometimes only the shadow-play. It is the fact that instills dynamism to the structure and growth of the law, the settlement of disputes, the processes of accommodating interests, and that induces general respect for the verdict of the polls.

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The argument of this essay is that the risk of violence is necessary and useful in preserving national societies. This specifically includes sporadic, uncontrolled, "irrational" violence in all of its forms. It is true that domestic violence, no less than international violence, may become a self-generating vortex which destroys all values, inducing anarchy and chaos. However, efforts to prevent this by extreme measures only succeed in making totalitarian societies more liable to such collapses. Democracies assume the risk of such catastrophes, thereby making them less likely.

Violence has two inextricable aspects: its actual use (political demonstrations, self-immolation, suicide, crimes of passion, property, politics, etc.), or its potential use. The actual demonstration of violence must occur from time to time in order to give credibility to its threatened outbreak; thereby gaining efficacy for the threat as an instrument of social and political change. The two aspects, demonstration and threat, cannot be separated. The two merge imperceptibly into each other. If the

¹"Violence" is defined as direct or indirect action applied to restrain, injure, or destroy persons or property.

capability of actual demonstration is not present, the threat will have little effect in inducing a willingness to bargain politically. In fact, such a threat may provoke "pre-emptive" counter-violence.

The "rational" goal of the threat of violence is an accommodation of interests, not the provocation of actual violence. Similarly, the "rational" goal of actual violence is demonstration of the will and capability of action, establishing a measure of the credibility of future threats, not the exhaustion of that capability in unlimited conflict.³

Political Systems and Consensus

An investigation of the function of violence begins with an outline of concepts. We assume that all human relationships, both individual and institutional, are involved in a dynamic process of consensus and competition. These are opposites only as conceptual poles of a continuum. In real relationships, it is often difficult to distinguish objectively between the two. The distinction is sharp only subjectively, for the participant, and his perception of consensus or competition may change from moment to moment, depending on his political role and objective circumstances.⁴ A political role is defined in terms of the many political systems in which the individual objectively or subjectively (by identification of interests) plays a part. A political system operates through a hierarchy of authority and values. Each system constitutes a complex structure of leadership and influence but, because of the nature of its task (maximizing and allocating certain values), decision-making power is usually vested in one or a few roles (the elite) at the top of a pyramid of authority relationships. Formal and informal political systems exist at all levels of group life (children's play groups, families, lodges, gangs, work groups, nation-states, international alignments, etc.), interpenetrating each other among and between levels. Each isolated system has an interdependent structure of roles, involving loyalty to certain values, symbols, leaders, and patterns of behavior according to system norms. The discrete individual, part of many different systems, must structure his own hierarchy of commitment to meet the simultaneous demands made upon him by many different roles.

Within the individual, the conflicting demands of these roles create tension. Similarly, within each system there are conflicting values among members which are constantly adjusted as roles change, maintaining a state of tension. Political systems have an objective, dynamic interrelationship,

³By "rational" here is meant: having a conceptual link to a given end, a logical or symbolic means-ends relationship which can be demonstrated to others or, if not demonstrable, is accepted by others (but not necessarily all) as proven.

⁴Essentially, the perception by an individual of his relationship to others within a framework of hostility or cooperation is the subjective basis of "ideology" (Mannheim, 1957, pp. 265-6).

structured into the hierarchy of macrosystems. Within the latter, each subsystem has a role much like that of the individual in smaller constellations. Each subsystem may be part of several macrosystems, imposing conflicting demands upon it. Consequently, within macrosystems there is maintained a state of constant tension between subsystems. This objective tension, existing on all levels, is seen subjectively in terms both of competition and consensus, depending on the comparative degrees of collaboration and conflict which exist in the situation at any given moment.

Any two or more systems may appear as hostile at any given time. From the viewpoint of the participants, the conceptual framework of competition overrides underlying consensus. Decisions and policies of the rival elites are rationalized in terms of hostility to the values and leaders of the other systems. However, if events conspire to place a higher value on a hostile tactical situation involving the macrosystem of which both smaller systems are a part, their relationship will be transformed quickly to a conceptual framework of consensus which will override and mute the unresolved competitive elements. Such an event may also bring about internal leadership changes in both subsystems, if the elites were too firmly wedded to the requirements of the now-irrelevant competitive situation.

Objectively, tension is always present among all roles and systems; that is, there is always present both elements of competition and consensus. The subjective emphasis which each pole of the continuum receives depends on the value which the tactical situation places on acts and attitudes of hostility or collaboration among the various systems at various times. Degrees of hostility and collaboration are structured by a hierarchy of values within and among all roles and systems all the time. All are involved in a dynamic process.

Conflict, in functional terms, is the means of discovering consensus, of creating agreed terms of collaboration. Because of the individual's personal role in the macrosystem of nation-states, he tends to view the Cold War in terms of competition. Similarly, because of his role in the subsystem of the family, he tends to view family problems in terms of consensus (until the system breaks down completely).

One can reverse these conceptual fields. The Cold War can be viewed in terms of the large areas of consensus that exist between the two power blocs, for example, the wish to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to each other's allies; the wish to avoid giving each other's allies the power of general war and peace between the main antagonists; the common interest in reducing accidental provocations; the common interest in establishing certain norms of predictability in each other's behavior; etc. Conflict can be considered merely as the means of perfecting these areas of consensus. In the same way, one can view the family situation negatively in terms of competition and hostility. As in an O'Neill drama, one would dwell on all

of the things that divide the family members and interpret all actions in terms of maneuvers to subdue each other's will . . .

In performing this exercise, the relativistic nature of the concepts of consensus and competition becomes evident. It is impossible to reach any consensus without competition and every consensus, no matter how stable, is only provisional, since it represents for all of its members a submerging of other values. There is a constant effort by all collaborating individuals, groups, or nations to exploit any favorable opportunity to improve their roles or to impose a larger part of their own value structures upon a larger political system. In an important sense, all individuals, groups, or nations desire to "rule the world," but are constrained to collaborate with others on less desirable terms because of the objective limits of their own power.

The commitment required by a credible threat of violence, able to induce peaceable accommodation, is one of a very high order. Not all individuals nor all political systems are capable of credibly using the threat of violence in order to induce greater deference by others to their values. There is general recognition by all of the kinds of values which can and cannot elicit the high degree of commitment required to make the threat credible.

By and large, all violence has a rational aspect, for somebody, if not for the perpetrator. All acts of violence can be put to rational use, whether they are directed against others or against oneself. This is true because those who wish to apply the threat of violence in order to achieve a social or political bargaining posture are reluctant to pay the costs or take the uncertain risks of an actual demonstration of that threat. Many incoherent acts of violence are exploited by insurgent elites as a means of improving their roles or imposing a larger part of their values upon a greater political system. The greater the logical connection between the act and the ends sought, the easier it is to assimilate the act and claim it as a demonstration of the threat available to the insurgents if their demands are ignored. . . .

Nations, Laws, and Ballots

The nation is a highly organized, formal political system, whose structure is well defined by law and custom, reinforced by sanctions legally imposed by the police power of the state. The central problem of lawful societies is to develop principles, procedures, institutions, and expectations that create conditions of continuity and predictability in the lives of its members. The legal system is an abstract model of the society, designed to crystallize relationships of the status quo, maintain their continuity in the midst of political and social change, provide lawful methods of resisting or accommodating change. Law itself, however, tends to maintain the status quo and, with the instruments of state power, to resist change. But relationships in organized societies change anyway. The process for codifying changed conditions and relationships is called "politics." Formal political

systems legitimize certain kinds of potential violence within controlled limits.⁵ However, law almost never serves the interests of all equally. Rather, it protects some against others or gives advantages to some over them. By placing the violence of the state behind the interests of some, law serves to neutralize the potential violence behind the demands of others. In a sense, it thus raises the threshold of violence required to make social protests against the law efficacious. This fact guarantees that the law cannot be changed easily or quickly by any group, thus giving it greater permanence and stability.

Pressures for political and social change must be substantial before the threat of violence and the fear of the breakdown of law and order rises above the threshold set by the reserves of force held by the state. While the threat and fear remain below the threshold, the status quo often responds to challenges against the law by more severe enforcement, augmented police and enlarged prisons. Just as soon as the threat and fear near or cross the threshold, there is a general tendency toward nonenforcement of the law. The status quo interests begin to share with the disaffected groups a desire to evade and to change the law.

Private demonstrations of violence are illegal in all domestic societies. Toleration is accorded to threats of potential violence, however, to the extent that the laws and institutions are democratic. In all systems, the state must apply adequate force to control all outbreaks of actual violence by private sources. If the state power is not equal to a private threat, the government in power ceases to rule. The private threat of violence becomes in fact the last resort of authority in the system.⁶ Why do governments fall when there is a general strike, or a street demonstration? Governments fall when their capabilities for dealing with threatened violence fail. The emerging political system which proves itself capable of raising a higher threshold of violence becomes *de facto* the highest authority, and *de jure* the new government.

Laws are not merely the rules of a game of economic and political competition. They can also be a means of winning the game, if some of the players can, as they do in fact, write the laws. The ideal system is one in

⁵The distinction between "violence" and "force" (one controlled, the other uncontrolled), was common in pre-Lasswellian literature. They are often difficult to distinguish objectively. Assessments of controllability may be almost entirely ideological. I prefer to use "force" to designate the objective capabilities, i.e., the concrete means or instruments for violence.

⁶There are many areas outside the jurisdiction of formal governmental authority, as, for example, "off-limit" slum areas where police seldom penetrate, or the Mafia areas of Sicily. Such areas represent political subsystems which possess a high degree of sovereignty, tolerated, for one reason or another, by the general government. Within such areas, the *de facto* authority is often the elite able to maintain the highest threshold of potential violence, not the formal government. In such areas, there is usually an unwritten law making it a severely punished offense to call upon the authority of the general government.

which the rules are written with perfect dispassion, so that they accord no special advantages to anyone. This ideal is never realized. The process of politics which underlies the making and unmaking of laws is not dispassionate. Indeed, it is one of the most passionate of the affairs of men. No matter how scrupulously fair may be the original constitution and the representation of governing institutions, the tensions of political systems soon intrude historical hierarchies of advantage. Whomever enjoys early advantages in the game soon enjoys more by law, with the heightened threshold of the state to vouchsafe them.

Thus, the law tends always to become to some extent the instrument of the status quo and an instrument for resisting change.

However, in democratic societies the law also guarantees the rights of voluntary association, political liberties, and restrains (by a constitutional distribution of authority) arbitrary use of the police power. These permit opponents of the status quo to establish and maintain a formidable base of political action. It is difficult for the regime to find legal pretexts for controlling this base while its potential for anti-state violence is still within the state's control capability. Once the insurgent capability of demonstrating violence is equal or greater than that of the state, there is no realistic prospect of repressing it. Changing the law gains precedence over enforcing it, even for status quo leaders, who wish to preserve what control remains over informal political systems whose elite they are. Once the process of peaceful political change has been successfully established, all political elites, both emerging and declining, have a high interest in maintaining general freedom to threaten violence without initiating or provoking it, either on the part of the state or by other groups. For the insurgent elites, there is usually more to be gained in preserving the continuity of the laws than in appealing to the uncertain results of violence.

In democratic systems, the ballot becomes the nonprovocative symbol by which the elites may measure their capabilities for threatening direct action. In a real sense, voting is an approximation of picking sides before a street fight. Once the sides are picked, the leaders are able to gauge their bargaining strengths and make the best possible deal for themselves and their cohorts. The appeal to actual battle is not only unnecessary, but also, for the weaker side (the only side with an interest in challenging the results of the count), does not promise to change the results, and may in fact undermine the authority of the polls as a method of reversing one's position in the future.

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The International Process

Many people blithely argue for law as a substitute for violence, as though there were a choice between the two. They call for international law and

world government to eliminate war. This point of view reveals a blissful ignorance of the functions of violence in domestic legal systems. A viable system based on law protects the conditions of group action. Law always rests on violence. The threat of violence and the fear of the breakdown of law and order act to moderate demands and positions, thereby setting into peaceful motion the informal political processes of negotiation, concession, compromise, and agreement. Although there is no centralized police power in the international forum, the processes of mediation and negotiation operate in much the same way. The credible threat of violence in the hands of the nations has a similarly stabilizing effect, providing statesmen are attentive to maintaining their national capability for demonstrating violence, and providing their ambitions are commensurate to the bargaining position which their armaments achieve. More comprehensive legal codes and a world government may not improve the stability of the world community in any case, since the possibility of civil conflict exists in all political systems. Civil wars are frequently bloodier and more unforgiving than wars between sovereign nations.

In international politics, the threat of violence tends to create stability and maintain peace. Here the threat is more directly responsive to policy controls. The nation-state has greater continuity than the informal political systems that coalesce and dissolve in the course of domestic social change. The threat of violence can be asserted much more deliberately and can be demonstrated under full control, as in "good will" navy visits, army maneuvers near a sensitive border, partial mobilization, etc. Because of the greater continuity of these macro-systems, the national leaders must strive to maintain the prestige of a nation's might and will. If the reputation of a nation's military power is allowed to tarnish, future bargaining power will be weakened. It may be forced to reestablish that prestige by invoking a test of arms, as a means of inducing greater respect for its position from other nations. All strong nations are anxious to demonstrate their military power peaceably in order that their prestige will afford them the bargaining power they deserve without a test of arms.

Because the threat of violence is a conscious instrument of national policy, it generally lacks the random character which violence has domestically. This means that if the armaments of nations fall out of balance, if the prestige of nations is no longer commensurate with their ambitions, if the will to take the risks of limited military conflicts is lacking, if domestic political considerations distort the national response to external threat, then the time becomes ripe for the outbreak of violence, escalating out of control.

In general, the dangers of escalating international conflict induce greater, not lesser, restraint on the part of national leaders in their relations with each other. Attempts to achieve infinite security for the nation are as self-defeating as such attempts are for domestic regimes.

The functioning of consensus and competition between nations is not fundamentally different from that of domestic politics. The most striking difference is that in domestic politics the level of centralized violence available to the state creates a high threshold of stability against the threats brought to bear within the system by private groups. In the international forum, the closest approximation to such a threshold is the decentralized forces available to the Great Powers. A power interested in modifying the status quo must raise the level of its threat of violence, in order to induce other powers to choose between concessions to its demands or the costs and risks of an arms race. To the extent that the status quo powers are capable and willing to pay the costs and take the risks, their own levels can be raised, depriving the challenger of any political advantages from his investment. When all of the great powers are attentive to the equations of potential violence, no nation can hope to gain conclusive political advantages from an arms race. This situation makes possible international agreements for stabilizing arms and bringing about political settlements.

Diplomatic ceremonials, like the ceremonials of personal relations which we call "manners," serve to minimize the dangers of provocation and threat in the day-to-day relations between nations. Conversely, manners tend to minimize the dangers of provocation and threat in relations between people.

The Domestic Process

Underneath all of the norms of legal and institutional behavior in national societies lies the great beast, the people's capability for outraged, uncontrolled, bitter, and bloody violence. This is common to totalitarian as well as democratic societies. Any group whose interests are too flagrantly abused or ignored is a potential source of violent unrest. This fact is a major restraint against completely arbitrary government. Even totalitarian regimes can hope for stability only if they reflect the changing currents of political interest of the people and if they are willing to recruit new elites from the potentially disaffected groups which they rule. Even totalitarian states must purvey some concept of fairness and flexibility, an ability to change in response to the changing internal and external demands put upon it. In fact, to the extent that a totalitarian regime permits the threat of violence to be raised against it in the form of political pressure, it has ceased to be totalitarian and has become, for all substantive purposes, pluralistic. However, the dynamics of totalitarianism generally make this kind of evolution difficult, if not impossible. Dictatorships of one or a few raise the level of official terror to offset or deter the threat of violence from below. The terror and counter-terror may escalate until the whole system collapses in an orgy of violence. The prospects for raising anything but another such dictatorship out of the wreckage are remote. Dictators may

seek an escape from this iron logic by external adventures which unite the country behind the leader, postponing issues of internal dissension.

The threat to carry political dissent outside peaceable channels can distract the government from the pursuit of other values, can impose upon the government as its first and major responsibility the establishment of domestic peace and order, and can force the government into shortsighted measures to suppress violence, which may widen the base of opposition and increase the occasions for anti-government protests.

The mere threat of private violence directed against the government has very great power over government actions. By causing reallocations of the resources of the society into the essentially negative goals of internal security, the opposition is in a position to defeat or cripple the positive goals whose accomplishment might legitimize and strengthen government authority. To avoid this predicament, even totalitarian governments may go out of their way to appease their critics. The alternative to reform is ruthless suppression not only of the sources of the threat, but also of every symptom of united social action. Bowling clubs, assemblies of three or more people on street corners—there is no rational way to identify the first links of the chain which leads to social action. All must be broken up, and every symptom, however innocuous, must be stamped out. The hopeless search for infinite security begins in this way and often ends with the downfall of the regime.

With this choice before it, it is easy to see why social and political reform are the preferred reactions to the threat of violence. This is why so many kings and tzars, rather than destroying their opposition, sent them on enforced vacations and educational tours abroad. In more recent cases, the State Department arranged scholarships in United States colleges for a number of leading anti-Yankee student agitators in Panama.

In democratic societies this sharp dilemma is avoided far short of infinite deterrence. The institutional distribution of authority (checks and balances, federalism, civil rights, etc.) precludes unilateral attempts to centralize all the police powers in the hands of one agent. Also, the law proscribes the overt threat of private violence and the existence of para-military forces, although it tolerates and protects the implicit threat of pluralistic political activities. Violence is demonstrated, not in organized forms, but rather in sporadic outbursts. Those disgruntled elites who possess a clear capability for causing a planned demonstration, i.e., they have organized groups with a deep sense of moral outrage and injustice, avoid incriminating themselves and avoid provoking counteraction against themselves. Instead, they carry out "peaceable demonstrations" designed to reveal their numbers and the intensity of their commitment. These are likely to have the bonus effect of provoking violent action against them, causing government intervention, and/or causing their more inflammable followers

to ignite into unplanned outbursts of violence. This potential exists implicitly in the situation.

The reformist leader is placed in a position of minimum risk and maximum effectiveness, that of playing the role of "responsible leader." He can bargain with formal authorities and with all the other members of the society in this way: "You must accept our just complaints and you must deal with us; otherwise, we will not be able to control our people." While playing this role, the reformist leader is not unhappy to have his prophecies fulfilled by a few psychotic teenagers. Events which demonstrate violence (and thus induce other elites to make concessions) do not have to be planned. Once the emotions of a real social movement are churned up, the problem is to keep them from happening.

The irresponsible elements are, of course, disowned, but the bargaining power of the responsible leaders is enhanced. In the bargaining process, the moderate leaders often accept concessions which fall short of those demanded by some of their more extremist followers. Opportunists or "realists" often inherit the benefits wrought by the blood of martyrs. This is a healthy mode of exploiting the demonstration of violence without condoning it, enabling compromises to be reached which isolate the extremists and render them less dangerous to the body politic. The bulk of followers in social movements will follow responsible leadership through the gives-and-takes of compromise, because they share the general fear of unlimited violence and counter-violence, with their unpredictable results and the defeat of all rational goals. Accommodations can be reached, even if only provisionally, which preserve the general consensus in maintaining the form and continuity of society and law.

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Some Concluding Remarks

There are several points that might be made in conclusion. Demonstrations of domestic violence serve to establish the intensity of commitment of members of the political system. The more intense the commitment, the greater the risks which the system will take in challenging the status quo. Accordingly, the greater will be the bargaining efficacy of future threats. Social change often occurs legalistically. Rationalization in terms of the continuity of abstract legal models is a useful means of stressing consensus over competition, adding to the stability of the whole society. However, it is obvious that a legal or ideological syllogism is meaningless except in terms of the emotional force which members of the society attach to the first principle. The infinite regress of syllogistic reasoning ends somewhere with a commitment of self. Such commitments cannot be explained or understood by reasoning alone. Efforts to adduce rational principles for explaining social and political change are futile unless one grapples with the

often irrational and illogical intensity of self-commitment which marks social movements.

No system can hope to survive unless it can live with and adjust itself to the multitudinous threats of violence which are the basis of social change. Democracies have shown a greater ability to do this. However, this is not to rule out the possibility that, even within totalitarian forms, substantial democracy can be achieved. On the other hand, democratic forms can be subverted to become totalitarian in substance, if the search for infinite security in the international forum is reflected internally by the search for infinite deterrence of threats against the social and political status quo. Major social changes have major social causes; they are not the result of isolated conspiracies and plots. They cannot be arrested by an effort to stamp out all conspiracies and plots.

"Reason," as understood by Eighteenth Century Rationalists, Nineteenth Century Positivists, and Twentieth Century Pragmatists, plays an important role in conflict resolution as a means of gauging the possibilities of potential violence in bargaining situations. But conflicts cannot be resolved as merely legalistic, academic, or ideological abstractions. The dimensions of commitment and potential violence constitute the real substratum which give the myths of consensus reality.

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Unconventional Warfare

J. K. ZAWODNY

In the third century B.C. in the city of Argos, Pyrrhus of Epirus, known as the Red King, was killed by a chamber pot thrown from a roof top by an elderly lady. The basic elements of what is today known as "unconventional warfare" were embodied in her action: there was surprise, and an unusual—if not extraordinary—weapon; the object of attack was strategically important; the attack was successful; and it was performed by a non-professional warrior. The performer, not the technique, is the significant element of this episode.

The outstanding feature of unconventional warfare is that it is carried out by people of all ages and backgrounds and of both sexes. It is a "People's Warfare." A warfare of masses who have lost patience, it is an unremittingly violent way of saying to the enemy by all possible means: "We hate you; we are everywhere; we will destroy you!" Unconventional warfare is the effective weapon of the weaker adversary; and, strange as it may sound, the United States is as vulnerable to this sort of warfare as Cuba. It is, furthermore, an extremely cheap weapon—at least, monetarily. . . .

Unconventional warfare is that part of "Special Warfare" that employs violence. It can be broadly classified as offensive and defensive. It is offensive when one government promotes the overthrow of a foreign government or a change of its political elite. In these circumstances, organization, manipulation and assistance are carried into another territory; the recent affair with Cuba is an example. It is defensive when a frustrated political group structures itself into a disciplined organization to apply violence against the government of its own nation or when a people fight the occupational forces of an invading army. This classification does not preclude both types from being (and they usually are) *strategically and tactically* offensive.

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J. K. Zawodny, "Unconventional Warfare," *American Scholar*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1962), pp. 384-394. Reprinted by permission.

There seem to be three prerequisites for initiating unconventional warfare. First, an organization must be created to support those who will carry the violence directly to the enemy. Leadership, supplies and money are indispensable for the inception and survival of the underground. Guerrilla and saboteur units are only a small part of the structure; also included are Headquarters, Intelligence, Communications, Propaganda, Cadres in Reserve and Training, and Logistics.

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The second ingredient essential for the initiation of unconventional warfare is a culture that allows or promotes violence, and the effectiveness of the organization usually depends on the degree to which the cultural values and traditions of a people condition them to use violence. . . .

The third prerequisite for unconventional warfare is the volunteer, the guerrilla and saboteur, who carries violence to the enemy. Any movement aimed at using violence gathers to its ranks those who are threatened and/or dissatisfied. In the Polish underground movement between 1939 and 1945, the resentment against the cruelty and oppression of the German and Soviet occupation, the absence of formal channels for voicing grievances and the lack of opportunities to change conditions caused the people to band together. Such at least were the usual explanations. Many men were unable to articulate the reasons why they fought. But they did believe that it was the only way they could "do something" about their problems. The messenger of a company in the Uprising of Warsaw (1944) was eight years old. No one knew why he was there; but the boy wanted to fight and was dependable. In one of the actions a sergeant who had been a university professor was fighting because it was "his moral duty to uphold justice."

Women, following precedents in Polish history, were splendid unconventional fighters and did men's jobs, including manning street barricades and shooting. In fact it appeared to this writer that when prolonged and steady physical effort was necessary, women, particularly peasant women, had more stamina and resilience than men. Like the men, they were of all ages and from all social classes. Women with high levels of intelligence worked themselves up into the policy-making levels of the underground (and of the enemy). Nor were they lacking in heroism. A beautiful Polish girl, who was a superb linguist in the movement's Intelligence, was captured and tortured by the Gestapo in a most sadistic fashion. When she could no longer stand it, she asked for poison through a bribed guard. She revealed no information.

It should be emphasized, however, that not only the noblest are attracted by this kind of fighting. Because its participants spring from a very broad cross-section of the population, unconventional forces are also a cesspool of killers and people with aberrations looking for a formalized excuse to use

violence. There was many a man ready and willing to kill a prisoner to get "even" for some real or imaginary reason known only to himself. Many kinds of men can be found, particularly among guerrillas. To idealize them is self-destructive.

Guerrillas and saboteurs are the true "unconventional fighters" for they carry violence directly to the enemy. It seems that, irrespective of culture and country, the people who are close to the soil and nature are the main stock of guerrilla units. These are not, on the whole, rich peasants; the well-to-do tend to stay out of the fighting. The guerrillas' pattern of living requires stamina, physical endurance and a rather philosophical acceptance of hardship. The greatest hardship, other than physical, is the lack of women. Pleasures are scarce. . . . Mobility is one of the guerrilla's greatest assets; yet, the men tend to get overequipped, particularly with heavy weapons when they are available. Such weapons provide them with some feeling of security. Another painful problem is the lack of identity. In many societies it appears that men would rather fight in uniforms and be identified as a military unit rather than a guerrilla band.

Their lives are largely regulated by the degree of support given by the indigenous population, and also by the climatic conditions and the terrain. While valleys are avoided because they might become deadly traps, guerrillas can operate in literally any terrain so long as the distance between their hideouts and the targets is relatively short. When in danger of being encircled by the enemy, the guerrilla units will try to "evaporate" by disbanding and reassembling at a predetermined point. This is not a difficult task if the climate and terrain are favorable.

When possible, the members of the group try to live within communities among the peasants, and to assemble only when necessary for action. The Chinese Communist guerrillas during the revolutionary war tried to be self-sustaining and in some instances even operated cooperatives helping peasants produce food and the necessities of daily life; at the same time they carried on very intense political indoctrination. This kind of approach has two direct gains: first, it conserves energy which can be utilized at the time of action; second, it cements the relationship between the guerrillas and the local population.

Guerrilla fighting has no rules. For security reasons it might be necessary to shoot one's own wounded—an act practically unheard-of in conventional forces. Participants usually do not wear uniforms; thus captives in many instances are treated as "bandits" and shot. Tactics are basically offensive in spirit. Hit-and-run fighting is practiced. Mobility, surprise and dispersions are necessary. Ideally guerrillas follow the principle of "Move while attacking; attack while moving." (Han Wu-ti, 140 B.C.) It would be this writer's axiom that if the enemy has a chance to reload his weapon, the guerrilla action was poorly planned or executed and should be abandoned.

The smaller the groups, the more active they seem to be in searching out and hitting the enemy. The greater the imagination of the leader, the more enterprising and unusual are the actions of the group. In July 1950, four Koreans in a jeep rode into an American post and wanted their gas tank filled. After this was done they rode away, spraying the Americans with automatic fire. Successful action to some extent seems to depend upon determination and a cool head.

Guerrillas are not after territorial gains. Their effectiveness lies rather in binding the enemy forces, killing and spreading terror, destroying elements that are of strategic and tactical importance. Furthermore, they preserve and protect to a considerable degree the economic wealth and structure of a community.

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In regard to the destruction of tactically and militarily important objectives, one can point to the techniques of French guerrillas dealing with German transportation. The range of their activities was broad: faking, changing and turning the directional signs; felling roadside trees; spreading spikes on the roads; burning wooden bridges; mining roads; attacking telephone lines; blocking inland waterways.

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Needless to say, picking off a high-ranking officer or a member of the political elite is considered a coup by any guerrilla. Soviet partisans poisoned at least one German general and carried another out of his own headquarters wrapped in a carpet.

In many instances guerrillas in Italy and the Soviet Union acted as protectors of the local industry, at the last moment preventing the German dismantling effort. One of the techniques by which guerrillas may preserve the integrity of the plants is to synchronize with their activities public riots and general strikes. Both of these weapons were used in China, Italy and the Soviet Union.

One final facet of guerrilla activities worth mentioning here is the organization of evasion. This term may encompass attempts to evacuate allied prisoners, airmen shot down or sympathizers. It can also refer to the establishment of an underground railroad facilitating the escape of able-bodied men or specialists to join guerrillas or their supporters abroad. As many as two thousand French volunteers to the Free French forces were entering England monthly in the late summer of 1940, in spite of the fact that the Vichy Government and the Germans were trying to stop them.

Troublesome as they may be to the enemy, guerrillas at certain times become as troublesome to their own political leadership. This happens when

the country is liberated or when the political leadership feels obliged to set forth a concrete political program. Political leaders try to avoid specific pronouncements at the inception of the organization. By remaining vague, they are able to accommodate individual aspirations and thus increase their ranks. When the elite feels strong enough to seize power officially, however, or when, for one reason or another, they are compelled to state their political objectives, they prefer to do so when the guerrillas have been disarmed. Hence a gentle, and sometimes not so gentle, tug-of-war arises between the political leadership and the guerrillas. "Give us the weapons and we will give you the political program." "Give us the political program and we will give you the weapons." If the leaders have a label of legality and have the territory under control, the usual practice is to incorporate the guerrillas into the conventional military forces. Thus the guerrillas retain the weapons but they have little to say about the direction and content of political programs. Any successful guerrilla movement, however, carries within it the seeds of violent opposition to its own political leadership.

If guerrilla fighters are the artisans in violence, those who are engaged in sabotage are the artists. They are the "surgeons of violence" by profession; they deal with the nerves, heart and brain of the enemy. They hit power stations, transformers, high tension lines and all possible centers of communication. They work themselves into the industrial network of the enemy, causing stoppages, faulty production, delays and physical destruction of anything that might be of value.

The ingenuity with which sabotage men choose and attack their targets is boundless. There was one instance when even condoms produced for the German army were punctured. (How this was supposed to contribute to Allied victory is not clear.) They might put sugar in gas tanks, cause faulty execution of aircraft engine parts, spike oil wells and change the labels on freight cars. This latter procedure was used by the Polish underground in diverting precious metals used in the production of high-grade steel from Berlin to a small town in southern Greece. It took three months for this transport to reach Berlin, part of it having been blown up by Greek saboteurs.

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If these groups really want to get a man, there is practically no chance for him to survive. The German general who commanded the security police in Warsaw rode to and from his office by different routes every day with an escort of armored cars. Nonetheless he was ambushed and killed.

There is no logistics problem with the members of sabotage units as there is in the case of guerrillas. They live "ordinary" lives and maintain themselves. The Polish experience showed that to pass information to the members of

the group took about ten hours in a large city; to get them ready and assembled at the point of action took an additional six to ten hours. Outside of their time in action, they are responsible for their own maintenance and their own lives.

It must be emphasized that as effective as is the guerrilla and sabotage units' tactical and strategic contribution to defeating the enemy, this does not adequately explain their value in the struggle for political power. Here, *the greatest contribution of guerrillas and saboteurs lies in catalyzing and intensifying counterterror which further alienates the enemy from the local population.* The enemy as a rule will relegate the responsibility for dealing with unconventional fighters to military forces or security agencies. These groups deal with the fighters by using the only methods available to them—those involving force. Because the guerrillas are elusive and the saboteurs even more so, the frustration of the pursuers results in counterviolence, which falls on the lifeline and source of manpower of these units—the local population. Reprisals begin.

This is what sophisticated political leaders of guerrillas may expect. There is no better way to alienate a regime in power from the population than to incite it to apply nonselective terror. Guerrillas and saboteurs serve this purpose eminently. The ebb and flow of membership in these units is not related to the number of tactical victories, to their losses or even to their prospects for success. The rate of recruitment is directly related to the intensity of terror applied by the enemy in suppressing the movement. Any counterterror by the enemy brings to the ranks of the unconventional fighters new recruits who are escaping from the reprisals or who wish revenge. In this way the movement perpetuates itself. Unless the guerrillas are also using terror against the population, the more terror the enemy applies, the more fighters he produces, provided, of course, that the cultural values permit violence. (Certainly Quakers would react to counterterror differently from Catholic Poles.)

The existence of an underground and its result—unconventional warfare—is evidence of the breakdown of social order. When this occurs, there is a considerable alteration of the operational values and social mores of the society. What was a crime before the struggle can become exemplary behavior during strife. Killing, destroying property that may be of use to the enemy and slowing production become not only respectable, but also moral obligations. This modification of values affects the process of socialization of the generation growing up while the underground activities are in progress. Violence becomes an acceptable means and part of solving problems for that generation. Polish underground authorities were aware of this and established a special "Pedagogical Council" to see that the boys would not become one-track killers, but would continue with the acquisition

of education and the development of moral values necessary for existence in a normal democratic society. A man who grows up in the Judaic-Christian tradition of compassion and love has to go through intellectual calisthenics to rationalize his participation in the ruthless operation of unconventional warfare. This is not the case with the Communists, where all activities of this kind can be explained and justified in terms of class struggle.

In terms of American cultural values, it seems that to engage in unconventional warfare we would have to abandon two rules in our code of manly conduct—waiting for the enemy to reach for his gun first and face-to-face combat. These two ideals are the very antithesis of unconventional fighting.

Mass movements using unconventional warfare exist at this time in at least eleven countries: Algeria, South Africa, Angola, Burma, China, Vietnam, South Korea, Kenya, Laos, Venezuela and Guatemala. There are also “dormant” underground movements in at least ten countries in East Central Europe now within the sphere of Soviet influence. In the years since the end of World War II, the political elites and forms of governments in six countries have been changed through the application or with the assistance of the techniques of unconventional warfare: China, Israel, Vietnam, Iraq, Cuba and Laos. Such techniques for gaining political power will be used frequently by technologically backward people because they are cheap and effective.

Our political leadership ought to face this question squarely: Is unconventional warfare an instrument of foreign policy to be applied in international relations as an element of power and pressure, or is it merely an infantry combat technique to be used in wartime? If the latter is what we have in mind, then we are really using “unconventional warfare” in the most “conventional” fashion. On the other hand, *if* we intend to enter the game of systematically initiating, manipulating and fostering political mass movements in order to help peoples realize their political objectives through violence, then we must understand and clearly distinguish between the prerequisites, the techniques and the objectives of unconventional warfare.

If such a definition takes place, then the aspirations and expectations of the indigenous people with whom we plan to work ought to be given paramount attention and faced squarely and honestly! Otherwise we shall fail as we did in Cuba.

This is even more important when we try to fight guerrillas, as we are doing now in Southeast Asia. True, in some situations it is necessary to deal with guerrillas in the most stern and unyielding manner. (Seek them out and put such pressure on them that the guerrilla will not have a chance to stop behind a bush to relieve himself. . . .) But this is a short-term tactical answer; the final solution should not rest at this. For a long-range consideration, it

is necessary that a basic question be asked: "Why did guerrillas emerge and what are their values, goals and grievances?"

You cannot expect a starved peasant in an underdeveloped country to fight on behalf of "free enterprise"—he has experienced it already from his landlord. Neither does the word "freedom" mean much to him—freedom to do what? Behind a guerrilla's gun is a man; that man shoots in the direction from which there is no hope. He shoots because he does not believe that for him justice and satisfaction can be achieved in any other way. In the long run, therefore, he should be met on the level of his expectations and hopes, and not with a rifle. "For a partisan may be completely wrong on what he is fighting *for*, but is not likely to be nearly so wrong on what he is fighting *against*."

Are Americans and Their Cultural Values Adapted to the Concept and Techniques of Unconventional Warfare?

ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR.

Two crucial sets of considerations are involved in this subject. First, to what extent and in what ways do the values and beliefs of the American people permit the effective employment of unconventional forms of special warfare? Second, supposing the willingness and the ability to commit forces to unconventional warfare, what are likely to be the most important socio-psychological characteristics of these forces?

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Three Levels of Values . . . it is necessary to be alert to the role of values and beliefs at three levels: (1) the making of decisions and the establishment and implementation of political and military policies at the national level; (2) the diffuse influence of general public opinion; (3) the actual formation and use of unconventional forces.

Perhaps we may be permitted to overstate our argument in the beginning in order to pose the problems clearly. We will contend that, first, the American heritage of values and beliefs is not incompatible with the ability to use unconventional—unorthodox or unusual—methods and to find, recruit, and train adequate guerrilla and counter guerrilla forces of high combat effectiveness; but, second, our cultural values do greatly affect our willingness as a nation to engage in unconventional warfare and do affect our policies and strategies in dealing with the widespread threats posed by infiltration and subversion on the part of hostile powers in many areas of the world.

The obvious tendency for the general public as well as some leaders to

Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Are Americans and Their Cultural Values Adaptable to the Concept and Techniques of Unconventional Warfare?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 341 (May, 1962), pp. 82-92.

ignore, minimize, or shy away from the possible role of unconventional, that is, guerrilla-type, operations as an instrument of national policy does not center upon the feasibility of finding the motivated people to carry out unconventional missions. Rather, it reflects three main factors: (1) doubts about the military effectiveness in the nuclear age of unconventional operations on our part; (2) reservations concerning political effectiveness; (3) distaste for the ethical implications of unconventional warfare. These three sets of considerations are interdependent. If we ourselves and the people of allied and uncommitted nations believe that what we are doing is ethically indefensible, then our efforts in unconventional warfare, by the same token, will be politically disastrous, which means in turn that the military objectives become senseless. . . .

Relevant Characteristics of Unconventional Warfare

To be able to analyze the implications of American cultural values and beliefs for the nation's capacities in the field of unconventional warfare, we must know what such warfare requires, and, to know what it requires, we must know something of the specific character of whatever hypothetical warfare we may wish to understand and appraise.¹ For example, the sending of small cadres of specialists to assist a foreign government contrasts with the deployment of larger numbers of operational forces in the field.

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. . . It seems most manageable here to focus upon guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations rather than upon other segments of the spectrum.² Because guerrillas are now subverting existing states, and are supported by external Communist aid, the primary American emphasis in some highly important instances is on counterinsurgency. This approach to the support of friendly states in the present cold-war situation does not appear to raise any especially new issues. On the other hand, subversion in hostile states with which this nation maintains a nominally peaceful relationship would raise questions which would require a separate analysis.

Guerrilla and counterguerrilla activities have special characteristics which must be noted before we can understand their specific relation to American value-patterns. Such operations are characterized by mobility, surprise, deception, the tactics of disengagement, fluid objectives, rapidly shifting and often tenuous organization and communication. Guerrilla fighters can rarely count on obvious victories. Their work is secretive,

¹Cf. *Readings in Guerrilla Warfare* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: U. S. Army Special Warfare School, 1960), p. iii.

²*Guerrilla Warfare Special Forces Operations*, Department of the Army Field Manual. FM 31-21, May 1958, p. 3.

bloody, dirty, and endless. Guerrilla activity takes place, for the most part, without fixed lines in a continually shifting no-man's land, under the psychological attrition of insecurity and the extraordinary threats of defection and betrayal.

All war is the province of unpredictability; guerrilla war is its ultimate intensification. The element of surprise is normal. Rapid shifts in circumstances often combine with scanty information and uncertain communication to bring the ordinary chaos of battle to nightmare proportions. The utmost in flexible adaptability is a necessity for survival; the guerrilla fighter must be instantly alert "to convert to his service all the accidents of the action."³

Much depends upon the relations which the guerrillas establish with the resident population in the areas within which they operate. To the extent that guerrillas must subsist upon the country and be protected by the inhabitants—above all, by shelter, secrecy, and information—these relations are the key to success.⁴

Requirements of Fighters. The qualities demanded by these circumstances from the effective guerrilla and counter guerrilla fighter read like an ideal list of military virtues. First and foremost are the capacities for absolute reliability and for secrecy under stress: discipline plus discretion. And the requisite reliability means a capacity for self-sacrifice in the interest of the group. The ideal guerrilla or counter guerrilla fighter knows how to combine daring with caution. He must have a high degree of self-confidence, aggressiveness, and initiative, combined with the capacity for co-operation and loyalty to his fellows. He must be endlessly adaptable and inventive, able to function under great distraction and danger. Especially in sabotage and in attacks on specialized installations, he may have to have very considerable technical knowledge and skill. In psychological terms, he must have strong ego-controls and be relatively free from excessive emotional dependence and strong unconscious anxiety. His ability to identify with the group—so indispensable in any type of combat unit—must not lead to such excessive dependence upon others that the wounds and deaths of comrades are psychologically catastrophic. He must be convinced of the worth-whileness of his mission.

Any type of warfare places extraordinary stresses upon personality integration. These stresses can only be counterbalanced, if at all, by training,⁵ indoctrination, organization, leadership, and maximally effec-

³Ché Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 25.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 17, 79.

⁵"To wage war successfully required a strenuous reorganization of the American character, effected only through a long 'training' period." Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel, *Men Under Stress* (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Press, 1945), p. 447.

tive support in weapons, supplies, medical service, and social recognition.

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Some Current Beliefs

The national posture of the United States toward unconventional warfare depends not only upon our values but also upon our knowledge and beliefs—or our ignorance and belief—concerning such warfare. Although we have little of the research which is much needed on this topic, ordinary impressions will provide basis enough for a preliminary discussion. Several current beliefs will be singled out for brief comment.

Lack of Importance. “Guerrilla warfare is an exotic, tactical, localized type of fighting. Its irregular and poorly equipped forces can rarely be of historic significance in international affairs.”

Little comment is needed. In addition to the great importance of guerrilla actions in World War II, [the more informed layman is] familiar with the continued frequency of limited wars and guerrilla movements—on the average nearly two new “wars” per year since 1945—and with the great impact of some initially tiny guerrilla operations, from Indo-China to Algeria to Cuba.

Lack of Precedent. “Although Americans have fought well in conventional wars, they have no usable tradition of guerrilla operations.” Shades of the Swamp Fox and the Indian fighters: from the beginnings of North American settlement, there was extensive experience in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla actions.⁶ There was much action by irregulars in the Civil War. In World War II, Americans in the Phillippines helped to organize and co-ordinate effective guerrilla movements, and our agents helped to train guerrilla elements in Southeast Asia for activities which were rather more than annoying to the Japanese.

Compromise of Principles. “To participate in unconventional warfare is to fight fire with fire and thereby to be false to our own faith and principles.”

The evidence of recent politico-military history indicates that there is not an invariant and necessary conflict between humane and democratic values and the requirements of technical effectiveness in unconventional warfare.

... It is not a military advantage to guerrilla forces to make the host population regard the enemy's protection as a preferable alternative. Nor is it sensible to be so harsh in counter-guerrilla operations as to make the local people see the guerrillas as the lesser of two evils.

The American conscience is a reality. It will not accept or condone all

⁶Lt. Col. John B. B. Trussell, “Seminoles in the Everglades: A Case Study in Guerrilla Warfare,” *Army*, Vol. 12, No. 5 (December 1961), p. 41.

possible features of unconventional warfare. It may well be doubted, however, that the unacceptable policies and practices are invariably desirable from a purely military standpoint.

Brutality. "Guerrilla and counter guerrilla actions will involve our forces in especially cruel and inhuman practices, brutalizing our men and adversely affecting our relationships with other peoples of the world."

This belief simply equates guerrilla warfare with atrocities. There is no doubt that grim things happen in unconventional warfare. Some parts of the general public may unconsciously assume that American fighters would have to emulate the secret police of totalitarian regimes. Clearly, it would be the national intention that the unconventional forces in the service of the United States would not be terrorists but military agents of national policy.⁸ The possibility of escalation in the ferocity of tactics, however, is a real one in protracted operations.

Incompatibility. "The close engagements of guerrilla fighting require hatred and vindictiveness incompatible with the values and temperament of Americans."

The two parts of this belief require separate comment.

The first can be quickly dismissed. Aggression in combat is not synonymous with hatred. In World War II, combat soldiers were less likely to express hatred against the enemy they were fighting than were men who had never engaged the enemy.⁹ Nor is hatred necessary to combat effectiveness, although aggressiveness is.

The second part is true of some Americans and not of others. Reluctance to kill and guilt and horror over one's own destructive capacities¹⁰ are common. But it simply is not true that the United States has ever had insuperable difficulty in finding men with the values and personality characteristics congruent with guerrilla fighting. Indeed, it is entirely possible that this is a type of combat less likely than conventional war to impose a burden of guilt. For unconventional operations clearly are often on the side of the underdog, and the man-to-man quality of much of the actual engagement of the enemy is hardly comparable with the nuclear obliteration of civilian populations.

Recklessness of Fighters. "Unconventional war calls for fighters who are contemptuous of danger and indifferent to death."

Men who self-consciously want to be heroes do not belong in guerrilla or counterinsurgency forces; unconventional operations will make more

⁸In this connection, we agree with the estimate of Grinker and Spiegel, *Men Under Stress*, *op. cit.*, p. 43, which is also supported by the research of *The American Soldier*.

⁹Samuel A. Stouffer and Others, *The American Soldier* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), Vol. II, pp. 157-67.

¹⁰Grinker and Spiegel, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

than enough heroes in the natural course of events. This myth is properly derided by American veterans of combat. Our values do not require our fighters to be fearless or to pretend to be fearless. The effective fighter knows his own fear and controls it. He takes the risks that are essential and does his best to stay alive to fight another day.

* * * *

Attention Required. "It is time that careful and sustained attention be given to the bearing of unconventional warfare upon American values, and vice versa."

To this belief we wholly subscribe, and to its actual content we now turn.

Major American Values

The values of a people are their dominant conceptions of desirability—their emotionally meaningful ideas of the good man and the good society. Values are standards of worth-whileness and importance. In American life as it has developed over more than two centuries of distinctive cultural existence, certain combinations of values and beliefs have come to stand out with special emphasis. A sheer listing of these pervasive themes will be suggestive: activity and work, achievement and success, moral emphasis, humanitarianism, efficiency, practicality, material comfort, progress, science and secular rationality, conformity, equality, freedom, democracy, individual personality, patriotism and nationalism, and racism and group superiority. There are conflicts and inconsistencies within our value systems and unevenness in the acceptance of various values in different segments of the population. Nevertheless, the main thrust of the accepted values is toward an open-ended democratic society which respects and has faith in the human individual and seeks to provide the opportunities necessary for exercise of the capacities individuals discover in themselves.¹¹

It is difficult to overestimate the complexity of the major value systems of an entire national social system. In the American case at this period of history, merely to sketch the main values is a difficult and still imperfectly realized task. In very general terms, however, we are able to say that a core set of values centers around the desire for and high appreciation of an active mastery of life and environment. This "instrumental activism"¹² leads to a high evaluation of purposive, disciplined energetic efforts to control and improve the physical and social environment. Within broad limits, it is

¹¹ For a more detailed consideration, Robin M. Williams, Jr., *American Society* (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), Chap. XI.

¹² Talcott Parsons and Winston White, "The Link Between Character and Society" in Seymour Martin Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (eds.), *Character and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 101 ff.

regarded as desirable that this activism should be put in the service of the goals of individuals, rather than of collectivities, assuming that individuals are able to decide for themselves what is best for them. A high ethical evaluation of individual personality is thus presupposed. Both of these orientations are consistent with the cultural emphases on ethical universalism, achievement, efficiency, practicability, progress, material comfort—as well as on freedom, democracy, equality, humanitarianism, and moral rectitude.

The austerity of the original value system of ethical individualism and instrumental activism is easy to see. It was a firm and demanding system, it did not encourage relaxation or an easy way out. It is not clear from present evidence to what extent such a system of values may have been softened by a high level of material comfort, by the erosion of expediency in the widespread striving for individual success and status, by the strains of rapid social change, or by the mass anxiety generated by the felt threat of total war. On the whole, it seems most likely that the main historic values are still in force, although often obscured, held in abeyance, or blocked by the factors just named.

The Individual and Related Values. As a purely empirical matter, high ethical evaluation of the individual does not preclude unconventional warfare—especially if such warfare is conceived as a defense of just this value against the threat of extinction in a totalitarian engulfment. However, respect for the individual person, together with related democratic values, does preclude terror.¹³ There is no ground for supposing that behavior which fits this label would be generally acceptable even if done in good cause or that we would ever feel anything less than revulsion for mass reprisals against civil populations.¹⁴ For democratic governments to allow their own forces and agents the unrestrained use of any technically effective means would be to become “the mirror image of that which they despise.”¹⁵

Concepts of Fair Play. American concepts of fair play and a fair fight also seem to have a definite effect on the attitudes toward unconventional warfare. The public has learned to think of subversive activities as something that the Bad Guys use against the Good Guys (us). At the same time, many Americans have come to think of unconventional warfare in general and guerrilla activities in particular in connection with the premeditated use of deception, subversion, and terror.

Although often overshadowed by other considerations in particular

¹³Cf. Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 40–42.

¹⁴Lieut. Gen. Sir Reginald F. S. Denning's “Foreword” in Dixon and Heilbrunn, *Communist Guerrilla Warfare*, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

¹⁵Holt and Velde, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

instances, there is a strong element in American society of identification with the underdog—sympathy for the oppressed, the outnumbered, the beleaguered—and a corresponding aversion for the bully, the autocrat, the overbearing individual or group. However, unconventional warfare is often a means by which an oppressed or threatened people can offer telling resistance to a more powerful party.

There is, furthermore, a tendency to personalize nations and to feel that use of indigenous forces to fight for another power is unethical. It is not right for a man to have another man fight his battles for him. In this view, it is wrong for the United States to use the indigenous population of an area to fight a threat to our national interests.

It appears that this complex mixture of values, misinformation, ignorance, and confused beliefs often works to the substantial disadvantage of the United States in dealing with undeclared hostile military activity and with unfriendly political domination of subverted areas.

Values for Combat Personnel. Thus far we have concentrated upon generalized value themes that are widely shared in the total population. Certain more specific standards of evaluation are of great importance for combat personnel, above all, the standards of masculine bravery, endurance, and toughness. In spite of much speculation and a certain amount of clinical evaluation, there is very little real evidence concerning the exact contribution of such values to effective personality functioning in combat situations. . . .

It is quite plausible to suppose that American soldiers—familiar with machines, adept in technical affairs, and enamoured of gadgets—can easily develop high respect for the arts of sabotage. For example, the interdiction of communication and transportation through destruction of roads, bridges, railways, supply points, telephone and telegraph lines, vehicles, and the like would seem to have a rather natural appeal for trained American Special Forces. The possibility of doing a difficult job well represents a strong challenge and an effective instigation for many individuals in this task-centered and achievement-oriented culture.

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The emphasis upon and enjoyment of teamwork, so prominent in our society, are a major resource in any military operation, conventional or unconventional. Research with American personnel—both army and air force—in World War II abundantly documented the crucial importance of the social group for the morale and effectiveness of our fighting men.¹⁹ The primary group in the small combat unit is a vital source of both support and social control.²⁰ The value placed on teamwork fits well with the nature

¹⁹ *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2, *op. cit.*, especially Chaps. 3–5 and 7–8.

²⁰ Grinker and Spiegel, *op. cit.*, Chaps. 3 and 6.

of many unconventional operations and is consistent with the importance, in some instances at least, of co-ordination of efforts in such operations, both within and among units and between guerrilla and regular military forces.

Ideological Commitment. Nothing we have said thus far is intended to minimize the importance of ideological convictions. Belief in the justice of a cause and in its ultimate triumph can be of great significance in initially motivating men to enter upon combat roles and in sustaining them under difficult circumstances. Convictions concerning the values for which we fight can give the necessary answer to the recurring question, "Why are we here?" This question is bound to arise with special emphasis in unconventional operations. Nagging doubts and corrosive cynicism can be minimized when our goals are consistent with the dominant values recognized by the individual.

* * * *

Conclusion

The total picture we have attempted to sketch does not lend itself to a simple characterization. There is enough knowledge and codified experience to permit us to say that unconventional warfare is not incompatible with American cultural values. Extensive participation in unconventional warfare, on the other hand, certainly does involve an appreciable degree of value conflict and sociopsychological strain. There are limits to what public opinion will understand and approve. These limits are quite broad and are not fixed in detail for all types of situations. With the primary accent of American military policy upon deterrence, as it now is, the capability for unconventional warfare assumes a new potential significance.

A common-sense appraisal of the relations of American values to unconventional warfare is likely to be highly inadequate at best and seriously misleading at worst. Values are consequential in human conduct but not completely determinative of it. Specific social actions cannot be deduced directly on a point-to-point basis from the content of cultural values. Conduct is shaped not only by values but also by environmental conditions, social interactions, and personality structures and processes. Furthermore, the influence of any one value will be affected by the influence of other coexisting values. . . .

In World War II, American troops only rarely had clear and detailed convictions concerning the ideological, political, economic, and military causes of and justifications for American participation—and even fewer had such convictions concerning the Korean conflict. And, indeed, detailed political indoctrination in either instance would have been felt to be highly repugnant. What was surprising to many observers was the ability of men who seemed so little ideologically committed to work and fight effectively and

to make the sacrifices required. A crucial factor was the strength of group loyalties, coupled with a diffuse generalized belief in the rightness of the nation's position. It was enough for millions of Americans that their country was in desperate need and that their fellows needed them and expected them to do their part. The whole cluster of beliefs, values, and motivations came to focus in the classic soldier's creed: "I couldn't let the other guys down."

It is taken for granted in the prototypical American male's view that one is justified, indeed obligated, in fighting back if attacked. In World War II, this was the great persuasiveness of Pearl Harbor. We can not expect that unconventional warfare will ever provide so clear-cut a symbol of unwarranted assault. It is our present guess that the important thing is whether a given conflict is felt to be justified, not who strikes first. If the nation is directly and obviously attacked in a serious way, that settles the issue for most people. With increasing politico-military sophistication, it is likely that the American people are now alert to less conspicuous aggression and threat. If so, a considerable measure of support can be anticipated for a differentiated series of national actions, ranging from economic aid to military deterrence, intended to prevent massive aggression while there is time. The forms of preventive intervention and assistance most likely to be acceptable are those congruent with the pattern of values we have tried here to describe.

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CHAPTER 5 • *Communication Problems*

The Failure of Intelligence Prediction

BENNO WASSERMAN

I. Introduction

Crises in international affairs nearly always come as surprises to governments. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in Korea, the outbreak of the First World War, and the launching of the Russian Sputniks are a few examples of the numerous events which came unexpectedly to the foreign governments concerned. The thesis of this paper is that foreign policy and military action are the result of human design and aimed at certain goals or objectives. Violent measures in international affairs usually occur after a period of protracted friction and military action requires lengthy preparation which cannot be concealed. It should therefore be impossible to surprise any country with an efficient intelligence service—at least they should not be surprised to the extent to which they usually are surprised. The problem which this paper seeks to explain is why governments are in practice often surprised, when in theory such surprise should not be possible.

In order to throw light on this problem, a study of intelligence has been undertaken. Intelligence is knowledge, and *adequate* knowledge is necessary for knowing what to expect and what may be achieved in a situation—i.e. for successful policy and prediction. This paper maintains that governments are surprised by events and by failures of their own policies because they usually do not possess or seek the sort of knowledge or intelligence necessary

Benno Wasserman, "The Failure of Intelligence Prediction," Political Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1960), pp. 156-169. Reprinted by permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford. Footnotes renumbered.

for sound evaluation and prediction. This knowledge is not obtained because intelligence tends to be geared to an uncritical conceptual framework, so that—despite its voluminous detailed information—its estimates of the intentions of other countries are based on inapplicable assumptions. . . .

II. The Official Theory of Intelligence

After a series of interviews and personnel studies, Roger Hilsman found a 'community of attitude' among policy-makers, intelligence administrators and researchers, and academic observers about the role of intelligence and, therefore, about knowledge.¹ Basic to this (implicit) 'community of attitude' is the notion that knowledge consists of 'unvarnished' facts and is induced by unbiased observation. Consequently, the purpose of intelligence is conceived of as accumulating ever more facts unbiasedly or 'objectively', and the purpose of policy is conceived of as being based on 'all' the facts. I shall call the belief that knowledge consists of objective facts or realities (which, therefore, 'admit of only one interpretation'²) naïve realism; and the belief that knowledge is induced by unbiased observation—and, therefore, without thought or preconceptions³—inductionism.

¹Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*, Princeton, 1956. Of the few officials who deviated significantly from the official 'community of attitude', Hilsman writes (p. 118): 'In essence these officials are suggesting a new role for intelligence, the job of explaining alternatives open to the United States in any given policy problem. Although these ideas are still vague and ill-formed, to the extent that they reject the old role for intelligence and suggest a new one, they do represent at least the beginnings of a break sharp enough to be inconsistent with the general convictions about *the role of facts and the danger of bias*. Both from what he said and what he did not say one would infer that the third official is at least partly aware of and has rejected these attitudes and assumptions. Significantly he also seems to have rejected the present role for intelligence, which is apparently based on those attitudes and assumptions. On the other hand from the statements of the other two officials on this subject of the role of facts and the dangers of bias one would infer that in spite of suggesting a new role, they still share their colleagues' basic assumptions . . . these officials may be starting a process of questioning . . . that has not yet developed quite enough to bring about an examination of the more fundamental attitudes and assumptions.' He adds the following footnote: ' . . . this is more likely to be an individual process of change in attitude than a group effort at a rational examination of the present roles and doctrine. For example, the third official quoted, who seemed to have reached a position of basic disagreement, resigned from the organization a few months later.'

²Hilsman, p. 64: 'The implied assumption behind what the operators say about the role of facts is not only that knowledge is impossible without facts but that the obstacle to new knowledge is lack of facts and that there is no difficulty in finding the knowledge we seek once the facts are known.'

³Hilsman, p. 62: 'They [the policy-makers] seem to feel that the man who is concerned with policy will tend to become the unreasoning advocate of some pet solution and that if he must assemble the facts on which policy is based as well as evolve policy, he will tend to select the facts that support his pet ideas rather than find the correct answer by assembling "all" the facts. Thus if one had a man assemble facts who had no concern with policy (who, in fact, tried as much as is humanly possible not even to think about it), one would guarantee that the facts would not be selected to fit a preconceived notion.'

Inductionism and naïve realism are implicit in practically all the attitudes about intelligence discovered by Hilsman. The belief that policy and intelligence are separate skills, and therefore separate functions, implies the assumption that what is necessary for intelligence (to gather knowledge) is the ability to induce facts unbiasedly; and that what is necessary for policy is the ability to make decisions based on 'all' the facts.⁴ The depreciation of intellectualism, theorizing, and reasoning, and the appreciation of simplism, activism, experience, and 'know-how', reflect the belief that knowledge is facts divorced from thought or interpretation (the latter, therefore, having no place in the formation of foreign policy).⁵ Similar beliefs account for the emphasis on current intelligence and encyclopedic accumulation of details (and on day-to-day policy-making) rather than on long-term intelligence and analysis (and long-term policy-planning). The intense bureaucratic preoccupation with 'organizational tinkering'⁶ presupposes that new knowledge is acquired by gathering more facts and that therefore improvements in the fact-gathering organization of intelligence will automatically result in more knowledge. Finally, the notion of a determined future not made by humans or open to their influence derives from the assumption that it is determined by objective facts or realities; consequently it is contained in present facts or realities, and knowledge or prediction of it therefore consists of divining what the facts have in store (i.e. it is therefore unconditional, historicist, and unalterable).⁷

The doctrines of inductionism and naïve realism held by the governmental orthodoxy are unsound. The notion of inductionism, of 'objective' knowledge acquired by unbiased observation (i.e. knowledge without

⁴See Hilsman, pp. 51-55. Also quotations cited in nn. 1 and 2 above.

⁵See Hilsman for descriptions of official 'activism' (pp. 57-58), 'simplism' (pp. 56-59), appreciation of 'experience' (pp. 72-74), and 'know-how' (pp. 74-78), and 'anti-intellectualism' (pp. 78-79). On p. 58 he writes: 'The policy-makers tend to reject not only the complex solution but also the subtle reasoning, richness in qualification and even the general attitude of experiment and inquiry characteristic of the scholarly approach.' See also Willmoore Kendall's article 'The Function of Intelligence', *World Politics*, July 1949, p. 550.

⁶This is Hilsman's expression. It refers to the constant proposals and discussions for (relatively insignificant) adjustments to bureaucratic techniques and organization, which treat of such issues as geographical or functional intelligence, research or espionage, centralized or decentralized intelligence, CIA as a managerial or operational agency, the administration of the responsibility for the field force, &c. Such proposals and discussion predominate within the bureaucracy (see Hilsman's case studies of Generals Donovan and Vandenberg, Admiral Hillenkoetter, Alfred McCormack, and Allen Dulles, chap. 5). George Pettee's *The Future of American Secret Intelligence* (1946) and Sherman Kent's *Strategic Intelligence* are largely devoted to it. See Kent, chaps. 5, 6, 7, & 8.

⁷Kendall, p. 549. 'The course of events is conceived not as something you try to influence but as a tape all printed up inside a machine; and the job of intelligence is to tell the planners how it reads. With this conception of intelligence one does not, and on the record at least cannot, distinguish between what we may call absolute and contingent prediction.'

unobserved or *a priori* preconceptions), leads to an *infinite regress*.⁸ A statement, description, or explanation which is claimed to be without *a priori* preconceptions has to be justified in terms of 'objective' observations of facts or experiences. This 'objective' or 'factual' justification itself constitutes a statement or description which, therefore, in turn requires justification by 'objective' observation of further facts and experiences; and this further justification, also being a 'factual', 'objective', or non *a priori* description, itself required further justification. The doctrine of unbiased, induced knowledge requires an *ad infinitum* justification of its successive objectively observed statements and is, therefore, logically untenable. Similarly, the notion of naïve realism, of knowledge reflecting a public, known factual order, leads to *a priori* untestable dogmas. Statements which are claimed to be the facts (i.e. the objective, entire facts) are ultimate explanations, which, therefore, preclude alternative explanations, (or 'facts') or even the possibility of future alternative explanations. As it cannot be known that an explanation will never be refuted or superseded, such statements are in principle untestable.

The untenability of the doctrines of inductionism and naïve realism renders the attitudes based on them equally unsound. The belief that policy and intelligence require two separate skills and are therefore different functions—the latter being concerned to accumulate facts or knowledge by unbiased induction, the former to make decisions based on 'all' the facts—is false, for knowledge cannot be acquired without preconceptions and policy cannot be based on 'all' the facts (which are, in principle, unobtainable).⁹ The depreciation of intellectualism, theorizing, and reasoning and the appreciation of simplism, experience, 'know-how', and activism is mistaken because knowledge is not facts divorced from analysis and

⁸The 'infinite regress' referred to here should be distinguished from that usually associated with the principle of induction—namely, inductive inferences would presuppose a principle of induction, which in turn would presuppose inductive inferences, &c.

⁹Hilsman (p. 65): 'Certainly it is obvious that on almost every problem in the world there is simply no end of facts. On a problem in American relations with France, for instance, an investigator could begin by collecting all the facts in the history of American and French relations; he could add all the facts in the history of the relations of France with other countries; and he could then go to facts about the French economy, about the amounts and kinds of French goods produced and sold, about the people and factories producing each item, about the market patterns, about the financial system behind the markets, and so on to infinity. Next he could gather facts about French technology, French science and literature, about French geography and about French political and social institutions; he could pile on more facts about French politicians and public officials, about the way these people think, their backgrounds, likes, dislikes and predilections, and then he could begin to gather the countless billions of facts about the millions of people who are merely citizens of the country. . . . Clearly our problem-solver can easily spend several lifetimes with a problem in Franco-American relations and still not make a dent in the infinite number available. . . . Inescapably a problem-solver must find some means of selecting the facts he needs. Clearly, the devices involved are concepts, notions of how and why things happen' (see also pp. 63–72). One has only to carry this argument a stage farther to realize that these concepts (or knowledge) are *a priori*.

interpretation. For the same reason the emphasis on current intelligence and encyclopedic accumulation of details (and on day-to-day policy-making) as opposed to long-term and analytic intelligence (and long-term policy-planning) is ill-advised. Moreover, as knowledge is not acquired by fact-gathering, the intensive bureaucratic preoccupation with tinkering with the fact-gathering organization of intelligence is unlikely to produce more knowledge or better prediction. Finally, as knowledge is not contained in facts, the future, and future knowledge, are not determined but are open to influence, and depend upon the actions of individuals; and prediction cannot be historicist, unconditional, or absolute.

The official conception of an objectively or passively induced knowledge, which reflects a known and given factual order (and is, therefore, certain, untestable, and unchangeable) should, I believe, be replaced by the notion of an *a priori* or deductive testable knowledge, which consists of actively or intellectually invented (falsifiable) explanations of an infinite unknown world (and is, therefore, hypothetical, testable, and changeable). The governmental theory of intelligence and knowledge places major emphasis on the accumulation of details and the avoidance of bias, and neglects intellectual speculation and evaluation and critical testing and measuring. It is the neglect of these latter factors which accounts for the failure of the policy and intelligence functions.

III. The Functioning of Policy and Intelligence

The unsound official doctrine of a given inductively observed factual knowledge leads to the erection of barriers between the policy and intelligence functions—the former being charged with the active role of making decisions, free from the structures of intelligence; the latter with the passive (or unbiased) role of collecting information divorced from policy considerations. This so-called separation of policy and intelligence¹⁰ results in practice in the subordination of the latter to the former. It protects policy from the fire of intelligence, and presents intelligence with no clearly discernible aim. It results in policies not being based on the best available knowledge and in intelligence producing vast amounts of information irrelevant to the actual policy problems. Finally, it helps to explain the irresponsibility and authoritarianism of policy-making and the submissiveness of intelligence.

¹⁰ In taking an attitude similar to my own Hilsman and others have criticized 'the separation of policy from intelligence'. This expression can be misleading (for instance Kent, in taking a similar attitude, complains of 'the lack of guidance' for intelligence from policy-making and I have, therefore, been reluctant to use it. My objection is not to the division of labour, which is obviously necessary for both policy and intelligence to function more efficiently, but to the system which denies intelligence the possibility of an independent role by concealing the policy problem from it (in this sense policy and intelligence are too separate) and by making it rationalize the policy line (in this sense policy and intelligence are not separate enough).

No policy decision is made without some sort of explicit or implicit knowledge, conceptual framework, or horizon of expectations. Policy decisions without objectives or assumptions would be pointless (for instance, they obviously imply expectations or assumptions about the consequences of the decision). Foreign policy is therefore based upon the decision-maker's conceptual framework, which consists of a hierarchy of assumptions (which might be divided into a philosophy or way of life and interpretations of the situation) all of which are interrelated, yet each of which is individually testable; and a change in any one of them would affect the decision made. The more the decision-maker's conceptual framework is exposed to the examination or criticism of intelligence specialists (and others), the greater will be the opportunity for decreasing his misconceptions and improving the basis of his foreign policy.

All intelligence presupposes some sort of policy problem or frame of reference, for the collection of information without some sort of purpose or point of reference would be inconceivable (and probably impossible). Information is selected because it is considered significant—i.e. because it refers to some sort of policy problem—by the intelligence researcher (or whoever else is ultimately responsible for its selection). Thus the more precisely the intelligence official is aware of the actual policy problem (i.e. the situation as seen by the decision-maker) the easier it will be for him to provide relevant (critical) information and the greater are his chances of predicting the likely outcome of a contemplated decision, and of improving policy.

In practice policy-makers are very reluctant to expose their conceptual frameworks to the intelligence specialists—and the higher the policy-making the less exposed to intelligence it tends to be. This can be seen in the exclusion of intelligence officials from the policy-making councils, particularly at the highest levels; in the policy-maker's demand for an 'objective' factual intelligence and their contradictory demand (which shows that their demand for an unbiased intelligence is a demand for an intelligence with no bias different from their own) for 'back-stopping';¹¹ in their refusal to allow intelligence to explore the likely consequences of policy decisions or the possible alternatives in a situation; and in the suppression of information conflicting with the policy framework.

Intelligence for its part tends to be conformist in practice, and reluctant to criticize the policy-makers.¹² Being unaware of the precise situation

¹¹ Hilsman's interviews show that the intelligence considered most useful and most welcomed by policy-makers is that which provides support for courses of action already decided upon. . . .

¹² Even if policy-makers welcomed critical information causing it to alter its decisions, where necessary, it would have difficulty in obtaining it from intelligence as constituted today. The structure, techniques (e.g. 'piecing together the picture'), and recruitment of intelligence are conducive to its uncritical submission to the policy framework. For instance, the practice

envisaged by the policy-maker, it vainly attempts to gather 'all' the facts and provide for all possible contingencies. In so doing it produces voluminous amounts of information, much of which is irrelevant to the actual policy problems, and that which is relevant tends to get lost in the mass which is not. It concentrates on the encyclopedic accumulation of 'current intelligence' (i.e. of detail) and neglects 'long-term intelligence' and analysis. Finally, it tends to evaluate policy after it has been made and not before, when it can be influenced.

Despite its voluminous labours, intelligence does not (except where it deals with actual policy problems) influence policy greatly. Hilsman's interviews show that most of the material produced by intelligence is never read by policy-makers, and, indeed, the existence of much of it is unknown to them (for instance, many of the policy-makers had not even heard of the encyclopedic country surveys).¹³ Policy-making in its turn proceeds unaware of much significant available knowledge. It blunders along with great self-assurance and high pressure on a day-to-day basis¹⁴ unaware that the daily problems it 'disposes' of are often facets of larger ones which

of favouring 'ideal' representatives of a society and discriminating against the foreign-born or -educated—who might be more receptive to, and capable of, understanding foreign societies—in recruitment for diplomatic and intelligence positions is undoubtedly conducive to uncritical intelligence. The same consideration seems to underlie the complaints of Hilsman (p. 81) that 'It is remarkable that the administrators [i.e. the heads of the intelligence agencies] ... have been, with only one exception, either lawyers or soldiers'; and of Kendall (pp. 550–1) of 'an extremely high percentage of historians' and of a 'crassly empirical state of mind' in intelligence. For an example of an ambassador who silenced his misgivings about a policy-maker's policy by providing himself with an expediently congenial interpretation of it, see the study of Dirksen in *The Diplomats*, edited by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert. For the feelings of insecurity and lack of confidence among intelligence officials as opposed to policy-makers (e.g. as reflected in the high turnover rate in the intelligence agencies)—and consequently for the formers' reluctance to take a line independent of the latter—see Hilsman, pp. 119–22, Kendall, pp. 551–2, and Kent, p. 183.

¹³ See Hilsman, p. 40.

¹⁴ See Hilsman, pp. 57–58 and 79–80 for descriptions and examples of the day-to-day *ad hoc* functioning of American policy-making. The American (and also the British) decision-making process is geared to *ad hoc* day-to-day functioning. For instance, the National Security Council is organized to deal with problems *after* they have arisen rather than to anticipate and, therefore, possibly to avoid them. Similarly, attempts at policy-planning with a view to long-term objective and strategy have not materialized.

The Russians, on the other hand, appear much more capable of long-term strategic policy-planning than the West. I believe this is due to their having a more explicitly formulated ideology. This enables them to work for clearer or more precise objectives and therefore gives them initiative not possessed by the West. It also allows them a greater short-term flexibility, while enabling them at the same time to maintain a consistent propaganda line (which is obviously impressive to Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries). If the 'democratic way of life' were more clearly and explicitly worked out so that Western policy-makers were more conscious of their objectives (rather than only becoming aware of them when they were threatened) I believe Western policy would have more initiative and consistency and less need to blunder along (defensively) on a day-to-day basis.

keep recurring because they are never properly tackled; that the objectives it pursues are often contradictory and unattainable in the situation and that the 'fires' it 'puts out' are generally consequences of its own decisions.

Intelligence which merely duplicates the views and interpretations of the policy-maker at length and in detail cannot influence the course of action. Considerations of the psychological effects of providing policy-makers with support for their views are here omitted. These vary with individuals and would have to be taken into account in practice. In order to do this it must change the views or assumptions upon which foreign policy is based, by showing that the consequences of a contemplated policy decision are unlikely to be what the decision-maker assumes, expects, or intends. Policy which takes no cognizance of the information made available by intelligence (other than for 'back-stopping') cannot rectify its errors. In order to discover its misconceptions it must make its views and intentions as clear as possible to the independent examination of intelligence.

For policy and intelligence to function as efficiently as possible there should be the maximum interaction between them. The policy-maker should reveal his contemplated decision (and, therefore, the way he views the situation) to the intelligence official. The intelligence specialist should be prepared to test these contemplated decisions by estimating their likely consequences, bringing all available relevant (i.e. adequately selected or evaluated) evidence to this task. These tests or estimates should then be taken into account by the policy-maker in the formation of his policy.

Pearl Harbor, the inter-war coups of Nazi Germany, the Bogotá Revolution (1948), the outbreak of the Korean War and of the Suez Conflict, to take just a few examples, show beyond reasonable doubt that the *failure of policy and intelligence prediction is due to faulty evaluation and not the lack of available information*. The subordination of intelligence within the decision-making process leads to its relatively uncritical operation within the framework of the policy-maker. It is the uncritical character of this policy and intelligence framework which prevents the sort of evaluation (or the selection of relevant, adequately weighed information) necessary for sound prediction.

IV. The Policy and Intelligence Framework

Every foreign policy presupposes some conceptual framework or set of assumptions, and predictions or expectations regarding the consequences of a decision derive from this (i.e. from the policy-makers' assumptions or interpretation of the situation). The *actual* as opposed to the *expected* consequences of a policy decision will depend mainly upon the (re)actions or policies of foreign states and, therefore, upon their conceptual frameworks.

Thus intelligence prediction is the estimation of the likely actions or intentions of foreign nations, and its failure can be reduced in the last analysis to a misunderstanding of foreigners' conceptual frameworks—i.e. a failure to understand properly the assumptions or interpretations of the situation upon which foreigners base their decisions. Such misunderstanding is due to the uncritical interpretation of foreign states' actions in terms of one's own framework.

Intelligence estimates or predictions are based upon calculations of foreign states' power and resources or 'strategic stature' and 'specific vulnerabilities', to use Kent's terminology.¹⁵ Policy action is not undertaken by strategic resources but by foreign-policy-makers with certain intentions and, therefore, assumptions (which, of course, take account of strategic resources). The compilation of a list of strategic resources outside the foreigners' frame of reference implicitly, involves the uncritical interpretation of his actions and intentions in terms of one's own framework. Intelligence estimates or predictions on such a basis are bound to be faulty for they are based on inapplicable assumptions.

The uncritical interpretation of the actions and intentions of foreign

¹⁵This interpretation of the uncritical way in which intelligence estimates of others' actions and intentions are made is largely based on Kent's detailed description of intelligence prediction ('estimates of the probable courses of action') in chap. 3, which he illustrates with the hypothetical example of Great Frusina. The procedure described is to estimate a country's 'strategic stature' and 'specific vulnerabilities'—i.e. to draw up a list of strategic factors such as a country's military force, power resources, mobilizable force, allies, manpower, raw materials, transportation, &c. Such factors are, of course, important, but only in so far as they are viewed as such by the country concerned and not merely by the outside country. In uncritically drawing up such a list, an outside country unquestioningly assumes that its conceptual framework or principle of selections coincides with that of the acting state (I do not deny that this may *in part* be so in practice). Such an assumption cannot be unquestioningly made and may lead to more or less serious misestimation. For instance, the Russian retention of a large mobilized military force after 1945 may have been in part due to her traditional awareness of the need to guard her extended frontiers. The unquestioned interpretation of this in terms of aggressive designs would have been in part mistaken. Hilsman's interviews support my thesis that intelligence tends to ignore different cultural frameworks (or 'the mind behind the gun'). On pp. 104–5 he writes: 'This tendency to discount cultural difference at least as an operational concept seemed rather widespread. . . . Rejection of the idea that the foreign-born or -educated might be useful was occasionally accompanied by xenophobic prejudice. . . . Those officials who are unaware of cultural differences as a concept also tended, quite consistently, to feel that for practical purposes one could assume that the basic motivations of Americans were almost universal. . . . One official, for example, said that all one did was to put oneself in the other fellow's boots—what would *you* do if you were Stalin with his capabilities?' (It is clear from the text that what was meant by this intelligence official is that Stalin's actions or intentions could be estimated on his 'capabilities' or 'strategic stature' irrespective of conceptual framework or ideology. See pp. 103–5.) Similarly Kissinger's limited nuclear warfare thesis assumes that Russia will play the game within these rules (convenient to the West). It cannot be uncritically assumed that Russia would interpret nuclear actions intended by the West to be limited, as such; and the history of international relations is full of such wishful assumptions which have come unstuck.

states in terms of an inapplicable conceptual framework makes these irrational and senseless. It leads to the explanation of their actions in terms of an irrational aggressiveness or drive for power. While such explanations are an easy substitute for a rational understanding of other states' actions they are an unsatisfactory basis for prediction. They apply a different standard for estimating or predicting the actions or intentions of others than would be acceptable for one's own (for no statesman could accept that his policy is irrational or senseless, otherwise there would be no point in his having one). If the estimation of one's own actions by another state in terms of such a dual or subjective standard is obviously faulty, there is no reason to suppose that one's own estimation of others' actions in the same way will be sound.

The only satisfactory basis for intelligence prediction is the universalizable or objective standard of estimating the actions of other states *rationally in terms of their assumptions*. This applies the same standard in explaining the actions of other states as one accepts in explanation of one's own. It attributes disagreements to differences in assumptions rather than to a one-sided foreign hostility or irrationality. It involves a willingness to submit one's own estimates and assumptions to a universal, independent, rational standard and to change them when they are found wanting thereby.

The explanation of the actions of foreign nations as being rational in terms of their assumptions—i.e. in terms of how they view the situation—is difficult because it involves understanding a different conceptual framework or structuring of the situation. The actions and intentions of other nations are bound to appear strange, irrational, and unpredictable in terms of one's own conceptual framework, and the rational explanation of them requires considerable *imaginative effort* and modesty (i.e. in claiming no arbitrary prerogatives for one's own assumptions). If such *genuine* attempts at explanation reveal fundamental misconceptions in one's own assumptions one will be in a position to learn something and to avoid errors, of which one would previously have been unaware. If, on the other hand, they reveal no fundamental misconceptions in one's own assumptions (but rather in those of other states) then one will be in a position to disagree more effectively, and with greater prospects of influencing others, for having taken the pains to understand their frameworks.

Ideally, accurate intelligence and policy estimates require the *genuine* attempt at explaining the actions and intentions of other states rationally—i.e. at applying the same universal rational standard to oneself and to others. This can only proceed on the assumption that one's own estimates and framework are, in principle, like any others, and are, therefore, subject to error and are not 'unbiased' or 'objective' facts or realities, not open to change or improvement. While no bureaucratic techniques or institutions

can in the final analysis guarantee sound estimates, the present uncritical organization of the policy and intelligence functions militates against accurate prediction and those willing to attempt it. The first step towards an improvement would be the honest recognition of policy and intelligence failures.¹⁶

¹⁶ Professor Kendall drew my attention to the fact that intelligence failure is never officially admitted. For instance, the first official reaction to the launching of a Sputnik is always 'it was not unexpected'. It is always possible to produce some evidence from somewhere (e.g. the so-called warning messages about Pearl Harbor . . .) to show an event has been predicted. This is inadequate unless the warning has been given unambiguously and with all the emphasis necessary to influence policy (e.g. the so-called warnings of Pearl Harbor were said by Kimmel and Short to have diverted their attention to the Far East and thus actually to have hindered their preparation of a defence of Pearl Harbor).

The Semantics of the Cold War

WILLIAM A. GLASER

Since the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States is particularly bitter and since the stakes are especially high, it has generated an extraordinarily large and heated amount of propaganda. Like all such verbalizations, the expressions by each side are designed to inform and inspire one's own constituents and allies, to inform and unnerve the opponent, and to inform and cajole neutral third parties. As in all human communications, certain key words recur in the statements by each side and constitute the crux of the arguments.

This article analyzes Soviet and American public statements in order to clarify the meanings and usages of certain key concepts. We shall compare the crucial similarities and differences in the Soviet and American uses of such basic and commonly shared words as "international cooperation," "peace," "war," "imperialism," "aggression," "democracy," and "freedom." We shall analyze some other key ideas which bear upon the problem of meaning in Soviet and American ideology. Occasionally we shall also compare the simple public statements by Soviet and American spokesmen with the formal ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and Liberalism which are the intellectual wellsprings of the two governments.

For expressions of the Soviet and American arguments, we shall rely upon speeches and documents of policy-making officials, documents issued by governmental departments, and—in the case of the U.S.S.R.—the many periodicals which faithfully reflect the official line. Most of the data are drawn from the seven-year period after the end of World War II, when the cold war was most bitter, but the basic findings remain true for subsequent years.

Basic Theoretical Positions

Underlying the use of key concepts are certain fundamental assumptions which influence the form and meaning of any political argument. Although

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such premises are occasionally stated explicitly, usually they are not. Soviet and American ideologies and actions are, however, profoundly affected by them.

A crucial difference between the Soviet and American positions arises from their respective conceptions of the basic sources and patterns of political phenomena. Soviet officials and writers either explicitly or tacitly structure all their statements around the familiar Marxist philosophy of history. Like other Marxists, they assume that economics is the exclusive cause of all political phenomena. Occasionally Soviet spokesmen spell out this theory and apply it to the events of the cold war. They argue that history moves in irreversible patterns according to the logical development of competing modes of production; that the specific policies of the United States and its allies are responses to the objective needs of the crisis-bound capitalist mode of production; and that the Soviet Union grows in world-wide influence because of the superiority and growth of its own mode of production.¹

In contrast to Marx himself, who realized that the proximate causes of political behavior are numerous and varied, and who identified economics only as the exclusive ultimate cause, Soviet leaders are quick to identify immediate pecuniary interest as the outstanding motive of men generally. Soviet periodicals are filled with lurid descriptions of how the capitalist opponents of the U.S.S.R. manipulate all the domestic and foreign policies of their states to ensure the maximum pecuniary income for themselves and to gain security for their property.² Even the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S.S.R. are usually interpreted as attempts to ensure the *material* welfare of men.³

While the Americans attribute many political controversies to social and

¹ Stalin, Josef V., "Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (27 June 1930), *Leninism*. New York: International Publishers, 1933, II:311-313, 315-320; *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)—Short Course*. New York: International Publishers, 1939, pp. 105-131; S. Ivanov, "Leninism: The Victorious Banner of the International Proletariat," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, January 1949, pp. 24-44; Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, "Speech of November 16, 1949, before the Political Committee of the General Assembly," *On Condemning the Preparation of a New War and Concluding a Five-Power Pact for Strengthening Peace*. Washington: Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., 1949, pp. 43-46.

² E.g., Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, "Speech on Warmongers" (18 September 1947), in *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism—Supplement I: One Hundred Years of Communism 1848-1948*. Washington: House Document No. 619, 1948, pp. 197-199; Andrei Zhdanov, "The International Situation" (speech before the Cominform in September 1947), *Ibid.*, pp. 214-216, 220-228; S. Buranov, "To Whom Is the Imperialist Policy of Aggression Profitable?", *Izvestia*, 29 July 1950, p. 3.

³ E.g., Viacheslav M. Molotov, *The 30th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*. Washington: Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., 1947, pp. 3-12; Lavrenti P. Beria, *Thirty-Fourth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*. Washington: Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., 1951, pp. 5-15, 25, 29-30.

economic problems, they believe the causes of political phenomena are numerous and include "moral" as well as "material" factors.⁴ If American official statements have given special prominence to any one factor, it is the role of spiritual values. Repeated emphasis has been placed on the spiritual basis of American life, the spiritual needs of men throughout the world, and the ethical values which American foreign policy pursues. Sometimes "Christian principles" and the supremacy of God are cited as the basis of American policies and of all morally legitimate political action. At other times, purely humanistic moral ends are cited as the goals of American policy.⁵

In contrast to these strong spiritual and religious strains in American thinking, the Soviets give little prominence to the power of ideals in their public statements. On the rare occasions when Soviet leaders refer to the "spiritual" orientation of the Soviet people, they seem to define such attitudes as a devotion to one's economic or military duties.⁶ Soviet spokesmen repeatedly debunk American dedication to moral ideals as propaganda designed to conceal the alleged violent and ruthless pursuit of pecuniary interests.⁷ Once, in accordance with the Marxist belief that all morality is a mundane ideological expression of economic interest, the Soviets predicted that under Communism all transcendental ideals would be replaced by "scientific knowledge";⁸ but this connection has been soft-pedalled in recent years.

In describing how capitalists relate the political policies of states to their own pecuniary interests, the Soviets continually use an extreme conspiracy theory of politics. Small "ruling circles" of capitalists are pictured planning how these interests may best be served, bribing or coercing domestic and foreign politicians to pursue favorable policies, and

⁴Rusk, Dean, "Universal, Regional, and Bilateral Patterns of International Organization," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 3 April 1950, XXII: 530; Adrian S. Fisher, "The Principal Ingredients of U. S. Foreign Policy," *Ibid.*, 18 February 1952, XXVI:245.

⁵E.g., Harry S. Truman, *Mr. President*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952, pp. 71-72, 106, 149, 204; Dean G. Acheson, *The Strategy of Freedom*. Washington: Department of State Publication 4034, 1950, p. 12; John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950, Ch. XXI; Frederick Osborn, *Atomic Impasse—1948*. Washington: Department of State Publication 3272, 1948, pp. 28, 34-36.

⁶Molotov, Viacheslav M., *The 30th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*. Washington: Embassy of the U.S.S.R., 1947, pp. 23-25.

⁷Vyshinsky, Andrei Y., *On Eliminating the Danger of a New War and Strengthening the Peace and Security of Nations*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951, pp. 16-17; Ilya Ehrenburg, "Wolves on the Potomac," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, 29 December 1950, p. 4; David Zaslavsky, "The Hangmen and Their Patrons," *Pravda* 19 May 1952, p. 3.

⁸"The Program of the Communist International Adopted by the Sixth World Congress" (1 September 1928), *Blueprint for World Conquest*. Washington: Human Events, 1946), pp. 180-181.

scrupulously coordinating all the domestic and foreign policies of their own countries and of their satellites. Thus actions occurring at various times and places throughout the world *which seem to be separate events*, are really integral parts of a single, all-embracing, centrally conceived and centrally directed plan.⁹ Nothing approaching this extravagant conspiracy theory of politics appears in statements by American officials.

Another basic problem in political thought is the relative scope of freedom and determinism. Whether Marxists genuinely believe in total determinism or in some scope for freedom (defined as an absence of external constraint) has long remained unsettled. Sometimes the Soviet leaders refer to "inevitable" and "irreversible" historical laws which require men to behave in certain unavoidable ways. At other times they contend that men can intelligently control and change the political situations which they encounter.¹⁰ Failure to clarify this issue produces important ambiguities in Soviet arguments, such as the ambiguity over whether capitalists can or cannot conduct peaceful cooperation with the U.S.S.R. In contrast to the Soviet confusion between freedom and determinism, American spokesmen consistently assume and sometimes explicitly say that men can always choose among alternative courses of political action in accordance with their personal interests and moral convictions.¹¹

Two-Valued Orientation

Both Soviet and American arguments are permeated by simple dualisms. With no exceptions in the U.S.S.R. and with few exceptions in America, the spokesmen think in terms of polar concepts—i.e., truth v. falsehood, good v. evil, cooperation v. obstructionism, peace v. war, freedom v. tyranny, etc. Such either-or mental categories are common in human discourse, particularly in situations of conflict, and some semanticists call this type of thinking the "two-valued orientation."¹²

Persons using the two-valued orientation characteristically arrange all the approved concepts in one pile and all disapproved concepts in another.

⁹"A Vital Matter," *New Times*, 6 September 1950, pp. 3-4; "For Peace, Against War and Fascism!," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 15 July 1951, p. 1.

¹⁰Complete determinism is expounded by G. Alexandrov, "Concerning the Present and the Future," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 1 January 1952, p. 1. Scope for free will appears in Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, "Speech of November 16, 1949, before the Political Committee," *On Condemning the Preparation of a New War and Concluding a Five-Power Pact for Strengthening Peace*. Washington: Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., 1949, p. 46.

¹¹Acheson, Dean G., "Military Assistance and the North Atlantic Pact" (27 April 1949), *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom*. Washington: Department of State Publication 3852, 1950, p. 90.

¹²Hayakawa, Samuel I., *Language in Action*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941, Ch. 11; Wendell Johnson, *People in Quandaries*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946, pp. 6-10.

They then use the concepts with favorable connotations to describe themselves and the persons and things they like and all the concepts with unfavorable connotations to describe the persons and things they dislike. The use of such simple dualisms is probably inherent in expressions of ethical value; but often the mind of a speaker becomes so permeated with his moral judgments that he describes empirical data as if they also fit into a simple two-category pattern. This produces serious confusions between norm and fact.

Both Soviet and American spokesmen use the two-valued orientation. Each side identifies itself and its allies with desirable concepts (such as truth, cooperation, peace, freedom, etc.) and identifies the other side and its allies with undesirable concepts (such as dishonesty, evil obstructionism, aggression, tyranny, etc.). Since both sides agree about which verbal images have favorable or unfavorable connotations, the Soviet and American arguments are similar from a purely linguistic standpoint. The two sides differ fundamentally only in their empirical referents—i.e., they apply the same arguments in opposite ways to the same set of facts.

Soviet and American spokesmen maintain that objective and concrete "truth" and "falsehood" exist in politics; and each side is convinced that what it says is absolutely and self-evidently true while the opponent's statements are completely false. "There are plain and incontestable truths which remain truths," declares one Soviet writer. In contrast to the U.S.S.R., maintains a Soviet historian, the Americans "call black white and white black."¹³ Americans use identical language, but they identify themselves as spokesmen for the truth and the Soviet Union as the embodiment of deception.¹⁴ Each side contends that the other does not sincerely believe what it says.¹⁵

All the spokesmen assume a similar dualism between "good" and "bad."

¹³The quotations are from A. Sokolov, "The 'New Statesman' and Some Plain Truths," *New Times*, 5 September 1951, p. 15; and A. Miller, "From History of Aggression in the East," *Izvestia*, 11 August 1950, p. 3. See also Vera Ketlinskaya, "Standard-Bearer of Peace," *New Times*, 11 October 1950, p. 3; and Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, "Aggressive Actions and Interference in the Internal Affairs of Other Countries by the United States of America," *New Times*, 9 January 1952 (Supplement), pp. 7, 17-21.

¹⁴Truman, Harry S., "Going Forward with a Campaign of Truth," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 1 May 1950, XXII: 669-670, 672; Dean G. Acheson, "Support for an Expanded Information and Education Program," *Ibid.*, 17 July 1950, XXIII: 100-102; Warren R. Austin, "Exposing Soviet Propaganda Tactics," *Ibid.*, 4 September 1950, XXIII: 370-373; Edward W. Barrett, "Expanding Techniques for a Truth Strategy," *Ibid.*, 11 December 1950, XXIII: 945-948.

¹⁵Vyshinsky, Andrei Y., "Speech in the Political Committee, U. N. General Assembly," *New Times*, 18 October 1950 (Supplement), p. 5; "U. S. Insists that Discussion with Soviet Union Include Real Causes of Tension in Europe—Note of February 19, 1951, to the Soviet Union," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 5 March 1951, XXIV: 366.

Each side believes it represents virtue while its opponents embody evil. Since their ideology is a form of nineteenth century "Positivist" philosophy, the Soviet spokesmen do not distinguish between truth value and moral value; and therefore their previously cited statements about truth and falsehood also accurately represent their ideas about virtue and evil. The Americans do make this distinction, but their explicit statements are also dualistic. The principal difference between the Soviet and American statements is practical application to the facts—in contrast to the Soviet usage, the Americans claim virtue for America and call the U.S.S.R. evil.¹⁶

In a manner typical of the two-valued orientation, each side describes the detailed facts of contemporary world politics in terms of contrasting absolutes. Soviet statements continually contrast the "two camps" of socialism and capitalism, the former characterized by equality, prosperity, peace, cooperation, democracy, etc., and the latter characterized by inequality, exploitation, misery, violence, aggression, tyranny, etc.¹⁷ Between these two camps, there is no third alternative. "There is no middle system," said Stalin. "What is not communism is capitalism."¹⁸ Since Soviet thinking is permeated by a conspiracy theory of politics, Soviet leaders readily assume that all political institutions and actions which they do not control are united in a single system antithetical to their own.

Americans do not go so far in assuming that the world is divided into two, and only two, monolithic camps which are distinct and antagonistic in every detail. But occasionally an American spokesman will interpret the Soviet-American cold war as a conflict waged simultaneously over many different issues, and as a conflict in which each side's own institutions and actions are closely interlinked. For example, an American deputy representative to the U.N. once wrote that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. "symbolize" two mutually exclusive approaches to politics, and therefore the antagonism between them really is a world-wide conflict between peace and war, collect-

¹⁶ E.g., Dean G. Acheson, "Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union" (16 March 1950), *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom*. (Washington: Department of State Publication 3852, 1950, pp. 21-22.

¹⁷ E.g., Andrei Zhdanov, "The International Situation" (September 1947), *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism—Supplement I: One Hundred Years of Communism 1848-1948*. Washington: House Document No. 619, 1948, pp. 216-219; Lavrenti P. Beria, *Thirty-Fourth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*. Washington: Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., 1951, pp. 14-30; M. Tyurin, "The Forces of Democracy and Socialism Are Growing and Winning," *Izvestia*, 22 February 1949, p. 3; Editorial, "1951," *New Times*, 1 January 1951, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸ Statement during a meeting with Stanislas Mikolajczyk (October 1944), quoted by Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948, p. 100.

ive security and unilateral conquest, the U.N. and anarchy, and freedom and tyranny.¹⁹

International Cooperation

Both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. claim they favor international cooperation. In characteristic examples of the two-valued orientation, each side graphically contrasts cooperation, and non-cooperation, identifies itself with the former, and links the opponent with the latter. Since the verbal symbols for describing international relations are few, each side must use the same language, and the dualistic logic of the two-valued orientation requires that both of the participants organize these words together in a nearly identical way.

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Imperialism and Aggression

Both the Soviets and Americans consistently define "imperialism" and "aggression" as any attempt by one nation to dominate any other nation. The two sides differ in describing the causes of such expansion and in emphasizing the importance of certain aggressive techniques over others.

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War and Peace

During recent years, both the Soviets and Americans have defined "war" and "peace" in terms of the presence or absence of large-scale violence between states. Both clearly believe that "war" is an outcome of imperialism and aggression. On the other hand, both conceptions of peace are ambiguous, since it is not clear whether the two sides consider "peace" a necessary outcome or attribute of international cooperation.

The Soviets view war as a completely opportunistic tactic, morally neutral in itself. War is merely one of the various tactics of politics. The Soviets specifically repudiate dogmatic condemnations of all military action on purely *a priori* moral grounds not related to the practical political facts which determine whether such action is proper or not. The propriety of any war effort depends upon whether or not it contributes to the growth of Soviet power and the promotion of world revolution.⁴² The U.S.S.R. will initiate,

¹⁹ Gross, Ernest A., "Analysis of Soviet Performance in the United Nations," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 5 March 1951, XXIV: 390-393.

⁴² This pragmatic approach to the evaluation of war appears in Vladimir I. Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky*. New York: International Publishers, 1934, p. 65; Joseph V. Stalin, "The July Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U." (13 July 1928), *Leninism*. New York: International Publishers, 1933, II: 125; A. Belyakov, "Under the Banner of the Struggle for Peace," *Bolshevik*, February 1952, pp. 46-54. The criteria for distinguishing between "just" and "unjust" wars are discussed in *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)—Short Course*. New York: International Publishers, 1939, pp. 167-168; E. Khomenko, "On Wars Just and Unjust," *Krasny Flot*, 9 October 1949, pp. 2-3.

intervene in, or withdraw from any war as its interests dictate.⁴³ Thus the many eloquent condemnations of war which have become the most frequent theme in recent Soviet literature are not due to any *a priori* moral revulsion against war for its own sake; but they must be interpreted simply as protests against potential threats to Soviet success at the present time.

American leaders often flatly condemn all war as a moral evil. Among the "great principles which have animated American life and American policy from the very beginning," Secretary of State Acheson listed "first of all, that you shall not use force to settle international disputes. That has been one of the most fundamental concepts of American foreign policy." He rejected "preventive wars" under all circumstances.⁴⁴ While Americans will fight defensively when actually attacked, they assume that only those devoid of ethical convictions initiate wars. Although they recognize that wars always arise out of political conflicts, Americans do not believe that such conflicts automatically produce a disposition to wage war. Rather, wars result when participants in such conflicts happen to lack moral inhibitions.

* * * *

Thus, from a purely verbal standpoint, the Soviets and Americans use similar and often identical words to describe peace and war. When they use the same verbal images, however, the two sides work from different theoretical assumptions about freedom and determinism, causation, and the role of morality. Of course, each side uses the language describing "peace" to refer to itself and applies the verbal imagery of "war" to the opponent.⁶³ Each side demands that the opponent emulate it in order to become "peaceful."⁶⁴

⁴³ E.g., Vladimir I. Lenin, "Theses on the Conclusion of a Separate Peace" (20 January 1918), *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism—Supplement I: One Hundred Years of Communism, 1848–1948*. Washington: House Document No. 619, 1948, pp. 30–34; "Theses of the VI World Congress of the Communist International," *International Press Correspondence*, 28 November 1928, VIII: 1590; Stalin's decision to attack Japan, described in William D. Leahy, *I Was There*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950, p. 420.

⁴⁴ Acheson, Dean G., "Plowing a Straight Furrow," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 27 November 1950, XXIII: 840; Acheson, "Peace Through Strength" (13 June 1950), *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom*. Washington: Department of State Publication 3852a, Supplement, 1950, pp. 3–4.

⁶³ E.g., Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, *On Condemning the Preparation of a New War and Concluding a Five-Power Pact for Strengthening Peace*. Washington: Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., 1949, passim; Dean G. Acheson, "Good Faith Among Nations Needed to Achieve U. N. Goals," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 19 November 1951, XXV: 803–808.

⁶⁴ E.g., Editorial, "1952," *New Times*, 1 January 1952, pp. 1–2; William Sanders, "Peaceful Coexistence—Fact and Fiction," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 11 December 1950, XXIII: 924.

Democracy

At first glance, from the standpoint of their formal political philosophies, the two sides seem to use very different language in defining democracy. The Americans believe that democracy is a possibly permanent political condition in which all citizens share certain rights and powers of participation.⁶⁵ In contrast, Lenin thought of democracy as a temporary thing which, like all political institutions, ideally should and would disappear under classless communism.⁶⁶ The Soviets believe all types of states are devices by which certain economically powerful classes suppress others for their own self-interest. Thus unlike the American conception of rights and powers shared universally, the explicit Soviet definitions of democracy imply inequality and oppression. No state can serve as an agency for conciliating antagonistic groups, declare the Soviets, a thesis which fundamentally contradicts American democratic philosophy.⁶⁷

* * * *

Of course, some crucial differences arise between the Soviet and American verbal expressions of their ideas about democracy. The Americans assume that human ideas and actions in a democracy will be diverse and often conflicting, while the Soviets believe they will be unanimous and solidary. American leaders believe that a community of spiritual purpose among men is indispensable for the existence and successful utilization of democracy and freedom.⁷⁶ Nothing like this spiritual premise appears in Soviet statements, which invariably identify democracy with such mundane ends as the economic "interests of the people." American leaders occasionally assert that decision-making in a democracy is conducted by "majority" rule. Soviet leaders never use the word "majority" in this context, but instead they tacitly assume that a true democracy always acts for "the people" as a unified whole. This contrast is a further illustration of the fundamental difference between Soviet collectivist assumptions and the conception of individualism and diversity inherent in American thought. Finally, while

⁶⁵ Marshall, George C., "Reconstruction of Germany on a Democratic Basis," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 23 March 1947, XVI: 524; William Sanders, "Peaceful Coexistence—Fact and Fiction," *Ibid.*, 11 December 1950, XIII: 923; Philip C. Jessup, "Democracy Must Keep Constant Guard for Freedom," *Ibid.*, 6 August 1951, XXV: 221.

⁶⁶ Lenin, Vladimir I., *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution*. New York: International Publishers, 1932, p. 28.

⁶⁷ Lenin, *State and Revolution*. New York: International Publishers, 1932, pp. 8–9.

⁷⁶ E.g., Harry S. Truman, *Mr. President*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952, p. 72; William Sanders, "Peaceful Coexistence—Fact and Fiction," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 11 December 1950, XXIII: 923; Francis H. Russell, "Wellsprings of Democracy," *Ibid.*, 7 July 1952, XXVII: 9–11.

Soviet thinkers clearly believe that democracy is possible only in a socialist or communist economy, American officials have not clearly and systematically analyzed the correlations and incompatibilities between democracy and different economic institutions.

Freedom

As in the case of "democracy," the Soviets and Americans define and use the word "freedom" in many ways that are essentially similar, but some important differences exist. This becomes increasingly obvious when one examines the elaborate political theories about human rights, duties, institutions, etc. which each side weaves around the basic word "freedom." Both the Soviets and the Americans consistently use the word "freedom" to mean an "absence of restraint."⁷⁷ The two sides differ in emphasis when they specify the type of restraints to which the concept "freedom" applies. American spokesmen usually use the word to denote various types of curbs imposed by governments upon the acts, expressions, and thoughts of individual persons and groups. Freedom is "the protection of the individual against tyranny."⁷⁸ Americans list various forms of such freedom from governmental authority—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, security from unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of movement, freedom of economic opportunity, etc.⁷⁹ Such freedom is supposed to be the basis for men's self-development, progress, moral dignity, happiness, and peace.⁸⁰

While Soviet writers often speak about "democracy," they give much less attention to systematic analyses of the concept of "freedom." But a

⁷⁷The Soviets' everyday use of the word greatly differs from the formal definition of "freedom" stated by the patron saints of Communism, Marx and Engels. The latter define freedom not as an immunity from necessity, but as an actor's conscious control over the necessity which dictates one's actions. See Friedrich Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring)*. New York: International Publishers, 1939, p. 125; Karl Marx, *Capital*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1909, III: 954–955. The early Soviet leaders also used this definition—at least in their formal metaphysical discussions—e.g., Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1925, pp. 33–37, 42.)

⁷⁸Cates, John M., "Expanding Concept of Individual Liberties," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 31 December 1951, XXV: 1059. Similar definitions appear in Carroll Binder, "U.S. Urges Noncompromise of Principles of Freedom of Information," *Ibid.*, 29 January 1951, XXIV: 195; and in *United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information . . . —Report of the United States Delegates*. Washington: Department of State Publication 3150, 1948, pp. 1, 4, 25, 41.

⁷⁹Truman, Harry S., *Mr President*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952, p. 95; Walter M. Kotschnig, "ECOSOC 1948: A Review and Forecast," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 2 January 1949, XX: 8; John M. Cates Jr., "Expanding Concept of Individual Liberties," *Ibid.*, 31 December 1951, XXV: 1059.

⁸⁰This became one of the most prominent themes in statements delivered by American leaders during the cold war. E.g., Dean G. Acheson, "Freedom—The Key to Hemisphere Solidarity and World Peace," *Ibid.*, 9 April 1951, XXIV: 569–570.

coherent argument is implicit in their scattered statements about the subject. The Soviets agree with the Americans that freedom is an absence of restraint. Their statements agree with the Americans' list of civil liberties as important concrete embodiments of freedom.⁸¹ But, in addition, the Soviets extend their definitions of freedom to include the absence of certain restraints which recent American leaders have not yet fully embraced in their thinking—i.e., the elimination of all economic and social as well as governmental curbs. The contrast between the American and Soviet positions is particularly clear when they discuss the conditions under which the press is "free." American leaders declare that freedom of the press exists only where government monopoly is absent and government curbs upon private management and expression are minimized; while the Soviets declare that freedom of the press exists for "the people" only where the press is transferred from the hands of a minority of private owners to control of organizations accurately representing the people's will, such as a socialist government, trade unions, etc.⁸² In societies where constitutional guarantees of civil liberties exist but where persons depend upon other property-owners for employment and for the wherewithal to enjoy civil liberties, the Soviets declare that persons enjoy only "formal" but not "real" liberty. Bourgeois democracies have only such "formal" freedom, while socialist countries such as the U.S.S.R. alone possess "real" freedom.⁸³

* * * *

Conclusion

A systematic analysis of the statements by Soviet and American leaders and official publications thus has shown many linguistic and theoretical similarities as well as some important differences. In their discussions of the basic questions at issue between the two sides in the cold war, each side uses much similar verbal imagery to define the basic concepts and to describe

⁸¹ In their many discussions of the alleged destruction of democracy in the United States—some of which I cited in a previous paragraph—the Soviet spokesmen cite as evidence the supposed curbs upon speech, press, movement, fair trial, etc. by the government. The formal recognition of such civil liberties is used by Soviet writers—some of whom I also cited before—to prove that true democracy supposedly exists in the U.S.S.R.

⁸² The two arguments are stated, compared, and applied to conditions in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Andrei A. Gromyko, "Monopoly Throttles Press Freedom, Gromyko Tells U.N.," *USSR Information Bulletin*, 10 June 1949, IX: 338-340; "Free Press of USSR Has Major Job—To Serve, Guide the People," *Ibid.*, 25 March 1949, IX: 192-193; Carroll Binder, "Soviet Preamble of Freedom of Information Convention Analyzed," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 5 February 1951, XXIV: 232-233.

⁸³ Stalin, Josef V., *Interview Between J. Stalin and Roy Howard*. Moscow: Co-Operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1936, pp. 12-13; Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State*. New York: The Macmillian Company 1948, Ch IX *passim*.

the various alternatives of action. Spokesmen for each side seek support from their own followers and from neutral third parties by eulogizing themselves and by using similar words to condemn the opponent. Each side attempts to depict an antithesis between its own and the opponent's ideology and practice. The similarity between the Soviet and American arguments has important implications for understanding the cold war.

First, the Soviet-American conflict is not fundamentally over ideology, except in some key areas, such as the American major emphasis upon the role of spiritual values compared with the meagre Soviet concern for this factor. Thus the cold war cannot be understood simply by contrasting the Soviet and American ideologies. Rather, the two sides are divided fundamentally by practical policies. They disagree basically about applying the same store of verbal images to the explanation of various practical situations.

Second, despite the current implacable opposition of the two sides in their practical actions and in their evaluations of each other, the fact that their thinking contains some similarities presents some scope—however slight—for future conciliation between the two. Of course, this is no guarantee of such accommodation—death struggles often have been fought by rivals each of whom posed as the only “true” exponent of a single faith. But the two sides would be even more hopelessly split if they were divided over ideology as well as over other factors.

Third, diplomats for both sides must perceive more acutely where the disagreements in the cold war rest. They must focus their action around the concrete points at issue instead of engaging in negotiations purely over words. In the past, Soviet and American leaders have sometimes committed some such mistakes. For example, during and immediately after the war—at Yalta, Potsdam, and Paris—the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. adopted agreements and treaties stating that “democracy” and “freedom” should be established in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Transcripts of the conference proceedings reveal that the two sides discussed the key words with extreme generality and vagueness, they agreed on the verbal connotations of the key words, and then they inserted these words into crucial agreements and treaties with the conviction that they had accomplished something concrete, certain, and permanent. Soon conflicts arose over fulfilment of the agreements, and the two sides became implacable opponents. The basic trouble was that the sides simply verbalized about the basic concepts in the treaties without pointing to possible empirical situations which would give concrete meaning to the terms of the agreements and which would clarify whether or not the negotiators really were thinking in essentially the same ways.

Fourth, since the two sides expound many of the same basic ideas in their ideologies, the cold war in large part is a competition to see who is the “true” exponent of these ideas and whose institutional embodiment of

these ideas will triumph. Thus the cold war differs fundamentally from many other past international conflicts, such as World War II, in which the antagonists expounded vastly different ideologies. This fact of similarity in verbal imagery is an important source of strength for the U.S.S.R. On the ideological plane, the latter can compete with the U.S. for the allegiance of third parties who have been exposed to the vocabulary and ideas of Western Liberalism and who otherwise might be disposed to heed the appeals of the Americans. Many other enemies of the United States—such as the Nazis and Japanese in World War II—were not able to compete with the Americans so effectively, since their own ideologies fundamentally differed.

Fifth, the fact that the opposing sides in the cold war share many ideas proves that ideologies in conflict do not always become mutually exclusive in every respect. Sometimes conflict causes increasing ideological differences, but instead the cold war has stimulated increasing ideological similarity. This is particularly true of the Soviet spokesmen, whose recent propaganda contains deviations away from the early Bolshevik ideology in the direction of many Western ideas.

The United States leaders must correct certain verbal defects if they wish to make the best possible use of language as a tool for enabling themselves to understand the world, for informing and winning the populations of America and of foreign countries, and for conducting diplomatic negotiations effectively. First, much American discussion—particularly about such key concepts as “international cooperation” and “freedom”—is seriously vague. Potentially dangerous results flow from such a situation. Vague language cannot be applied to the facts in an informative manner and, since words are indispensable tools in thinking, such language prevents men from themselves understanding complex situations or from informing other persons intelligibly. If it continues to use such uninformative language, the United States cannot communicate an adequate understanding of its ideas and policies to the Asians and Africans who are not already predisposed on its behalf; and also America cannot effectively refute the competing appeals of the U.S.S.R. to these peoples. Vague language also hinders the Americans from making important additions or important revisions in their traditional ideology which may be necessary in order to grapple with contemporary and future problems. Vague language also prevents the United States from demonstrating with sufficient precision the extent to which its own institutions and policies conform to its professed democratic ideology, and the extent to which it surpasses the U.S.S.R. in this respect.

Second, the ways in which American leaders organize their language is defective. The two-valued orientation may be valid for expressions of ethical value. But often an understanding of facts can be achieved more usefully by means of many different categories and gradations rather than

by means of simple dichotomous classes. Certainly practical policy alternatives are usually numerous, they depend on many contingencies, and thus they rarely can be stated in elementary either-or fashion. Similarly the circular reasoning . . . hinders understanding of facts. For example, the belief that all democracies are always non-aggressive and anti-imperialist, or the notion that no non-democracy ever can be trusted to be cooperative or peaceful are untrue historically and are serious obstacles to informed policy-making in the face of the concrete facts of the modern world.

Finally, United States leaders must use language in a more sophisticated manner in order to deal with their opponents more effectively than they have in the past. Linguistic defects have not hampered American relations with traditional friends and allies already disposed to effect agreement. But when agreements must be hammered out between radically different and hostile institutions and interests, diplomacy becomes very complex and difficult. Representatives of such nations must be adept at the use of subtle language with clear factual meanings in order for the two sides to understand each other and to write agreements which will endure. These are the challenges which face American leaders at present, and only through intelligence can they be met.

Some Problems In Transnational Communication (Japan-United States)

WILLIAM CAUDILL, Ph.D.

I went to Japan first . . . in 1954 after several years of work in psychiatric hospitals in New Haven and Boston, and, before that, four years of work with Japanese-Americans in Chicago as part of a team of social scientists and psychiatrists studying the acculturation and personality adjustment of these people. In my two trips to Japan I feel I went through four stages in the transnational communication process and I should like to begin by outlining these.

Stages in Communication

The *first stage* consisted both in initial enthusiasm for the culture, and somewhat later, estrangement from it. This early period of uninformed interest and enthusiasm was coupled with the belief that I was communicating, until something would happen to indicate that quite obviously I was not. This would be followed by a most unpleasant feeling of estrangement accompanied by a mild but very real depression, and with thoughts such as, "These people do not understand what I am trying to say," or, "I don't understand what they are saying." After several bouts of this kind, I came to realize that I had been somewhat too prideful, that I really knew virtually nothing about this language (even though I had studied it for over a year before going to Japan) or about the meaning of interpersonal relations in Japanese culture.

I do not think that my initial reactions were atypical. A foreign culture is

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a highly convenient vehicle onto which to project, or to use to deny, one's own fairly "normal" conflicts. Common early reactions are overacceptance or overrejection of the foreign culture.

Somewhat more complicated is the denial of problems in one's *own* culture (concerning, say, the existence of social classes, the position of women, and so on) and then seeing just these problems in the foreign culture. For example, in Japan, it is not uncommon to find the American housewife who has decided to pay her Japanese servant a "decent wage" and to "treat her as a person." This very frequently ends in the servant taking leave with rather feeble explanations—feeble because she cannot communicate her real reasons for leaving across the language barrier. Even if this barrier did not exist, the servant would not openly voice her real reasons—even to a Japanese employer—because it is not good form to do so in Japanese interpersonal relations. Her unstated reasons are, however, probably of the order that she does not want to be treated as a "person"—American style, but rather wants to be treated as a servant—Japanese style. Involved in the latter is the assistance of her employer in finding a husband for her should she desire to get married, the giving of gifts at the appropriate times to her and to her family, and her identification with the hopefully rising status of the employer's family in the community. But the American housewife is not likely to know or to understand these matters, and when the servant leaves unexpectedly the housewife is left with feelings of frustration, outrage, or depression, and with such discomforting thoughts as, "Something went wrong," or, "I can't communicate with these people." This sort of reaction, in a somewhat more technical context, is not an unusual one for anthropologists to have during the first few months of a period of field work. Frequent responses to this condition are withdrawal, getting drunk, or deciding to become active—to plan "to do something." This latter response is particularly characteristic for Americans, who, if they are living in Tokyo, will decide to take a trip to Kyoto, or to go to Hong Kong, or plunge into a course in flower arranging, and so forth.

The *second stage* that I felt I went through was one I find it hard to label neatly, but I am calling it here a period of attenuated childhood and dependence as regards certain aspects of the reality with which one is faced. Supposing that the process of the first stage is broken into by some event, one is then faced with the reality of communication difficulties, and with a somewhat sobering view of one's own knowledge of the inner and outer world to be contended with—perhaps not so much in one's sphere of technical competence (providing you could communicate your area of technical competence), but certainly in many areas of general living. If one pays attention to these sobering thoughts, there starts at this point a fairly long period of "growing up in the culture." This is accompanied by the feeling that one "is as a child" and "is being treated as a child." This can at

times be very comforting, given the indulgence of children in Japan, and, at other times, at least for me, infuriating. In any case, I think perhaps Americans are especially threatened by the need for such dependency for a period of time, whereas this sort of dependency is the stuff of life for Japanese. If the American is embarrassed, or angry, or brusquely shakes off such helpful overtures, the Japanese person is likely to withdraw into *enryo* (a passive reserve) and once again, to use Hearn's statement in 1904 (which might be more indicative of his state of mind than perhaps of reality) the American is faced with "walls of everlasting ice."

The *third stage* is what I call the technical task phase. About this time, assuming one has managed to survive successfully the preceding stages, one turns sensibly to one's technical work. It is only for so long that I, for one, can enjoy exclusively such general initial experiences as sitting on *tatami*, and of learning to name and eat the various parts of raw tuna, which are graded by the fat content in the flesh (I happen to like the part with the least fat best). So, with an American-educated research assistant, who some five years later was to become my wife, I started on one of my tasks—learning about Japanese psychiatric hospitals.

* * * *

Observations on Doctor-Patient Relationship

I was impressed by the ease with which patients talked about their problems in Japan. By this I do not mean that patients talked easily about very deeply felt or very private matters. But they did talk freely about the nature and content of their symptoms, the incidents that led to their hospitalization, their personal background and family history, and so on. This was particularly evident in a series of case conferences which occurred over a period of six months at one of the hospitals. At these conferences quite sick patients would be brought in and would talk with the examining doctor for an hour or even an hour-and-a-half in the presence of six or seven other doctors. American patients are, of course, brought into case conferences, but it is usually not for such a long period of time, and it is seldom that they seem to feel as much at "ease" as did the patients in the Japanese hospital.

Nature of the Relationship

I believe that one thing that was happening in the case conferences was that the patient was taking the "role" of patient very easily in relation to the doctor. Patients at these conferences would very often literally say to the doctor, "I am completely in your hands" ("*Watashi o omakase shite imasu*"). When the patient says this, he is saying that he wants to be taken care of, and is asking to be allowed to take a passive and dependent position with

reference to the doctor. The doctor accepts and fosters this wish; indeed, he is not consciously aware of the wish or of his acceptance in the psychological sense implied here because such interaction is so much a part of Japanese culture.

* * * *

Behavior outside the Hospital

At this point in my work, then, I felt (as I hope is indicated in what I have said by way of example) that I could understand something of the meaning of communications in actions and words in the Japanese hospital, and I began to wonder how this behavior was related to what went on outside of the hospital in more general life. Thus my attention was drawn back again to events in the wider culture.

Mutual Dependence

It seemed to me that one way of linking interaction in the hospital to that in everyday life was to examine the relative emphasis placed on independence or dependence in behavior in Japan when compared with the United States. Perhaps for Japan, the phrase "mutual dependence" is a better one than simply "dependency" since in the family, for example, the parents are almost as dependent (particularly psychologically, although also in many other ways) on their children as the children are on the parents. I wish to be quite clear about my meaning here. All people in both cultures have, of course, the need to be independent and the need to be dependent, the need to assert oneself as a unique person and the need to be taken care of or to take care of others. However, a person in the United States, particularly a man, is likely when faced with a problem to choose to emphasize his independence whereas a Japanese man would more often express his dependence.

Patterns of mutual dependence can be seen in many areas of Japanese culture and throughout the life span—from childhood to old age. In adulthood, for example, the Japanese person tends to stay with the same company, university, or hospital for the major part of his productive career. Moreover, in his relations with his supervisors he asks for and receives their advice on many matters which would be considered personal in the United States—problems in the family, marriage partners, financial difficulties and so forth. In contrast, the person in the United States is free to, and expects to, move from one job to another fairly often. The commitment in Japan to one channel of action—and hence the dependence on superiors in that channel—starts often in childhood with the fierce competition to be accepted by the correct kindergarten as a road to the correct primary school. This school leads to the appropriate university and later

to a favorable job. Again, this is in some contrast to the United States where, at least prior to college, children may, and frequently do, change from one school to another.

Mother-Child Closeness

Moving further back to the pre-school years, the patterns of sleeping and bathing during childhood are quite different in the two cultures. In Japan, the child sleeps in the same covers with his parents (usually his mother) for a long time (anywhere from two to five years), and also receives the personal care and stimulation that is involved in bathing together with his mother or grandmother for many years. In the United States, a middle class child tends to be given a separate bed, and often a separate room, fairly soon after birth, and he is bathed by his mother rather than the two of them taking a bath together. The difference in emphasis between the two cultures in these regards is one of "closeness," or perhaps in how such closeness is expressed. In Japan the relation between mother and child is for a long time almost a symbiotic one where words are not necessary since emotions are communicated in actions. In the United States there is less communication through direct action. There is also more emphasis on the independence of the child, and more use of words between mother and child to try to express feelings that are left unsatisfied.

In psychoanalytic terminology a distinction is sometimes made between "talking out" one's problems as a more acceptable solution than "acting out" one's problems. Neither of these terms applies very well to the relation of the Japanese mother and her child, nor to the normal relations of adult Japanese persons. Dr. Joseph Michaels of the Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, upon hearing the presentation of some of these materials, suggested the term "living out" for the relation of the Japanese mother and child. This seems an appropriate term as it avoids the negative implications of "acting out," and yet allows one to call attention to the large amount of physical contact that goes on for many years between mother and child.

Final Stage in Communication

With the partial shift of my interest out of the hospital and into the family and community, it seemed to me that I began to move into a *fourth stage* in my efforts to understand and to communicate in Japanese life. I would call this a movement from a predominantly rational-technical emphasis in communication to a more general process that included some ability to have emotional understanding of life in the culture.

Throughout the four stages in adjustment that I have sketched, has run the theme of a gradually increasing ability to deal more successfully with communications in actions and words on both rational-technical and emotional levels.

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My general point here is that for certain kinds of transnational communication to be effective, it is more important for the parties involved to know about the emotional feelings associated with everyday events and objects in each other's culture than for them to be deeply steeped in more formal knowledge as regards history, economics, and so forth. For example, in order to understand emotions in Japan, it is probably more important to know the feelings aroused by the smell of fresh *tatami* mats in the house than it is to know about the history of the Tokugawa period.

An "Expectable Map"

In an even more general way, what I want to call attention to here is the expectation that is built up, at both conscious and unconscious levels, in the mind of a person as he grows up in a culture, concerning (to paraphrase Hartmann's concept and apply it somewhat differently) an "average expectable set of interpersonal relations." Such an "expectable map" on interpersonal relations plays a large part in transnational communication. When the American psychiatrist visiting in Tokyo says to his young friend who is a Japanese psychiatrist, "Why don't you apply for a fellowship to study in the United States, and I'll help you," the American has in mind one set of expectations that includes the presumption that an individual can act relatively autonomously in attempting to translate his desires into reality. The young Japanese psychiatrist has in mind a different map of expectations which includes the mutual dependency of people on each other within a tight network of superior and subordinate relations. Because of this the American psychiatrist may be annoyed that his query calls forth embarrassment and evasion.

I think we are just at the beginning of our exploration of the interrelations between the rational-technical and the emotional meanings of words and actions in the communication process, and how these are influenced by the development from childhood through adulthood of culturally patterned maps of average expectable relations.

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Mass Communications and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflicts

KARL W. DEUTSCH

The basic hypothesis to be tested by the proposed research is relatively simple. Governments frequently—though not always—decide to go to war when they believe themselves to be constrained by the lack of any acceptable political alternative to war. Their political decision-makers picture themselves to be in a situation in which international or domestic political pressures or the exigencies of some economic or military situation seem to leave them no other choice but war. If this were indeed a frequent situation—and part of the proposed research would be designed to test this possibility—then it seems worthwhile to study the flow of information by which these images of an implacable objective situation or of an implacable enemy or of an implacable domestic public opinion are being built up in the minds of the decision-makers. We should try to find out to what extent these images are realistic, that is, to what extent they do correspond to objective factors beyond their control; but we should also ask to what extent the actual state of the attitudes of the foreign country or of inflamed domestic public opinion has itself been produced by the flow of the communication process by which the basic “mental set”—the background for political perceptions of friendship or hostility—is being built up and by the further communications process through which latent attitudes of friendship or hostility are transformed into acute perceptions of a present conflict.

Governments, of course, may find it expedient to encourage this process

Karl W. Deutsch, “Mass Communications and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1957), pp. 200–211. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in original.

in its early stages; they may even consider it essential, up to some unspecified point, in order to marshal public support for any effective but costly foreign policy. Robert Dahl has put the point clearly:

"The dilemma of the political leadership is this. Only if public opinion is fluid and undecided will the full range of theoretical alternatives be open; to the extent that public opinion hardens, alternatives are foreclosed. But because effectiveness in foreign policy depends finally upon the willingness of a nation to indulge in collective sacrifices, to rely on a fluid and indefinite public opinion is to substitute a reed for a sword."²

In order to be able to choose among several acceptable foreign-policy alternatives, any government must be able to command some significant portion of the income and manpower of its population. Dictatorships can compel a limited amount of such sacrifices in the face of public apathy; democracies will find it necessary, and even dictatorships find it expedient, to reduce or dispel this apathy by confronting their populations with the image of single, sharply defined enemy and a single, clear-cut conflict. Yet, as these tactics are pursued and attitudes harden in proportion to the sacrifices demanded and sustained, the resulting policies and cumulative actions may pass the "point of no return." What began as an expedient may end as a trap, with all exits barred save those leading to catastrophe.

If it could be shown how governments lose their freedom of decision in the late stages of this process, it should be possible to alert these governments themselves, as well as the international community, to this mounting danger in its early stages. Just as it is often possible for United Nations personnel to patrol the physical borders of two adjacent states and to report any troop movements across them or even any threatening troop concentrations in their close vicinity, so it should be theoretically possible for the United Nations or some other international agency, as well as for agencies of the governments themselves, to patrol the borders of the mind. It should be possible to say whether the amount of attention given to a specific conflict area or to the image of a particular "enemy" country is reaching the danger point, in the sense that continuing hostile attention in the mass media may tend to harden public opinion to such a degree as eventually to destroy the freedom of choice of the national government concerned.

In some cases all the relevant phases of this process may occur within a single country, relatively independently of what the other country does, so long as it does not capitulate to the demands presented to it. In other cases it may involve the interplay of two or more countries in which information originating in each country may tend to aggravate further the hostile images and attitudes in the other.

²Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950), p. 247.

In all such cases, however, if the underlying hypothesis should be confirmed, it should be possible to construct an "early warning system," in regard to the mass-communication aspects of interstate conflicts; and it should also be possible to suggest some ways in which the media of mass communication could themselves be used by the national governments, either spontaneously or under the influence of the international community, in such a way as to soften and blur again these images in the public mind to a point at which the governments of the states in conflict would regain their freedom of decision and with it continuing opportunities for procrastination and eventual adjustment.

* * * *

The Methods of Attack

The main methods to be used in this research would consist in a combination of four approaches.

The first would be an application of communication theory to the way in which attitudes and images are built up in the minds of political decision-makers in such a way as to make a later decision to go to war appear as highly probable or even inevitable if even moderate additional provocation should occur. This would involve primarily a study of memories, attitudes, and "mental sets" of political decision-makers and of the ways in which these are produced and preserved.

The second approach would concentrate upon the role of the media of mass communication and particularly the press and radio in this process. It would try to measure quantitatively the relative shares of attention allotted to particular interstate conflicts and issues in the general flow of news, the extent to which these are retained or forgotten by leaders, and the extent to which they have cumulative effects. This approach will involve some of the techniques of public opinion research, such as item counts, content analysis, and some audience research, including interview data.

The third approach would consist in a survey of cases of recent international conflict situations that threaten to become unmanageable and of other such situations that appear to have been contained or managed sufficiently to prevent an outbreak of war. One or two situations of each kind should then be further studied in somewhat greater depth. The survey methods to be used would involve mainly the assembly of published information on these cases in the fields of international relations, comparative government, and political and diplomatic history, as well as such data on comparative political behavior as may be available. For the cases to be studied in greater depth, more intensive research, visits to the field, and some highly selective interviewing should be added.

The fourth approach would consist in a legal evaluation of the methods of regulation and control which have been found to be effective in past

cases, together with such additional methods and techniques of control as might be suggested as potentially promising avenues of study. The evaluation would center around the problem of the legitimate international concern for peace and security, as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and its relation to the respect expressed in the same charter for the domestic jurisdiction of all states. More specific questions suggested by this approach will be set forth in the following sections of this paper.

Some Questions to be Asked

The basic questions for the proposed research are two: What are the characteristics of the decision to make war? and What are the characteristics of the flow of information to political decision-makers that lead to it?

These two broad questions can be broken down into a series of more specific questions. Each of these can be asked in two ways. Once it can be asked in general terms as a question about the nature of the general model of a decision-making process, such as might be obtained from a comparison of relevant decision situations at different countries. The other way of asking each question would be to apply it to a particular country in a particular conflict situation, so as to give fuller weight to the concrete and unique aspects of each case. In the course of the proposed research it is suggested that each of these questions should be asked whenever possible in both these ways. For reasons of convenience, an incomplete sample of such questions is listed here.

I. The decision-makers and their environment.

- a)* Who are the political decision-makers? What are their backgrounds, interests, memories, and levels of anxiety? What are their images of their own roles, of the role of the rest of the elite, and of the non-elite?
- b)* What are the elite groups other than the political decision-makers? And what are their conditions and images?
- c)* Who are the members of the non-elite or "mass," and what are their conditions and images?
- d)* Are there other politically relevant groups which are not covered adequately by the preceding division?
- e)* Are there any foreseeable changes in group strength and political activity? (Examples would be the growth of towns or of wage earners or of intellectuals or of unemployed; or increases in mass literacy, voting, and other forms of political participation.) What are their probable effects on the images and roles of the elite?

II. How are political decisions made?

- a)* What are the relative effects of current information versus past memories and stereotypes in the process of decision-making? What is the relative weight of current information versus past memories in the political

behavior of each of the following four groups: the governing elite, the non-political elite, the politically active members of the non-elite, and the politically passive members of the non-elite?

b) What is the stratification of opinion? Which groups appear to have a particularly large influence in the making of national political decisions? Are there other criteria for the strategic importance of particular groups in politics? (An example would be Daniel Lerner's identification of a group of "transitional Turks" in certain surveys.)⁶ Are there any impending shifts in the numbers or pressures of these strategic groups?

III. How large or prominent is the share of the media of mass communication in influencing the outcome of current decisions, as against other media, such as word of mouth? What is this share in regard to current information and to accumulated past information that is recalled in the decision process?

a) What are the effects of vicarious experience through communications vis-à-vis the effects of past experiences that are firsthand and personal? (Examples would be the relative effects of having read about the expulsion of a minority and having been expelled one's self or between having heard about unemployment and having lost a job one's self.)

IV. What is the effect of the non-elite on the making of decisions?

a) Do its expectations set an objective limit to what decision-makers can expect to "get away with"?

b) To what extent are the actions of the decision-makers influenced by their own images of the non-elite and of its supposed expectations?

V. What is the "hardening of opinion"—and how is it preserved for longer periods?

a) Can the point of this hardening be identified?

b) Is the process reversible? Can a hardened public attitude or "national will" be made flexible again? If so, how?

c) Do hardened political attitudes soften again with the mere passage of time? If so, how quickly?

d) If time does tend to soften hardened attitudes, what kinds of communication and machinery are needed to keep them hard? How much is needed and with how frequent repetitions?

VI. How does the hardening of attitudes occur?

a) What are the effects of a changed "mental set" upon the preservation and retention of specific conflict issues?

b) What are here the relative influences of the media of mass communication versus word-of-mouth communication?

⁶Cf. Daniel Lerner, *Modernizing the Middle East* (Cambridge: Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955).

VII. Within the mass-communication sector

a) What are the levels of attention devoted generally to a particular "enemy" country or people and specifically to some particular conflict issue (e.g., the Gaza strip), in terms of percentage of news space or radio time?

b) What is the ratio of favorable to unfavorable items in this news flow, and what is the share, in particular, of "human-interest" items with favorable connotations?

c) How specifically is attention focused on particular conflict areas or issues?

d) What are the expectations of violence, including war, and of its consequences, as presented by the media of mass communication? What are the images of the probability of war: likely or unlikely, soon or later? What are the images of the consequences of war: favorable or unfavorable?

e) What are competing foci, if any, of attention and of expectations, either favorable or unfavorable?

f) What part of the items in the news flow are directly traceable to the action of the government of the country concerned or to the actions of its officials? (Examples would be speeches by government leaders, administrative or military actions, official releases of documents, publicized diplomatic steps, etc.)

By segregating these items, it should be possible to divide the flow of news into an obviously "government-inspired" sector and a remnant of news and comment which would seem, at least on the face of it, to be the spontaneous expression of non-governmental opinion, including, of course, the opinions of the owners and editors of the newspapers themselves, as well as of the owners and personnel of the radio stations and newsreel companies if these should be independent of the government.

It is recognized, of course, that some of the opinion in the ostensibly private sector might also be indirectly inspired by the government, but it should be possible to find out how large a role in the hardening of attitudes in an interstate conflict is played by the news created by the government and by the organizations under its direct control.

g) What was the share of news created by the government in providing competing foci of attention, so as to draw away public attention from the interstate conflict or so as to suggest possibilities of negotiation and compromise?

Answers to these questions would have to be sought in part by a survey of existing public opinion research, and beyond this by actual sampling, item counts, and content analysis of the mass media themselves.

VIII. In the audience research and word-of-mouth sector

a) Repeat the questions under point VII by questionnaires or interviews, using open-ended questions to probe the attention space.

b) Recheck the relative influences of mass media and word-of-mouth communication (see Sec. VI).

c) Test for the durability of media-induced attitudes: How much hostility survives, and for how long, after a media campaign has ceased?

d) How applicable are the techniques of some of Louis Guttman's questionnaires, which combine research into the distribution of an attitude with an inquiry into the intensity, personal involvement, and closure of mind with which it is held?⁷

IX. Policy problems

a) How can the hardening of attitudes be prevented?

[1] By keeping low the level of attention to any particular conflict? [2] By keeping attention unfocused or split between different foci? [3] By increasing the proportion in the communications flow of favorable items to the other side or to the making of concessions? [4] By increasing the share of items deprecating violence, stressing the prospective sufferings of war, and the like? [5] By increasing the proportion of items stressing the continuation of relative national self-sufficiency and of national strength and indifference, regardless of the outcome of the particular conflict? (This would be the opposite of the nationalist's appeal of "all is lost unless...") [6] By any combination of two or more of the above techniques?

b) What are the possible motives for governments and elites to prevent the hardening of conflict attitudes? [1] What could be the nature and strength of their motives for preventing the hardening of mass expectations relating to some or all interstate conflicts? [2] What could be the nature and strength of their motives for preventing the hardening of such attitudes and expectations among the members of the elite and the personnel of the governments themselves?

c) How can the hardening of attitudes be reversed [1] Among the non elite? [2] Among the elite and governments themselves?

d) What would be the nature and strength of possible motivations of governments and elites to attempt such reversals?

e) What is the share of governments and of government-controlled agencies in producing a hardening of public attitudes?

f) What is the share of governments and of government-controlled agencies and of the news which they create or control in reversing these attitudes?

⁷ Cf. Louis Guttman, "The Principal Components of Scalable Attitudes," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld (ed.), *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), pp. 258-348.

g) What particular techniques appear to have been more effective for giving governments greater opportunities for reducing the pressure of their own domestic public opinion toward more inflexible attitudes in situations of interstate conflict?

Possible Methods To Seek Answers to These Questions

A good deal of information on the questions listed above is available in the large published literature of political science and public opinion research. One method for getting answers would consist in a critical survey of existing literature that would collect and evaluate the available information bearing on these aspects of political behavior. Such a survey might also suggest to what extent there are any uniformities in any political behavior that are limited to the politics of western Europe and the United States or to what extent uniformities are limited to countries of the Near East or of other non-European culture areas or else to what extent uniformities are limited to much smaller groups of more similar countries.

An essential corrective to the generalizing approach through a survey of existing public opinion research would consist in a survey of specific cases of conflict, giving full weight to the peculiarities of each area and country and to the possible uniqueness of each conflict situation.

The third approach would be the legal study of the extent to which international concern for the national management of mass media of communication in conflict situations has come to parallel—or could be made to parallel—the recognized international concern for the national management of armaments, military forces, and troop movements toward or across particular boundaries in situations of conflict. Such a legal study would require both a survey of relevant legal principles and a study of some relevant precedents in international law and international organization.

Finally, information on many of these questions could be added by means of the content analysis of some particular mass communication undertaken specifically for this study, preferably in connection with some of the case studies. To this could further be added information obtained through selective interviews in countries where these studies are made in connection with the current conflict situation. If additional funds should become available to the project, opinion polling and broader interview surveying could be added, depending on the final scale of the total study undertaken.

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
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